Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV13651, Date: 2025-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13651    Hearing Date: February 20, 2025    Dept: 56

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

 MARIA HERNANDEZ MEDINA,

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, MICHAEL MOORE, ANBEL EUBANK, DOES 1-20,

                                                                             

                        Defendants.                              

 

      CASE NO.: 24STCV13651

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

 

MOTION TO QUASH

 

 

Date: February 20, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY:  

On Motion to Quash: Defendant Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”)

On Demurrer and Motion to Strike: Defendants City of Los Angeles (“City of LA”), Michel Moore (“Moore”) and Annabelle Eubank (“Eubank”) (collectively, “City Defendants”).  

RESPONDING PARTY: None

 

            The Court has considered the moving papers. No oppositions have been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed by February 5, 2025. (Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1005, subd. (b) [opposition must be filed at least nine court days prior to the hearing].)

 

BACKGROUND

             This action arises from an incident between Maria Hernandez Medina (“Plaintiff”) and two LAPD officers while Plaintiff was operating her street food vending stall. On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint (“Complaint”) alleging causes of action for: (1) general negligence and (2) intentional tort.

 

            On October 11, 2024, the City Defendants filed a demurrer (“Demurrer”) and motion to strike (“Motion to Strike”). On November 15, 2024, defendant LAPD filed a motion to quash (“Motion to Quash”). The Demurrer and both Motions include proofs of service indicating that they were served on Plaintiff’s counsel. On February 7, 2025, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition to the Demurrer and Motion to Quash.

 

MEET AND CONFER

             The parties have satisfied the meet and confer requirement.

 

MOTION TO QUASH

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (CCP, § 418.10, subd. (a).)

 

LAPD argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over it in this matter because it is not a properly named defendant.  The Court agrees. LAPD cannot be sued in state court because it does not exist separately and apart from the City of LA and thus does not have its own legal identity. (See Alcala v. City of Corcoran (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 666, 669-71.) Thus, LAPD is not a properly named defendant in this matter. The City of LA is also named as a defendant in this action and as Plaintiff has not opposed the Motion to Quash, there is no argument justifying why LAPD can be sued separately from the City.

 

Thus, LAPD’s Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

 

DEMURRER

            A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; CCP § 430.10, subd. (e).) To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) 

 

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)  

 

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].) 

 

Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].) 

 

City Defendants contend that the Demurrer should be sustained because the Complaint fails to plead any facts supporting the asserted causes of action. (Demurrer, p. 1.)  They also argue that there are no facts in the Complaint establishing that Plaintiff has complied with applicable tort claims statutes and that Plaintiff has not met the heightened pleading standards required to state a cause of action against a public entity or public entity employee. (Demurrer, pp. 4:13-7:14.) Lastly, City Defendants argue that the LAPD is not a separate legal entity apart from the City of LA and is not a proper defendant in this action. (Demurrer, p. 7:15-26.) Because defendant LAPD’s Motion to Quash has been granted, this final argument will not be separately addressed.

 

Negligence

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) The Complaint does not adequately allege the elements of a cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff does not plead the existence of a duty, breach or causation. While Plaintiff has attached the declaration of an alleged witness, a copy of a citation and some photographs to her Complaint, the Complaint itself includes no facts alleging each element of her causes of action. Thus, the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to state a negligence cause of action.

 

Intentional Tort

            Except as provided in Government Code sections 946.4 and 946.6, a written claim must be presented to a public entity and must be denied or deemed denied before a suit for money or damages may be brought against the public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented.¿ (Gov. Code, § 945.4; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777.)¿¿ The claim must be filed within six months.¿ (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a); Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777.)¿ The Complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding Plaintiff’s compliance with the Government Claims Act.

 

            Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.  The Court notes, however, if these flaws in the pleading are not cured in any amended complaint, and if City Defendants demur thereto, the Court will consider sustaining such a demurrer without leave to amend.

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP, § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

 

As the Court sustained the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.

 

 

            LAPD’s Motion to Quash is GRANTED. LAPD is hereby dismissed from this action.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

The Motion to Strike is MOOT.

             

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.           

 


 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

 

Dated this 20th day of February 2025

 

 

 

 

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court