Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV12744, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV12744 Hearing Date: February 25, 2025 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
|
SSI REFRIGERATED EXPRESS, INC., a
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, vs. UTILITY
TRAILER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; CHEVRON CORPORATION.,
and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive,
Defendants. |
|
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS Date: February 25, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
|
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS |
|
|
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants Chevron Corporation and Chevron USA Inc. (collectively,
“Chevron”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff SSI Refrigerated Express, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint
(“Complaint”) against defendant Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company alleging
a single cause of action for negligence. The Complaint alleges that defendants sold
Plaintiff hydraulic oil as opposed to motor oil that was ordered, resulting in
damage to Plaintiff’s semi fleet.
On November 12, 2024, Chevron filed
the instant motion for terminating or evidentiary sanctions. On November 20,
2024, defendant/cross-complainant Southern Counties Lubricants, LLC (“SCL”)
filed a joinder. On January 28, 2025, defendant Utility Trailer Sales of
Southern California, LLC (“Utility”) filed a joinder. Also on January 28, 2025,
defendant Universal Exchange Inc. (“Universal”) filed a joinder. On January 29,
2025, defendant Jay Mehta dba JM Oil (“JM”) filed a joinder. On February 10,
2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). On February 13, 2025,
Utility filed a reply. On February 18, 2025, Chevron filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
section 2023.030 permits California courts to impose terminating, evidence,
issue, and monetary sanctions for discovery misuses, which are defined by CCP section
2023.010. Discovery sanctions “should be appropriate to the dereliction, and
should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party
entitled to but denied discovery.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 771, 793.) Moreover, “[d]iscovery sanctions must be tailored in
order to remedy the offending party’s discovery abuse, should not give the
aggrieved party more than what it is entitled to, and should not be used to
punish the offending party.” (Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217.)
Terminating sanctions are drastic
sanctions that should be imposed sparingly and only when it is clear that the
party to be sanctioned has left no viable alternatives. (See
Dept. of Forestry & Fire. Prot. v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154,
191 [disapproved on other grounds].)
Spoliation of evidence means the “destruction
or significant alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for
another’s use in pending or future litigation.” (Williams v. Russ (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223.) Spoliation undermines the search for truth and
fairness by creating a false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact
by destroying authentic evidence. (Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 9.)
A party moving for discovery sanctions
based on spoliation of evidence must make an initial prima facie showing the
responding party had destroyed evidence that had a “substantial probability of
damaging the moving party’s ability to establish an essential element of his
claim or defense.” (Williams, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.)
Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the responding
party to prove the moving party did not suffer prejudice from the loss of the
documents. (Id. at pp. 1226-1227.)
Discovery sanctions are thus authorized
depending on the facts of the case. (Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court (1998)18 Cal.4th 1, 12 [“Destroying evidence in response to a
discovery request after litigation has commenced would surely be a misuse of
discovery within the meaning of section 2023 as would such destruction in
anticipation of a discovery request”].)
In
egregious cases, a terminating sanction may be imposed for one act of spoliation.
(Williams, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1223-25 [terminating
sanction issued where plaintiff obtained his legal file from his former
attorney and then permitted the file to be destroyed]); see also New
Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424-26
[collecting cases].)
Chevron, and the other joining
defendants, seek terminating, or in the alternative, issue or evidentiary
sanctions, based on Plaintiff’s failure to preserve evidence including business
records, the allegedly damaged trucks and the oil drum label. (Mot. pp. 8:26-11:3.)
Plaintiff stored certain business records including load tenders, fuel tax
administration reports, maintenance records, insurance files and records of
truck repairs in a storage locker in Riverside. (Mot., p. 9:10-9:28; Ananian
Decl., Ex. C [Stallone Depo.].) Plaintiff stopped paying the storage locker fee
in 2022 and the records were destroyed. (Mot., p. 9:1-6; Ananian Decl., Ex. C
[Stallone Depo.].) Plaintiff also maintained certain electronic records
including truck mileage logs and QuickBooks files which were similarly
destroyed in 2022 when Plaintiff stopped paying cloud storage fees. (Mot., p. 10:1-15; Ananian Decl., Ex. C [Stallone Depo.].) Chevron also
asserts that the oil drum label has been lost and the allegedly damaged trucks have
since been repossessed. (Mot., pp. 10:15-11:3.)
Chevron argues that the loss of
critical evidence—identifying which trucks received the allegedly mislabeled
oil, the extent of the damage, whether the oil caused the damage, the cost of
repairs, and accounting records of lost profits—has impaired its ability to
challenge causation and damages. (Mot. pp. 12:22-13:2.) Chevron also argues
that loss of the oil drum label itself has impaired its ability to challenge
the allegation of mislabeling. (Mot. p. 13:3-5.) Thus, Chevron has met its burden to make an
initial prima facie showing that there is a substantial probability that the
lost evidence has damaged its ability to establish essential elements of the defense.
The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to
show that Chevron, and the other joining defendants, did not suffer prejudice
from the loss of the documents. In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues that it has
since produced some of the affected trucks, the oil barrel and oil, all
documents that are within Plaintiff’s custody, photos of the oil label and a
profit and loss statement from 2019 to current. (Opp. pp. 4:11-17.) Plaintiff
argues that Chevron could have inspected the property earlier, never issued an
evidence preservation letter and could subpoena the Small Business
Administration, which repossessed the trucks, to conduct an inspection. (Opp.
p. 9:2-6.)
Chevron and the other defendants are
substantially prejudiced by the disposal of the evidence. Plaintiff claims that
its trucks were damaged by the allegedly mislabeled oil as evidenced in repair
and maintenance records that are now unavailable to Chevron. Plaintiff
calculates its total damages based on repair costs and lost profits, records
that Chevron cannot inspect. This imbalance is clearly prejudicial, hindering
Chevron and the other defendants’ ability to mount a defense against
Plaintiff’s allegations. The lost business records would have informed Chevron how
the trucks were damaged, the extent of the damage, the cost of the repairs and the
lost profits resulting from the repairs and damage. Accordingly, Chevron’s
ability to dispute the extent to which the oil caused damage to the trucks or challenge
the amount of damages attributed to the oil—relevant to the causation and
damages elements of Plaintiff’s negligence claim—is impaired.
The question turns to what kind of
sanction is appropriate. “Discovery sanctions are intended to remedy discovery
abuse, not to punish the offending party. Accordingly, sanctions should be
tailored to serve that remedial purpose, should not put the moving party in a
better position than he would otherwise have been had he obtained the requested
discovery, and should be proportionate to the offending party's misconduct.” (Williams,
supra 167 Cal.App.4th at 1223.) Here, terminating sanctions would be
disproportional. Accordingly, the Court will issue evidentiary sanctions
forbidding Plaintiff from presenting witness testimony regarding the contents
of the lost business records including: the identification or number of its
trucks that broke down after being serviced with oil from the drum; the
mechanical reasons that one or more its trucks broke down; whether oil from the
drum caused any of its trucks to breakdown and become unavailable for service;
the length of time that its trucks were unavailable for service following their
breakdown; the cost of repairing any damage to any truck that was serviced with
oil from the drum; the revenue and profits generated by its trucks before their
purported breakdown; and Plaintiff’s estimates of lost profits caused by the
unavailability of any or all of its trucks.
Chevron’s Motion is GRANTED, in
part, and DENIED in part. Chevron’s requests for terminating and issue
sanctions are DENIED. Chevron’s request for evidentiary sanctions is GRANTED,
as set forth above.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 25th day of February 2025
|
|
|
|
|
Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |