Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 19STCP01720, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Watson Land Company (“Watson”) moves for awards of attorneys’ fees and costs against Respondents City of Carson (“City”) and Carson City Council (“City Council”) (collectively, “City”) following the court’s entry of judgment against Respondents on January 8, 2024.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Watson filed the Complaint against the City on May 6, 2019. The operative pleading is the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4thAC”) filed January 31, 2023, alleging claims for (1) declaratory relief and (2) traditional or administrative mandamus. The 4thAC alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Watson is a developer and manager of industrial properties and owns real property in the City. 4thAC, ¶9. In 2017, the City enacted an urgency ordinance that established a moratorium on the establishment, expansion, or modification of truck yards, logistics facilities, hazardous materials or waste facilities, container storage, and container parking (“Moratorium”). 4thAC, ¶16. The Moratorium was intended to provide time for the City to establish a citywide community facilities district (“CFD”) to pay for infrastructure maintenance. 4thAC, ¶17. The Moratorium was extended on May 2, 2017 and again on March 20, 2018. 4thAC, ¶16.

According to the City, the need for a CFD was based on an influx of new development and was necessary to fund municipal services associated with new industrial and multi-family residential development. 4thAC, ¶19. Unlike development impact fees, a CFD is intended to pay for ongoing services. 4thAC, ¶19. The City Council had authority to the Moratorium if the developer or tenant agreed to participate in a CFD to pay for ongoing City services – including road and landscape maintenance, lighting, public safety, storm water management -- to the City’s satisfaction. 4thAC, ¶18.

On September 18, 2018, the City Council adopted Resolution 18-083, stating its intent to form the Carson CFD pursuant to the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (“Mello-Roos Act”). 4thAC, ¶¶ 2, 20. The Carson CFD was formed with a single parcel owned by a company, CalPak, which had requested City approval to construct an industrial building that was prohibited under the Moratorium. 4thAC, ¶21. The City Council conditioned approval of CalPak’s project on the annexation of its property into the Carson CFD and payment of a special parcel tax. 4thAC, ¶21. The boundary of the Carson CFD consisted of CalPak’s single property, with all other property within the City’s boundaries labeled as the “Future Annexation Area.” 4thAC, ¶21. None of the property owners in the Future Annexation Area were allowed to vote on the establishment of the Carson CFD, the inclusion of their property in the Future Annexation Area, or the amount of the special parcel tax. 4thAC, ¶21.

At a public hearing on November 7, 2018, the City Council adopted Resolution 18-119 to establish the single-parcel Carson CFD for CalPak. 4thAC, ¶22. It also approved Resolution 18-120 to levy the special parcel tax upon CalPak and Resolution 18-121 to declare that CalPak had voted in favor of the special parcel tax. 4thAC, ¶22. Watson’s lawsuit does not challenge any of these Resolutions. 4thAC, ¶25.

On April 2, 2019, the City Council adopted Resolution 19-009, which outlined the administrative annexation procedures for properties within the Future Annexation Area. 4thAC, ¶23. Approved as part of Resolution 19-009 were a March 2019 Fiscal Impact Analysis for Citywide Future Development (“2019 FIA”), the Rate and Method of Apportionment of Special Tax, a form copy of a Unanimous Approval of Annexation to a CFD, a form copy of an Amendment to the Notice of Special Tax Lien, and a change to the special tax rate. 4thAC, ¶23. The public did not vote on the administrative procedure, the decision to levy a special parcel tax, or the amount of the special parcel tax. 4thAC, ¶23.

The 2019 FIA recommended that, because residential projects cause the fiscal impacts which the City wanted to address via the Carson CFD, the City should establish a Special Funding District (“SFD”) to mitigate those impacts. 4thAC, ¶24. The City did not follow this recommendation or impose annexation requirements on residential developments except for multi-family units. 4thAC, ¶24.

After Watson filed this lawsuit, on January 12, 2021, the City Council adopted Resolution 21-003 rescinding the annexation administrative procedures, tax rate, and 2019 FIA adopted in Resolution 19-009. 4thAC, ¶25. The City Council did not replace the 2019 FIA or establish new administrative procedures to annex properties within the Future Annexation Area. 4thAC, ¶25. The lack of uniform criteria fosters the City’s abuse of discretion whereby it compels any property owner that wishes to develop property to be annexed to the Carson CFD and pay the resulting special parcel tax in perpetuity. 4thAC, ¶¶ 26-27. The payment of a lump sum special parcel tax is not a real alternative because the lump sum will be a large amount and the property owner does not benefit from the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶28. Watson does not know of any property owner who has chosen to make a lump sum payment over annexation. 4thAC, ¶28. The City has used this leverage to engage in an illegal pattern and practice of compelling property owners one- by-one to levy the special parcel tax and approve the annexation of their property to the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶29.

On February 2, 2021, Watson submitted a Development Permit Application for a design overlay review (“DOR”) permit, No. 1860-2021. 4thAC, ¶31. The DOR permit would allow Watson to demolish an existing building at 2277 E. 220th Street and replace it with a Class A light industrial building (“Building I”). 4thAC, ¶31. On March 4, 2021, the City sent Watson a letter which included the requirement that Watson either agree to annex the property to the Carson CFD or establish a funding mechanism to provide an ongoing source of funds. 4thAC, ¶32. Watson must also pay the special tax provided in the rescinded 2019 FIA, subject to annual adjustments. 4thAC, ¶32.

Watson responded that the City cannot impose this requirement as a condition of development approval. 4thAC, ¶33. On May 13, 2021, the City replied that it is requiring Watson’s proposed development to mitigate its impacts on City services by funding the ongoing costs permitted by the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶34. City staff stated that it has been using the 2019 FIA to determine those impacts in the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶34. Accordingly, the City refused to issue permits for Building I until Watson agrees to pay the special parcel tax and annex its property into the Carson CFD, based on the amount in the disapproved 2019 FIA. 4thAC, ¶34.

Watson has also applied for building permits to demolish two industrial buildings and replace them with a single building on Bonita Street (“Building II”). 4thAC, ¶35. On September 1, 2022, the City informed Watson that it is required to mitigate its impacts on City services and must establish a funding mechanism to provide an ongoing source of funds at a rate comparable to the uniformed-standardized citywide rate under Resolution 19-009 and the 2019 FIA. 4thAC, ¶36.

On October 21, 2022, the City requested a $5,000 payment for annexation of the property for Building II into the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶37. Watson paid this fee under protest. 4thAC, ¶37. On December 13, 2022, the City approved Watson’s proposal for Building II conditioned on payment of the special parcel tax and annexation to the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶38. When Watson replied that it paid the fee under protest, the City replied on January 13, 2023 that it cannot accept payment under protest because annexation into the Carson CFD is voluntary. 4thAC, ¶¶ 39-40. Watson must either voluntarily annex and drop its protest or retrieve the $5,000 check. 4thAC, ¶40.

