Judge James C. Chalfant, Case 21STCP00834 2023-02-09 Tentative Ruling

Communities for a Better Environment and Ramona Quezada v. Huntington Park, City Council, and Ricardo Reyes, 21STCP00834

Tentative decision on motion for attorney’s fees: granted in part

Petitioners Communities for a Better Environment (“CBE”) and Ramona Quezada (“Quezada”) move for an award of attorney’s fees from Respondents City of Huntington Park (“City”), the Huntington Park City Council (“Council”), and Ricardo Reyes in his capacity as City Manager of Huntington Park (collectively, “City”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply,[1] and renders the following tentative decision.

On March 15, 2021, Petitioners filed a Petition for writ of mandate and Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (“Petition”). The Petition alleged in pertinent part as follows.

Huntington Park is a densely populated city of no more than three square miles with a 97.1% Latino population. Vacancy rates in the City have decreased significantly and continue to decrease, with 20% of all renters living in severely overcrowded conditions and 23.6% of the population living below the poverty threshold. These facts combined with high housing costs have created severe housing burdens. The City has no homeless shelter despite an increasing homeless population.

The City has spurned proposals to build affordable multi-family rental housing and insists that it needs to increase the level of homeownership. As the City receives funds from a federal community development block grant, it must create a consolidated plan addressing the housing issue. Its draft plan for 2020-2024 favors a first-time homebuyer program despite the fact that the renter population faces severe overcrowding and affordability issues.

The low-income and racial minority communities in the City bear a disproportionate burden of pollution and associated health risks. The City is adjacent to an industrial city, Vernon, and faces exposure to bio-persistent toxic emissions from its factories. There also are emissions from heavy truck traffic passing on the I-710 freeway. When combined with the high rates of asthma and cardiovascular disease of its residents, the City has a high CalEnviroScore reflecting a vulnerable population. The lack of new, affordable, safer multi-family housing is an environmental injustice impacting the community.

The City missed its October 15, 2013 deadline to adopt its 2013-2021 Housing Element. When it finally did adopt a Housing Element on May 29, 2019, it did so without soliciting public input or submitting a draft to the state Department of Housing and Community Development (“HCD”). In December 2019, HCD replied that the City’s Housing Element (1) lacked a site-specific inventory of land to accommodate the City’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (“RHNA”), (2) did not report and analyze implementation of the Cycle Housing Element programs, (3) did not evaluate employment trends or quantify the need for affordable housing, (4) inadequately analyzed various constraints on housing developments, (5) inadequately analyzed special housing needs in the City, (6) inadequately provided for programs to remove constraints on housing development, (7) did not establish a program to make sites available to accommodate the RHNA, (8) permitted manufactured housing in the same areas as conventional housing, (9) did not promote or further fair housing, (10) did not describe specific public participation efforts regarding the Housing Element, and (11) quantified the number of units to construct and conserve over the planning period. The Housing Element had deadlines that already had passed by the time the City adopted it. The City also has failed to provide mandatory Annual Progress Reports since 2014 or to implement some of the programs in the Housing Element.

The City’s general plan does not have an environmental justice element, which has been required since 2018. The land use element does not include a mandatory analysis of the needs of a fringe community within its sphere of influence.

Finally, the City has discriminated against the disabled and communities of color through implementation of housing and land use policies. City leaders have expressed hostility and perpetuated stereotypes about these communities when discussing proposals for affordable housing. The City has added an array of requirements for emergency shelters, making them difficult to build.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate compelling Respondents to (a) adopt a Housing Element that complies with state law, (b) implement programs 2, 10, and 13 in the 2019 adopted Housing Element, (c) allow supportive housing by right where multifamily and mixed-use developments are allowed, (d) prepare and submit a 2019 Annual Progress Report, (e) cease discrimination against disability and low-income housing, (f) affirmatively further fair housing, (g) amend the City’s land use element to include the analysis required by Government Code section 65302.10, and (h) amend the City’s general plan to include an environmental justice element or integrate environmental justice objectives. Petitioners further seek injunctive relief enjoining Respondents from taking any action that illegally discriminates against those in need of affordable housing and seek declaratory relief that the City and its May 2019 Housing Element do not comply with state law.

