Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV21443, Date: 2024-12-23 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants B&B Stables; Robert D. Buell and Mary D. Buell (“Ms. Buell”), (collectively, “Defendants”)

This is a civil rights and discrimination action in which Plaintiff alleges she was treated differently based on her race and was evicted from a stable despite tendering full monthly payment of her stable rent. Plaintiff filed this action on September 6, 2023. On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleging cause of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Rights [Unruh Act, Civil Code § 51]; (2) Violation of the Business and Professions Code [§17200, et seq.]; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On October 1, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer (the “Demurrer) to each of the four causes of action stated in the FAC on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, are uncertain and/or are barred by the statute of limitations.

On December 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Demurrer (the “Opposition”). On December 16, 2024, Defendants filed a reply (the “Reply”).

Defendants object to the Declaration of Ronda Jones which was filed in support of Plaintiff’s Opposition.

Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED. The defects in a complaint are not properly cured by a declaration in opposition to a demurrer. (Allred v. Bekins Wide World Van Services (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 984, 993.)

The Court can only take judicial notice of the matters specified under Evidence Code section 452 or required under Evidence Code section 451. (Evidence Code (“Evid. Code”), §§ 450-452.)

To the extent an item is judicially noticeable, the Court may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

Pursuant to Defendants’ request, the Court takes judicial notice of the California Secretary of State filing of the Articles of Organization for Young Voices Making Choices LLC. (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) No. 5; Evid. Code 452 subd. (h).) The Court takes judicial notice only to the extent of the document’s existence.

The Court does not take judicial notice of Defendants’ remaining requests or of Plaintiff’s request, because none of the matters are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. (see Defendants’ RJN Nos. 1-4; Plaintiff’s RJN; Evid. Code §§ 451-452.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].)

Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

A discrimination claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”) must be brought within two years of the alleged discrimination. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 760; Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 335.1.) Plaintiff alleges that she began stabling her horse with Defendants in June 2020 and was wrongfully evicted “within another few weeks” or “relatively soon after” May 2021. (FAC ¶¶ 10, 16, 19, 22) Plaintiff filed this action on September 6, 2023. Although the exact date of Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful eviction is not clear, from the face of the FAC, it appears that it was more than two years prior to Plaintiff filing this action. Thus, Plaintiff’s UCRA cause of action pertaining to alleged discrimination during her tenancy at the stables appears to be barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED, with thirty days leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action – Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.

The Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Business and Professions Code (“Bus. & Prof. Code”) § 17200; Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610.) “An unlawful business practice or act is an act or practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) A violation of other laws is deemed independently actionable under the UCL. (Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.)

Plaintiff states that Defendants’ violations of the UCRA “serve as the borrowed statute to which Plaintiff brings forth her UCL claim.” (Opp. p. 12:21-24.) Thus, Plaintiff must establish each element of the UCRA in order to state facts sufficient to allege her UCL claim.

The necessary elements for a discrimination claim under the UCRA are: (1) that the defendant was a business establishment; (2) that the defendant intentionally denied the plaintiff full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services; and (3) that the denial was based on the plaintiff’s sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation. (Civil Code (“Civ. Code”), § 51 subd. (b); Payne v. Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 729, 746.)

Plaintiff alleges that during her initial tour of the stables, Ms. Buell stated that she has “an affinity toward Blacks” which Plaintiff argues was said “to conceal what was in fact an animus toward African-Americans.” (FAC ¶ 11) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ “animus toward African-Americans was demonstrated in its discriminatory naming of different areas of the stables to reflect racially stereotypical neighborhoods according to race” and that she and her daughter were told they had to wash their horses in the “South Central” wash area of the stables. (FAC ¶¶ 12-14) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “did not like the fact that [Plaintiff], an African-American woman, now owned the most valuable horse at B&B and sought to taker her horse and end her tenancy at B&B.” (FAC ¶ 18) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants told Plaintiff’s daughter that they were in ‘trouble’ and would be evicted soon and that they were subsequently wrongfully evicted. (FAC ¶¶ 19, 22)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that this is sufficient to show that Defendants engaged in discrimination. Plaintiff does not allege that other tenants who are similarly situated but are not African-American were told they could use the other wash areas of the stable or were otherwise treated differently. As to Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants did not like that she owned ‘the most valuable horse at B&B’ and implied that she should not be able to afford a new truck because of her race, this is insufficient to constitute actionable discrimination under the UCRA. Plaintiff does not show that her eviction from the stables was on account of her race. Plaintiffs merely allege, in a conclusory way, that her eviction from the stables was motivated by Defendants’ perception of her race. This, without more, is insufficient to state a UCRA cause of action, and thus, her UCL claim fails as well.

Moreover, if the UCRA claim is barred by the statute of limitations, because it is the sole basis for the alleged UCL claim, this UCL claim lacks an actionable basis.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED, with thirty days leave to amend.

“To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98.) “If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 229, 307.) “A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms – set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference – or by its legal effect. [Citations.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) “The elements of a breach of oral contract are the same as those for breach of a written contract. [Citations.]” (Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 437, 453.

Plaintiff states that “around June 2020, [she] entered into a contract with Defendants to stable her and her daughter’s horses at B&B Stables for a set monthly rate.” (FAC ¶ 34) Plaintiff neither attaches a copy of this contract to the FAC nor sets out the substance of the contract’s relative terms in the FAC. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to submit the alleged contract through her request for judicial notice, the Court notes that this is procedurally improper, as judicial notice is limited to matters explicitly identified in the Evidence Code, which does not include disputed contracts. The Court further notes that even had the alleged contract been properly before the Court, the Court is not convinced that it is evidence of the necessary elements of an enforceable contract or that the alleged breach constitutes an enforceable breach of that alleged contract.

Thus, among other things, Plaintiff’s breach of contract cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action and is impermissibly vague and uncertain, leaving Defendants unable to determine which specific provisions or terms of the contract are alleged to have been breached.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED, with thirty days leave to amend.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

The actions of Defendants, as summarized above, fail to meet the threshold of extreme or outrageous conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented facts demonstrating that Defendants acted with the intent to cause emotional distress or with reckless disregard for the likelihood of causing such distress. Additionally, Plaintiff has only made conclusory assertions, without supporting facts, that she has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.

In addition, the Court notes that the statute of limitations for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years (CCP §335.1) and therefore it appears that this cause of action may also be barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED, with thirty days leave to amend.

Defendants’ Demurrer to the FAC’s first through fourth causes of action are SUSTAINED with thirty days leave to amend.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court