The City refuses to issue building permits for Building II until Watson agrees to pay for the “voluntary” annexation without protest. 4thAC, ¶41. An annexation cannot be voluntary when the City conditions building permits on an agreement for annexation. 4thAC, ¶41. The City has not informed Watson of any funding mechanism that would be an acceptable alternative to Carson CFD annexation for either Building I or II. 4thAC, ¶42. Watson therefore is required to vote in favor of annexing each of Building I and II into the Carson CFD and levying the special tax without protest in order to obtain the DOR permit and building permits. 4thAC, ¶42.

Watson is under contractual obligation to demolish and replace Building II by March 31, 2024. Because the City refuses to issue the building permits to Watson that it has already approved, Watson has been required to pay the $5,000 and withdraw its language protesting the payment. 4thAC, ¶51. If Watson prevails in this lawsuit, it will seek removal of the property underlying Building II from the Carson CFD and a refund of all fees and taxes. 4thAC, ¶51.

Watson is challenging the City’s conditions for approval of Buildings I and II on its vote in favor of Carson CFD annexation and payment of the special property tax in perpetuity as imposed in violation of law. 4thAC, ¶53. In 1982, the Legislature enacted the Mello-Roos Act to provide a method of imposing special parcel taxes to finance certain public capital facilities. 4thAC, ¶57. Watson enjoys the constitutional right to be free from taxes on its properties other than as approved by voters in a manner consistent with Articles XIII A (Prop 13), XIII C and XIII D (Prop 218) of the California Constitution. 4thAC, ¶61. Under Government Code (“Govt. Code”) section 53326, a community services district may be established to finance certain services provided that the levy of any special taxes is submitted to the qualified voters of the Carson CFD, and to the qualified electors of the territory to be annexed by the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶57.

The City’s special parcel tax scheme violates the First Amendment because it curtails Watson’s freedom to vote for the special parcel tax and annexation of property to the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶64. It requires unanimous approval of the tax and annexation to obtain approval of Buildings I and II. 4thAC, ¶64. Each property owner must mark the ballot in favor of levying the special parcel tax and annexing its property into the Carson CFD before the City will approve a project. 4thAC, ¶67. This also violates the property owner’s right to vote in secret. 4thAC, ¶67. The City’s conditions for approval compel Watson’s waiver of its First Amendment rights and rights under California Constitution XII A, XIII C, and XIII D in violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 4thAC, ¶68.

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 7(a) of the California Constitution, Watson is entitled to due process, including adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. 4thAC, ¶¶ 69-70. The City has prevented Watson from challenging the imposition of the special parcel tax and Carson CFD annexation. 4thAC, ¶71.

The City also has violated substantive due process because there is no rational connection or nexus between the amount of the special tax, the impacts of the proposed developments, and the activities to be funded by the tax. 4thAC, ¶72. A special tax must be fairly related and proportional to the benefits provided to the landowner and the City does not rely on any fiscal impact analysis to show a causal nexus or to demonstrate that the tax rate is proportional to the burden the projects would place on the community. 4thAC, ¶73.

Watson did not challenge the legality of Resolutions 18-083, 18-119, 18-120, 18-121, and 21-003. 4thAC, ¶¶ 74, 81. Watson asserts that under the U.S. Constitution, California Constitution, and the Mello-Roos Act, the City cannot condition approval of its projects on a vote to impose a special parcel tax or approve annexation of the underlying property into the Carson CFD. 4thAC, ¶¶ 74, 78.

Watson sought a declaration, writ of mandate, and injunction prohibiting the City from conditioning approval of Buildings I and II on Watson’s agreement to vote in favor of annexing the underlying properties into the Carson CFD or to pay the special parcel tax. 4thAC Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 1-3. If Watson was forced to vote in favor of annexation of either property, it would seek an injunction removing the properties from the Carson CFD and reimbursement of all associated fees and taxes. 4thAC Prayer for Relief, ¶4. Watson seeks attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses. 4thAC Prayer for Relief, ¶5.

On May 8, 2019, the court granted Watson’s ex parte application to serve the City by publication in the Daily Breeze newspaper and by posting at City Hall. Watson published the Summons in the Daily Breeze on May 10, 17, and 24, 2019.

On May 8, 2019, Watson personally served the City with the Petition and Summons.

On June 12, 2019, Watson filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and served the City by electronic mail.

On August 19, 2019, the court ordered the case transferred to Department 1 (Hon. Samantha Jessner) for reassignment to an independent calendar court. On August 28, 2019, Department 1 reassigned the case to Department 12 (Hon. Barbara Meiers). At some point, the case was reassigned to Department 45.

On February 9, 2021, Department 45 (Hon. Mel Red Recana) granted Watson’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. On February 11, 2021, Watson filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and served the City by electronic mail. On February 12, 19, and 26, 2021, Watson served the City with the Summons by publication in the Daily Breeze.

On March 16, 2021, Department 45 denied Watson’s request for entry of default against the City.

On December 30, 2021, Department 45 denied Watson’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the City from requiring that Watson either annex its property into the Carson CFD or establish a funding mechanism to provide a source of funds for ongoing services acceptable to the City prior to permit approval for Building I.

On March 23, 2022, Department 45 sustained City’s demurrer to the SAC, with leave to amend for five of the six causes of action.

On April 12, 2022, Watson filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) and served the City by electronic mail.

On December 5, 2022, during a hearing on the City’s demurrer to the TAC, Department 45 granted Watson’s motion for leave to file a mandamus cause of action and deem it served and filed on April 12, 2022. Department 45 struck the TAC that Watson already had filed and sent the case to Department 1 for reassignment.

On December 14, 2022, Watson filed a new TAC and served the City via electronic mail.

On December 30, 2022, Department 1 reassigned the case to this court (Department 85).

On January 31, 2023, the court granted leave to amend to file the 4thAC and vacated hearing on the City’s demurrer to the TAC. Watson filed the 4thAC on January 31, 2023 and served it via electronic mail on January 31, 2023.

On November 2, 2023, the trial was held on the petition for writ of mandate. On November 8, 2023, the court issued its decision granting the petition for writ of mandate.

On January 8, 2024, the court entered judgment in favor of Watson and against the City.

CCP section 1021.5 (“section 1021.5”) codifies the “private attorney general” exception to the general rule that each side bears its own fees unless the parties contracted otherwise. See CCP §1021. Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award fees to a successful party in any action that: “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery. The issue is committed to the trial court’s discretion. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, (“Flannery”) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 634.

The courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” in order to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565. The party seeking attorney’s fees need not prevail on all claims in order to qualify for an award. Harbor v. Deukmejian, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103; Daniels v. McKinney, (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 55. A party is considered successful under section 1021.5 if the litigation “contributed substantially to remedying the conditions at which it was directed.” Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 174. In other words, the successful party under section 1021.5 is the party that succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Maria P. v. Riles, (“Maria P.”) (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; see Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 610. Prevailing counsel who qualify for an award under section 1021.5 are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably spent. Serrano v. Unruh, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632–633.