On March 18, 2021, Petitioners served Respondents with the Summons and Petition.

On May 2, 2022, Respondents filed a proposed confession of judgment agreeing to (1) meaningfully engage with Petitioners throughout the process of developing an updated Housing Element and an environmental justice element, and (2) file supplemental briefing with the court regarding the date of execution, return, and Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief.

On May 24, 2022, Petitioners filed a request for dismissal of the fourth, seventh, and tenth causes of action without prejudice.

On June 7, 2022, the court considered cross-briefs on proposed timelines for compliance with Govt. Code sections 65008 and 8899.50 and rendered a decision as to the final timeline.

On July 7, 2022, the court ordered that any proposed judgment include good cause extension prospects and be approved as to form by opposing counsel. The court signed an orally modified version of proposed judgment at an Order to Show Cause Re: Judgment hearing on July 14, 2022.

CCP section 1021.5 (“section 1021.5”) codifies the “private attorney general” exception to the general rule that each side bears its own fees unless the parties contracted otherwise.¿ See CCP §1021.¿ Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award fees to a successful party in any action that: “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if (a) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery.¿ The issue is committed to the trial court’s discretion.¿ Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (“Flannery”), (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 634.¿

PILP is a non-profit that focuses on affordable housing and public benefits, does not charge clients, and relies solely on attorney fees awards for funding. Feldman Decl., ¶12. Because of this, any fees granted through this motion will inure to PILP to support other advocacy cases. Feldman Decl., ¶24.

Valerie Feldman, Esq. (“Feldman”) was admitted to the bar in 2000. Feldman Decl., ¶3. Since she became a Public Interest Law Project (“PILP”) staff attorney in January 2016, she has been lead counsel on multiple affordable housing and land use cases. Feldman Decl., ¶5.

Melissa Morris, Esq. (“Morris”) has practiced housing law since 2004 and developed expertise therein. Feldman Decl., ¶25. She joined PILP in January 2018, where she litigates in state and federal court and advocacy training on affordable housing, fair housing, renters’ rights, California public benefits programs, disability rights, and civil rights of people experiencing homelessness. Feldman Decl., ¶¶ 25-26.

CBE is a non-profit environmental health and justice organization that has fought to address environmental justice issues for 40 years. Ganata Decl., ¶2. The organization has 6,000 members across the state, many of whom in Los Angeles County. Ganata Decl., ¶16.

CBE does not charge clients for fees and depends on fee awards to continue serving clients. Ganata Decl., ¶17. As far as CBE knows, this is the first case that challenges the Govt. Code compliance of a jurisdiction’s environmental justice element. Ganata Decl., ¶19. This case required CBE to research laws related to the City’s general plan and legal obligations to develop a Housing Element and environmental justice element. Ganata Decl., ¶19.

Jennifer Ganata, Esq. (“Ganata”) has been an attorney since 2010 and a CBE Senior Staff Attorney since September 2018. Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 2, 5, Ex. C. She has litigated under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) and Housing Element Law to protect the health of both low-income communities and their surrounding environment. Ganata Decl., ¶6.

Idalmis Vaquero, Esq. (“Vaquero”) graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law in May 2021, joined CBE in September 2021, and joined the state bar in December 2021. Vaquero Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.

Jamie Hearn (“Hearn”) is currently the Superfund Program Manager at the Duwamish River Coalition based in Seattle, Washington. Ganata Decl., ¶12. She was a CBE legal clerk from May 2021 to December 2021 before she graduated from law school in May 2022. Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. H. As a CBE clerk, she helped research and write memoranda on environmental law and land uses critical to drafting the documents in this case. Ganata Decl., ¶14.

Disability Rights California (“DRC”) is a non-profit that has spent 40 years advocating for the rights of those with disabilities and provides free legal services to their families. Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. This involves crossover with many areas of law, including education and housing. Grewal Decl., ¶4. DRC was counsel for Quezada in this case. Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 11, 13. Because DRC does not charge clients, any fees awarded will inure to DRC to support other advocacy cases. Grewal Decl., ¶12.

