Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV25832, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.
Case Number: 24STCV25832 Hearing Date: April 14, 2025 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
STUART SENDER, Plaintiff, vs. GRAND PROMENADE, LP, a California
limited partnership; GK MANAGEMENT CO., INC., a California corporation, and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE Date: April 14, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants Grand Promenade, LP and GK Management Co., Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff Stuart Sender (“Plaintiff”)
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This is a habitability case. On October 4,
2024, Plaintiff filed the complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendants alleging
causes of action for: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2)
negligence; (3) negligent hiring; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) nuisance; (7) Business & Professions code
§ 17200; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (10) fraudulent misrepresentation; (11) negligent
misrepresentation; (12) violation of LAMC § 45.35; (13) violation of LACC § 8.52.130;
(14) violation of Civil Code § 1940.2; and (15) retaliatory eviction.
On January 2, 2025, Defendants filed
the instant demurrer (“Demurrer”) and motion to strike (the “Motion”). On April
2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Demurrer (the “Opposition”). On
April 4, 2025, Defendants field a reply (the “Reply”). The Motion to Strike is
unopposed.
MEET AND CONFER
The parties have satisfied the meet and confer
requirement.
DEMURRER
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code of
Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 430.10, subd. (e).)
To sufficiently
allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that
is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded.
(Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983)
35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey
Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary
fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be
alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.)
In testing the
sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all
material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at
Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer,
however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A demurrer for
uncertainty lies where the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible.
(CCP, § 430.10, subd. (f).)
“A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
612, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title
Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46 [holding claims for unfair business
practices need not be pled specifically, impliedly disapproving Khoury].)
As a result, a special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach
failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at
uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro
(1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825, disapproved on other grounds in Jefferson v.
J.E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719-720 [statute of limitations
question].)
Where a
complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise a defendant
of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer for
uncertainty. (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A
special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of
the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues
which he is to meet”].)
Defendants demur
to the entire Complaint on grounds that it does not distinguish between the two
Defendants or attribute any specific conduct or knowledge to either of them. (Demurrer,
p. 12:6-17.) Defendants also demur on grounds that Plaintiff fails to plead any
facts about the alleged habitability issue or dangerous condition. (Demurrer,
pp. 12:21-14:12.) Alternatively, Defendants demur to each cause of action on
grounds that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to allege each cause of
action. (Demurrer, pp. 14:15-25:16.)
Upon review of
the Complaint, it is both uncertain and fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute
any of the alleged causes of action. The factual allegations contained in the
Complaint are as follows: In 2022, a fire broke out at Plaintiff’s apartment
complex and Defendants informed the tenants that they would cover the cost of
temporary relocation. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Defendants issued 3-day notices to pay
or quit, although no rent was due. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff “received multiple
harassing notices,” which he complained about, and as a result “lives in
constant fear of being served with eviction notices.” (Compl., ¶¶ 11-13.)
The Complaint
does not identify any specific conduct by the Defendants or their agents or
representatives. There are no facts describing what the alleged habitability concern
or dangerous or defective condition of the property is. There are no facts describing
the alleged harassing conduct or what misrepresentations were made, or by whom.
Each cause of action merely recites the legal elements of the claim without providing
any factual allegations describing how the cause of action applies to this
case. (Compl., ¶¶ 17-95.) Thus, the Complaint is insufficient to apprise
Defendants of the issues which they are to meet and does not state facts
sufficient to constitute any of the 15 alleged causes of action.
In the
Opposition, Plaintiff conclusory states that the Complaint does state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is not uncertain or ambiguous.
(Opp., pp. 2:11-3:7.) Plaintiff does not, however, point to any actual facts
alleged in the Complaint to support his argument.
The Demurrer is
SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
MOTION TO STRIKE
The court may,
upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed
in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the
court. (CCP § 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d
767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is
surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].)
As the Demurrer has been sustained
in its entirety, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.
Defendants Grand Promenade, LP and GK
Management Co., Inc.’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.
The Motion to Strike is MOOT.
Moving
Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 14th day of April 2025
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Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |