Judge Holly J. Fujie, Case Number: 2STCV09671, Date: 2024-06-07 Tentative Ruling

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation (“Plaintiff”) RESPONDING PARTY: None

This action arises from the alleged breach of a lease for farm equipment. On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against

Defendants Goodland Global Farm, Inc. (“Goodland”), Utomo Tani (“Tani”), Yongsook Kim

(“Kim”) (collectively “Defendants”), and DOES 1-10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for:

(1) Breach of Leases; (2) Breach of the Tani Guaranty; (3) Breach of the Kim Guaranty; (4)

Claim and Delivery; and (5) Conversion. On May 23, 2022, Defendants filed a joint Answer to the Complaint.

On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the Answer, to which Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiff replied.

On July 18, 2022, after hearing, the Court sustained Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendants’ Answer with leave to amend. (07/18/22 Minute Order.) The Court ordered an Amended Answer to be filed by August 19, 2022. (07/18/22 Minute Order.) Defendants, however, did not file an Amended Answer.

On August 9, 2022, after hearing, the Court granted the motion to be relieved as counsel filed by Paul A. Hoffman as to Defendant Goodland. (08/09/22 Minute Order.)

On February 17, 2023, after hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Answer of Defendant Goodland. (02/17/23 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants at the hearing. (02/17/23 Minute Order.)

On March 6, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the Court granted the motions to compel filed by Plaintiff. (03/06/23 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants at the hearing. (03/06/23 Minute Order.)

On January 23, 2024, a non-jury trial commenced in this action. (01/23/24 Minute Order.) There were no appearances by Defendants. (01/23/24 Minute Order.)

On February 27, 2024, Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff on each cause of action in the Complaint. The Court entered a money judgment in the amount of $4,785,847.07 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in favor of Plaintiff. The Judgment provides that Plaintiff “is deemed the prevailing party and shall also recover contractual attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined pursuant to a post-judgment motion, plus statutory costs to be determined pursuant to a memorandum of costs.” (Judgment at p. 4: 25-28.) Defendants did not appear at trial.

On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (the “Motion”). Plaintiff seeks an order setting the attorneys’ fees award in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the sum of $201,021.57 or in such other amount as the Court deems just and proper. The Motion is made on the grounds that: (1) on February 27, 2024, the Court entered judgment against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees pursuant to the parties’ contracts. The Motion was initially set for hearing on May 22, 2024.

On April 29, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion from May 22 to May 24, 2024. The Court ordered Plaintiff to give notice of the continued hearing date to all parties and to file proof of service of such notice in this department. (04/29/24 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order.) Plaintiff did not file a proof of service showing effectuation of notice of the continued hearing date on all Defendants; however, the Court’s April 29, 2024 Notice of Continuance of Hearing and Order was mailed by the Clerk’s Office to Defendants Tani and Kim. (04/29/24 Certificate of Mailing.) There is no indication that Defendant Goodland was given notice of the continued hearing date.

On May 24, 2024, after hearing oral argument, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion to May 31, 2024, and ordered counsel to file proof of service as to the Motion and to file a notice of continuance. (05/24/24 Minute Order.) Also, on May 24, 2024, the Court issued an order (the “Order”) which directed Plaintiff to file “a Request for Judicial Notice regarding Goodlands’ corporate status, together with Proof of Service of [the] Order for the continuance of [the] hearing . . . with the Court before the hearing date.” (05/24/24 Order at p. 7:22-25.)

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Continued Hearing informing Defendants that the hearing on the Motion was continued from May 24 to May 31, 2024. (05/28/24 Notice of Continuance.) The Notice of Continuance was served on Defendants on May 24, 2024 via FedEx. Plaintiff, however, did not file a proof of service as to the Order. The Notice of Continued Hearing attaches a “Continuation Page” thereto which is a document indicating that “[r]elief from [s]tay is granted immediately so that Grand Pacific Financing Corporation . . . may take any all action necessary to foreclose on the property on or after August 2, 2024.” (05/28/24 Notice of Continuance at Exh. 1.) Plaintiff also did not file a request for judicial notice as ordered by the Court and, based on a review of the court file, has not served Defendants with the Order. Plaintiff did not comply with the Order. The Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the motion to June 7, 2024, instructing Plaintiff to file a request for judicial notice as to the corporate status of Defendant Goodland and to file proof of service of the Order before the next hearing date.

Plaintiff’s requests for the Court to take judicial notice of (1) all prior papers and pleadings filed by Plaintiff in connection with its Motion for Attorney’s fees on May 22, 2024; (2) the Court’s Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order continuing the hearing to May 24, 2024, herein referred to as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1; (3) the Court’s May 31, 2024, Minute Order, herein referred to as Exhibit 2; and (4) the document entitled as the Dissolution of Goodland Global Farm, Inc. filed with the California Secretary of State herein referred to as Exhibit 3 are GRANTED under Evidence Code 452(b) and (d) as the documents are records of the Los Angeles Superior Court and the California Secretary of State respectively.

In general, a prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees only when a statute or agreement of the parties provides for fee shifting. (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1248.) It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) “The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com., supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) An award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1365.)

In its prior order the Court ordered Plaintiff “to file a request for judicial notice as to the corporate status of Defendant Goodland and to file proof of service of the Order before the next hearing date.”(05/31/2024 Minute Order.) The Court notes that since issuing its order. Plaintiff has filed and served its request for judicial notice and proof of service on May 31 as instructed. (05/31/24 Request for Judicial Notice.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

Hon. Holly J. Fujie

Judge of the Superior Court