Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 23STCV22930, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTIES: (1) Defendant Mina Sirkin Esq. (“Defendant Sirkin”); and (2) Defendant George Mark Santa-Anna, Esq. (“Defendant Santa-Anna”) (sometimes collectively, “Defendants”)

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were due to be filed at least nine (9) court days before the hearing on the motion.

This is an action arising from an alleged oral agreement for Plaintiff Michelle Briones to receive an inheritance from the Estate of Maris Knauts. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants Sirkin, Santa-Anna and DOES 1 to 100, for Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud) pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1710 et seq.

Defendant Sirkin and Defendant Santa-Anna each filed a special motion to strike the Complaint (the “Anti-SLAPP Motion”). No opposition has been filed. (Code Civ. Proc. Section 1005(b).)

Under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 425.16, subdivision (b), “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b).)”

Such a motion involves a two-step analysis, in which the court must first determine whether a movant “has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity ...” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 712 (quoting Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67).) If the court so finds, it must then examine whether the respondent has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 712.) In determining whether the respondent has carried this burden, the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2); see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 425.16, subdivision (f), “The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (f).)

The Court finds that both Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motions are timely. Although the Complaint was filed on September 21, 2023, Plaintiff Briones did not file a summons on the complaint on that date. Furthermore, when Plaintiff filed the summons on the complaint on September 26, 2023, it did not include a proof of service, and no proof of services has been filed since that date. Nonetheless, Defendants each filed a notice of acknowledgement and receipt on November 29, 2023. Both Defendants filed their Anti-SLAPP motion on December 29 2023, which is thirty (30) days after their notices of acknowledgement and receipt were filed. Thus, Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motions will be considered on the merits.

Both Defendants move to specially strike Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff Briones’ claims against Defendants fall squarely within the reach of the Anti-SLAPP statute because they are based on Defendant Santa-Anna’s litigating of and Defendant Sirkin’s filing and litigating of an underlying conservatorship action on behalf of their respective clients, Rouget Briones and Shoushan Movsesian; (2) Plaintiff cannot meet her responsive burden of establishing the probability of prevailing on her claims against Defendants because Plaintiff’s sole claim for intentional misrepresentation is barred by the three-year statute of limitations per Code of Civil Procedure, Section 338, subdivision (d); and (3) Plaintiff will be unable to prove the elements constituting a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation. Defendant Sirkin’s Anti-SLAPP motion is also based upon his position that Plaintiff’s claim against him is barred by California’s absolute litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code, Section 47, subdivision (b).

An act in furtherance of a person's right to petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution includes “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

Defendant Sirkin contends Plaintiff’s claims are based upon Defendant Sirkin’s representation of Ms. Movsesian and the alleged representation of Rouget Briones, despite the fact that Mr. Briones was not Defendant Sirkin’s client. Defendant Sirkin further argues it is well settled that claims by non-clients arise from petitioning activity because they are based upon statements and conduct during the litigation and are subject to protections set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, Section 425.16. (Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 158.) Moreover, Defendant Sirkin asserts beginning in May 2018, appearing on behalf of her client Ms. Movsesian, she began filing papers in the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts to establish Ms. Movsesian as conservator of the Estate of Maris Knauts and Ms. Movsesian’s nominee, Rouget Briones, as conservator of the person of Maris Knauts. Additionally, Defendant Sirkin contends she continued to represent Ms. Movsesian in the conservatorship action until its conclusion in August 2021 and in the related matter of the Estate of Maris Knauts. As such, Defendant Sirkin’s argues Plaintiff Briones’ claims clearly arise from Defendant Sirkin’s constitutionally protected activity taken on behalf of her client Ms. Movsesian. Lastly, Defendant Sirkin argues the rule would still apply if she was hired by Rouget Briones because all her falsely alleged actions including initial communications concerning her ability to perform certain tasks would have been taken in furtherance of her purported representation of Rouget Briones in the conservatorship action.