The “significant benefit” necessary for a section 1021.5 fee award need not represent a concrete gain; in some cases a significant benefit may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy. Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, (“Woodland Hills”) (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939; Braude v. Automobile Club of Southern Cal., (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 994, 1011. Moreover, the extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an attorney fee award. See, e.g., Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 496 (significant public benefit where litigation prompted agency to improve methods of creating and managing its CEQA records). The trial court determines “the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 939–40.

The party seeking attorney’s fees must show that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 941. Although case law refers to this requirement as the “financial burden” criterion, nothing in the language of CCP section 1021.5 limits the consideration of the necessity and financial burden clause to solely financial interests. Hammond v. Agran, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 125. “The idea is that the litigation for which fees are claimed must transcend one's interests, whether pecuniary or not.” Id. at 127. The financial burden question is whether advancement of the public interest was merely coincidental to attainment of the party’s personal goals. Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 181. The party seeking attorney’s fees must show that its litigation costs transcend its personal interests. Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court, (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 235, 247. The trial court's application of the financial burden criterion involves a “realistic and practical comparison of the litigant's personal interest with the cost of suit.” Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. Bd. of Supervisors, (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 505, 515.

The court issued an injunction permanently enjoining and permanently prohibiting the City from requiring as a condition of approval that landowners agree to annex their properties into Community Facilities District (“CFD”) and pay a special tax in perpetuity, or alternatively pay an upfront lump sum that is intended to pay the special tax. See Taber Decl., Ex. 2. All land within the City’s boundaries is located in the Future Annexation Area. See Taber Decl., Ex. 6. The judgment that the court issued permanently prohibits the City from imposing the same unconstitutional conditions on property owners in the future. See Taber Decl., Ex. 2. Watson was the only landowner to finance the litigation. Forsey Decl., ¶4. Watson sought relief to protect all landowners in the City, not just Watson. Forsey Decl., ¶3.

Two firms represented Watson during this litigation, Jackson Tidus and Hanson Bridget LLP. Taber Decl., ¶¶23-29. The case moved with Arlene M. Taber, Esq. (“Taber”) from Jackson Tidus to Hanson Bridget. Taber Decl., ¶21. The work was split between partners, associates, and paralegals of appropriate skill and availability, which helped reduce costs, among other things. Taber Decl., ¶¶24-25.

The requested hourly rates for Hanson Bridget LLP’s tenure as Watson’s counsel are $745 for Taber, $525 for Wiemond Wu, Esq. (“Wu”), $795 for Mohammad Walizadeh, Esq. (“Walizadeh”), $795 for Adam H. Hoffman, Esq. (“Hoffman”) $670 for Robin R. Baral, Esq. (“Baral”), $490 for Cole A. Benbow, Esq. (“Benbow”), $460 for Jillian E. Ames, Esq. (“Ames”), $415 for paralegal Janell E. Gerhke, and $325 for litigation specialists Rosa Hall (“Hall”), Carolyn Lundin (“Lundin”), and Joe A. Ramirez (“Ramirez”). Taber Decl., ¶¶ 26, 40.

The requested hourly rates for Jackson Tidus are $745 for Taber, $550 for Kathryn M. Casey, Esq. (“Casey”), $475 for Brittany A. Ortiz, Esq. (“Ortiz”) and $425 for Lauren E. Palley, Esq. (“Palley”) (who was “eligible to practice law”). Taber Decl., ¶40. These rates are reasonable based on approved rates from recent cases in Los Angeles County Superior Court under section 1021.5 and are comparable to rates awarded in Los Angeles County Superior Court at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse in cases that involve attorneys with similar education, skill, and experience. Taber Decl., ¶¶ 22-32.

The hours claimed in this case were based on contemporaneous recorded time that was reviewed each month for accuracy and reasonableness, and that the time requested was necessary to represent Watson adequately and competently in this matter and complete each of the tasks. Taber Decl., ¶¶33-35. Watson’s attorneys exercised conservative billing practices, including not charging for travel and appropriately staffing the matter based on number of years of experience, skill, expertise, avoiding duplication, and not charging for attorneys to learn the case, or for work that needed significant revisions. Taber Decl., ¶¶35, 37, 41, 42.

The City engaged in extensive pleading challenges in this action, including multiple demurrers and motions to strike, which led to other motions, such as the motion for preliminary injunction and the review of hundreds of additional documents. Taber Decl., ¶33-42. Watson was prevented for years from conducting discovery due to the City’s motion to stay discovery, which forced Taber to resort to sending California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) requests to the City, coupled with general problems of obtaining documents from City throughout the litigation. Taber Decl., ¶7(g).

Watson drafted and responded to over 130 documents in connection with this matter, which required extensive legal and factual research involving complex constitutional issues. Taber Decl., ¶¶37-38. Time was also spent involved in numerous other court hearings and related matters, such as conferences, settlement attempts, and communications with the City’s attorneys. Taber Decl., ¶¶33-42.

Over the course of approximately seven years, starting in October 2017 through February 29, 2024, the two law firms expended a total of 1,587.4 hours. Taber Decl., ¶37.

A total of 84.6 hours was expended on prelitigation activities, including analyzing the City’s intent to form the CFD, analyzing the City’s moratorium, understanding the City’s intent to impose an interim development fee, researching and evaluating the City’s ordinances and resolutions (Resolution Nos. 18-083, 18-119, 18-120, 18-121; Ordinance Nos. 1814; Resolution Nos. 19-009 and 21-003). This work was necessary to exhaust Watson's administrative remedies and prosecute this lawsuit. It was also intended to persuade the City to adopt a legal approach to public financing and avoid this litigation altogether.

This time includes Taber: 77.8 hours; Casey: 1.1 hours; and Ortiz: 5.7 hours. Taber Decl., ¶37a.

A total of 68.3 hours was expended on drafting the Complaint and the publication order for the Summons, drafting ex parte applications to serve the City by publication, attending the hearing on the ex parte applications, attending the trial setting conference and providing notice of the same, reviewing the court’s minute orders, and overseeing legal issues involving the personal service of the Summons and Complaint on the City. Numerous legal theories had to be evaluated and researched, and facts assembled and considered in order to draft a verifiable Complaint.

This time includes: an unstated time expended by Taber; 28.8 hours by Casey; and 39.3 hours by Ortiz. Taber Decl., ¶37b.

A total of 80.8 hours was expended drafting the FAC, analyzing the City’s Answer; attending trial setting and status conferences, reviewing minute orders/rulings, conferring with the City and drafting stipulations and notices, preparing and attending hearings on motions, reviewing the City’s preemptory challenge, drafting and reviewing case management statements, analyzing and opposing the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, opposing the City’s ex parte application for a stay of discovery, and preparing for and attending the hearings.