Navneet Grewal, Esq. (“Grewal”) is DRC’s litigation counsel and leads its impact litigation casework. Grewal Decl., ¶2. She graduated from New York University School of Law in 2007. Grewal Decl., ¶6, Ex. A. She has extensive expertise in housing litigation and advocacy. Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.

Lucia Choi, Esq. (“Choi”) is a seventh-year attorney with extensive housing experience, including unlawful detainer actions, administrative hearings, and writs of mandate proceedings. Grewal Decl., ¶13, Ex. D.

Natasha Reyes, Esq. (“Reyes”) was a DRC staff attorney from October 2016 through February 2021. Grewal Decl., ¶14. She has experience advocating for municipal zoning reforms to reduce barriers to affordable housing. Grewal Decl., ¶14, Ex. F.

Heidi Joya, Esq. (“Joya”) was a DRC staff attorney from June 2018 through February 2021 who specialized in California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) requests. Grewel Decl., ¶15, Ex. H.

The City is a priority area for CBE. Ganata Decl., ¶4. Ganata learned that the City has a non-compliant Housing Element when she joined CBE in 2018. Ganata Decl., ¶20. She soon after learned that it also had no environmental justice element. Ganata Decl., ¶20. She asked City staff for information on the City’s plans as to both general plan elements via demand letter but received no response. Ganata Decl., ¶20.

On September 23, 2020, the City sent a letter responding to HCD’s concerned about the City’s non-compliance for its Fifth Cycle Housing Element. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. The City explained that its high density leads to several challenges and constraints. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. The decisions that former leadership made over the last 20 years created several problems, and the COVID-19 pandemic added to it. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. Despite this, the City has a rich history of supporting affordable housing development, including 14 projects with 557 affordable units during those 20 years. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. The City did not want to focus on the non-compliant Housing Element before it took time to address the additional challenges and burdens it faced. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. It therefore asked for four months to address the Housing Element as its Ad Hoc Housing Committee worked to address current issues. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F.

In March 2021, the Attorney General notified the City by letter that it had failed to comply with Govt. Code section 65302 by failing to adopt a compliant environmental justice element with revisions to its general plan. Feldman Decl., ¶35, Ex G. The Attorney General had warned the City multiple times, but the City had not taken any steps towards compliance. Feldman Decl., ¶35, Ex G. The letter urged the City to take immediate steps to comply and to discuss the matter with the Attorney General if it so chose. Feldman Decl., ¶35, Ex G.

Throughout 2021 and 2022, the City struggled to get people to attend meetings to discuss development of the environmental justice element. Feldman Decl., ¶21. Its outreach efforts were insufficient to garner public participation, and it adopted the environmental justice element on November 15, 2022 in a City Council meeting without any public comment. Feldman Decl., ¶21.

CBE’s success in this case will have a positive impact on the City and other communities in the state. Eng Decl., ¶12. An environmental justice element will compel the City to develop policies, programs, and goals that reduce exposure to harmful pollution, increase access to parks, and improve access to healthy food options. Eng Decl., ¶13. This will reduce the disproportionate environmental burdens of communities. Eng Decl., ¶13. This case has created precedent about the nexus between housing and environmental justice. Eng Decl., ¶17.

When PILP first worked on this case, Morris was the lead attorney until Feldman joined the team in 2020. Feldman Decl., ¶13. Petitioners’ counsel drafted a Petition with ten causes of action, a 25-page opening brief addressing seven of them, and a request for judicial notice. Feldman Decl., ¶21. This required review of 5000 pages of evidence. Feldman Decl., ¶21.

In early stages, DRC staff focused on edits to demand letters and the Petition. Grewal Decl., ¶11. DRC drafted sections of the opening brief connected to the City’s reasonable accommodation ordinance and permanent supportive housing, as well as the duty to affirmatively further fair housing and land use discrimination. Grewal Decl., ¶11. Choi drafted sections of the briefs that discussed emergency shelters and transitional housing. Grewal Decl., ¶13.