Plaintiff Briones’ Complaint alleges that “the subject matter of the lawsuit involves the Plaintiffs’ claim to the inheritance from the Estate of Maris Knauts.” (Compl., ¶¶ 5, 10, 29; Mtn., p. 10:26-27.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendant Sirkin introduced Plaintiff Briones to Ms. Movsesian and “[s]oon thereafter the plan to disinherit Briones unfolded, and instead of drafting the trust and/or will, in May of 2018, a petition to conserve Knauts was filed by Briones and Movsesian. The petition was filed by Defendant Sirkin, whereby the petition sought to appoint Briones as the conservator of the person of Knauts, and Movsesian to be appointed conservator of the estate of Knauts.” (Compl., ¶ 21; Mtn. p. 10:27-28, 11:1.) The Complaint further alleges that “Santa-Anna and Defendant Sirkin conspired to deliberately misrepresent to Briones the purpose of the conservatorship and whether Knauts contained the legal capacity to draft a will and/or trust.” (Compl., ¶ 26; Mtn. p. 10:27-28, 11:1.) The Complaint also alleges that “in 2015, Knauts made an oral agreement with Briones that if Briones agreed to assist Knauts with daily needs, that Knauts would leave the entirety of his estate to Briones.” (Compl., ¶ 16; Mtn. p. 11:2-4.)

The Complaint also alleges that “In late 2017 and/or early part of 2018, the Administrator solicited Defendant Sirkin. There was a telephone conversation whereby Defendant Sirkin informed Plaintiff and the Administrator that she could draft the necessary paperwork to establish Knauts’ wishes to have Briones inherit his estate.” (Compl., ¶¶ 17-19; Mtn. p. 11:4-7.) The Complaint then alleges that “Unbeknownst to Briones, Movsesian was a professional fiduciary. However, Briones was under the impression she was an attorney in Defendant Sirkin’s office.” (Compl., ¶ 20; Mtn. p. 11:8-9.)

Finally, the Complaint alleges that “Each of the Defendants failed to explain to Briones that it was not possible after the establishment of the conservatorship that Knauts would have the legal capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of a will and/or trust. But yet, seemingly as a tactic to divert Briones’ attention away from those issues, Defendant Santa~-Anna continued to represent Briones to only be appointed the conservator of the person of Knauts, and not the estate, whereby Briones would have the authority to act upon Knauts best interests regarding his financial decision.” (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 26; Mtn. p. 11:9-12.)

“The mere fact that a plaintiff has filed an action after a defendant has engaged in some protected activity does not mean that the plaintiff's action arose from that activity. The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be read to mean that any claim asserted in an action which arguably was filed in retaliation for the exercise of speech or petition rights falls under section 425.16, whether or not the claim is based on conduct in exercise of those rights." Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002), 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1398 (internal citations and quotations omitted).)

This is not the case here. Plaintiff Briones’ claims are predicated on Defendant Sirkin’s conduct throughout the filing and litigation of the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts leading to her prevailing in the probate action. Furthermore, Defendant Sirkin cites to several allegations from the Complaint that concern statements, communications, and actions taken by Defendant Sirkin in furtherance of the probate action. These allegations form the basis of Plaintiff Briones’ claim for intentional misrepresentation (fraud) and are not merely incidental to unprotected conduct, if any, that are alleged in the Complaint. (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672 (“where a cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the protected conduct is ‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected conduct.”); Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 414 (“if the allegations of protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, the mere mention of the protected activity does not subject the cause of action to an anti-SLAPP motion.”)

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Sirkin has made a prima facie showing that the claims in the Complaint arise from protected speech or activity and that the Anti-SLAPP statute does apply.

Defendant Santa-Anna contends his alleged conduct was taken on behalf of his client, Rouget Briones, and is therefore constitutionally protected litigation-related activity. Specifically, Defendant Santa-Anna contends Mr. Briones retained him for the purpose of opposing the Public Guardian of Los Angeles County’s competing petition to be appointed conservator of the estate and person of Mr. Knauts. Defendant Santa-Anna asserts he filed papers in the conservatorship action petitioning on behalf of Mr. Briones as well as objected to the Public Guardian’s competing petition. Furthermore, Defendant Santa-Anna asserts he attended a court-ordered mediation on behalf of Mr. Briones and appeared at post-mediation hearings until his withdrawal from the matter in August 2019.

