Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV16435, Date: 2024-12-03 Tentative Ruling

This action arises from a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) entered into between Plaintiffs and Defendant on February 11, 2022 in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC683350 (the “Underlying Case”). Although the complaint in the within action (the “Complaint”) alleges that the Settlement Agreement provided that the court in the Underlying Case retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms thereof [Complaint, ¶1], instead of seeking relief in the Underlying Case, Plaintiffs filed this separate action, and on July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint seeking to enforce certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the Complaint here seeks to require Defendant to remit $296,666.67 to Plaintiff Diana Sparagna for her 1/3 interest in the real property located at 350 Paseo De Playa, Unit 231, Ventura, CA 93001 (“Paseo de Playa Property”), and to remit $296,666.67 to the Rayna Stephanie Alice Navarro Special Needs Trust dated October 1, 2010, for its 1/3 interest in the Paseo de Playa Property.

On August 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Demurrer to Defendant’s Answer and Motion to Strike. On November 18, 2024, Defendant filed Oppositions to both the Demurrer and Motion to Strike. On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Strike.

The meet and confer requirement has been met. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41 subd. (a), 435.5 subd. (a); Su Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.)

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer.

(Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and "treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

A demurrer to an answer may be appropriate if "[t]he answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense [or] [t]he answer is uncertain." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20,

Ultimate facts are generally sufficient, rather than evidentiary matters or legal

The critical inquiry when a plaintiff demurs to an answer is whether the answer raises a defense to plaintiff’s stated cause of action. (Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-80.) Even where a defense is defectively pled, it may be allowed if the answer gives sufficient notice to enable the plaintiff to meet the defense, in part because defenses not pled are waived. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)

Defendant asserts 13 affirmative defenses in her Answer. Plaintiffs demur to each of Defendant’s affirmative defenses on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute affirmative defense, are ambiguous and state only conclusionary matter. Additionally, Plaintiffs demur to the Answer on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense that not all parties were signatories to the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs also contend that the Answer fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense that the absence of a condition precedent excuses Defendant’s performance.

While the evidentiary facts alleged in the Answer are sparse, the cardinal rule of pleading is that only the ultimate facts need to be alleged. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 714, 719.) The “‘distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree. [Citations]. For example, the courts have permitted allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them “ultimate facts” or “conclusions of fact.””’ (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

Most importantly, the sufficiency of an answer depends on the complaint to which it purports to answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733.) Even where an answer is entirely bare of facts, it is read with reference to the facts alleged in the complaint or cross-complaint. Additionally, some vagueness may exist in a defendant’s answer because most defendants do not have the ability to prove their defenses at the initial answering phase; accordingly, a defense may be allowed if the defendant’s pleading gives sufficient notice to enable the plaintiff to prepare to meet the defense. (Harris, supra 56 Cal.4th at 240.)

Thus, Plaintiffs’ contention that each of the affirmative defenses fails to include sufficient facts is unavailing. The Court has reviewed the Answer and finds that it fairly apprises the Plaintiffs of Defendant’s affirmative defenses. As pled, the defenses are sufficient to withstand demurrer. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].) Any uncertainty as to the facts underlying Defendant’s defenses, including whether all relevant parties were signatories to the Settlement Agreement or whether there is a condition precedent to performance, can be clarified in discovery.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” generally means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3), (c)).

In analyzing a motion to strike, California courts “accept as true the well-pleaded allegations” in the challenged pleadings, as well as “well-pleaded allegations admitted in” the responsive “answer.” (Atwell Island Water Dist. v. Atwell Island Water District (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 624, 628; Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 [California courts “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)

Plaintiffs move to strike certain portions of Defendant’s Answer, and all the affirmative defenses, as false and irrelevant. (Mot. to Strike, pp. 5:15-6:21.) As discussed above, the Court finds that the affirmative defenses are well-pled. Further, the challenged sections of paragraphs 1, 12, 13, and 17 in the Answer are not irrelevant because they relate directly to Defendant’s ninth affirmative defense of lack of standing and her eleventh affirmative defense of failure of condition precedent. Thus, the motion to strike is DENIED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court