This time includes: 57 hours by Taber and 23.8 hours by Casey. Taber Decl., ¶37c.

The SAC, Demurrer/Motion to Strike, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion for Leave to Amend, and Related Tasks Through April 12, 2022

A total of 372.2 hours was expended drafting the SAC (which was necessitated by the City rescinding the resolution addressed by the lawsuit), drafting an ex parte application for leave to file the SAC and publication of pleading or order shortening time, analyzing and drafting a reply to the City’s opposition to the ex parte application, preparing and attending hearings on motions, reviewing minute orders/rulings and preparing notices, analyzing and opposing the City’s demurrer to and motion to strike the SAC, drafting Watson’s ex parte request to take the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings off calendar, drafting Watson’s motion for a preliminary injunction, analyzing and replying to the City’s opposition, drafting Watson’s objections and request to modify tentative decision on preliminary injunction, drafting the joint statement of mediation date, drafting Watson’s supplemental brief regarding continuing violation requested by the court, analyzing and replying to the City’s supplemental brief, and meeting, conferring and communicating with the City's attorneys.

This time includes: 175.4 hours by Taber; 109.5 hours by Casey; 7.6 hours by Palley; 7.8 hours by Hoffman; and 6.8 hours by Baral. Taber Decl., ¶37d.

The TAC, Demurrer/Motion to Strike, Motion for Leave to Amend, and Related Tasks Through January 20, 2023

A total of 133.1 hours was expended drafting the TAC, evaluating and opposing the City’s demurrer and motion to strike, preparing and attending the hearing, reviewing minute orders/rulings, preparing and reviewing various notices and joint stipulation, drafting Watson’s motion for leave to amend and reply, and meeting, conferring and communicating with the City's attorneys.

This time includes: 118.1 hours by Taber; 8.7 hours by Wu; 6.1 hours by Hoffman; and 0.2 hours by Hall. Taber Decl., ¶37e.

The 4thAC, Motion for Leave to Amend, Demurrer, and Related Tasks Through June 29, 2023

A total of 169.3 hours was expended drafting the 4thAC to incorporate the City's refusal to issue building permits for Watson's Bonita Street property, drafting Watson’s motion for leave to amend (necessitated by the City's refusal to stipulate to the amendment), attending the trial setting conferences, analyzing and opposing the City’s demurrer to the 4thAC, preparing and attending hearings on the demurrer, reviewing the minute orders and the court’s decision overruling the Demurrer, analyzing the City’s Answer to the 4thAC, attending and preparing for two trial setting conferences, and meeting, conferring and communicating with the City's attorneys.

This time includes: 100.9 hours by Taber; 34.4 hours by Wu; 14.1 hours by Hoffman; 19.6 hours by Benbow; 20.8 hours by Lundin; and 0.3 hours by Ramirez. Taber Decl., ¶37f.

The CPRA Requests, Propounding Discovery, Research to Locate City Documents Not Produced, and Preparation of the Appendix of Evidence

A total of 262.5 hours was expended drafting two CPRA requests, propounding discovery, preparing for depositions, analyzing the documents produced by the City to identify relevant evidence and gaps in the evidence, conferences and communications with City officials and the City's attorneys to obtain the missing documents, research to locate the missing responsive documents (necessary because the City refused to produce all of the relevant documents, prepare an administrative record, and blocked the depositions), and preparing the appendix of evidence.

In 2021, Watson met and conferred with the City, and prepared to take depositions of the City’s key witnesses that were administering and overseeing the CFD to collect relevant evidence to support its case. Even though the validation action entitled Watson to pursue depositions of key witnesses, the City sought and obtained a stayed preventing the depositions from going forward. As part of another effort to obtain the missing relevant evidence, Watson requested the City to prepare an administrative record. Without a response, Watson then inquired if the City's attorneys would accept service of a CPRA request. It declined to do so, and Watson directed a second CPRA request to the City on April 5, 2023. Receiving no documents in a timely fashion, Watson was forced to propound discovery requests on April 24, 2023. Only after an extensive meet-and-confer process did the City provide supplemental responses and produce over 3,300 documents. None of the produced documents pertained to the other properties annexed by the City that were raised as an issue in Watson’s 4thAC. Watson’s litigation team had to spend an extraordinary amount of time to review the City’s public records via its online database to retrieve relevant documents and information about each of the 16 annexations that have been approved, and the other annexations that were pending, before the City.

Watson was forced to expend this additional research into the public records to piece together the extent to which the City was engaging in a pattern and practice of enforcing its illegal taxing scheme – documents that were clearly responsive to Watson's CPRA requests and discovery demands, but were not produced by the City. This work was directly the result of the City's failure to produce all of the requested responsive documents. After synthesizing thousands of documents, time was spent to put together a concise appendix of evidence with approximately 1,600 pages, which had to be indexed and reduced in file size for filing and lodging.

This time includes: 122 hours by Taber; 90.2 hours by Wu; 20.8 hours by Lundin; 12.4 hours by Gehrke; and 16.9 hours by Casey. Taber Decl., ¶37g.

A total of 127.8 hours were expended on preparing Watson’s motion for writ of mandate and supporting documents, analyzing the City’s opposition, drafting Watson’s reply, preparing for and attending the mandamus trial on November 2, 2023, reviewing the court’s tentative and final decisions, and preparing the judgment and writ. As the issues were complex, Taber and Wu consulted with other attorneys who had specialized experience with some of the issues. The consultations were for discrete issues and were not duplicative of Wu's and Taber’s efforts.

This time includes: 53.9 hours by Taber; 68.7 hours by Wu; 2.9 hours by Walizadeh; and 2.3 hours by Hofmann. Taber Decl., ¶37h.

A total of 165.3 hours was expended on settlement discussions and meet-and-confer efforts. The parties engaged in extensive settlement negotiations that lasted for months. The parties also engaged in conferences regarding the proposed judgment and writ.

This time includes: 156.0 hours by Taber; 9.3 hours by Wu; 1.6 hours by Hofmann; and 8.4 hours by Casey. Taber Decl., ¶37i.

A total of 123.5 hours was expended pursuing Watson’s post-judgment costs and fees. Time was spent reviewing all the invoices for the past seven years. Costs had to be broken down into categories before categorizing them within Watson’s Memorandum of Costs as required by law. Watson’s counsel spent time analyzing the City’s motion to tax costs, and drafting Watson’s opposition.

This time includes: 6.9 hours by Taber; 60.8 hours by 60.8; 46.9 hours by Ames; 0.5 hours by Gehrke; and 8.4 hours by Lundin.

The listed time only represents efforts up to February 29, 2024. A lot of work on the fee motion and accompanying declarations occurred in March 2024. A supplemental declaration will be filed at the end of the March billing cycle and for the April billing cycle. Taber Decl., ¶37j.

Taber expended a total of 952.1 hours (431.9 hours at Hanson Bridgett and 520.2 hours at Jackson Tidus) over the course of seven years (approximately five years of litigation and two years of pre-litigation Taber Decl., ¶39.

