Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCP02246, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants PJ Spring Properties, Beverly Hills Suites LLC, 2307 Charlotte LLC, Adrian Bejarano and Ken Hong (collectively, “Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Adrian Lopez, Lorena Gutierrez and S.L., a minor by and through her guardian Adrian Lopez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs filed this action on January 29, 2024. The operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) private nuisance; (2) negligence; (3) breach of warranty of habitability; (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) violation of California Civil Code § 1941 [constructive eviction]; (7) violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4 [wrongful rent collection/increase, and/or notice to pay or quit]; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On November 18, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer (“Demurrer”) to the FAC and motion to strike (the “MTS”). On March 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed oppositions to both the Demurrer (“Opposition to Demurrer”) and the MTS (“Opposition to MTS”). On March 26, 2025, Defendants filed replies (“Reply to Opp. to Demurrer”) (“Reply to Opp. to MTS”).

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].)

Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

In an action founded upon a contract, a party may also demur to a complaint on grounds that it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, oral or implied by conduct. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (g).)

Defendants demur to the first, second, third and fourth causes of action on the grounds that the lease agreements (the “Agreements”) attached to the FAC are illegible, thus tantamount to no contract at all, and that each cause of action refers to ‘Defendants’ collectively, without identifying which specific party allegedly engaged in the conduct at issue. (Demurrer, pp. 5:12-8:13.) Upon review, although some portions of the Agreements are blurry, the Agreements are readable and clearly serve as leases for the Plaintiffs concerning the subject premises. (FAC, Ex. A.) Thus, it can be ascertained from the pleading that the Agreements are written and a Demurrer is not proper under CCP section 430.10 subdivision (g).

The FAC is not, however, sufficiently clear to apprise Defendants of which issues each is to meet. Defendants are three entities and two individuals. (FAC, ¶¶ 12-16.) The FAC alleges that all Defendants are owners and/or property managers of the subject premises. (FAC, ¶¶ 12-16.) There are no distinct allegations about each party, creating uncertainty as to which entity or individual participated in which alleged wrongdoing. The FAC fails to specifically identify, for example, whom Plaintiffs notified about the uninhabitable conditions, which party failed to abate the conditions or how knowledge was imputed to the entities. (FAC, pp. 21-26.) In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants know who among them is a landlord or property manager and thus the FAC is not uncertain. (Opp. to Demurrer, p. 4:16-5:10.) The uncertainty does not pertain to each Defendants’ relationship to the premises, but rather to which factual allegations are levied against them and which issues must be admitted or denied.

Thus, the Demurrer to the first through fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when there is an eviction, actual or constructive, of the tenant. (Marchese v. Standard Realty & Development Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148.) Constructive eviction occurs when there is a substantial and material interference with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises, causing the tenant to vacate. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903.)

Defendants demur to the fifth and sixth causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ continued residence in the premises precludes their ability to sustain causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment or constructive eviction. (Demurrer, pp. 8:14-9:3.) The FAC states: “[b]ecause of the substandard and unlivable conditions of the PREMISES, PLAINTIFFS abandoned the PREMISES on September 30, 2024.” (FAC, p. 28:15-17.)

Seventh Cause of Action, Violation of CA Civil Code § 1942.4 [Wrongful Rent Collection/Increase and/or Notice to Pay or Quit]

Civil Code section 1942.4 states: “A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”

Defendants demur to the seventh cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the purported substandard conditions at the premises were not abated. (Demurrer, pp. 9:4-10:2.) The FAC states that “the substandard conditions and violations existed and were not abated thirty-five (35) days beyond the date of service of the first written code-enforcement report, as evidenced by the subsequent reports as well as further correspondence between PLAINTIFFS and DEFENDANTS.” (FAC, p. 30:8-11.)

The necessary elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) which was intentional or reckless in nature; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259 (Huntingdon).) For purposes of pleading IIED, conduct is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (Davidson).)

¿ Although emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry [citation], to make out a claim, the plaintiff must prove that emotional distress was severe and not trivial or transient.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376.)¿ Such distress must be “of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.”¿ (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.)¿A tenant may sue their landlord for IIED “if the landlord’s acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (a) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (b) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (c) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Id. at p. 921.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ IIED claim fails because Plaintiffs have not alleged, who, on behalf of the entities, engaged in or authorized the alleged outrageous conduct. (Demurrer, pp. 10:3-11:17.) The FAC alleges that ‘Defendants’ engaged in outrageous conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶ 63-76.) This is insufficient to provide either the individual or entity Defendants with notice of the specific conduct alleged against them, or to identify which party acted on behalf of the entities and how the entity ratified or consented to the acts of its employee.

Thus, the Demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

Defendants move to strike portions of the FAC pertaining to Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. (Mot., pp. 2-3.) As the Court sustained the Demurrer to the eighth cause of action for IIED, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.

Defendants’ Demurrer to the FAC is SUSTAINED as to the first, second, third, fourth and eighth causes of action, with 20 days leave to amend. The Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court