Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: 24STCV28030, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV28030 Hearing Date: June 12, 2025 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
Shaunt Nigoghossian, Plaintiff, vs. DreamWorks Animation Television, LLC;
NBCUniversal, LLC; Entertainment Partners Enterprises LLC; Jen Yip; Peter Gal;
Veronica Blakney; and Does 1 to 100, inclusive,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION Date: June 12, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants DreamWorks Animation L.L.C. (successor in interest to
DreamWorks Animation Television, LLC) (“DreamWorks”), NBCUniversal, LLC, Jen
Yip, and Peter Gal (collectively, “DreamWorks Defendants”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff Shaunt Nigoghossian (“Plaintiff”)
The Court has considered the moving,
opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This is a harassment and wrongful termination action. Plaintiff
sues DreamWorks Animation L.L.C. , NBCUniversal, LLC, Entertainment Partners
Enterprises, LLC, Jen Yip, Peter Gal, Veronica Blakney (“Blakney”) and Does 1
through 100 pursuant to an October 25, 2024, complaint (“Complaint”) alleging
causes of action for: (1) discrimination in violation of the FEHA; (2) hostile
work environment harassment in violation of the FEHA; (3) retaliation in
violation of the FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or
retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) breach of express oral contract not to
terminate employment without good cause; (6) breach of implied-in-fact contract
not to terminate employment without good cause; (7) negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention; (8) wrongful termination of employment in violation of public
policy; (9) whistleblower retaliation [Labor Code § 1102.5]; and (10)
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On January 27, 2025, DreamWorks Defendants filed the instant motion to compel
arbitration (the “Motion”). On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition
(the “Opposition”). On June 5, 2025, DreamWorks Defendants filed a reply (the “Reply”).
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Pursuant to
Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the Court may take judicial notice
of “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the
United States or of any state of the United States”.
Pursuant to
Plaintiff’s request, the Court takes judicial notice of the following: (1) Order
Granting Defendants Robinhood Markets, Inc. and Hemal Doshi’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, Erkan v. Robinhood Markets, Inc., et al.,
Case No. CGC-22-600149, dated October 17, 2022; and (2) Order Regarding
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, Kennedy v.
Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., Case No. CGC-23-604370, dated April 28, 2023.
DISCUSSION
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
while a federal statute, applies in California courts and requires state courts
to enforce arbitration agreements as required by the federal common law
developed under the FAA. (Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1,
15-16.) The FAA preempts and invalidates state law and state judicial decisions
that disfavor arbitration or require arbitration provisions to pass higher
scrutiny. (Southland Corp., supra (1984) 465 U.S. at 12; Perry
v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 490.) If the parties designate the FAA
applies, then California arbitration law is preempted. (Rodriguez v.
American Techs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121-1122.)
A court’s inquiry is limited to a
determination of (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and (2)
whether the arbitration agreement covers the dispute. (9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron
Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126,
1130; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84; Simula,
Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc. (9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716, 720 [if the finding is
affirmative on both counts the FAA requires the Court to enforce the
arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms]; Lacayo v. Cataline
Restaurant Group Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 244, 257 [Where moving party
meets initial burden, “the party opposing arbitration must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition”].)
Existence
and Scope of Arbitration Agreement
“Parties are not required to arbitrate
their disagreements unless they have agreed to do so. A contract to arbitrate
will not be inferred absent a ‘clear agreement.’ When determining whether a
valid contract to arbitrate exists, we apply ordinary state law principles that
govern contract formation. In California, a ‘clear agreement’ to arbitrate may
be either express or implied in fact.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1092-93 [applying California law] (internal citations
omitted).) In determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the
court first considers “two ‘gateway issues’ of arbitrability: (1) whether there
was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, and (2) whether the
agreement covered the dispute at issue” (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The court is only required to make a finding
of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.
(Condee v. Longwood Management Corp., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p.
219.)
In support of this Motion,
DreamWorks Defendants attach a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement and the DreamWorks
Animation Television, L.L.C. Writer/Individual Standard Terms and Conditions executed
by Plaintiff on April 29, 2020 (the “Agreement”). (Yip Decl., Exs. 1-2.) In
relevant portion, the Agreement states: “Any controversy, claim, or dispute
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or this agreement to arbitrate,
including, without limitation, the interpretation, performance, formation,
validity, breach, or enforcement of this Agreement, and further including any
such controversy, claim, or dispute against or involving any officer, director,
agent, employee, affiliate, successor, predecessor, or assign of a party to
this Agreement (each, a “Dispute”), shall be fully and finally adjudicated by
binding arbitration to the fullest extent allowed by law (the “Arbitration”).”
(Yip Decl., Ex. 2, ¶ 14(a).)
In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues
that the Agreement is unenforceable by operation of the Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), 9
U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
The EFAA states: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct
constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the
named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such
conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver
shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the
sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402.) The preceding section
defines a sexual harassment dispute as “dispute relating to conduct that is
alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or
State law.” (9 U.S.C. § 401.) Under the EFAA, when a plaintiff's lawsuit
contains at least one claim that fits within the scope of the act, the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all claims asserted in the
lawsuit. (Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791,
800.)
The Complaint includes a hostile work
environment/harassment cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that his colleague Blakney
made unwanted sexual advances towards Plaintiff, called Plaintiff repeatedly
and left him inappropriate voicemail messages, “used her foot to rub [Plaintiff’s]
groin area over his pants without his consent,” showed up to Plaintiff’s house
uninvited, forced Plaintiff to have sex with her, broke into Plaintiff’s house
and internet accounts and threatened to “ruin his career” if he would not
oblige her. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-27.)
In the Reply, DreamWorks Defendants for
the first time argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible sexual
harassment cause of action against them. In Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 567, the Court states that “where a party
seeks to invoke the EFAA based on a claim of sexual harassment, such a claim
must have been plausibly pled.” DreamWorks Defendants argue that none of the
alleged harassing conduct occurred in the workplace nor was the alleged
harassment committed by a supervisor. (Reply, pp. 9:11-10:22.) DreamWorks
Defendants also argue that they were only made aware of the conduct after it
had already ended and that Plaintiff does not allege that any incidents of
harassment occurred after he reported the issue to DreamWorks Human Resources.
(Reply, pp. 10:23-11:16.)
DreamWorks Defendants contend that
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a sexual harassment claim against them;
however, they do not dispute that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a sexual
harassment claim against Blakney. The EFAA applies to bar an entire “case” from
arbitration, not just the claims for sexual harassment (Liu, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) It follows that the EFAA applies to all defendants in such
a case as well, not just the parties against whom the sexual harassment claim
is directly alleged. DreamWorks Defendants have cited no authority suggesting otherwise.
Thus, the Court finds that the EFAA applies.
The Motion to Compel Arbitration is
DENIED.
Moving Party is ordered to give notice of
this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed
by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 12th day of June 2025
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Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |