Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV08582, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

Case Number: 24STCV08582    Hearing Date: November 19, 2024    Dept: 56

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs LORENZA ANN GARCIA AND JOSE MARIA GARCIA MONTOY (jointly, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (“Defendant”)

            The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers.  No reply has been filed.  Any reply was required to have been filed and served at least five court days prior to the hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

BACKGROUND

             This is an action arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle.  Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant alleging (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200.

            On July 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”) and Production of Documents and Request for Mandatory Monetary Sanctions (the “Deposition Motion”).  Defendant filed an opposition to the Deposition Motion on November 5, 2024.  No reply has been filed.

On September 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production from Defendant (the “RFPs Motion”).  Defendant filed an opposition to the RFPs Motion on November 5, 2024.  No reply has been filed.

DISCUSSION

Deposition Motion

Any party may obtain discovery by taking the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.)  Service of a proper deposition notice is “effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280, subd. (a).)  If, after service of a deposition notice, a party fails to appear for examination or fails to produce for inspection any document described in the deposition notice, without having served a valid objection under section 2025.410, the party noticing the deposition may move for an order compelling attendance or production. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)

            On May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Defendant’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”), with Production of Documents for June 25, 2024.  (Declaration of Ezra Ryu in support of Deposition Motion, ¶ 2.)  Although the Plaintiffs did not consult with Defendant in setting a date for the deposition [Declaration of Ariane A. Sadanaga, ¶ 4], the date set was more than six weeks from the date of the notice.  Over five weeks after service of the notice and only five days before the deposition date, Defendant served its objections to Plaintiffs’ deposition notice, advising that Defendant would not be available and inviting Plaintiffs to contact counsel for Defendant to reschedule the deposition, but without giving alternative dates.  (Id., ¶ 3.) 

On the date set for the deposition, June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel office requested dates for Defendant’s PMK deposition in late July or August, to which Defendant’s counsel responded that she would reach out to her client and get back as soon as her client provided a date.  (Id., 4.)  Plaintiffs heard nothing about alternative dates for the deposition, and filed the instant Deposition Motion twenty days later, on July 15, 2024.  (Id., ¶ 5.)

            Over two months after the Motion was filed -- on October 2, 2024 --  Defendant’s counsel offered March 27, 2025 for the deposition to proceed – over ten months after the original notice was served --and requested that Plaintiffs take the Deposition Motion off calendar.  (Id., ¶ 8.)  On the same day, Plaintiffs’ counsel served an amended notice of Defendant’s PMK deposition for March 27, 2025.  (Id., ¶ 9; Exh. E.)  On October 10 and 30, 2024, Defendant sent emails to Plaintiffs’ counsel requesting that the Deposition Motion be taken off calendar, but Plaintiffs’ counsel did not do so.  (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12.)

            Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.450(a), a party’s attendance at a deposition

may only be compelled if (1) the party fails to appear for or proceed with the examination, and (2) the party did not serve a valid objection under section 2025.410.  Here, Defendant has not refused to appear for or proceed with the deposition of its corporate witness as contemplated by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.450(a).  (Sadanaga Decl., ¶¶2-12).  Rather, Defendant timely objected to each of Plaintiffs’ unilateral deposition notice and invited counsel for Plaintiffs to contact Defendant to schedule the deposition on a mutually convenient date.  (Id., ¶¶ 3-4.)  Furthermore, Defendant has offered March 27, 2025 for the deposition of Defendant’s PMK to proceed.  In fact, Plaintiffs accepted this date and served an amended notice of Defendant’s PMK deposition.  (Id., ¶ 9, Exh. E.) 

            In their Deposition Motion, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendant’s PMK witness deposition within 10 calendar days from the entry of the Court’s Order on this Motion. There is, however, no basis for Plaintiffs’ Deposition Motion at this time, considering that Plaintiffs have already agreed to a March 27, 2025 deposition date.  The Court also notes that there is no urgency for this deposition given that trial is in April 2026. 

In opposing the motion, Defendant seeks imposition of sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel.  California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 states: “Misuses of the discovery process include…[m]aking or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery.”  (CCP, § 2023.010(h).) 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs acted with substantial justification in filing the Deposition Motion, and that there are circumstances that would make the imposition of sanctions unjust.  Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions to be assessed against Plaintiffs for the cost of opposing the Deposition Motion.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.

RFPs Motion

Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 provides that a party may bring a motion to compel responses to a request for production of documents, where the responding party failed to serve a timely response.  Unless otherwise agreed, the responding party is required to serve responses within 30 days after service of the discovery demand for production documents.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260(a).)  If the responding party fails to serve a timely response, the party “waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300(a).)

