Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV27075, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 56 JUDGE HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAW AND MOTION RULINGS. The court makes every effort to post tentative rulings by 5.00 pm of the court day before the hearing. The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)], and are also available in the courtroom on the day of the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(b)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call Dept 56 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0656) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call. Court reporters are not provided, and parties who want a record of motions and other proceedings must hire a privately retained certified court reporter.

The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed by May 28, 2025. (Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 1005, subd. (b) [opposition must be filed at least nine court days prior to the hearing].)

This action arises from Defendants’ attempts to repossess a Toyota vehicle operated by Plaintiff after Plaintiff’s mother defaulted on the car payments. Plaintiff Leonardo Aldape (“Plaintiff”) sues Defendants Toyota Motor North America; Inc., Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota of Downtown L.A., American Recovery Service (“ARS”), Benchmark Asset Resolution Inc. (“Benchmark”), Bernal Louie Ray, and Does 1-100, inclusive, (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to an October 16, 2024 complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of the peace [Commercial Code § 9609]; (2) false imprisonment; (3) assault; (4) battery; (5) kidnapping [Penal Code § 207(A)]; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligence.

On January 27, 2025, LAD-T filed the instant demurrer (“Demurrer”). The Demurrer is unopposed.

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), the Court may take judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”

The court, however, may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made such that the truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

Pursuant to LAD-T’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of the following licenses issued by the California Bureau of Security & Investigative Services: (1) Licensing Details for Benchmark Asset Resolution, Inc.; and (2) Licensing Details for All American Recovery, Inc.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747;CCP § 430.10, subd. (e).)

To sufficiently allege a cause of action, a complaint must allege all the ultimate facts—that is, the facts needed to establish each element of the cause of action pleaded. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212, superseded by statute as stated in Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) “[E]ach evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) Courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228, disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

“The legal owner, debt collector, debtor, lienholder, lessor, lessee, or registered owner, or the agent of any of them, is not liable for any act or omission by a licensed repossession agency, or its agent, in carrying out an assignment or repossession order and is entitled to indemnity from the repossession agency for any loss, damage, cost, or expense, including court costs and attorney’s fees, that the legal owner, debt collector, debtor, lienholder, lessor, lessee, or registered owner, or the agent of any of them, may reasonably incur as a result thereof. Nothing in this subdivision limits the liability of any person for his or her tortious conduct.” (Business & Professions Code, § 7507.13, subd. (b).)

LAD-T demurs to the entire Complaint on the ground that it is immune from liability for the alleged conduct of the repossession companies. LAD-T contends that, as the selling dealership, it does not claim a security or ownership interest in the subject vehicle and did not hire or contract with repossession companies ARS or Benchmark to repossess the vehicle. (Demurrer, p. 12:20-25.) LAD-T further argues that, even if it had hired ARS or Benchmark, it would nonetheless be immune from liability under Business & Professions Code section 7507.13, subdivision (b). (Demurrer, p. 13:1-4.) LAD-T also asserts that the Complaint fails to allege any tortious conduct committed by LAD-T or its employees. (Demurrer, p. 13:5-6.)

Upon review, the allegations in the Complaint are based solely on the conduct of the repossession companies and their employees. (Compl., ¶¶ 21-42) While Plaintiff alleges that LAD-T hired ARS and Benchmark (Compl., ¶ 19), any liability arising from the repossession agencies’ actions cannot be imputed to LAD-T as a matter of law. (See Business & Professions Code, § 7507.13, subd. (b).) In addition, Plaintiff has failed to oppose the Demurrer or otherwise address the above-described deficiencies. The Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition as a tacit admission of the merits of LAD-T’s arguments. (See Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to allege any cause of action against LAD-T.

LAD-T’s Demurrer to the entire Complaint is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court