Plaintiff Briones’ Complaint alleges that “the subject matter of the lawsuit involves the Plaintiffs’ claim to the inheritance from the Estate of Maris Knauts.” (Compl., ¶¶ 5, 10, 29; Mtn., p. 10:26-27.) The Complaint further alleges that “Santa-Anna and Defendant Sirkin conspired to deliberately misrepresent to Briones the purpose of the conservatorship and whether Knauts contained the legal capacity to draft a will and/or trust” and devised a “plan to disinherit Briones….” (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 26; Mtn. p. 10:27-28, 11:1.) The Complaint also alleges that “in 2015, Knauts made an oral agreement with Briones that if Briones agreed to assist Knauts with daily needs, that Knauts would leave the entirety of his estate to Briones.” (Compl., ¶ 16; Mtn. p. 11:2-4.) The Complaint also alleges that “In late 2017 and/or early part of 2018, the Administrator solicited Defendant Sirkin. There was a telephone conversation whereby Defendant Sirkin informed Plaintiff and the Administrator that she could draft the necessary paperwork to establish Knauts’ wishes to have Briones inherit his estate.” (Compl., ¶¶ 17-19; Mtn. p. 11:4-7.) The Complaint then alleges that “Unbeknownst to Briones, Movsesian was a professional fiduciary. However, Briones was under the impression she was an attorney in Defendant Sirkin’s office.” (Compl., ¶ 20; Mtn. p. 11:8-9.) Moreover, the Complaint alleges that “Each of the Defendants failed to explain to Briones that it was not possible after the establishment of the conservatorship that Knauts would have the legal capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of a will and/or trust. But yet, seemingly as a tactic to divert Briones’ attention away from those issues, Defendant Santa~-Anna continued to represent Briones to only be appointed the conservator of the person of Knauts, and not the estate, whereby Briones would have the authority to act upon Knauts best interests regarding his financial decision.” (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 26; Mtn. p. 11:9-12.) Finally, the Complaint alleges “Defendant Santa-Anna made several filings on behalf of Briones primarily to respond to objections to Briones’ petition to be appointed conservator of the person of Knauts. However, upon information and belief, and upon that basis, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant never informed Briones that his desire to inherit the estate of Knauts was impossible after Knauts had been conserved.” (Compl., ¶ 27; Mtn. p. 13:12-14.)

This instant case is distinguishable. Although the allegations regarding Defendant Santa-Anna’s conduct are limited, Plaintiff Briones’ claim for intentional misrepresentation against Defendant Santa-Anna are directly based upon Defendant Santa-Anna’s conduct throughout the filing of the competing petition in the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts probate action and litigation of that probate case until his withdrawal as Mr. Briones’ counsel. Further, Defendant Santa-Anna cites to multiple allegations of Defendant Santa-Anna’s actions taken in furtherance of the probate case on behalf of Mr. Briones. As such, these allegations are not merely incidental to unprotected conduct, if any, that are alleged in the Complaint. (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672 (“where a cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the protected conduct is ‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected conduct.”); Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 414 (“if the allegations of protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, the mere mention of the protected activity does not subject the cause of action to an anti-SLAPP motion.”)

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Santa-Anna has also made a threshold showing that the claims in the Complaint arise from protected speech or activity and that the Anti-SLAPP statute does apply.

The Court now turns to whether Plaintiff Briones has a reasonable probability of prevailing on the claims in the Complaint.

On the second component of the analysis, courts employ a “summary-judgment-like” procedure, “accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendant’s evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law.” (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.) In other words, the court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. The court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has “minimal merit” to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 291.)

Defendant Sirkin argues this present action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, Section 338, subdivision (d), which provides “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” shall be brought within three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) Further, “[t]he cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Id.) Defendant Sirkin contends Plaintiff Briones brings this action as Administrator on behalf of her father, Rouget Briones’ estate, so he is the aggrieved party and the statute of limitations began to accrue when Mr. Briones’ reasonably could have discovered the alleged fraud occurred. As such, Defendant Sirkin argues the statute of limitations began to run on or before August 12, 2019, the date Mr. Briones first alleged a conspiracy between Defendant Sirkin and Defendant Santa-Anna to disinherit him from Maris Knauts’ estate in his objection to the petition authorizing sale of Maris Knauts’ home. Defendant Sirkin further argues the statute of limitations for the intentional misrepresentation cause of action expired August 2022 and this action was filed in September 2023.