            The facts underlying the RFPs Motion are unclear, to say the least.  First, the parties refer to the RFPs as having been signed and served on different dates (May 10, 2024 for Plaintiffs - Declaration of Ezra Ryu in Support of Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production (“Ryu Decl.”), ¶ 3 and Exhibit “A,” p. 18 and May 13, 2024 for Defendant - Declaration of Ariane A. Sadanaga in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to the RFPs Motion (“Sadanaga RFP Decl.”), ¶ 3, Exh. “A,” p. 18).  The Court notes that the text of the two RFPs is identical – and the signature appearing on page 18 is absolutely identical, indicating either that it was electronically signed (although it does not appear to be so) or stamped or cut-and-pasted to the document(s).  Neither of the documents submitted by the parties has a proof of service attached.  Apparently, therefore, either two separate RFPs were served, or one party is mistaken about the document(s) served or someone has created a false document.  The Court will discuss these alternatives with counsel at the hearing on the RFPs Motion.

The next set of facts on which the parties’ versions differ is in whether extensions were requested by Defendant or given by Plaintiffs.  According to Plaintiffs, they propounded the RFPs on May 10, 2024, such that Defendant’s statutory deadline to respond was June 11, 2024, but Defendant failed to provide any written responses or to produce any documents in response to the RFPs by the statutory deadline.  (Ryu Decl., ¶ 4.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel then attests that “[o]n July 29, 2024, in an attempt to avoid filing potentially unnecessary motion [sic] Plaintiffs’ counsel requested from Defendant’s counsel that Defendant provide all responses and produce responsive documents to RDP1.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel attests that “Defendant’s counsel did not respond to this request.”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel then attests that “[o]n August 8, 2024, a new handling attorney on this matter, Ariane Sadanaga, assumed the meet and confer attempts.  However, Ms. Sadanaga refused to engage in any communication regarding RFP1 and through inaction further failed to provide responses and produce documents to RFP1.”  (Id. at ¶ 6.)   On the basis of this statement of facts, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendant to provide responses to the RFPs, without objections, and all responsive documents requested therein.

            In opposition, Defendant provides a completely different set of facts.  First, Defendant’s counsel’s declaration stating that the RFPs were served, not on June 10, but on June 12, 2024, and that counsel’s office requested a 30-day extension to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests by email on June 12, 2024 (Sadanaga RFP Decl., ¶ 4 and Exh. “B”.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed a two-week extension on June 12, 2024, with Defendant’s new deadline to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests as June 28, 2024.  (Id., ¶5 and Exh. “C.”)  Defendant’s counsel declares that on June 28, 2024, Defendant served its responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, however, the “Proof of Service” was mistakenly saved as the “Request for Production of Documents, Set One”, and that as a result, the Proof of Service was served twice.  (Id., ¶ 6.)  Defendant’s counsel further attests that on October 22, 2024, she had a telephone call with Plaintiffs’ counsel, at which time, she was advised of the mistake of serving the Proof of Service twice under the title “Request for Production of Documents, Set One.”  (Id., ¶ 11.)  On the same day, Defendant served its verified responses to the RFPs, and non-confidential document production, with the verification dated June 28, 2024.  (Id., ¶ 12; Exh. K.)

Accordingly, since Defendant has now served its responses, the RFPs Motion is MOOT. 

Relief from Waiver of Objections

The Court is puzzled by Defendant’s request that the Court relieve it from waiver of objections under Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 which reads, in relevant part: 

The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: 

1.              The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280. 

(2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300(a).)

The Court’s confusion is also based upon the parties’ differing and unclear statements of the facts underlying the RFP Motion.  For example, Plaintiffs filed no reply to the opposition and to the Sadanaga RFP Declaration’s vastly different version of the facts presented in the Ryu Declaration regarding the service of documents and the granting of an extension.  Moreover, the Sadanaga RFP Declaration itself is confusing – was the verified response to the RFPs actually served on Plaintiffs on June 28, albeit under a different file name?  Or was it not served and only a Proof of Service served on that date.  Under either scenario, why does Plaintiffs not acknowledge the receipt of something on June 28, 2026? 

According to Defendant’s version of the events underlying the RFP Motion, Plaintiffs granted an extension to Defendant to respond to the RFPs to and including June 28, 2024 and a responsive document was served on that date.  As Plaintiffs have not contradicted this statement of the facts, the Court will accept it for the purpose of this RFPs Motion.