Judge: James A. Mangione, Case: 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - February 22, 2024

02/23/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-75 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:James A Mangione

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Civil - Unlimited  Other employment Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL GUZMAN VS ALLAN COMPANY INC [EFILE] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant Cedarwood-Young Company's Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.' (CCP § 437c(f)(1).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If satisfied, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make his or her own prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of fact. (Id.) 'There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.' (Id.) Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 6 In the Court's ruling denying Defendant's JOP, the Court held that the 2021 LWO Amendment was a clarification to, not a material change of, the LWO. (ROA 331.) Necessarily involved in the Court's JOP ruling was a finding that the 2014 LWO amendment 'was intended to apply to all service contracts and removed the categorical divide that exempted service contracts below the $25,000 monetary threshold.' (ROA 331.) The Court also stated that it 'disagree[d]' with Defendant's argument that, 'as it existed in 2014, the LWO applied' only to service contracts that expended taxpayer money. Consequently, the Court has already determined that, at all relevant times, the LWO applied to all service contracts, regardless of whether they were cost-neutral, revenue-generating or cost-expending. As such, summary adjudication of Defendant's Issue No. 6 is denied.

As to Issue Nos. 1 and 2, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the 'combined annual value of payments' under the Curbside Services Agreement exceeded the $25,000 thresshold. Therefore, whether, and until what point, the grandfather clause applies to the Curbside Services Agreement is irrelevant. Defendant would not qualify for an exception from the LWO even if it was entitled to invoke the grandfather clause. Therefore, summary adjudication of these issues is denied.

Issue Nos. 3 and 4 CYC withdrew Issue No. 3 in its reply brief because it was premised on the inaccurate assertion that the language 'waste collection and waste disposal, including recycling' was added by the 2016 LWO Amendment. Although Defendant did not withdraw Issue No. 4, it is also premised on this assertion and summary adjudication is denied.

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3034695  5 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  GUZMAN VS ALLAN COMPANY INC [EFILE]  37-2019-00011626-CU-OE-CTL The LWO defines 'services' to include 'waste collection and waste disposal, including recycling'.

Relying on the definition of 'include', Defendant argues that 'recycling is included within the LWO's definition of 'services' only when it is a component part of 'waste collection' or 'waste disposal.'' (ROA 444, pg. 22.) However, the Court need not address this argument.

Defendant's PMQ Michael Ochniak testified that Defendant would receive recyclables from the City on a daily basis, would separate out the 'commodities' and anything 'not valuable[], any contamination or residual' was taken back to the City. (UMF 22.) Practically, returning this material was accomplished by 'transporting it to the City's Miramar landfill facility.' (ROA 463, ¶ 6.) Pursuant to the Curbside Recyclables Agreement, recyclables and residue became Defendant's property upon delivery and contamination remained the City's property until disposal. (Deft. Ex. 28, § 3.4.) Contamination was defined as '[m]aterial that is delivered to [Defendant] for processing which is not in itself marketable or material that causes recyclables to become unusually difficult to process and or market' while residue was defined as '[r]ecyclables that are no longer marketable due to CONTAMINATION, breakage during transportation, or processing system that was used to segregate and prepare RECYCLABLES for market'. (Id. § 7.0.) Finally, while Defendant was responsible for the cost of transporting residue and contaminates to the Miramar Landfill, the City was responsible for paying landfill fees for contamination removed from recyclables and residue, up to 10% of the overall tonnage. (Id. § 5.2.) Whether this qualifies as 'waste collection or waste disposal' under the LWO is a factual question properly reserved for the jury. Therefore, summary adjudication on this issue is denied.

All requests for judicial notice are granted. All evidentiary objections are overruled.

The minute order is the order of the Court.

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