As to efforts to garner public participation in the development of an environmental justice element, CBE continuously reminded the City that it needed to provide public information materials in Spanish. Ganata Decl., ¶22. CBE counsel would also communicate with opposing counsel and the Attorney General to gather and disseminate information about public meetings and deadlines. Ganata Decl., ¶23. Ganata also participated in public meetings and provided the Attorney General with updates on the litigation. Ganata Decl., ¶23. Vaquero drafted comprehensive comments about the City’s public outreach efforts and early drafts of the element. Ganata Decl., ¶23.

In October 2021, the City proposed a stay to explore a resolution to the claims. Feldman Decl., ¶17. Petitioners agreed to two extensions to the City’s deadline to file its opposition before they agreed on what topics and policies would be part of the negotiations. Feldman Decl., ¶17. Feldman drafted several Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”) throughout this process. Feldman Decl., ¶17. The last, on December 17, 2021, included settlement terms with a deadline of January 6, 2022. Feldman Decl., ¶18. Because the City did not respond, Feldman sent a reminder email on January 3, 2022. Feldman Decl., ¶19. Although the parties had a settlement call sometime after, the MOU expired. Feldman Decl., ¶19.

Feldman helped edit the City’s confession of judgment to reflect all the writ claims in this action. Feldman Decl., ¶20. She helped draft the supplemental brief about the judgment, the proposed judgment, and writ of mandate. Feldman Decl., ¶20. Feldman also attended status conferences on April 7 and 21, 2021, June 7, 2021, and July 7 and 14, 2022. Feldman Decl., ¶20.

On June 14, 2022, Petitioners sent the City a proposed judgment and writ of mandate. Feldman June 30, 2022 Decl., ¶4. On June 27, 2022, counsel for City indicated via email that it would respond by the end of that day. Feldman June 30, 2022 Decl., ¶5. Feldman replied that the City should notify whether it had any objections to the proposed writ by day’s end; it did not do so. Feldman June 30, 2022 Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.

On July 11, 2022, after the court ordered Petitioners to amend the proposed judgment to include a good faith exception, the City sent proposed revisions. Feldman July 12, 2022 Decl., ¶8. Counsel for Petitioners felt the revisions to the timeline for escalating injunctive relief were too extensive and Petitioners made additional revisions accepting some but not all of the City’s revisions. Feldman July 12, 2022 Decl., ¶12. The City replied that it did not agree with Petitioners’ proposed amendments. Feldman July 12, 2022 Decl., ¶13. Because Petitioners felt that further negotiation on the injunctive relief schedule would lead to delay, it filed an amended proposed judgment and writ of mandate. Feldman July 12, 2022 Decl., ¶14. On July 14, 2022, the court signed Petitioners’ proposed judgment and deleted the good cause exemption language. Id.

On February 20, 2013, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority awarded the City a Transit Oriented Development Grant for the preparation of the focused General Plan Update. Infanzon Decl., ¶3. The City released a Request for Proposal to qualified firms to assist the City in preparing the General Plan Update. Infanzon Decl., ¶4.

On February 17, 2015, the City entered into an agreement with Tierra West Advisors, Inc. (“Tierra West”) to engage in the focused General Plan update. Almazan Decl., ¶10; Infanzon Decl., ¶5. In October 2015, the City agreed to move forward with a plan from Tierra West. Infanzon Decl., ¶6. The City thereafter never stopped working on the development of the draft General Plan Update or with it the Fifth Cycle of the Housing Element; there are hundreds of City documents to that effect. Infanzon Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.

Hundreds of documents corroborate and support the work done in the community, the partnership with CBE, and its involvement during the process to develop the draft general plan update that included the Housing Element. Infanzon Decl., ¶14.

On March 7, 2019, the City provided a copy of the City’s draft Housing Element to HCD via Melinda Coy (“Coy”). Infanzon Decl., ¶27. She replied via voicemail on April 4 with next steps and a checklist for evaluating the element. Infanzon Decl., ¶¶ 28-29. On May 13, 2019, City staff had an in-person meeting with Coy. Infanzon Decl., ¶30. She remained in contact thereafter to identify steps for the City to comply. Infanzon Decl., ¶31; Almazan Decl., ¶12.

