Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV21346, Date: 2025-05-30 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Megan Olinn and Shen Deshayne (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Deng Pan and Xiyangyang Moving Company (collectively, “Defendants”)

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident. On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Deng Pan and Does 1-20, inclusive. The operative first amended complaint (the “FAC”) alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence; and (2) loss of consortium.

On May 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to quash deposition subpoena for production of business records (the “Motion”). On May 16, 2025, Defendants filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). On May 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply (the “Reply”).

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs filed a single motion seeking to quash four subpoenas. There is no legal authority or rule of Court permitting Plaintiffs to improperly combine four separate motions to be heard together absent a Court order permitting such. Motions to quash separate discovery requests should be filed separately. Each motion requires a separate notice, a motion, and memorandum in support. (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1112(a).) Moreover, combining motions avoids payment of separate filing fees and deprives the Court of filing fees it is otherwise entitled to collect. While the Court declines to decide this Motion on procedural grounds, Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the additional $180.00 in filing fees they would have paid had they properly filed four separate motions to quash.

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1987.1 states, “[w]hen a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, …, upon motion reasonably made by the party, the witness, or any consumer described in Section 1985.3, or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” There is no requirement that the motion contain a meet-and-confer declaration demonstrating a good-faith attempt at informal resolution. (Id.) A motion to quash does require a separate statement, unless the party being subpoenaed did not provide any response to the subpoena. (Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(5), (b)(6).)

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (CCP § 2017.010.)

Plaintiffs move to quash the subpoenas for medical records issued to Plaintiffs’ therapists Brianna Johnson and Anne Crile, or in the alternative for the Court to order that the parties execute the LASC Model Protective Order. Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenas are overbroad and violate Plaintiffs’ right to privacy. (Mot., p. 10:14-17.)

Defendants argue that the parties have agreed upon more narrowly tailored business records subpoenas, but that modifications to the standard LASC Model Protective Order are necessary to satisfy Defendants’ insurer’s requirements. (Opp., pp. 6:14-15.) Defendants assert that modifications are required regarding: (1) who may access the subject records; and (2) retention and disposal of the subject records. (Opp., pp. 6:16-7:1.) Specifically, Defendants assert that “members of the insurer’s claims personnel need to be involved in reviewing damage related records for purposes of claim valuation and payment, and such cannot be subject to approval by Plaintiffs or their counsel.” (Opp., p. 6:18-20.) Defendants also assert that the standard language in the LASC Model Protective Order pertaining to retention and disposal of records conflicts with certain insurance code provisions with which insurers are required to comply. (Opp., p. 6:20-28.) In the Reply, Plaintiffs fail to explain why they are unwilling to agree to the requested modifications.

The subpoenas here seek medical records for each of the Plaintiffs from two separate therapists. Plaintiffs responded in discovery that both therapists have examined and/or treated them in connection with injuries attributed to the alleged motor vehicle incident. (Opp., Hakopian Decl., ¶ 5; Exhs. A & B [Responses to Form Interrogatories, Nos. 6.1-6.4, 6.7.] While Plaintiffs have a right of privacy in their medical records, privacy interests are substantially reduced or implicitly waived when a party places their mental, physical or emotional conditions directly at issue in an action. (See Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 101.) Plaintiffs here claim loss of consortium and seek to recover related medical expenses and damages. (FAC, pp. 4-5.) Thus, Plaintiffs have substantially reduced their privacy interest in their medical records and related documents concerning their mental and emotional condition. The documents are directly relevant to Defendants’ defenses and for Defendants to establish any alternative causes to Plaintiffs’ conditions. The Court does find, however, that good cause exists to have a protective order in place to maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiffs’ mental health records and related documents.

“[I]n making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (CCP § 1987.2 subd. (a).)

The Court does not find that this Motion was made or opposed in bad faith; therefore, sanctions are not warranted.

Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion in so far as it seeks to quash Defendants’ deposition subpoenas to Brianna Johnson and Anne Crile but GRANTS the Motion in so far as it seeks a protective order. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed protective order to the Court within 10 days of the date of this ruling. Plaintiffs are further ordered to pay $180.00 in unpaid filing fees to the Court within 20 days of this order.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court