Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 24STCV34368, Date: 2025-05-13 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“JLRNA”) and Jaguar Rocklin (collectively “Defendants”)

This is a lemon-law action. Plaintiff sues Defendants pursuant to a December 27, 2024 complaint (“Complaint”) alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code (“Civ. Code”) § 1793.2 subd. (d) [against JLRNA]; (2) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2 subd. (b) [against JLRNA]; (3) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2 subd. (a)(3) [against JLRNA]; (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability [Civ. Code §§ 179.1, 1794, 195.5] [against JLRNA]; (5) negligent repair [against Rocklin]; and (6) fraudulent inducement – concealment [against JLRNA].

On April 18, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “Motion”). On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition (the “Opposition”). On May 7, 2025, Defendants filed a reply (the “Reply”).

"A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analogous to a general demurrer, but is made after the time to file a demurrer has expired." (International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 230 v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1196.) If the party moving for judgment on the pleadings is a defendant, there are only two permissible grounds for bringing the motion: the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or the complaint "does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant." (Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), § 438, subd. (c)(1)(b)(ii).)

“Because the motion is, in effect, a general demurrer, the same rules apply.” (Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586.) Therefore, when determining whether a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the court must treat the complaint as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465.)

If the court grants the motion, it may permit the opposing party to amend the pleading. (CCP, § 438, subd. (h)(1).) If granting leave to amend, the court must allow the party 30 days to file the amended pleading. (CCP § 438, subd. (h)(2).) But “[i]f there is no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted.” (Schonfeldt, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 1465.)

The necessary elements for fraudulent concealment are: (1) that the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) that the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) that the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted in the same way had she known of the concealed fact; (5) causation; and (6) that the plaintiff sustained damages.¿(Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 868; See also City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 [any action sounding in fraud must be pleaded with particularity].)

“[A] duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) “[A] duty to disclose arises in this context only where there is already a sufficient relationship or transaction between the parties.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312 [no duty to disclose where no transactional relationship existed between parties].)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment fails because JLRNA does not owe Plaintiff a duty of disclosure, the claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine and Plaintiff has not satisfied the heightened pleading standard required for a fraud cause of action. (Mot., pp. 7:1-13:15.)

Upon review, Plaintiff alleges no facts to establish any direct transactional relationship between Plaintiff and JLRNA at the time of the alleged non-disclosure regarding the vehicle’s defects. Plaintiff does not allege that she purchased the vehicle from JLRNA. (see Compl.) Merely alleging that the vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with defects and nonconformities to warranty is insufficient to impose a duty to disclose upon JLRNA where Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating any direct dealings between the parties. (Compl., ¶ 7.) “Under California law, manufacturer warranties that accompany the sale of a vehicle without regard to the substantive terms of the sale contract between the buyer and the dealer are independent of the sale contract.” (Davis v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 825, 837 [emphasis added].)

In the Opposition, Plaintiff contends that she has pled a “buyer-seller relationship” with JLRNA and that JLRNA “profited from the sale.” (Opp., p. 1.) There are no facts in the Complaint supporting such assertions. Plaintiff never alleges that JLRNA financed or controlled the sale or otherwise had a direct interest in the sale of the vehicle to Plaintiff. There are no facts alleging Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from a JLRNA-authorized dealership or other JLRNA sales representatives or that JLRNA’s agents directly solicited business from Plaintiff. (Compare Dhital¿v. Nissan North America, Inc.,¿(2022)¿84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 [holding a transactional relationship is sufficiently pled for the purposes of a demurrer where “plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers.”].) Further, while Plaintiff alleges JLRNA concealed information in its “marketing materials” (Compl., ¶ 72), Plaintiff has not alleged any facts identifying these materials such that it can be inferred that the materials were anything more than communications to the public at large. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 41 [“Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff has no concealment claim against JLRNA absent some allegation of a direct transactional relationship which imposed on JLRNA some duty to disclose. (See Bigler-Engler, supra, (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.)

Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment is not pled with the heightened level of specificity required for fraud allegations. In general, “fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) “The requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

Plaintiff alleges that JLRNA “knew about and concealed” the vehicle’s engine defect from Plaintiff and its dealerships at both the time of the sale to Plaintiff and during repairs. (Compl., ¶¶ 59, 68.) Plaintiffs allege JLRNA and its agents “actively concealed the Engine Defect and failed to disclose this defect to Plaintiff at the time of purchase of the Subject Vehicle or thereafter.” (Compl., ¶ 57.) Plaintiff has not identified any facts pertaining to the specific omissions or representations made in any transaction with Plaintiff in particular, or with respect to the specific vehicle purchased by Plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to identify the names of the agents who participated in the concealment, their authority to speak on behalf of JLRNA, whether JLRNA ratified such conduct or when or where she allegedly spoke to JLRNA’s agents.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a fraudulent inducement – concealment cause of action.

To plead a claim for negligent repair, a plaintiff must allege the elements of negligence. “Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty.” (Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795; Crouse v. Brobeck (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1532 [a plaintiff need only state what occurred, and generally that the acts were negligently done, but “need not state the specific act or omission constituting negligent conduct.”].) Likewise, causation may be alleged “succinctly and generally, unless the pled facts ‘do not naturally give rise to an inference of causation…’” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc.¿(1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 78 [internal citations omitted].)¿

“In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922.) Typically, plaintiffs may only recover in tort for a breach of contract where: “(1) the breach is accompanied by a traditional common law tort, such as fraud or conversion; (2) the means used to breach the contract are tortious, involving deceit or undue coercion or; (3) one party intentionally breaches the contract intending or knowing that such a breach will cause severe, unmitigable harm in the form of mental anguish, personal hardship, or substantial consequential damages.’ [Citation.]” (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 553–554.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s negligent repair cause of action fails because it is barred by the economic loss rule. (Mot., pp. 13:16-14:26.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to Jaguar Rocklin for “substantial repair,” but does not specify the services sought or the damages suffered. (Compl., ¶ 47.) While the Complaint does not reference a contract, it is reasonable to infer that the parties contracted for the provision of services to the vehicle. (Opp., p. 14:26-28.) Plaintiff does not allege any other duty independent from Jaguar Rocklin’s agreement to perform services that would give rise to tort liability for Jaguar Rocklin’s alleged negligence.

In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the economic loss rule is not an absolute bar in all cases where the parties have a contractual relationship. (Opp., pp. 14:15-15:15.) Plaintiff relies on the ‘component exception’ to the economic loss rule, under which recovery is not barred where economic losses are “accompanied by some form of personal injury or damage to property other than the defective product itself.” (KB Home v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079; See also Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 483-84.) Here, however, Plaintiff has neither alleged personal injury nor damage to property other than the vehicle. The Complaint does not specify the type of damages sustained and the pled facts do not give rise to an inference of personal injury or damages to property other than the vehicle. (Compl., ¶¶ 46-50.) Accordingly, the facts alleged on the face of the Complaint do not reflect that the component exception to the economic loss rule is applicable.

Thus, the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a negligent repair cause of action.

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend.¿

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court