Taber’s lodestar fees are $321,765.50, Wu’s fees are $142,852.50, Walizadeh’s fees are $2,305.50, Hofmann’s fees are $25,360.50, Baral’s fees are $4,556.00, Benbow’s fees are $9,604.00, Ames’ fees are $21,574.00, Gehrke’s fees are $5,353.50, Hall’s fees are $65.00, Lundin’s fees are $9,490.00, Ramirez’ fees are $97.50. The total lodestar through February 2024 is $543,024.

A 1.5 lodestar multiplier is warranted given the risk of challenging a governmental agency, and the amount of work entailed due to the City’s various motions and discovery challenges. Taber Decl., ¶37; Wu Decl., ¶16. Watson requests the court to award attorney fees in the amount of $1,564,662 (which includes a multiplier of 1.5). Taber Decl., ¶40.

Watson is one of the largest industrial developers in California. Forsey Decl., ¶3. Watson admitted that it has a significant financial interest in development entitlements from the City. Watson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 18; 4thAC, ¶31.

Watson has engaged in a myriad of improper filings and litigation tactics in this matter. Watson has filed many documents without leave of court, filed amended pleading after amended pleading, engaged in unnecessary motion practice with the City, and excessively filed multiple amended documents. Flowers Decl., ¶2.

Watson’s Complaint, filed on May 8, 2019, alleged three causes of action for reverse validation of the CFD and CFD Resolutions, as well as a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 seeking to invalidate the CFD and the City’s levy of special taxes. Flowers Decl., ¶3. In response to the City’s meet-and-confer letter that the causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations and the City would file a demurrer and motion to strike, Watson filed a FAC on June 12, 2019 which removed the causes of action for writ of mandate, but continued to alleged reverse validation. Flowers Decl., ¶4.

On October 16, 2020, Watson served a deposition notice and a request for production of documents for James Nguyen, a deposition notice and document request for three other City employees: Sharon Landors, Saied Naaseh, and John Raymond, a deposition notice and document request for a person most knowledgeable, and a deposition notice for former Councilmember Albert Robles. The City’s counsel objected, and the depositions did not go forward. Flowers Decl., ¶5.

On January 5, 2021, Watson served amended deposition notices and document requests for Mr. Nguyen and Ms. Naaseh. The City’s counsel again objected and again the depositions again did not go forward. Flowers Decl., ¶6.

On January 12, 2021, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 21-003, which repealed Resolution No. 19-009 in its entirety. On January 15, 2021, the City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and an ex parte application for a stay of discovery. The court granted the City’s ex parte application and ordered a stay of discovery. Flowers Decl., ¶7.

In order to avoid a hearing on the merits, Watson filed an ex parte application to file a SAC, which was granted by the court. On February 11, 2021, Watson filed its SAC to (inconceivably) invalidate Resolution No. 21-003, along with other challenges to the CFD Resolutions which continued to be time-barred. Flowers Decl., ¶8.

The City demurred to the SAC on March 16, 2021. Notwithstanding that the City had made multiple appearances in the case and that Taber knew that the City was imminently filing a demurrer to the SAC, Watson bizarrely and unethically attempted to take the City’s default. Of course, the request for entry of default was rejected by the Clerk. Flowers Decl., ¶9.

While the City’s demurrer was pending, Watson sought a preliminary injunction which was denied by the court on November 23, 2021. On March 23, 2022, Department 45 sustained the City’s demurrer in its entirety and gave Watson 20 days leave to amend. Flowers Decl., ¶10.

Watson filed its TAC on April 12, 2022, with only causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate. On May 6, 2022, the City’s counsel informed Taber that the City intended to file a demurrer to the first cause of action based on the statute of limitations, and a motion to strike the second cause of action for writ of mandate because it was added without leave of court. Flowers Decl., ¶11. The City filed its demurrer and motion to strike and, on October 20, 2022 (several months after the demurrer was filed), Watson belatedly filed a motion for leave to amend to add the writ of mandate cause of action. On December 5, 2022, Department 45 granted Watson’s motion for leave to amend, struck the TAC, and ordered Watson to re-file and re-serve the TAC within ten days. Flowers Decl., ¶11.

Watson re-filed the TAC on December 14, 2022 and this case was subsequently transferred to Dept. 85. The City filed its demurrer to the TAC on January 18, 2023, which was set for hearing on February 23, 2023. Flowers Decl., ¶12. In a similar delaying tactic to the TAC, on the evening of January 30, 2023, the night before the parties’ trial setting conference, Watson filed another motion for leave to amend and file its 4^thAC. Watson’s motion for leave to amend was never heard. Instead, at the trial setting conference, the court permitted the amendment and ordered the City to file its demurrer to the 4thAC, which it did. The City’s demurrer was overruled. Flowers Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.

Watson’s petition for writ of mandate in the 4thAC was heard on November 2, 2023, and the court issued its ruling on November 8, 2023. Following the court’s ruling, Watson served multiple proposed judgments and writs of mandate and counsel for the parties met and conferred. The City’s counsel repeatedly advised that the proposed judgments and writs of mandate expanded the court’s ruling to include issues which were not litigated. The court had to hold three OSC hearings just to end up agreeing to the City’s original proposed judgment. Moreover, Watson filed a Fifth Amended Complaint (“5thAC”) after the court’s ruling on the petition for writ of mandate, which was stricken because the court had deemed the 4thAC amended according to proof. Flowers Decl., ¶16.

On April 5, 2024 – after judgment had been entered --Watson served an expert witness demand. Watson then served a document demand for the expert witness retained by the City in relation to the motion for attorney fees. Flowers Decl., ¶¶ 19-20. The City applied ex parte for a protective order, which the court granted on April 18, 2024, after determining the discovery was a waste of attorney resources. Flowers Decl., ¶21.

The City’s expert, Gerald Knapton, Esq. (“Knapton”) opines that the hourly rate proposed by Watson is not the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community conducting litigation of the same type, and that the cases cited in Taber’s declaration are of limited value because they are not rates for similar work and are not helpful for analyzing the non-contingent rates applicable to this motion. Knapton Decl., ¶35. Knapton cites the 2023 Real Rate Report and opines that the prevailing hourly rate for real estate work for partners in Los Angeles County is $400, and that the prevailing hourly rates for associates is $344. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶38, 45. These rates are still on the higher end and exceed the general real estate rates for both partners and associates. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶39, 40. The Real Rate Report is the gold standard for determining market rates for services performed for use in calculating market rates, and Watson provided no evidence supporting the requested rates as the prevailing rates for the same kind of work. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶42-44.

