Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV01691, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed by April 9, 2025. (Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1005, subd. (b) [opposition must be filed at least nine court days prior to the hearing].)

This action arises out of an insurance claim. On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff Jennifer Camarena (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“the Exchange”), David Horan and Does 1 through 100 alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) bad faith denial of insurance claim.

On March 11, 2025, the Exchange filed the instant motion for protective order (the “Motion”). The Motion is unopposed.

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP, § 2025.420, subd. (a).)¿

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions: “[t]hat the deposition not be taken at all,” or “[t]hat the deposition be taken only on certain specified terms and conditions.” (CCP, § 2025.420, subd. (b).)

“[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

The Exchange moves for a protective order to preclude the deposition of Gail Louis (“Ms. Louis”). Ms. Louis is the Corporate Secretary for ACSC Management Services, Inc., the attorney-in fact for the Exchange. (Louis Decl., ¶ 1.) The Exchange asserts that Ms. Louis is the designated officer for purposes of verifying responses to written discovery but was not involved in handling the underlying insurance claim and has no personal knowledge of the events at issue. (Mot., p. 11:21-23.) The Exchange further argues that Ms. Louis’s knowledge regarding Plaintiff’s claim was obtained solely from information conveyed to her by counsel and is therefore protected by attorney-client privilege. (Mot., pp. 11:23-12:3.) In support of its Motion, the Exchange submits the declaration of Ms. Louis stating that she was not involved in the underlying handling of Plaintiff’s insurance claim and that her “sole involvement in this matter was review and verification of the Exchange’s responses to discovery propounded by the plaintiff.” (Louis Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.)

The Exchange has shown good cause for a protective order precluding the taking of Ms. Louis’s deposition. Ms. Louis attests, under penalty of perjury, that she was not involved in handling the claim and has no direct knowledge pertaining to the claim in this case. Requiring Ms. Louis to sit for a deposition would impose an undue burden and expense on the Exchange given the minimal likelihood that the deposition will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not opposed this Motion and thus has not demonstrated good cause to require Ms. Louis’s deposition.

Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court