Judge: Holly J. Fujie, Case: BC691581, Date: 2023-05-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC691581 Hearing Date: May 5, 2023 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
Plaintiffs, vs. MARTA A. ALCUMBRAC, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO EXPUNGE
LIS PENDENS Date:
May 5, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
AND
RELATED CROSS-ACTION
MOVING
PARTY: Non-party Georgette Darvasan-Stanciu (“Ms. Stanciu”)
RESPONDING
PARTY: Non-party DiJulio Law Group (“DLG”)
The Court has considered the moving and opposition
papers. No reply papers were filed. Any reply papers were required to have been
filed and served at least five court days before the hearing under California Code
of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005, subdivision (b).
BACKGROUND
This action (the “Cindell Action”) arose out of a dispute
over an encroachment onto real property located in Los Angeles County (the “Cindell
Property”). Plaintiffs’ complaint (the
“Complaint”) alleges: (1) permanent injunction and damages- removal of
encroaching structure for willful trespass; (2) permanent injunction and
damages for negligent trespass; (3) abatement of private nuisance; and (4)
ejectment. On April 17, 2018,
Defendant/Cross-Complainant Marta A. Alcumbrac (“Alcumbrac”) filed a
cross-complaint (the “XC”) against George Stanciu (Mr. Stanciu”) and his
company under a fictitious business name, A&A Surveying & Mapping, alleging:
(1) implied indemnity; (2) comparative indemnity; (3) declaratory relief; (4)
equitable indemnity; (5) contribution; (6) negligence; and (7) declaratory
relief. The XC alleges that
Cross-Defendant George Stanciu (“Mr. Stanciu”) was responsible for any potential
damages alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint based on his conduct while serving as
Alcumbrac’s surveyor. Neither the
Complaint nor the XC alleges any claim against any real property owned by Mr.
Stanciu.
After
a series of discovery disputes, Mr. Stanciu’s Answer to the XC was struck and on
November 20, 2020, Cross-Complainant Alcumbriac entered default judgment was
entered against Mr. Stanciu. At the time
the default judgment was entered by the Court, the Court had not been notified
that Mr. Stanciu had died on August 24, 2020.
Alcumbriac did not satisfy the requirements of the California Probate Code for
proceeding against his estate in the Cindell Action’s XC. Therefore, Alcumbriac’s judgment is itself
not enforceable. No other party had a
claim against Mr. Stanciu or his estate in the Cindell Action.
On
April 14, 2023, Ms. Scanciu filed a motion for leave to intervene to file a
motion to expunge lis pendens (the “Motion”) in the Cindell Action. The Motion concerns a notice of lis pendens (the
“Lis Pendens”) allegedly recorded by DLG, “as Attorneys for Cross-Defendant
George Stanciu as an individual and dba A&A Surveying & Mapping” on
February 6, 2019 against real property owned by their own client, Mr. Stanciu,
together with moving party Ms. Stanciu, as joint tenants, located in the City
of Redlands, San Bernardino County (the “Stanciu Property”).
The
Lis Pendens is improper for a number of reasons. Outside of the fact that it apparently was
recorded by the attorneys for the party against whom the alleged claim was made
instead of by Alcumbrac, it erroneously states that the Cindell Action alleges “a
real property claim as described in this notice [which] was commenced on April
26, 2018, in the above-named court by Cross-Complainant, MARTA A. ALCUMBRAC, an
individual against Cross-Defendants [sic] GEORGE STANCIU, an individual [sic]
the action is now pending in the above-named court.” The Lis Pendens further erroneously represents
that “[t]he action affects right to possession of specific real property
commonly described as 825 East Colton Avenue, Redlands, CA 92374.” In fact, the XC does not allege a real
property claim within the meaning of Code of Civil procedure, Section 405, et
seq. and it does not “affect right to possession of” the Stanciu Property.
The
Notice of Lis Pendens was not filed in the Cindell Action, as required by CCP
Section 405.22, nor was it apparently served as required by that statute.
DISCUSSION
A party to an action who asserts a real property claim
may record a notice of pendency of action (lis pendens)[1] in
which that real property claim is alleged.
(CCP § 405.20.) DLG was noa a
party to the Cindell Action, and even assuming that its client authorized the
filing of a lis pendens against his own property, its contents are untrue. Moreover, any notice of pendency of action
shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the
requirements of CCP section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof
of service in the form and content specified in CCP section 1013a has been
recorded with the notice of pendency of action.
