Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV01839, Date: 2025-03-24 Tentative Ruling

This is an employment action. Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint, filed on April 16, 2024, asserts causes of action for discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation of the Family Rights Act; discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); retaliation in violation of FEHA; harassment in violation of FEHA; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA; failure to provide reasonable accommodation; failure to engage in interactive process; failure to provide lactation accommodation in violation of Labor Code §§ 1030-1031 9; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and constructive discharge in violation of FEHA against Defendant.

On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff served their Requests for Production, Set One (“RFPs”) on Defendant. (Declaration of Caley K. McGaffigan (“McGaffigan Decl.”), ¶ 3.) On July 23, 2024, Defendant served its responses. (Id., ¶ 4.)

The parties met and conferred as to Requests Nos. 1, 1 (duplicate), 2-6, 8-10, 12-17, 22-28, and agreed to attend an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) on December 18, 2024. (Declaration of Aren Derbarseghian (“Derbarseghian Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-9.)

Following the IDC, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses and for Sanctions (the “Motion”) on December 23, 2024. The parties subsequently entered into a Stipulated Protective Order (“Protective Order”) and filed it with the Court on February 28, 2025. (McGaffigan Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 4.) On the same date, Defendant served supplemental responses to the RFPs along with its supplemental document production in which it produced all the previously withheld documents, as well as other documents that had been identified in its investigation since its original responses were served. (Id., ¶ 12, Exh. 5.) On March 11, 2025, Defendant filed its opposition to the Motion. Plaintiff submitted a reply on March 17, 2025.

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).)

Motions to compel further responses must always be accompanied by a meet-and confer-declaration (per Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040) demonstrating a “reasonable and good faith attempt an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Id., §§ 2030.300(b), 2031.310(b)(2), 2033.290(b).) They must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must also be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. (Id., rule 3.1345(c).)

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. “Good cause” may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. (Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; CCP §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.); Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s responses do not comply with the Code because Defendant advances meritless objections based on vagueness, ambiguity, and/or the Official Information privilege.

In its opposition, Defendant argues that the Motion is moot because after the parties entered into the Protective Order, Defendant supplemented its responses and produced all withheld documents. Defendant contends that the only remaining issues are RFP No. 6 and sanctions.

In her reply, Plaintiff argues that the Motion is not moot except as to RFP No. 6. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s supplemental responses still incorporate the same “vagueness/ambiguity” and “Evidence Code §1040” objections as the original responses, and states that the Court should rule on the objections by striking them to help avoid further issues down the line. Plaintiff contends that RFP No. 6 is the only request that is moot because the parties reached a compromise when Plaintiff’s counsel offered to limit the scope of the Request by providing Defendant with a list of search terms. Plaintiff also contends that sanctions are still at issue.

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the requests. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

While Defendant has supplemented its responses and produced all documents previously withheld, Defendant reincorporates its objections into its supplemental responses and produced documents “to which no objection is being made.” (McGaffigan Decl., ¶ 12 , Exh. 5.) Thus, Plaintiff’s request that the Court rule on the vagueness, ambiguity and Evidence Code §1040 objections is reasonable. Other than RFP No. 6, Defendant has not stated any justification for its objections, and they are therefore overruled and stricken. The Motion is otherwise moot as to all requests other than RFP No. 6.

In opposition Defendant contends RFP No. 6, which seeks “[a]ll of your internal communications, including, but not limited to electronic messages (e.g. text messages, Teams, Slack) and emails, regarding Jessica Chandler,” is still at issue. Defendant argues that the request is overbroad, and to the extent Plaintiff requests the production of electronically stored information (“ESI”), Plaintiff has agreed the ESI sought is overbroad, but has yet to offer any limitations on the scope and time of the ESI sought.

In reply, Plaintiff contends that the Motion as to RFP No. 6 is moot because Plaintiff’s counsel has offered to limit the scope of the request by providing Defendant with a list of search terms.

The Court finds that the request is overbroad and orders the parties to meet and confer to finalize the list of search terms to be provided by Plaintiff’s counsel.

If the court finds that a party has unsuccessfully made or opposed such a motion, the court “shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Although Defendant has supplemented almost all its responses, produced almost all withheld documents after the filing of this motion but has not justified most of its objections, some sanctions are appropriate. Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in the total amount of $14,310. (Derbarseghian Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff’s counsel states it took him 15.5 hours to draft the Motion and anticipates it will take him another 12 hours to review the opposition and draft a reply, and another 2.5 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing. Counsel states his hourly rate is $475. Counsel has also paid $60 to file the Motion. (Ibid.) The Court finds that the amount requested is excessive. The Court finds that six hours was an appropriate amount of time spent on this Motion, and therefore assesses $2,850 in sanctions against Defendant, to be paid within twenty days of the date of this order.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer within ten court days to finalize the list of search terms to be provided by Plaintiff’s counsel for RFP No. 6. Defendant is ordered to do a search based upon those search terms within thirty days of agreement on the search terms and to produce the resulting documents within ten court days thereafter.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court