Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV10436, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV10436 Hearing Date: October 10, 2024 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. JOSEPH MELENDREZ, Does 1 to 10, et
al.,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER 8:30 a.m. October 10, 2024 Dept. 56 |
This is an action
arising from an intra-family dispute concerning the breach of an alleged series
of oral contracts between two brothers establishing ownership of a piece of
real property. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff Alejandro Melendrez (“Plaintiff” or
“Alejandro”) filed the operative Complaint against Defendant Joseph Melendrez
(“Defendant” or “Joseph”) for the following three causes of action: (1)
constructive trust; (2) fraud; and (3) unjust enrichment.
Demurrer
Defendant Joseph demurs to all three
causes of action for uncertainty and failure to state facts sufficient to
establish a claim. Defendant also argues that the demurrer as to all three
causes of action should be sustained because (1) the causes of action are all
barred by the relevant statute of limitations; (2) the causes of action all
violate the statute of frauds; and (3) Plaintiff alleges facts in the Complaint
which contradict the attached exhibits therein.
Statute of Limitations
Defendant
contends that the Complaint alleges several oral agreements concerning the
Subject Property which correspond with the following dates:
· January 18, 2005
o “Plaintiff
and Defendant agreed to purchase a residence in which both parties and their
families would live together” and “Plaintiff and Defendant orally agreed that
the property would be Plaintiff's property and that title to reflect this
ownership would be forthcoming.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 4-5.)
· May 23, 2007
o “Defendant
agreed that Plaintiff was the actual owner of the subject property and [ . . .
] explained to Plaintiff that Defendant must remain as part owner of the
property because the mortgage was in his name alone.” (Id., ¶ 8.)
· Early 2016
o Plaintiff
requested a modification of the mortgage to move from variable interest rate to
a fixed interest rate, and Defendant agreed. (Id., ¶ 11.)
· Late 2018
o “Plaintiff
requested that Defendant place Plaintiff on title to the subject property [ . .
.] reflecting Plaintiff's interest on said subject property" and Defendant
refused.” (Id., ¶ 12.)
The statute of limitations to bring an action on an oral contract
is two years from the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved
party and is three years for any action for relief on ground of fraud or
mistake. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 338(d) – 339.) Defendant argues Plaintiff’s
actions are all time barred because at latest, Plaintiff could possibly argue
the statute of limitations was triggered in late 2018 when Defendant refused to
change the state of the title from sole ownership to Joint-Tenancy with
Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 12.) The Court agrees.
Given that Defendant’s refusal resulted in the estrangement of the
families of Plaintiff and Defendant and that all communication between them
ceased—late 2018 represents the latest point by which Plaintiff can reasonably
assert he discovered the loss or damage of the alleged breach of oral
agreements. Although the Court notes that it was not until November 2023 that
Defendant served Plaintiff with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer Complaint (based
upon a Sixty Day Notice to terminate occupancy), the Court finds that Plaintiff
cannot (and does not) reasonably argue that such date would have been the date
that triggered the statute of limitations. Considering Plaintiff asserts his
family became estranged from Defendant’s family in late 2018, this establishes
Plaintiff was already suffering loss and damage as an aggrieved party by such date
as a result of the alleged breach.
Thus, the Court finds all three causes of action are barred by the
statute of limitations.
Statute of Frauds
California law requires for certain contracts to be
enforceable—including e.g. contracts for the sale, gift, transfer, or financing
of real property, and contracts whose performance will not be completed within
one year—they must be memorialized in a writing that satisfies the statute of
frauds. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1624.) Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s
allegations solely concern purported oral agreements related to the ownership
and/or transfer of real property, and for which Plaintiff had to pay more than
one year of monthly payments—the alleged contract falls within the statute of
frauds. (Dem., pg. 7.) Accordingly, Defendant contends such oral contracts are
unenforceable.
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s allegations represent
unenforceable oral contracts because such contracts concern the ownership of
real property. Given all three causes of action rely not on the written
contracts or grants but only the alleged oral contracts, said contracts violate
the statute of frauds.
Thus, all three causes of action are barred by the statute of
frauds.
Complaint Conflicting with Exhibits
Defendant provides that as a matter of law, if the allegations in
the complaint conflict with attached exhibits, any recitals in the document
contrary to allegations in the complaint must be given precedence. (SC
Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Liebert (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 68, 83; Barnett
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505; see
also Kalnoki v First Am. Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 23, 39, (facts appearing in attached exhibits control over
contradictory factual allegations in complaint).)
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s allegations of oral agreements
contradict the attached exhibits which evidence the written Grant Deeds which provide
for Defendant’s ownership.
Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations and causes of action therein are also
precluded by the attached evidentiary exhibits.
(1) Constructive Trust
Defendant
demurs to the first cause of action for constructive trust on the grounds that
such claim is uncertain, that Plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to
sue, and that constructive trust is merely a remedy which fails in this case
because the underlying causes of action are barred by the statute of
limitations. The remedy of a constructive trust necessarily fails if that
substantive right is barred by the statute of limitations. (Reid v. City of
San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343, 362.)
The
Court finds that in addition to constructive trust being barred as a cause of
action due to the statute of frauds, it is also barred due to the statute of
limitations. Thus, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained with respect to the first
cause of action for constructive trust, without leave to amend.
(2)
Fraud
Defendant demurs to
Plaintiff’s second cause of action on the basis that fraud allegations must be
pleaded with more detail than other causes of action. (Heritage
Pac. Fin., LLC v Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 989, (policy
of liberal construction of pleadings does not apply to fraud causes of
action).) The facts constituting the fraud, including every element of the
cause of action, must be alleged “factually and specifically,” i.e., the
plaintiff must plead facts showing the defendant's misrepresentation (or
omission that the defendant had a duty to disclose), the defendant's knowledge
of falsity (“scienter”), the defendant's intent to defraud (i.e., to induce the
plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation), the plaintiff's justifiable
reliance, and the resulting damage. (Kalnoki v First Am. Trustee Servicing
Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 35. See
Rossberg v Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 1481, 1498, (promissory fraud
claim must also be alleged with particularity); Knox
v Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 434, (constructive fraud
must also be pleaded with specificity).)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not pled facts in a manner that
is sufficiently specific and particular as required to state a cause of action
for fraud. As such, Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud is not only
time-barred and precluded by the statute of frauds, it is also not pled with
facts sufficient to state a cause of action.
Thus, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer as to Plaintiff’s
second cause of action for fraud without leave to amend.
(3)
Unjust Enrichment
Defendant demurs to
Plaintiff’s third cause of action for unjust enrichment on the grounds that
unjust enrichment is not a cause of action but merely a restitution claim.
(Dem., pg. 10.) Thus, Defendant argues that such a cause of action cannot
proceed and is subject to general demurrer.
(De Havilland v FX Networks, LLC (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 845, 870. See Reid v City of San Diego (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 343, 362, (restitution is a remedy, not a freestanding cause of
action).) Here, given the Court has
found Plaintiff’s causes of action barred by both the statute of limitations
and statute of frauds, Plaintiff’s third cause of action is unsupported.
Thus, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer as to Plaintiff’s
third cause of action for unjust enrichment without leave to amend.
In
sum, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to its entirety for all three causes of
action, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Defendant
is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMCDEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the
department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the
hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 10th day of October 2024
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |