Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV14722, Date: 2024-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV14722 Hearing Date: January 10, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. LAD MB, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS Date:
January 10, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Moving Defendant”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff
The Court has considered the moving and opposition
papers. No reply papers were filed. Any reply papers were required to have been
filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing under California Code
of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the sale
of an allegedly defective vehicle (the “Vehicle”) that was manufactured by
Moving Defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint
(the “Complaint”) alleges: (1) violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act;
(2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) concealment; (4) negligent
misrepresentation; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) violations of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (7) failure to commence repairs within a
reasonable time and to complete them; (8) failure to promptly repurchase
product; (9) violations of the Unfair Competition Law; and (10) violation of
Vehicle Code section 11711.
On August 14, 2023, Moving Defendant filed a motion
to compel arbitration and stay the action (the “Motion”) on the grounds that
when Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle, she signed a sales agreement (the
“Contract”) containing a binding arbitration provision (the “Arbitration
Agreement”). Moving Defendant argues
that while it is not a party to the Contract, it is entitled to enforce the
Arbitration Agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and as a
third-party beneficiary.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE
Moving
Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to the existence of the
court document, but not to the truth of the matters stated therein. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General
Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)
DISCUSSION
The
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is to move the parties in an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible. (Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460
U.S. 1, 23.) The FAA is consistent with
the federal policy to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate. (Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 57.) A written agreement to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract. (CCP §
1281.) California law, like federal law,
favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. (Armendariz
v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83,
97.) On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate
that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitrate the controversy unless grounds exist not to compel arbitration. (CCP § 1281.2.)
Terms of the Arbitration
Agreement
In
support of the Motion, Moving Defendant provides evidence of the Contract
entered into by Plaintiff and the dealership, MB of Los Angeles (the “Dealership”)
on March 4, 2023 that is attached to the Complaint. (See Declaration of Ali Ameripour (“Ameripour
Decl.”) ¶ 2, Exhibit 1 at Ex. 1.)
The
Arbitration Agreement included in the Contract, provides in part:
“EITHER
YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND
NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL.
…
Any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including
the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the
arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit
application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with
third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be
resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.”
(Ameripour
Decl., Exhibit 1 at Ex. 1 p. 5.)
Under
the Contract, the terms “we” and “us” refer to the Dealer. (Id. at p. 1.)
Third-Party Beneficiary
Standing
Third
parties may enforce a contract with an arbitration provision where they are intended
third-party beneficiaries or are assigned rights under the contract. (Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes
Program, LLC (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 840, 856.) This right is predicated on the contracting
parties’ intent to benefit the third party and the third party should therefore
not be permitted to enforce promises not made for his benefit. (Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 541, 551-52.) To determine
whether a third party may bring a claim pursuant to a contract’s terms, courts carefully examine the express
provisions of the contract at issue, as well as all of the relevant
circumstances under which the contract was agreed to, in order to determine:
(1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from the contract; (2)
whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a
benefit to the third party; and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring
its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent
with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties. (Goonewardene v.
ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.)
All three elements must be satisfied to permit the third party’s action
to go forward. (Id.)
The Arbitration Agreement at issue in this case expressly
provides that the right to enforce its terms is vested in the signatories and
their successors, agents or assigns. Moving Defendant has not provided evidence
that it is a successor, agent or assign of the Dealership or that the Dealership
and Plaintiff intended for the Contract to classify Moving Defendant as
such. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Moving Defendant may not enforce the Arbitration Agreement as a third-party
beneficiary.
Equitable Estoppel
Equitable
estoppel applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing an
arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting
its claims against the non-signatory party.
(Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 218.) The signatory cannot seek to hold the
non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by an agreement containing an
arbitration provision and then deny the applicability of arbitration because
the defendant is a non-signatory. (Id.
at 220.) Under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, a non-signatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel
a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against
the non-signatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the
underlying contract obligations. (Boucher
v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271.) To determine whether the plaintiff’s claim is
founded on or intimately connected with the sales contract, a court examines
the facts of the operative complaint. (Felisilda
v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 496 (“Felisilda”).)
Moving Defendant argues that it is entitled to enforce
the Arbitration Agreement under Felisilda because Plaintiff’s claims are
intimately connected with the Contract, even if they are rooted in the
manufacturer’s warranty. In Felisilda,
the plaintiffs brought breach of warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Act
against a car dealership and manufacturer. (Felisilda, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at 489.)
The dealership moved to compel arbitration based on the sales contract
and the manufacturer filed a notice of non-opposition to the dealership’s
motion. (Id.) The
trial court ordered the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against both the
dealership and the manufacturer. (Id.) On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they
were improperly compelled to arbitrate their claims against the
non-signatory manufacturer, but the Court of Appeal rejected their
argument, finding that the manufacturer was entitled to compel
arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory because the sales contract was
the source of the warranties underlying the lawsuit. (Id. at 496-97.)
This matter can be distinguished from Felisilda. Significantly, in Felisilda, the
non-signatory manufacturer and the seller were parties to the lawsuit at
the time the motion to compel arbitration was filed and granted. Here, the Dealer is not a party to the
action. The distinction is significant
because the language of the Arbitration Agreement provides that third-party
disputes arising out of obligations under the Contract shall be subject to
arbitration at the election of Plaintiff or the Dealer. The plain language of the Arbitration
Agreement states that the decision to arbitrate claims with third party
non-signatories belongs to the signatories.
As Plaintiff opposes arbitration and Moving Defendant is not a party to
the Contract, there are no signatories asserting their contractual right to
have this matter proceed in arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Felisilda does not enable Moving
Defendant to enforce the Arbitration Agreement under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. The Court finds that the facts
of Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 are analogous to
the facts of this case and adopts the reasoning set forth by the Second
District Court of Appeal rejecting Felisilda.
The Court therefore DENIES the Motion.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org
as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at
www.lacourt.org. If the department does
not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion
will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 10th day of January 2024
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |