Judge: James A. Mangione, Case: 37-2023-00025767-CU-OR-CTL, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - November 08, 2023

11/09/2023  09:00:00 AM  C-75 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:James A Mangione

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Civil - Unlimited  Other Real Property SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing 37-2023-00025767-CU-OR-CTL CHAKRA VS ZBS LAW LLP [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant's Special Motion to Strike Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16) is denied.

Pursuant to CCP § 425.16, the court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. First, the court determines whether the moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity, i.e., the act underlying petitioner's cause of action fits one of the categories delineated in CCP §425.16(e). (CCP §425.16 (b)(1); Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88-89.) The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the challenged cause of action arises from the moving party's protected activity. (Equilon Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the opposing party has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Ibid.) 'Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit – is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.' (Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 645.) Here, the Court finds that Defendant cannot satisfy its initial burden. A court must 'examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies . .

. . We assess the principal thrust by identifying the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claim. If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff's claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.' (Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (alterations, quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).) '[W]hen the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.' (Id. at 1273 (quotation marks omitted).) As alleged in the First Amended Complaint, the gravamen of the fraud cause of action is the assertion that Defendant and co-Defendant General Financial Services, Inc. conspired to 'secretly foreclose upon Plaintiff's Subject Property without Plaintiff being aware of such foreclosure until after the fact' via a fraudulent Deed of Trust. (FAC ¶ 21.) The filing of the unlawful detainer, as well as the statements made to police are ancillary to the initial fraudulent conduct alleged. Therefore, the 'core-injury producing conduct' does not arise from a protected speech or petitioning activity. (See Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1520 (nonjudicial foreclosure sales are not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute).) Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3022270  11 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  CHAKRA VS ZBS LAW LLP [IMAGED]  37-2023-00025767-CU-OR-CTL The minute order is the order of the Court.

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