The City’s counsel requested Taber to provide contemporaneous time records for the City to evaluate them, but Taber refused to do so. Flowers Decl., ¶22. This is not typical or customary for larger fee motions, and Watson’s attorneys provided far weaker evidence in the form of broad summaries of categories of loosely related tasks. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶52, 98. Watson’s failure to produce time records entitles the court to discount their declarations entirely. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶47-52. The evidence Watson submitted is insufficient to enable the court or the City to evaluate the actual time spent. See Knapton Decl., ¶52. Watson has failed to distinguish between the hours incurred for each task, and the descriptions provided for such a large fee request are insufficient to be able to determine what was reasonably and necessarily incurred in this matter. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶ 27, 47-101.

If not discounted entirely, the hours for various matters should be reduced substantially given that the City prevailed on the majority of them. More specifically, the hours should be reduced as follows: by 25.7 hours for Casey in connection with the initial pleadings; by 36.8 hours for Taber’s work in connection with the FAC; by 90.3% for the work performed in connection with the SAC; by 69.2% for the work performed in connection with the TAC and due to Watson’s improper litigation tactics; by 30% for the work performed in connection with the two CPRA requests, propounding discovery, research to locate City documents not produced, and analysis of documents; by 20% for the work performed in connection with the writ of mandate for improperly attempting to expand the scope of the court’s ruling; and by 10% for work performed in connection with settlement discussions/additional meet and confer efforts. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶ 55-59, 61-65, 67-72, 73-78, 80-84, 85-95; Id., Exs. 5A, 5B, 6A, 6B, 7, 7A, 7B, 8, 8A, 8B.

The fees incurred in connection with post-judgment effort should be denied altogether in light of Watson’s untimely post-trial demand for expert witness information and request for production of documents after discovery was closed. See Flowers Decl., ¶¶ 16-21.

The requested lodestar multiplier is unreasonable and unwarranted, given that Watson’s attorneys represent themselves as experienced real estate and land use attorneys on the application of taxes and fees, so the subject matter of this action cannot have been novel or difficult. See Knapton Decl., ¶44. Watson’s attorneys’ skill is questionable given their multiple deficient pleadings and motions, as well as bizarre actions throughout this litigation. See Knapton Decl., ¶44.

Watson claims a total of 167.3 hours expended on post-judgment effort since March 1, 2024. Taber Reply Decl., ¶7. This includes: 77.3 hours by Taber; 81.3 hours by Wu; 0.9 hours by Ames; and 7.8 hours by Lundin.

Ames and Lundin researched attorney rates in the Los Angeles Superior Court, and specifically rates awarded in the writs and receivers department. Lundin also researched declarations that Knapton had previously submitted in support of fee motions. Wu and Taber reviewed and drafted all law and motion papers that came after March 1, 2024, including: completing Watson’s motion for attorneys’ fees, filed on March 7, 2024; completing Watson’s opposition to the City’s motion to tax costs; reviewing the City’s ex parte application to continue the hearings on Watson’s motion for attorneys’ fees and the City’s motion to tax costs; drafting Watson’s opposition to the City’s ex parte application and attending the hearing; preparing and drafting Watson’s reply for its fee motion; and attending the hearing on the City’s motion to quash, in which the court expressed that Watson can seek discovery after it reviewed the expert’s declaration. None of the work of these timekeepers were duplicative. Taber Reply Decl., ¶7.

Watson experienced an estimated loss of $85,169 to $92,575 in leasing income due to the City’s actions. Taber Reply Decl., Ex. 35, ¶23.

Settlement discussions began in 2017 and lasted until the lawsuit was filed in 2019. Watson’s attorneys successfully sought discovery in other section 1021.5 motions in which all discovery was not necessarily prohibited. Taber Reply Decl., ¶9.

The invoices include substantial amounts of detailed attorney-client privileged information and attorney work product. Taber Reply Decl., ¶11.

Knapton’s methodology cherry picks portions of the Rate Report. He submitted a declaration in 2021 in support of Hanson Bridgett where he opined the applicable median hourly rate would be $826 for partners and $525 for associates. See Taber Reply Decl., ¶¶5-6, Exs. 36, 37. Taber previously has been awarded a lodestar rate of $650 an hour, and it is reasonable for that rate to have increased to $745 in three years. Taber Reply Decl., ¶4.

The court employs the “lodestar” analysis when looking to determine the “reasonableness” of an attorney fee award. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by the reasonable market billing rate. Serrano v. Priest, (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.

Petitioner Watson seeks an award of attorney’s fees under section 1021.5. Watson’s moving papers list a lodestar of $1,043,108 and its reply increases the lodestar to $1,146,328. Watson also seeks a 1.5 multiplier for a total fee award of $1,719,492.

Courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 565. The party seeking attorney’s fees need not prevail on all alleged claims to qualify for an award. Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 1103. A party is successful under section 1021.5 if the party succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at 1292.

Watson asserts that it is the prevailing party under section 1021.5. Mot. at 12. The City does not dispute that Watson is a successful party in this litigation.

Generally, “a right need not be constitutional in nature to justify the application of the private attorney general doctrine.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 935. Nor must the important right be confined to a particular area of law. Ibid. At the same time, the public always has a significant interest in seeing that laws are enforced and always derives some benefit when illegal private or public conduct is rectified. Flannery, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 635. The Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of fees under section 1021.5 in every lawsuit enforcing a constitutional or statutory right. Ibid. The court should realistically assess the significance of the right in relationship to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals. Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 936; see also Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 394.

Watson asserts that it enforced important rights by obtaining an injunction prohibiting the City from imposing unconstitutional conditions and protecting the electorate’s right to vote on taxes. No longer can the City extract a vote in favor of annexation and taxes in exchange for a project approval. Mot. at 13. The City does not seriously dispute this issue.

The court agrees that Watson has enforced an important right affecting the public interest.

The significant benefit necessary for a section 1021.5 fee award need not represent a concrete gain. In some cases, a significant benefit may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy. Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 939. Moreover, the extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an attorney’s fee award. See, e.g., Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at 496 (significant public benefit where litigation prompted agency to improve methods of creating and managing its CEQA records). The trial court determines “the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 939–40.

The section 1021.5 factors are interrelated; the more fundamental and important the right vindicated, the lower the showing required for the element that a large class of persons benefit. See Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., (“Press”) (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 319. The converse is also true. The less fundamental and important the right vindicated, the higher the showing required for a significant benefit to a large class of persons.

Watson argues that, prior to this lawsuit, the City was engaging in a pattern and practice in which it imposed unconstitutional conditions in exchange for project approval, enacting a tax without a two-thirds vote of the electorate. Since all land in the City is located in the Future Annexation Area, the City intended to force all landowners eventually to annex their property into the CFD and pay the tax. Thus, the litigation benefited all landowners in the City and all residents of a voting age who have a right to vote on taxes. Mot. at 14.

The City disputes the scope of persons benefited. The primary relief sought by Watson was to invalidate a permit condition affecting its privately owned property: Buildings I and II. The special tax at issue is not a generally applicable tax and was not imposed as an incident of property ownership. The court only held that the City cannot require annexation and payment of the special tax as a condition of development approval. Opp. at 10.

