Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV04867, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Patrick Hennings and Ann Hennings (“Plaintiffs”)

Plaintiffs filed this lemon-law action on February 27, 2024. The operative first-amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2 subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2 subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2 subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) fraudulent inducement.

On September 3, 2024, Defendant filed a Demurrer to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement (the “Demurrer”) and an accompanying motion to strike (the “Motion”). On January 22, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Demurrer (the “Opposition”) and an opposition to the Motion to Strike (“Opposition to Motion”). On January 27, 2025, Defendant filed separate replies. (the “Reply” and “Reply to Motion”)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

The elements of a fraudulent concealment claim are (1) concealment of a material fact, (2) a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) intentional concealment or suppression of the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiffs sustained damage. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 41 (“Rattagan”); Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-44, review granted and subsequently dismissed by Dhital v. Nissan N. Am. (Dec. 18, 2024, S277568) __ Cal.5th ___, 559 P.3d 1083, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 898 (Dhital).)

Defendant asserts that this cause of action is without merit because it is barred by the statute of limitations, fails to adequately allege specific facts giving rise to a claim and because Plaintiff did not allege a transactional relationship.

Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment cause of action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations. (CCP § 338 subd. (d).) Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle on September 24, 2017 (FAC ¶ 6.) This action was filed on February 27, 2024. Defendant argues that the delayed discovery rule does not apply here. Plaintiffs have conceded that the alleged “defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period.” (Demurrer, p. 7; FAC ¶ 6.))

In the Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations is tolled pursuant to the discovery rule here because they “only became aware of GM’s fraud after GM’s repeated failure to permanently repair the Subject Vehicle.” (Opp. p. 5:14-15.) The FAC asserts that Plaintiffs presented the vehicle for repair on September 5, 2018 for various concerns including the suspension and cooling system, on January 28, 2019 for various concerns including the electrical system, on August 3, 2020 for concerns including the brake system, and on June 10, 2022 for concerns including the transmission, suspension and cooling system. (FAC ¶¶ 23-26.) Thus, it appears that the fraudulent concealment cause of action began to accrue on either January 28, 2019 or August 3, 2020. Based on either date, Plaintiffs fraud claim is untimely.

To the extent Plaintiffs argue that Defendant actively concealed the defects and thus they could not have reasonably discovered the relevant material facts, this argument is unavailing. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendant issued technical service bulletins relating to the transmission as far back as 2014, prior to when Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle. (FAC ¶¶ 65 fn 5, 71 fn 6.) As Defendant highlights in the Reply, technical service bulletins are publicly available documents. (Reply, p. 2:20-23.) In addition, Plaintiffs acknowledge that in August 2020, “[t]he authorized repair facility performed Recall N192268490 (Increased Brake Pedal Effort).” (FAC ¶ 25.) Thus, it does not appear that Defendant actively prevented Plaintiffs from discovering the facts because the alleged defects were made public prior to the sale of the subject vehicle and Plaintiffs were specifically aware of a defect as early as 2020. Accordingly, the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment is barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED. Because the Court has reached its conclusion based on Defendant's statute of limitations argument, the Court need not examine the specificity or transactional relationship arguments.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”¿(Civ. Code, § 3294 subd (a).)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages. Since the Court has already determined that the FAC fails to adequately plead a cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment, the FAC lacks the necessary allegations to support a claim for punitive damages. Thus, the Motion is GRANTED.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED, without leave to amend.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court