Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV07331, Date: 2025-02-03 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers. No reply has been filed.

This action arises from an alleged breach of an oral agreement between unmarried partners related to sharing of property and financial support. On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against Defendant alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Oral Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Contract; and (3) Fraud and Deceit.

On October 11, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer (“Demurrer”) and accompanying motion to strike. On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). No reply has been filed.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].)

Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

First and Second Causes of Action —Breach of Oral Contract and Breach of Implied Contract

To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.”¿ (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98 [internal citation omitted].) “The elements of a breach of oral contract claim are the same as those for a breach of written contract: a contract; its performance or excuse for nonperformance; breach; and damages.” (Stockton Mortg., Inc. v. Tope (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 437, 453.)

The California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin stated that adults who voluntarily live together “may agree to pool their earnings and to hold all property acquired during the relationship in accord with the law governing community property; conversely they may agree that each partner’s earnings and the property acquired from those earnings remains the separate property of the earning partner. So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements.” (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 674.)

Plaintiff alleges that in August 2013, she and Defendant entered into an oral agreement wherein Defendant agreed that they would share all “property acquired during their relationship resulting from their personal skills, efforts and labor performed” and that such property would be divided equally between them. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that it was agreed that Defendant would provide for Plaintiff’s “financial support and needs in the event they ceased their cohabiting relationship.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that it was agreed that she would forego completion of her college degree and serve as the primary homemaker and care provider for their children. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff asserts that the property and earnings acquired during their relationship include, among other things, an ownership interest in Orange Theory Fitness and proceeds from the sale of a portion of their interest as well as the property located at 2542 Pesquera Drive in Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff alleges that during the time that Plaintiff and Defendant maintained a relationship together, she performed all the conditions required of her in accordance with the agreement. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that, in November 2022, Defendant breached the agreement and has since refused to acknowledge her equal ownership interest in the property acquired during their relationship. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff asserts that she has suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s breach. (Compl. ¶ 15.

In the Demurrer, Defendant argues that the alleged terms of the agreement are not sufficiently definite to form a contract, as they fail to delineate a scope of duties, the standards of acceptable performance, a time frame, or criteria for determining a breach. (Demurrer, p. 7: 15-25.) Defendant also argues that the first and second causes of action are barred by the statute of frauds as agreements for an interest in real property must be confirmed in some form of writing. (Demurrer, p. 7:26-8:23; Civil Code § 1624 subd. (a)(3).)

Plaintiff sufficiently states her causes of action for breach of oral contract and breach of implied contract. Plaintiff alleges that the parties entered into an oral agreement, that she performed all obligations under the agreement, and that Defendant has failed to perform his obligations, thus causing injury to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 14-15.) Equitable estoppel bars Defendant from invoking the statute of frauds to bar enforcement in this case because Plaintiff alleged that she already performed her obligations under the agreement in reliance on Defendant’s promises. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Marvin, supra 18 Cal.3d at 674 fn. 9; Whorton v. Dillingham (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 447,456; Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054.)

A cause of action for fraud requires the following elements: (1) a misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (3) intent to defraud (induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974.)

Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Plaintiff alleges that at the time Defendant made the promises, as well the times he reaffirmed the promises, he represented that he intended to keep and perform said promises and agreements. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 34.) Plaintiff alleges that these representations were false and that Defendant intended to defraud and deceive Plaintiff by causing her to act to her detriment in reliance upon them. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Plaintiff alleges that in reasonable reliance upon Defendant’s representations, she gave up completion of her college degree, worked as the primary homemaker and care provider for their children, gave up business opportunities, and expended uncompensated time and effort assisting Defendant with Orange Theory Fitness and other businesses. (Compl. ¶ 38.)

Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a cause of action for fraud. The allegations are conclusory and fail to allege, with specificity, that Defendant had knowledge of falsity of his statements or an intent to defraud. Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the alleged fraudulent representations were made. (Lazar, 12 Cal.4th at pg. 645.)

The Demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

Defendant moves to strike allegations of punitive damages from paragraph 41 and paragraph 5 of the prayer. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts supporting such damages. (Mot. to Strike, p. 4:20-5:5.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently alleged fraud and deceit by the Defendant, warranting the imposition of punitive damages. (Opp. to Mot. to Strike, p. 2.) Paragraph 41 and paragraph 5 of the prayer seek punitive damages with respect to the fraud cause of action. As the Court sustained the Demurrer to this claim, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.

The Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action and SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend, as to the third cause of action.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court