Even as limited by the City, Watson conferred a significant benefit on a large group of persons: commercial and industrial developers in the City.

“The necessity of private enforcement looks to the adequacy of public enforcement and seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where private enforcement is necessary.” In re Conservatorship of Whitley, (“Whitley”) (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214-15 (internal quotations omitted). In determining the financial burden on the petitioner, courts have focused not only on the costs of the litigation but also any offsetting financial benefits that the litigation yields or reasonably could have been expected to yield.” Id. at 1215. This prong evaluates “incentives rather than outcomes.” See id. at 1220. The party seeking attorneys’ fees must show that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 941.

This prong encompasses two issues: (1) whether private enforcement was necessary and (2) whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys. Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn., (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1348. The necessity of private enforcement becomes clear when the action proceeds against only the governmental agencies that bear responsibility for the alleged violations. Id; see Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941. The financial burden of private enforcement is met when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal financial interest. Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941. Non-financial motivations are irrelevant. Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4^th at 1216-17.

Watson points out that the necessity of private enforcement is readily met when a lawsuit is brought against the governmental entity to enforce its responsibilities. Mot. at 15. The City does not contest that private enforcement by Watson was necessary.

Watson argues that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on it out of proportion to its individual stake in the matter. Watson alone paid for the litigation. Forsey Decl., ¶4. Watson never achieved any financial gain because the judgment includes no award of damages against the City. Finally, Watson obtained the same injunctive relief that all other landowners and voters in the City received. Mot. at 15-16.

The City argues that Watson will make millions of dollars from its development of Industrial Buildings I and II. Watson has admitted that every month of delay in its property development was costing it $85,169 to $92,575 in lost leasing income. Thus, Watson stands to gain $3.6 million in one year, more than triple the cost of its attorney’s fees in this litigation. This case has always been about Watson’s real estate portfolio and bottom line, and any benefit to the public is purely coincidental to Watson’s financial gain. Opp. at 11-12.

The City’s argument is based on the premise that Watson could not develop the two properties without winning the lawsuit. This is incorrect. Watson could have simply agreed to pay the annual $5,000 special tax and obtained a development permit. Instead, as Watson’s reply argues (Reply at 6), it lost $3 million in revenue by choosing to file suit.

The financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing Watson’s attorneys, and Watson is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees.

Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.

The requested hourly rates for Hanson Bridget’s tenure as Watson’s counsel are $745 for Taber, $525 for Wu, $795 for Walizadeh, $795 for Hoffman, $670 for Baral, $490 for Benbow, $460 for Ames, $415 for non-attorney paralegal Gerhke, and $325 for litigation specialists Hall, Lundin, and Ramirez. Taber Decl., ¶¶ 26, 40.

The requested hourly rates for Jackson Tidus are $745 for Taber, $550 for Casey, $475 for Ortiz, and $425 for Palley. Taber Decl., ¶40.

According to Watson, these rates are reasonable based on approved rates from recent cases in Los Angeles County Superior Court under section 1021.5 and are comparable to rates awarded at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse in cases that involve attorneys with similar education, skill, and experience. Taber Decl., ¶¶ 22-32.

The City’s expert, Knapton opines that the hourly rates proposed by Watson are not the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community conducting litigation of the same type, and that the cases cited in Taber’s declaration are of limited value because they are not rates for similar work and are not helpful for analyzing the non-contingent rates applicable to this motion. See Knapton Decl., ¶35. The Real Rate Report is the gold standard for determining market rates for services performed for use in calculating market rates, and Watson provides no evidence supporting the requested rates as the prevailing rates for the same kind of work. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶42-44. The 2023 Real Rate Report states that the prevailing hourly rate for real estate work for partners in Los Angeles County is $400, and that the prevailing hourly rates for associates is $344. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶38, 45. These rates are still on the high end and exceed the general real estate rates for both partners and associates. See Knapton Decl., ¶¶39, 40. Opp. at 14-15.

Watson replies that Knapton’s methodology cherry picks portions of the Rate Report. Knapton also submitted a declaration in 2021 in which he opined that opined the applicable median hourly rate for Hanson Bridgett would be $826 for partners and $525 for associates. See Taber Reply Decl., ¶¶5-6, Exs. 36, 37. Taber previously has been awarded a lodestar rate of $650 an hour, and it is reasonable for that rate to have increased to $745 in three years. Taber Reply Decl., ¶4.

An attorney’s fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent on the litigation. Ketchum v. Moses, (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133. The trial court must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended and eliminate padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts. Id. at 1132; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39 (“it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted”). The factors for evaluating the reasonableness of attorney’s fees include the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required, and the successful of the attorney’s efforts. Stokus v. Marsh, (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.

While there is no doubt Watson was successful, the other Stokus factors warrant a reduction of the requested fees as unreasonable. There are a number of reasons why the hours of Watson’s attorneys are grossly excessive. In reaching this conclusion, the court hastens to add that it is not disputing that the hours were actually incurred. Rather, the hours simply are not reasonable.

First, the City is correct (Opp. at 13) that Watson has the burden of showing “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America, (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail to enable the City and the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez, (2015) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-87. The court may reduce compensation for a failure to maintain appropriate time records. Id.

The evidence submitted by Watson is insufficient to enable the court or the City to accomplish this task because the reader cannot easily evaluate which attorney performed a particular task and whether that attorney spent the appropriate time on that task. See Knapton Decl., ¶52. While Watson relies on the fact that invoices are not required and that fees may be awarded based on declarations alone (Reply at 13), case law establishes a preference that attorneys seeking fees provide their contemporaneous time records: “We publish to underline that contemporaneous time records are the best evidence of lawyers’ hourly work. They are not indispensable, but they eclipse other proofs. Lawyers know this better than anyone. They might heed what they know.” Taylor v. County of Los Angeles, (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 205. Despite Taber’s many years of experience, she and Wu made the decision not to present their time records even though the City’s attorneys asked for them. Watson’s attorneys “elected to only provide this Court with far weaker evidence in the form of broad summaries of categories of loosely related tasks in order to support her argument that counsel has billed a reasonable number of hours for those tasks.” Knapton Decl., ¶50. This issue alone is reason to significantly reduce Watson’s fees.

Second, Watson overstaffed this case with ten attorneys, a paralegal, and three litigation specialists. Some of this is attributable to the fact that Taber changed law firms and staffed the case with a new set of lawyers. It is true that Taber and Wu did most of the work and that most of the lawyers apparently were assigned discrete (but unknown) tasks. Nonetheless, every time a lawyer was assigned a task, that lawyer had to be brought up to speed. Knapton opined that the case should have been staffed with one partner supervising associates. Knapton Decl., ¶45. This is probably correct, and the number of associates should have been limited to two.