Defendant Sirkin also contends Plaintiff Briones’ claim for intentional misrepresentation is barred by California’s absolute litigation privilege under Civil Code, Section 47, subdivision (b), which provides “a privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b); Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322 (“the privilege is an absolute privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution”).)

Defendant Sirkin argues Plaintiff Briones’ claims against her stem from her conduct in the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts taken on behalf of her client, Ms. Movsesian. Defendant Sirkin contends throughout the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts, she expressly indicated to Mr. Briones and to the Court in the presence of Mr. Briones that she solely represented Ms. Movsesian. Defendant Sirkin thus asserts all claims against her clearly arise from her representation of Ms. Movsesian alone in her attempt to establish Ms. Movsesian as conservator of the state of Maris Knauts and falls within the ambit of the absolute litigation privilege.

Moreover, Defendant Sirkin argues Plaintiff Briones’ will be unable to set forth sufficient evidence demonstrating a probability it can satisfy the elements required to prove intentional misrepresentation. Defendant Sirkin contends Plaintiff Briones set forth little evidence or factual support for the allegations that Defendant Sirkin told Mr. Briones she would draft a will and/or trust or that she told Mr. Briones that Ms. Movsesian was an attorney in her office. Furthermore, Defendant Sirkin asserts that Mr. Rouget signed and acknowledged that Ms. Movsesian was a professional fiduciary and not an attorney. Additionally, Defendant Sirkin asserts Plaintiff Briones’ allegations that Defendant Sirkin forged Mr. Briones’ signature are completely baseless and contradicted by Mr. Briones’ own statement in his declaration to the motion to disqualify Defendant Sirkin where he admits that he signed the nomination attachment including the non-representation acknowledgement himself. Defendant Sirkin argues the evidence also suggests that Mr. Briones was involved throughout the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts by attending multiple court hearings regarding appointment of the conservator, participated at mediation where the parties agreed that Mr. Briones would withdraw his petition and Ms. Movsesian would be appointed conservator of the person and estate of Maris Knauts. Lastly, Defendant Sirkin argues Plaintiff Briones’ damages are completely speculative and appear to be based on the benefit of the bargain. Defendant Sirkin contends it is completely speculative as to whether Maris Knauts would have executed such a will/trust leaving his assets to Mr. Briones upon his death because Maris Knauts told his Attorney Kirakosian he wanted nothing to do with Mr. Briones. Also, the purported holographic will filed in probate in a petition by Plaintiff Briones as evidence of Mr. Knauts’ intention to leave his estate to Mr. Briones, which misspelled Maris Knauts name was rejected by the probate court.

Although Plaintiff Briones did not filed an opposition, the Court may consider the pleadings in determining whether Plaintiff Briones has carried her burden of proving she has a probability of prevailing on the claim of intentional misrepresentation against Defendant Sirkin. First, Plaintiff Briones’ Complaint does allege that she was unaware of the purported fraud until 2022. (Compl., ¶ 30.) Plaintiff Briones proffers no evidence to support this claim. Even if Plaintiff Briones did offer such evidence, it is clear from the nature of this lawsuit that the aggrieved party for purposes of this action for fraud is Plaintiff Briones’ father, Rouget Briones and Plaintiff Briones has not submitted any evidence to refute or rebut Defendant Sirkin’s evidence that Mr. Briones was aware of this alleged fraud in 2019.

Plaintiff Briones also does not proffer any evidence to support that Civil Code, Section 47, subdivision (b) does not apply to Defendant Sirkin in this instant action. Finally, Plaintiff Briones submits the attachment 3(c) for the nomination of Ms. Movsesian as conservator of the estate of Maris Knauts purported to have Mr. Briones’ forged signature but presents no other evidence of documents with his alleged true signature or statements by Mr. Briones denouncing that he signed the purported nomination to support her claim that this document is forged. Therefore, Plaintiff Briones has not established her sole claim for intentional misrepresentation has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.

Defendant Santa-Anna argues Plaintiff Briones cannot meet her burden because she will not be able to prove the elements required to sustain an intentional misrepresentation cause of action. Defendant Santa-Anna further argues even if Plaintiff Briones can prove the elements required for an intentional misrepresentation cause of action, this present action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 338, subdivision (d).