(CCP § 405.23.)[2]
At
any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or
any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply
to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. (CCP § 405.30.) A person who is not a party to the action,
however, shall obtain leave to intervene from the court at or before the time
the party brings the motion to expunge the notice. (Id.)
In
proceedings seeking to expunge a notice of pendency of action, the court shall
order the notice expunged if it finds that the pleading on which the notice is
based does not contain a real property claim or the claimant has not
established the probable validity of the real property claim by a preponderance
of the evidence. (CCP §§ 405.31,
405.32.) A third nonstatutory ground
also exists, such that a party alleging a lis pendens is “void and invalid” under
CCP section 405.23 for defective service may move for expungement on that
basis. (Rey Sanchez Investments v.
Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 259, 263.) A motion to expunge a lis pendens is not
required for a lis pendens that was not validly served to be deemed void. (See id.)
The
claimant opposing a motion to expunge a notice of pendency bears the
burden of showing that a that the notice of pendency is based on a real
property claim and that the claimant has a probability of prevailing on
that real property claim. (CCP §
405.30.)
The Motion seeks leave to intervene under CCP section 387
on the grounds that Ms. Stanciu, who is Mr. Stanciu’s widow, is the owner of
the property affected by the lis pendens.
(See Declaration of Georgette Darvasan-Stanciu ¶¶ 2-5, Exhibit
A.) She declares that she is the sole owner
of the Stanciu Property and that she was married to Mr. Stanciu until he died
on August 24, 2020. The Motion is not
captioned as a Motion for Leave to Intervene and it does not comply with CCP
section 387, subdivision (c) because it does not include a copy of a proposed
complaint in intervention.
The
Court notes, however, that DLG, which represented Mr. Stanciu until March 8,
2019, is also not a party to this action and is therefore not eligible
to oppose the Motion. DLG indicates that
it initiated an action in 2021 to recover Mr. Stanciu’s unpaid
attorney’s fees (21STLC07430, the “Collection Action”). Initially, the Court notes that by the time
the Collection Action was filed, Mr. Stanciu was dead, such that any action
regarding his obligations would have to be instituted pursuant to the Probate
Code, which the Collection Action was not.
In addition, it appears that the Collection Action was improperly
venued, as it appears that Mr. Stanciu, the only defendant, resided (before his
death) in San Bernardino County. (CCP
Section 395(a).) The Court further notes
that service on the late Mr. Stanciu was similarly suspect, as it was based on
a publication order which appears to have been based on the assumption that Mr.
Stanciu was still alive. Finally, the purported judgment in the Collection
Action was not in fact entered until after the first motion to Expunge Lis Pendens
was filed – having been entered on March 24 of this year.
Fundamentally,
however, DLG lacks standing to defend the Lis Pendens in this litigation because
it was never a party to the Cindell Action -- the action on which the Lis
Pendens is purportedly based. Moreover, it
appears that the Lis Pendens was void ab initio, as: 1) it was recorded
against real property that is not the subject of the Complaint or the XC; 2) it
was not filed with the Court upon its recordation; and 3) it was apparently not
served as required by the CCP. (See CCP
§ 405.22.)
Accordingly,
although the Court DENIES the Motion without prejudice, it sets an Order to
Show Cause hearing as to why the Court should not on its own motion expunge the
Lis Pendens for June 8, 2023 at 8:30 a.m..
Only actual parties to the Cindell Action may file opposition to the
expungement of the Lis Pendens.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at
SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email
and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off
calendar.
Dated this 5th day of May
2023
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|
Hon. Holly J.
Fujie Judge of the
Superior Court |
[1] The Court uses the terms notice of
pendency and lis pendens interchangeably.
[2]
Under CCP section 405.22: “Except in actions subject to Section 405.6, the
claimant shall, prior to recordation of the notice, cause a copy of the notice
to be mailed, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to all
known addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and
to all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property
claim as shown by the latest county assessment roll. If there is no known address for service on an
adverse party or owner, then as to that party or owner a declaration under
penalty of perjury to that effect may be recorded instead of the proof of
service required above, and the service on that party or owner shall not be
required. Immediately following
recordation, a copy of the notice shall also be filed with the court in which
the action is pending. Service shall
also be made immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later
joined in the action.”