Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV09585, Date: 2024-08-20 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Worrell James Campbell (“Campbell” or “Defendant”)

This action arises from a collision between a car driven by Campbell and a bicycle on which the Plaintiff was riding, which occurred on May 14, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that he was riding on his bicycle when Campbell made an unsafe lane change into the bike lane and collided with Plaintiff. (Complaint, p. 5, GN-2.) It is alleged that Campbell left the scene of the incident without providing Plaintiff with his contact information. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that at the time of the incident, Campbell was acting as an agent of Defendant Lyft, Inc (“Lyft”). (Id.)

On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a PLD-PI-001 form complaint (the “Complaint”) against Defendants Campbell and Lyft, asserting the following causes of action: 1) motor vehicle; 2) general negligence; and 3) intentional tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress).

On May 30, 2024, Campbell filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for intentional tort (the “Demurrer”) and also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint setting forth a claim for punitive damages (the “Motion to Strike”).

On July 9, 2024, a dismissal was entered as to Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) cause of action as to Lyft only.

Plaintiff filed oppositions to the Demurrer and the Motion to Strike on August 7, 2024, and Campbell filed replies to the oppositions on August 13, 2024.

Based upon the sworn declaration of Defendant’s counsel, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been met.

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a

demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth

of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those

expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4^th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or

conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350,

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Campbell asserts that by Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Intentional Tort, Plaintiff has attempted to assert a claim for IIED. Campbell argues that the Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating that (a) Campbell is guilty of outrageous conduct and (b) Plaintiff truly suffered severe emotional distress.

“The essential elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct; (2) intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 772, 786.) “An essential element of such a claim is…outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.) “ ‘Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) Conduct is actionable when the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse such resentment against the actor that the member would exclaim “‘Outrageous!’” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.) While there is no bright-line in deciding what “outrageous conduct” is and it involves a case-by-case appraisal, trial courts can determine whether the conduct was sufficiently outrageous. (Id.) The trial court can decide as a matter of law based upon the facts of the case that the conduct is not so extreme and outrageous “as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” (Wilkins v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1087, quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883 [while the outrageousness of the conduct is normally an issue to be determined by the trier of fact, the trial court can determine in the first instance whether the conduct may reasonably be regarded as “so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery”].)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that after the collision, “Defendant Campbell got out of his vehicle to check on Plaintiff. Defendant proceeded to flee the scene of the incident without providing Plaintiff with his contact information.” (Complaint, p. 8, IT-2.) The facts, as alleged, do not adequately allege an IIED claim. To establish a claim for IIED, the conduct must be "extreme and outrageous," exceeding all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community. Given the standards as discussed above, merely fleeing the scene of an accident, especially after first stopping to check on the victim, without additional egregious elements, do not reach the threshold of being "extreme and outrageous" as required for an IIED claim. None of the cases cited by Plaintiff supports a finding that fleeing the scene of an accident, in itself, constitutes outrageous conduct.

Moreover, to support his claim of severe emotional distress, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a result of Defendant fleeing the scene of the accident, Plaintiff was seriously concerned that Defendant may never be located and that he would be unable to obtain necessary medical treatment and also be saddled with medical expenses.” (Complaint, p. 8, IT-5.) Severe emotional distress means “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004.) The distress allegedly suffered by Plaintiff, i.e., “serious concern” about paying his medical bills, does not meet this demanding standard.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for IIED, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to amend the Complaint. The Court notes that unless a subsequent amendment cures the above defects in the pleading, the Court would consider sustaining a demurrer filed thereto without leave to amend.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

Here, Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to punitive damages and related references.

Civil Code § 3294(a) authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice…”

“(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the party of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

“Despicable conduct” that rises to the level of supporting an award of punitive damages against a defendant is that which is “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people” and has been described as “conduct…having the character of outrage frequently associated with a crime.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“Conscious disregard” means “the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) To be liable for punitive damages the defendant must “have actual knowledge of the risk of harm it is creating, and in the face of the knowledge, fail to take steps it knows will reduce or eliminate the risk of harm.” (Ehrhardt v. Brunswick, Inc. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 734, 742.)

Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051.) “The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.” (Tomaselli, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 1287 (“Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s conduct does not rise to the level of “despicable conduct” sufficient to support the award of punitive damages. As discussed above, Campbell’s act of fleeing the scene of the incident without providing Plaintiff with his contact information does not necessarily amount to “extreme and outrageous conduct”. Because the cause of action supporting the claim for punitive damages fails, so must the claim for punitive damages. (Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 [if the cause of action fails, so must an ancillary claim for punitive damages].)

Accordingly, Campbell’s motion to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary/punitive damages is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to amend the Complaint. The Court notes that unless a subsequent amendment cures the above defects in the pleading, the Court would consider granting a motion to strike filed thereto without leave to amend.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court