On May 29, 2019, the City adopted its Fifth Cycle Housing Element. Almazan Decl., ¶6.

On June 26, 2019, the City provided CBE a copy of the General Plan Update with the Fifth Cycle Housing Element. Infanzon Decl., ¶32. On July 9, 2019, City staff met with Ganata to discuss CBE’s concerns. Infanzon Decl., ¶33. After this meeting, CBE only sent three letters to City staff, two of them during the COVID-19 pandemic. Infanzon Decl., ¶¶ 35-38. The City remained open to meeting CBE to address its concerns. Infanzon Decl., ¶39.

On September 11, 2019, the City sent the draft Fifth Cycle Housing Element to the HCD for an informal review. Almazan Decl., ¶6. Compliance with state law thereafter became a challenge due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Almazan Decl., ¶7.

In 2020, the City and HCD agreed to 13 Housing Element milestones. Almazan Decl., ¶8. On March 16, 2021, the City secured funding and entered an agreement with JHD Planning, LLC (“JHD Planning”) to prepare the City’s Housing Element and any related actions as may be necessary. Almazan Decl., ¶13.

On February 9, 2021, the City had its first biweekly check-in meeting with HCD to discuss the status and progress of the City’s Housing and Environmental Justice Elements. Almazan Decl., ¶19. There began a series of bi-weekly calls between City staff, the City’s counsel, HCD, and two Attorney General divisions. Almazan Decl., ¶9.

The City submitted a draft Housing Element to HCD on August 6, 2021 to ensure that it received HCD’s comments by October 5, 2021. Almazan Decl., ¶22.

On October 25, 2021, without warning, JHD Planning sent the City a Notice of Termination wherein it exercised an option to terminate their agreement. Almazan Decl., ¶14.

On November 5, 2021, the parties in this action executed an MOU for negotiating a settlement agreement. Almazan Decl., ¶20, Ex. F.[3] The City entered into other MOUs with (1) HCD on November 8, 2021; and (2) the Attorney General on December 3, 2021. Almazan Decl., ¶21, Exs. G-H.

On November 16, 2021, the City entered into a one-year agreement with Rincon Consultants, Inc. (“Rincon”) to develop an Environmental Justice Element and ensure the City’s compliance with Senate Bill 1000. Almazan Decl., ¶15. One day before it expired, the City held a public hearing to receive public testimony and vote on whether to adopt the Environmental Justice Element Rincon had developed. Almazan Decl., ¶15, Ex. E. The City Council voted to adopt it. Almazan Decl., ¶15.

As of February 14, 2022, none of the 27 member cities that are part of the Gateway Cities Council of Governments (“GCCOG”) had a compliant Housing Element certified by HCD. Almazan Decl., ¶29. As of February 17, 2022, only three of the 200 cities in the Southern California Association of Governments (“SCAG”) had adopted fully compliant Housing Elements, and 122 had not adopted any Housing Element at all. Almazan Decl., ¶29.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, City Community Development Director Steve Forster (“Forster”) had multiple written and phone communications with various members of CBE counsel, HCD, and the Attorney General’s office. Forster Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.

As with other cities, Feldman spoke with Coy as the reviewer of the City’s proposed Housing Element several times to voice concerns. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶8. Coy never mentioned HCD’s interactions with the City. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶8.

On November 7, 2019, CBE submitted comments to HCD regarding the City’s Housing Element and the City’s failure to meet public participation requirements or provide required details. Ganata September 1, 2022 Decl., ¶17. On February 24, 2020, CBE wrote to the City’s General Manager to ask about next steps for the Housing Element but never received a response. Ganata September 1, 2022 Decl., ¶18. Demand letters on November 11 and December 16, 2020 also received no response. Ganata September 1, 2022 Decl., ¶¶ 19-20.