First, Defendant Santa-Anna contends Plaintiff Briones’ Complaint is completely void of facts regarding any fraudulent representation made by him beyond the vague and conclusory allegations set forth in paragraph 26. Defendant Santa-Anna further contends his representation of Mr. Briones was solely limited to petitioning on behalf of Mr. Briones to establish him as conservator of the person of Mr. Knauts and oppose the Public Guardian’s competing petition. As such, Defendant Santa-Anna argues he filed the pleadings on behalf of Mr. Briones and appeared at the court-ordered mediation with Mr. Briones, wherein the parties agreed that Ms. Movsesian would be conservator of the person and estate of Mr. Knauts. Moreover, Defendant Santa-Anna argues the few remaining allegations against him, i.e., that Defendant Santa-Anna continued to represent Mr. Briones “as a tactic to divert Briones’ attention away from those issues” completely fail to allege a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation. Defendant Santa-Anna also argues any reliance by Mr. Briones with respect to any alleged misrepresentation would have been unreasonable because Mr. Briones was involved throughout the Conservatorship of Maris Knauts action. Defendant Santa-Anna contends Mr. Briones attended multiple court hearings regarding the appointment of the conservator, participated at the mediation where the parties agreed that Mr. Briones would withdraw his petition and that Ms. Movsesian would be appointed conservator of the person and estate of Maris Knauts.

Lastly, Defendant Santa-Anna argues Plaintiff Briones’ damages are completely speculative and appear to seek the benefit of the bargain. Defendant Santa-Anna contends this is completely speculative as to whether Maris Knauts would have executed such a will/trust leaving his assets to Mr. Briones upon his death because Maris Knauts told his Attorney Kirakosian he wanted nothing to do with Mr. Briones. Defendant Santa-Anna also asserts the purported holographic will filed in probate in a petition by Plaintiff Briones as evidence of Mr. Knauts’ intention to leave his estate to Mr. Briones, which misspelled Maris Knauts name was rejected by the probate court.

Next, Defendant Santa-Anna argues this present action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, Section 338, subdivision (d), which provides “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” shall be brought within three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) Further, “[t]he cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Id.) Defendant Santa-Anna asserts Plaintiff Briones brings this action as Administrator on behalf of her father, Rouget Briones’ estate, so he is the aggrieved party and the statute of limitations began to accrue when Mr. Briones’ reasonably could have discovered the alleged fraud occurred. Defendant Santa-Anna thus argues the statute of limitations began to run on or before August 12, 2019, the date Mr. Briones first alleged a conspiracy between Defendant Sirkin and Defendant Santa-Anna to disinherit him from Maris Knauts’ estate in his objection to the petition authorizing sale of Maris Knauts’ home. Finally, Defendant Santa-Anna contends the statute of limitations for the intentional misrepresentation cause of action expired August 2022 and this action was filed in September 2023.

Although Plaintiff Briones did not filed an opposition, the Court may consider the pleadings in determining whether Plaintiff Briones has carried her burden of proving she has a probability of prevailing on the claim of intentional misrepresentation against Defendant Santa-Anna. Here, Plaintiff Briones does allege in her Complaint that she was unaware of the purported fraud until sometime in 2022. (Compl., ¶ 30.) Plaintiff Briones does not however submit any evidence to support this claim. It is also clear from the nature of this instant lawsuit that the actual aggrieved party for purposes of this action for fraud is Plaintiff Briones’ father, Rouget Briones and Plaintiff Briones has not submitted any evidence to refute or rebut Defendant Santa-Anna’s evidence that Mr. Briones was aware of this alleged fraud in 2019.

In addition, Plaintiff Briones does not proffer any evidence besides the attachment 3(c) to support the claim of intentional misrepresentation against Defendant Santa-Anna. While the attachment 3(c) for the nomination of Ms. Movsesian as conservator of the estate of Maris Knauts submitted by Plaintiff Briones in support of the allegation that Mr. Briones’ signature was forged, Plaintiff Briones presents no evidence of documents with his alleged true signature or statements by Mr. Briones denouncing that he signed the purported nomination to refute Defendant Santa-Anna’s evidence that Mr. Briones acknowledged that he signed this document. Therefore, Plaintiff Briones has not established that her sole claim for intentional misrepresentation has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.

The Court therefore GRANTS both Defendant Sirkin’s and Defendant Santa-Anna’s special motions to strike.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court