Judge: James A. Mangione, Case: 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPT.:
EVENT DATE:
EVENT TIME:
HALL OF JUSTICE
TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 12, 2023
10/13/2023 09:00:00 AM C-75 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
JUDICIAL OFFICER:James A Mangione
CASE NO.:
CASE CATEGORY:
EVENT TYPE:
CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:
Civil - Unlimited Other employment Motion Hearing to Certify/Decertify Class Action 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL GUZMAN VS ALLAN COMPANY INC [EFILE] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is granted in part.
Before turning to the class certification analysis, the Court addresses Defendant's fringe arguments.
First, the Court finds that Defendant has waived its right to arbitration by pursuing litigation, including significant motion work, over a four-year period without asserting any affirmative defense for arbitration.
(See Department of Finance v. City of Merced (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 286, 294 (holding affirmative defenses not raised in the answer are waived); Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 945 ('[A] party's unreasonable delay in demanding or seeking arbitration, in and of itself, may constitute a waiver of a right to arbitrate.').) Second, the Court finds that the existence/enforceability of the December 2020 claim releases between Defendant and its direct employees does not impact the class certification analysis. This is a merits issue as to whether these employees are entitled to recovery should Plaintiffs prevail. (See Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207 ('[A] class is not inappropriate merely because each member at some point may be required to make an individual showing as to eligibility for recovery.'), disapproved of on other grounds by Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 955.) Finally, Defendant's argument that it did not provide 'services' as defined by the LWO is also a merits question properly addressed at a later point in the proceedings. The Court now turns to the merits of the class certification.
Standard Cal. Code of Civil Proc. § 382 governs class certification of Plaintiffs' claims. Section 382 authorizes class actions 'when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.' The standards for class certification under CCP § 382 are well-established. There must be an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. (Linder v. Thrifty Oil (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.) The plaintiff must also establish that class treatment is superior to alternative methods of adjudication. (Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 654.) Plaintiff's burden on moving for class certification, 'is not merely to show that some common issues exist, but, rather, to place substantial evidence in the record that common issues predominate.' (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29
3004691 11 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: GUZMAN VS ALLAN COMPANY INC [EFILE] 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL transactional facts that make the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.' (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980 (alterations and quotation marks omitted).) There must be an objective and feasible way of identifying class members. (Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 719, 728.) For reasons discussed below in the 'Typicality' section, the Court finds that the class definition should be limited to employees working in the Consolidated Way facility between March 2015 and September 2019. (See Hicks v. Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 ('[I]f necessary to preserve the case as a class action, the court itself can and should redefine the class where the evidence before it shows such a redefined class would be ascertainable.').) These individuals can be ascertained through Defendant's employee records, as well as the records of the labor contractors.
Additionally, the parties are already in the process of ascertaining potential class members via the ongoing Belaire-West process.
Community of Interest Whether there is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact depends on three factors: 1) Are there questions of law and fact common to the class which are substantially similar and which predominate over any questions affecting individual members? 2) Are the claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs typical of the claims or defenses of the class? 3) Will the representative plaintiffs fairly and adequately protect class interests? Common Questions Here, the predominate questions are: Did the LWO apply to CYC's contracts with the City from March 2015 to September 2019 and, if so, did CYC pay employees in compliance with the LWO? Applicability of the LWO either applied to everyone who worked under the Curbside Recycling Agreement, or it did not. The parties have not identified any issues of liability dependent upon an employee's specific factual situation. Consequently, there are common legal and factual questions more easily addressed on a class basis.
Typicality '[T]he purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class. Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.' (Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1509.) Defendant argues that named Plaintiffs do not satisfy the typicality element because all three worked through the labor contractors at the Consolidated Way facility prior to September 1, 2019. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot represent individuals (1) directly employed by CYC, (2) located at the Miramar facility and (3) employed beyond September 1, 2019. The Court finds no relevant distinction between direct employees and employees provided through labor contractors for purposes of LWO applicability/compliance. If Defendant was required to pay its direct employees pursuant to the LWO, then it was equally obligated to do so for employees provided through labor contractors. However, the Court agrees with Defendant as to the latter two categories.
Named Plaintiffs are not typical of employees at the Miramar facility, who operated under an entirely different set of contractual agreements. The Miramar facility includes a lease agreement with the City and the two contracts are different in the way Defendant obtains recyclables and the rates of pay.
(Compare ROA 376 ¶ 9 ($15.00 was lowest wage paid at Consolidated Way) with ¶ 10 ($12.48 was lowest wage paid at Miramar facility).) Additionally, named Plaintiffs are not typical of employees working under the Consolidated Way Agreement, as modified on September 1, 2019. The major liability dispute in this case is whether the contract at issue was subject to the LWO. Because the contract was modified to explicitly require compliance with LWO pay rates as of September 1, 2019, its applicability is not in dispute after that date. Consequently, named Plaintiffs will be focusing on an issue wholly irrelevant to Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS
3004691 11 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: GUZMAN VS ALLAN COMPANY INC [EFILE] 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL these employees.
For these reasons, named Plaintiffs are typical of employees working at the Consolidated Way facility between March 1, 2015 and September 1, 2019. The Court modifies the class definition to satisfy this factor. (See Hicks v. Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 ('[I]f necessary to preserve the case as a class action, the court itself can and should redefine the class where the evidence before it shows such a redefined class would be ascertainable.').) Adequate Representation 'When the vast majority of a class perceives its interests as diametrically opposed to that of the named representatives, a trial court cannot equitably grant the named plaintiffs the right to pursue the litigation on behalf of the entire class.' (Richmond v. Dart Industries (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 471.) Here, there are no apparent conflicts between the named Plaintiffs and other class members, Plaintiffs have been actively involved in litigating this case and Counsel are experienced employment litigators. Therefore, this factor is met.
For the reasons stated above, the Court certifies the following class: All employees, either employed directly or through labor contractors Source One Staffing, LLC or OS4Labor, LLC, who worked at the Consolidated Way recycling facility for Cedarwood Young Company, pursuant to an agreement with the City of San Diego to provide waste management services, inclusive of management of recyclable materials, from March 1, 2015 through September 1, 2019.
All requests for judicial notice are granted. All evidentiary objections are overruled.
Plaintiffs are directed to submit a revised proposed order within five (5) court days.
Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS
3004691 11