Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV15686, Date: 2025-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV15686    Hearing Date: March 28, 2025    Dept: 56

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

 DONNELL EUGENE RAY; TEMPLE-CULBERSON ENTERPRISES, LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

                                                                             

                        Defendants.                              

 

      CASE NO.: 24STCV15686

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

MOTION TO VACATE ORDER FOR DISMISSAL

 

Date: March 28, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept. 56

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: None

 

            The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed.

 

BACKGROUND

            This action arises from a workers’ compensation subrogation action stemming from an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed the complaint (“Complaint”) on June 24, 2024, against defendants Donnell Eugene Ray (“Ray”), Temple-Culberson Enterprises (“Temple-Culberson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 through 100 alleging a single cause of action for negligence.

 

            On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to vacate order for dismissal (“Motion”). The Motion is unopposed.     

 

DISCUSSION

            “A motion for relief under section 473 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will not interfere unless there is a clear showing of an abuse. [Citation.] The statute is remedial and should be liberally applied to carry out the policy of permitting trial on the merits, but the moving party has the burden of showing good cause. [Citations.]” (David v. Thayer (1980) 133 Cal.App.3d 892, 904-905.) 

 

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 473, subdivision (b) provides that a court must vacate any resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against an attorney’s client whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entering of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by the attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect, unless the court finds that the fault or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (CCP § 473, subd. (b).) The affidavit need only attest to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect in causing the default or default judgment—the reasons for it need not be explained. (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 439.) Attestation that one of these reasons existed is sufficient to obtain relief unless the trial court finds that the dismissal did not occur because of these reasons. (Graham v. Beers (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660.) This is because “the purpose of the mandatory relief provision under section 473, subdivision (b) is achieved by focusing on who is to blame, not why.” (Martin Potts, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.)

 

For example, California courts have determined that an attorney’s conscious decision not to answer a complaint on behalf of his or her client is grounds for mandatory relief under this statutory subdivision. (Solv-All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1010.) The lawyer’s negligence need not be the exclusive or sole cause of the client’s loss so long as it was in fact a proximate cause. (Milton v. Perceptual Develop. Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861, 867.) However, mandatory relief under section 473, subdivision (b) may be denied where dismissal [or default] resulted from intentional conduct rather than a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (See Pagarigan v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Cal., Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 38, 45-46.)

 

            Plaintiff brings this Motion to vacate the orders of dismissal entered in this case based on the grounds that the dismissals were entered based on the mistake and inadvertence of Plaintiff’s counsel, Jeffrey Greathouse (“Counsel”), to respond to the Court’s November 4, 2024 request for an update as to service on defendant Ray and failure to take a default as to defendant Temple-Culberson. This position is supported by Counsel’s declaration. Counsel states that he received the notice from the Court requesting an update as to service of Ray and dismissal/default of Temple-Culberson, but mistakenly did not calendar the December 11 and December 19, 2024, deadlines. (Greathouse Decl., ¶¶ 4-7.)

 

The Court finds that the dismissal of the Defendants was the result of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. In addition, the Motion was timely filed within six months of the dismissals and is accompanied by Counsel’s sworn affidavit attesting to his mistake.

 

            The Motion is GRANTED. The Court orders that the dismissals be vacated, and that the Complaint be reinstated.  The Court will hold a case management conference on May 9, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. in this department.

 

 

             

Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.           

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

 

Dated this 28th day of March 2025

 

 

 

 

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court