On February 18, 2022, CBE sent the City a letter via email regarding concerns with the public participation in the development of the Environmental Justice Element. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶6. On July 1, 2022, CBE sent another email about the City’s technical report prepared in anticipation for the development of the Environmental Justice Element. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶6. On July 18, 2022, the City sent an email with the first draft of the Environmental Justice Element. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶7. On July 26, Ganata asked for a version in Spanish, which the City published two days later. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶8.

On August 13, 2022, CBE sent the City a comment letter as to the initial draft of the City’s Environmental Justice Element. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶9. On September 30, 2022, the City sent a second draft Environmental Justice Element that did not incorporate CBE’s comments. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶10. Similarly, when the CBE sent another letter about revisions that this draft needed, the City adopted the element on November 15, 2022 without any of the recommended revisions. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶11.

There were limited circumstances in this case in which more than one law firm edited a document before filing. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶9. Multiple attorneys reviewed Ganata’s declaration in support of the opening brief because it had everyone’s evidentiary exhibits. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶9. The opening brief also required numerous hours because it covered seven causes of action in 25 pages. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶10.

After judgment was entered in this case, Petitioners’ counsel asked the City to stipulate to an extension of time to file a motion for attorney’s fees to try and reach a settlement and the City agreed. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 11-12. Petitioners’ counsel worked together to review time records and develop an offer for settling attorney’s fees with an analysis of why Petitioners were entitled to them. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶13. This analysis was sent to the City on September 9, 2022. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶13. The City asked for more details about time spent on this case. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶14. Although Petitioners’ counsel sent the additional detail on October 6, 2022, the City never responded. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 15-16.

As of the reply, the hours spent on this fee motion include: (1) 16.1 hours by Ganata (Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. A); (2) 14.8 hours by Vaquero (Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. B); (3) 25.6 hours by Grewal (Grewal Supp. Decl., ¶3, Ex. A); (4) 16.5 hours by Choi (Grewal Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. B); and (5) 53.6 hours by Feldman (Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. A). This includes 1.9 hours from Vaquero, 0.2 from Ganata, and one from Feldman to respond to the request from City’s counsel to categorize time records by major task. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶12; Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.

Vaquero’s hourly rate before she passed the bar in December 2021 reflects the market rate for non-attorney duties. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶3.

Petitioners seek attorneys’ fees based on (1) a $563,184 lodestar, (2) a 1.25 multiplier for the $563,184 lodestar; and (3) $83,609.50 for the fee motion. Reply at 13.

Courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” in order to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5.¿ Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.¿ The party seeking attorney’s fees need not prevail on all of its alleged claims in order to qualify for an award.¿ Harbor v. Deukmejian, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103; Daniels v. McKinney, (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 55.¿ The party is considered successful under section 1021.5 if the litigation “contributed substantially to remedying the conditions at which it was directed.” Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 174.¿ In other words, the “successful” party under section 1021.5 is the party that succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”¿ Maria P. v. Riles, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; see Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, (“Tipton-Whittingham”) (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 610.¿ A prevailing party who qualifies for an award under section 1021.5 is entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably spent by their counsel.¿ Serrano v. Unruh, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632–33.¿

The City alleges that it has tried to pass compliant Housing and Environmental Justice Elements since 2015. Stripped of inadmissible evidence, the City shows as follows.

The City received a grant to prepare a General Plan Update in February 2013. Infanzon Decl., ¶3. In February 2015, the City entered into an agreement with Tierra West to engage in the focused General Plan update. Almazan Decl., ¶10; Infanzon Decl., ¶5. In October 2015, the City agreed to move forward with a plan from Tierra West. Infanzon Decl., ¶6. The City thereafter never stopped working on the development of the draft General Plan Update or the Fifth Cycle of the Housing Element; there are hundreds of City documents to that effect. Infanzon Decl., ¶¶ 14, 20-21.

On March 7, 2019, the City provided HCD with a copy of the City’s draft Housing Element. Infanzon Decl., ¶27. On May 13, 2019, City staff had an in-person meeting with HCD’s Coy. Infanzon Decl., ¶30.