Third, Watson overstates the effort of its attorneys in this case, routinely relying on the review or preparation of a simple document – e.g., a trial setting notice, minute order, case management statement or preemptory challenge – to make it appear that significant hours were justified. In fact, the attorney effort consisted of mostly of getting a viable pleading that would overcome a demurrer: (1) Watson’s Complaint, filed on May 8, 2019, the FAC filed on June 12, 2019, (2) an ex parte application to file a SAC and the subsequent February 11, 2021 SAC, (3) the City’s demurrer to the SAC on March 16, 2021, the TAC filed on April 12, 2022 after the City’s demurrer had been sustained, (4) the City’s demurrer and motion to strike the TAC, Watson’s motion for leave to amend to add the writ of mandate cause of action, Department 45’s order permitting Watson to re-file the TAC, (5) the City’s demurrer to the TAC, Watson’s belated effort for leave to amend and file its 4^thAC, and (6) the court’s permission for Watson to file a 4thAC, for which the City’s demurrer was overruled.

The City blames Watson for untimely and improper actions in this pleading effort. Flowers Decl., ¶¶ 3-14. Whether or not it is correct, Watson’s effort to obtain a pleading that would withstand demurrer does not justify the fees sought.

Fourth, a trial court may reduce attorney fees based on the plaintiff’s degree of success. A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole. Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino, (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185; see also Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California, (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 428, n. 29 (trial court should consider the fact that appellant, a successful party, was ultimately unsuccessful in its challenge to agency’s finding of mitigation). See In re Tobacco Cases I, (“In re Tobacco”) (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570 (approving apportionment of successful and unsuccessful contract claims based on percentage of time spent on unsuccessful theory.

There is no doubt that Watson prevailed on its mandamus claim. However, Watson failed on most of its reverse validation efforts in Department 45. Apart from the motions concerning the pleadings, Watson (a) attempted to take the City’s default, which was denied (Flowers Decl., ¶9), (b) moved for a preliminary injunction, which was denied, (c) attempted to depose various City employees which never occurred due to the City’s objection (Flowers Decl., ¶¶ 5-6). It is only fair to apportion fees between Watson’s failed reverse validation claim and its successful mandamus claim.

Additionally, in Department 85, Watson (d) prevailed a trial but then filed multiple proposed judgments and writs of mandate after trial, (e) filed a 5thAC which was stricken by the court (Flowers Decl., ¶16), and (f) made a post-judgment demand for exchange of expert witnesses and document demand from Knapton, which necessitated granting the City’s ex parte application for a protective order (Flowers Decl., ¶21).

Fifth, Watson is not entitled to attorney’s fees for making a CPRA request. As the City argues (Opp. at 18), CPRA requests are separate and apart from litigation. Wilder v. Superior Court, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 83 (public records request is distinct process from litigation discovery). The City cannot be required to foot the bill for Watson’s CPRA effort, even if it was necessitated by the City’s refusal to respond to discovery.

Watson argues that it is standard practice to include time that could not be included in the fee motion. Reply at 12. This is true only for preparation of the reply brief, not all post-motion time. Additionally, Watson included time for preparing the fee motion after February 29 and before the fee motion filling date of March 7, and it did so without any explanation.

The court generally agrees with Knapton that the 84.6 hours for pre-litigation activities is appropriate. Knapton Decl., ¶54. The court also concludes that a significant portion of the 262.5 hours of effort in gathering and preparing the Appendix of Evidence was appropriate, even though the hours incurred for the CPRA requests are not recoverable and although the work was not necessarily by the attorneys who should have performed the work. Finally, the court generally agrees with Knapton that the remaining categories must be reduced, albeit not in the same manner or percentage as he does.

Rather than parse the hours by category as Knapton did, the court will adopt a percentage of the total hours as reasonable. Where there is a voluminous fee application, the court may make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or the final lodestar figure. Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, (2019) 41 Cal.App.4^th at 24, 40. At a blended hourly rate of $561 and reasonable hours totaling 720, the reasonable lodestar figure is $403,920.

“[T]he unadorned lodestar figure reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under Serrano III.” Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1138. “The adjustment to the lodestar figure, e.g., to provide a fee enhancement reflecting the risk that the attorney will not succeed, constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous.” Id. “Rather, it is unintended to approximate market level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of non-payment or delay in payment of attorney fees.” Id.

The factors to consider include the novelty and difficulty of the litigation, the extent to which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, the contingent nature of the fee award, the fact that an award against the state would ultimately fall on the taxpayers, the fact that the attorneys received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character involved, and the fact that the moneys awarded would inure not to the benefit of the individual lawyers but the organizations employing them. Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 622-23.

Watson argues that it is entitled to a 1.5 multiplier. It prevailed on novel and complex federal and state constitutional issues. It is risky to challenge government agencies that the plaintiff is dependent upon for future approvals that are necessary to the plaintiff’s core business. The City’s serial demurring, refusal to stipulate to amended pleadings, and lack of cooperation with discovery, were strategic and likely intentional so that the City could continue to annex as many properties as possible before the court could declare its scheme unconstitutional. The City fabricated situations designed to moot Watson’s lawsuit. Finally, during the entirety of this unnecessarily long litigation, Watson was penalized by the City’s refusal to issue any building permits, and thus, lost rental revenue while construction costs increased. Mot. at 21-22.

These are not reasons for a multiplier. The court agrees that the lawsuit presented a novel issue, but it was not complex or difficult. Moreover, any difficulty is built into the hourly rate of Watson’s counsel. There is no evidence that Watson’s attorneys took the case on a contingency or prevented them from taking other work. An award against the City will ultimately fall on the taxpayers, and there is no evidence that Watson’s attorneys received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character involved. The request for a multiplier is denied.

[1] The parties have each filed numerous objections to the other party’s evidence. The court is unaware of any legal authority which requires a court to rule on evidentiary objections to a motion, except a motion for summary motion/adjudication (CCP § 437c (q)) or a special motion to strike (CCP §425.16 (b)(2). See also, Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947-49. The lack of need for court rulings on evidentiary objections is particularly acute for an attorney fee motion because the court is well aware of the underlying case, can look at the court file to refresh its memory, is well versed in attorney rates in the community, and can evaluate the reasonableness of fees with little aid. Consequently, the court declines to rule on the parties’ objections.

[2] Watson’s motion indicates that it will seek costs that are taxed as part of the City’s motion to tax costs. Mot. at 2. This is improper. Watson also states that its reply will include additional costs for responding to the motion to tax costs. Mot at 20. Taber’s reply declaration does not address any additional costs.

Respondents City of Carson (“City”) and Carson City Council (“City Council”) (collectively, “City”) move to strike and tax the memorandum of costs filed by Petitioner Watson Land Company (“Watson”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Watson filed the Petition against the City on May 6, 2019. The operative pleading is the 4thAC filed January 31, 2023, alleging claims for (1) declaratory relief and (2) traditional or administrative mandamus. The 4thAC alleges in pertinent part as follows.