Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV14791, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Elvira Rodriguez and Vanessa Rodriguez (“Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Andres Garibay, Connie Zeomeno, Huitzilin Anahuac and Navi Munoz (“Plaintiffs”)

This action arises out of a landlord-tenant relationship. Plaintiffs sue Defendants and Does 1 through 25 pursuant to a June 12, 2024 complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligence; (4) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09(A) [wrongful eviction]; (5) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.33 [tenant harassment]; (6) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09(G) [failure to pay relocation expenses]; (7) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 152.00 et seq. [failure to comply with tenant habitability program]; (8) violation of California Civil Code section 789.3; (9) violation of California Civil Code section 1940.2; (10) violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4; (11) violation of California Civil Code section 1942.5 [retaliation]; (12) violation of Civil Code section 1950.5; (13) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; and (14) conversion.

On August 19, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer (“Demurrer”). On January 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). On January 22, 2025, Defendants filed a reply (the “Reply”).

All demurrers must be accompanied by a declaration stating either that: (1) the demurring party met-and-conferred with the party that filed the subject pleading and an agreement was not reached resolving all objections; or (2) the other party failed to respond to the meet-and-confer request, or otherwise did not meet-and-confer in good faith. (CCP §§ 430.41(a)(3).) An insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (CCP, § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

Defendants have not filed a declaration indicating that they met and conferred with Plaintiffs before filing this Demurrer. While the Court will proceed to consider the Demurrer on its merits, the parties are reminded of their obligation to comply with the requirements of the CCP.

“Demurrers must be set for hearing not more than 35 days following the filing of the demurrer or on the first date available to the court thereafter. For good cause shown, the court may order the hearing held on an earlier day or later day on notice prescribed by the court.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320, subd. (d).)

Defendants filed this Demurrer on August 19, 2024, with the hearing set for February 27, 2025, without a declaration stating that the hearing date was the first date available. The Court declines to base its ruling on this procedural technicality but cautions the Defendants against further disregard of the requirements of the California Rules of Court.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A demurrer for uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].) As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v. J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations question].)

Where a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)

Defendants demur to the entire Complaint as uncertain and on grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants because none of the causes of actions are alleged against them. (Demurrer p. 2:7-12.)

Upon review, the allegations of the Complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the Defendants of the issues which they are to meet. The Complaint alleges various habitability concerns and alleges that Defendants failed to remedy the issues. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-16, 19-30.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendants harassed, retaliated against and constructively evicted Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-55.) Each of the fourteen causes of action is alleged against all Defendants. (see Compl.)

“[T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) The elements of a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability are “the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a¿reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Id. at p. 1297.)

The Complaint alleges multiple habitability defects, notice to the landlord Defendants, and failure to remedy the issues. (Compl. ¶ 19-30.) Thus, Plaintiffs have stated sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

“In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. [Citations] The covenant of quiet enjoyment ‘insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. [Citations]” (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 587.)

Defendants demur to the second cause of action on grounds that the allegations of damages are conclusory, unsupported by factual allegations, and contradict other allegations in the Complaint. (Demurrer p. 2:23-28.)

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs entered into a written lease agreement with Defendants, that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’ right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises and that Plaintiffs were harmed as a result. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-55, 63-68.) Thus, Plaintiffs have stated sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

The necessary elements for negligence are: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty to use due care; (2) the defendant breached the duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages.¿ (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4^th 292, 318.)

The Complaint alleges a landlord-tenant relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 70.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of the premises, provide Plaintiffs with premises meeting minimum habitability requirements and violated various statutory duties. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-55, 71.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were harmed as result of these alleged breaches. (Compl. ¶ 51-55, 73.) Thus, Plaintiffs have stated sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for negligence.

Defendants demur to the fourth through thirteenth causes of action on grounds that the allegations of damages are conclusory, unsupported by factual allegations, and contradict other allegations in the Complaint. (Demurrer p. 3:8-11.) Upon review, there are sufficient allegations of damage supporting each of these causes of action. (Compl. ¶¶ 74-130.)

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another.” (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 939.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendants have wrongfully interfered with Plaintiffs’ right to possession in their washer, dryer and mini split air conditioner by refusing to return the property to Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 131-137.) This is sufficient to allege a cause of action for conversion.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court