On May 29, 2019, the City adopted its Fifth Cycle Housing Element. Almazan Decl., ¶6. On June 26, 2019, the City provided CBE a copy of the General Plan Update with the Fifth Cycle Housing Element. Infanzon Decl., ¶32. On July 9, 2019, City staff met with Ganata to discuss CBE’s concerns. Infanzon Decl., ¶33. After this meeting, CBE only sent three letters to City staff, two of them during the COVID-19 pandemic. Infanzon Decl., ¶¶ 35-38.

On September 11, 2019, the City sent the Fifth Cycle Housing Element to HCD for an informal review. Almazan Decl., ¶6. Compliance with state law thereafter became a challenge due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Almazan Decl., ¶7.

In 2020, the City and HCD agreed to 13 Housing Element milestones. Almazan Decl., ¶8. On March 16, 2021, the City entered an agreement with JHD Planning to prepare the City’s Housing Element and any related actions necessary. Almazan Decl., ¶13.

Petitioners filed this lawsuit on March 14, 2021. The City submitted a draft Housing Element to HCD on August 6, 2021 to ensure that it received HCD’s comments by October 5, 2021. Almazan Decl., ¶22. On October 25, 2021, JHD Planning terminated its contract with the City. Almazan Decl., ¶14.

On November 5, 2021, the parties in this case executed an MOU for negotiating a settlement agreement. Almazan Decl., ¶20, Ex. F. The City entered into other MOUs with (1) HCD on November 8, 2021 and (2) the Attorney General on December 3, 2021. Almazan Decl., ¶21, Exs. G-H.

On November 16, 2021, the City entered into a one-year agreement with Rincon to develop an Environmental Justice Element and ensure the City’s compliance with Senate Bill 1000. Almazan Decl., ¶15. One day before it expired, the City held a public hearing and adopted the Environmental Justice Element developed by Rincon. Almazan Decl., ¶15, Ex. E.

On February 25, 2022 Rincon provided an initial assessment memorandum with steps to address HCD’s comments. Almazan Decl., ¶17. Rincon provided a proposal for professional services to the City on April 8, 2022. Almazan Decl., ¶18. Throughout 2022 and 2023, City Community Development Director Forster had multiple written and phone communications with various members of CBE counsel, HCD, and the Attorney General’s office. Forster Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.

The “catalyst theory” permits an award of attorneys’ fees even when the litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation. A plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense; and (3) the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. Tipton-Whittingham, supra 34 Cal. 4th at 608.

The City argues that the Petition did not motivate or expedite adoption of a compliant Housing Element. The City formally submitted the adopted Housing Element to HCD in May 2019. City staff and HCD already had identified 13 Housing Element compliance milestones before the Petition was filed, and bi-weekly calls between the City and HCD were ongoing. Opp. at 9.

Petitioners correctly argue that it need not rely on a catalyst theory because the court entered judgment in their favor. Reply at 6. When a party receives a final judgment with all the relief sought, it is the prevailing party for purposes of section 1021.5 attorney’s fees. On May 2, 2022, Respondents filed a proposed confession of judgment agreeing to (1) meaningfully engage with Petitioners throughout the process of developing an updated Housing Element and Environmental Justice Element, and (2) file supplemental briefing with the court regarding the date of execution, return, and Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. Petitioners then filed a request for dismissal of the fourth, seventh, and tenth causes of action without prejudice. After that, the court addressed the final timeline for compliance and entered judgment in Petitioners’ favor. Petitioners are a successful party for purposes of section 1021.5 attorney’s fees.

Even if the catalyst theory applied, the City’s conduct before the March 15, 2021 filing of the Petition shows that Petitioners catalyzed the Housing and Environmental Justice Elements. The City relies on its communications with HCD, but Petitioners point out that the City did not have a legally compliant Housing Element and that HCD knew as much since at least 2019. Yet, no public agency, including HCD, was enforcing the law. Reply at 9.

In a letter dated September 23, 2020, the City admitted that the challenges it inherited from 20 years of poor management and difficulties from the COVID-19 pandemic caused it to wait before addressing the Housing Element issues. Feldman Decl., ¶34, Ex. F. In March 2021, the month of the Petition was filed, the Attorney General’s office sent notice that the City had not complied. Feldman Decl., ¶35, Ex. G. Without Petitioners’ lawsuit, the City’s compliance with general plan law would have remained unresolved until a time convenient to it.

