Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 23STCV30598, Date: 2024-10-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30598 Hearing Date: October 11, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
AND RELATED
CROSS-ACTIONS.
______________________________________
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
STEVEN MAMAN (“Defendant”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
MVMJ INVESTMENTS, LLC (“Plaintiff”)
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from the alleged breach of
a lease agreement concerning real property located at 2430 Porter Street, Los Angeles,
California 90021 (the “Premises”). The
operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts the following causes of
action: (1) breach of lease – failure to pay rent; (2) breach of lease – damage
to premises; (3) breach of guaranty; and (4) waste.
On June 28, 2024, Defendant filed
the instant Motion to Strike Punitive Damages (the “Motion”). Plaintiff filed an opposition on September
16, 2024, and Defendant filed a reply on September 18, 2024.
MEET AND CONFER
The meet and confer
requirement has been met.
DISCUSSION
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of
any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a
court rule, or an order of the court. (Id.,
§ 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to
strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has
not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear
on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)
Here, Defendant moves to strike portions of
Plaintiff’s FAC pertaining to punitive damages and related references.
Exemplary/Punitive Damages
Civil
Code § 3294(a) authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract
cases “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice…”).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to
cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and
conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal.,
Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct
subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the
person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to
deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
Here,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are premised mainly on an alleged breach
of a lease agreement. It is well-settled
under California law that punitive damages are not available for mere breaches
of contract, no matter how gross or willful. (Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v.
Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949; see also, Crogan
v. Metz (1957) 47 Cal.2d 398; ¿Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California
Compensation Ins. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 71, [Punitive damages may not be
granted in action based on breach of contract, even though breach was wilful or
fraudulent.]; Power Standards Lab, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp. (2005),
127 Cal.App.4th 1039 [Under California law, plaintiff may not recover punitive
damages for breach of an obligation arising out of a contract.]; Brewer v.
Premier Golf Properties, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1243 [When a cause of
action is based on an agreement between the parties, rather than ex delicto
obligations arising by law, punitive damages are ordinarily not recoverable,
even where the defendant has violated his or her obligations maliciously or in
bad faith.].)
To
the extent Plaintiff asserts his claims against Defendant on the basis of a tortious
act, it is clear that a demand for punitive damages for the commission of any
tort requires more than the mere allegation of the “wrongfully and
intentionally,” “oppression, fraud, and malice” sort of language found in Civil
Code § 3294. (Perkins v Superior
Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 – 7.) The allegations of fact must, in their
totality, describe a state of mind and a motive that would sustain an award of
punitive damages. (Id.) The mere allegation that an intentional tort
is committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) Not only must
there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be
alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. (Id.)
Here,
the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to constitute malice, oppression or
fraud as those terms are defined in Civil Code § 3294(c)(1)-(3) for purposes of
the imposition of punitive damages. Conclusory
allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a
conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
RULING
Accordingly,
the Motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the
department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the
hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 11th day of October 2024
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |