Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV20839, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20839    Hearing Date: December 14, 2023    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (“Simplified”) and J.D. Cuzzolina (“Cuzzolina”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff

The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges intentional interference with contractual relations.

In relevant part, the Complaint alleges: On or about May 14, 2021, Simplified obtained a judgment against Tricap International, LLC (“Tricap”) (the “Tricap Judgment”).  (Complaint ¶¶ 9-11.)  Simplified and Cuzzolina, acting as Simplified’s attorney, engaged in aggressive collection activities in an attempt to collect the Tricap Judgment.  (Complaint ¶ 11.)  On or about August 28, 2023, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department arrived at the site of Plaintiff’s business operations (the “Property”) to enforce a lien on Tricap property based on Cuzzolina’s representation that Tricap operated out of the Property.  (Complaint ¶ 12.)  Cuzzolina therafter contacted Plaintiff and offered to stay the lien enforcement efforts if Plaintiff agreed to pay a portion of the Tricap Judgment.  (Complaint ¶ 15.)

On November 2, 2023, Moving Defendants filed a motion to strike (the “Motion”) on the ground that the conduct underlying the challenged allegations of the Complaint arise from Moving Defendants’ rights under the anti-SLAPP statute.  

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of J.D. Cuzzolina (“Cuzzolina Decl.”) are OVERRULED.

. 

DISCUSSION

Under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 425.16, a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.  (CCP § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

 The court must engage in a two-step analysis under when evaluating anti-SLAPP motions.  (Rivera v.  First DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709, 714.)  First, the court must decide whether the moving party has met the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the moving party’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.  (Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 622.)  Under CCP section 425.16, subdivision (e), acts in furtherance of a defendant’s furtherance include:

1.     Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

2.     Any written or oral statement in writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;

3.     Any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and

4.     Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (CCP § 425.15, subd. (e)(1)-(4).)

Once it has been determined that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the action.  (Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 843.)  If the plaintiff does so, the motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute must be denied.  (Id.)  Anti-SLAPP motions must be supported (and opposed) by declarations stating facts upon which the liability or defense is based.  (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.) 

            The Motion argues that the conduct alleged in the Complaint arises out of Moving Defendants’ attempt to satisfy the Tricap Judgment, which falls within CCP section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4).

Protected Activity

Statements made in litigation, or in connection with litigation, are protected by CCP section 425.16.  (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 803.)  In making a prima facie showing, however, it is not enough to establish that the action was filed in response to or in retaliation for a party's exercise of the right to petition.  (Id. at 804.)  Rather, the claim must be based on the protected petitioning activity.  (Id.)  When a cause of action involves both protected and unprotected activity, the court looks to the gravamen of the claim to determine if the claim is a SLAPP.  (Id.)  Protected conduct which is merely incidental to the claim does not fall within the ambit of CCP section 425.16.  (Id.)  Determining the gravamen of the claims requires examination of the specific acts of alleged wrongdoing and not just the form of the claim.  (Id.)

Both CCP section 425.16 and the litigation privilege are construed broadly, to protect the right of litigants to the utmost freedom of access to the courts without the fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.  (Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1055.)  Thus, it has been established for well over a century that a communication is absolutely immune from any tort liability if it has “some relation” to judicial proceedings.  (Id.)  Where the cause of action is based on a communicative act, the litigation privilege extends to those noncommunicative actions which are necessarily related to that communicative act.  (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1052.)  

            The gravamen of the claim in the Complaint—that the Sheriff’s execution of the lien interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual relationships—arises out of Cuzzolino’s alleged communications regarding collecting the Tripart Judgment.  This conduct falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.  (See O’Neil-Rosales v. Citybank (South Dakota N.A.) (2017 11Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6.)  The Court therefore finds that Moving Defendants have satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. 

Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

In the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court employs a summary-judgment-like procedure, accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendant’s evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law.  (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.)  In other words, the court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.  (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)  The court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has “minimal merit” to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.  (Id.)  The plaintiff is required to present facts which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.  (CCP § 425.16, subd. (b); Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 150-51.)  

The elements of intentional interference with contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.  (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) 

Plaintiff does not present evidence of its contracts with third-parties or Moving Defendants’ knowledge of these contracts.  The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial probability of succeeding on the merits of its claim.  The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. 

  Dated this 14th day of December 2023