In opposing the catalyst theory, the City points out that the California Supreme Court held in Tipton-Whittingham that attorney’s fees may not generally be awarded where a petitioner merely causes the acceleration of the issuance of government regulations or remedial measures when the process of issuing or undertaking them was ongoing at the time the litigation was filed. 34 Cal. 4th at 609. Opp. at 11-12.

True, but in Tipton-Whittingham there was a policy concern at issue. If the government agency has discretion on a number of courses of action available to it, awarding catalyst attorney’s fees could be counterproductive by causing the agency not to adopt any remedy. 34 Cal.4^th at 609. Here, it is undisputed that the law required the City to have Housing and Environmental Justice Elements in place and it failed to adopt compliant versions of both. The court need not address the catalyst theory, however, because Tipton-Whittingham also indicates that a judicially recognized change in the parties’ relationship – i.e., a judgment – will suffice. See id. at 608.

Petitioners are a successful party for purposes of section 1021.5 attorney’s fees.

The first prong of the section 1021.5 test — whether a petitioner’s action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest — requires a determination of the strength or societal importance of the right involved. Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist., (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1148. The right, whether constitutional or statutory, must be an important right affecting the public interest, not something involving trivial or peripheral public policies. Ibid. The societal importance of a right generally is determined by realistically assessing the significance of that right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals. Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 394.

The City asserts that no important right was at issue because the City adopted its draft Housing Element in May 2019 and submitted it to HCD in September 2019. Opp. at 9. As Petitioners point out, the 2019 Housing Element was deficient and there was no Environmental Justice Element at all. The Legislature has identified the availability of housing – more accurately low-cost housing -- as an ongoing crisis. Govt. Code §§ 65580(a), 65589.5(a)(2)(J). The compelled compliance with statutory law for Housing and Environmental Justice Elements in the City’s General Plan implicates important rights affecting the public interest.

Unlike the separate substantial benefit doctrine, “the ‘significant benefit’ that will justify an attorney fee award need not represent a ‘tangible’ asset or a ‘concrete’ gain but, in some cases, may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.” Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, (“Woodland Hills”) (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939.¿ “[T]he benefit may be conceptual or doctrinal and need not be actual or concrete; further, the effectuation of a statutory or constitutional purpose may be sufficient.”¿ Braude v. Automobile Club of Southern Cal., (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 994, 1011.¿ Moreover, the extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an attorney fee award.¿ See, e.g., Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 496 (significant public benefit where litigation prompted agency to improve methods of creating and managing its CEQA records). The trial court determines “the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.”¿ Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 939–40.¿

The second prong of the section 1021.5 test is whether plaintiff’s action has conferred a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons. The trial court is required to determine the significance of the benefit as well as the size of the group favorably impacted by making a realistic assessment, in light of all the circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case. Bui v. Nguyen, (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366.

The City is 6.5 miles south of downtown Los Angeles and adjacent to the industrial City of Vernon and other sources of pollution. Ganata Decl., ¶4. Most of the housing is old enough that the City struggles with high lead contamination rates. Ganata Decl., ¶4. Because the judgment compels the City to act more promptly to pass compliant Housing and Environmental Justice Element, it helps secure housing, safety, and public health for the citizens of the City and to some extent neighboring cities. This is a large group receiving at least a potential significant benefit, which is all that is required.

The party seeking attorney’s fees must show that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 941.¿ “The necessity of private enforcement looks to the adequacy of public enforcement and seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where private enforcement is necessary.” In re Conservatorship of Whitley, (“Whitley”) (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214-15 (internal quotations omitted). In determining the financial burden on the petitioner, courts have focused not only on the costs of the litigation but also any offsetting financial benefits that the litigation yields or reasonably could have been expected to yield.” Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 1215. This prong evaluates “incentives rather than outcomes.” See id. at 1220. The party seeking attorneys’ fees must show that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 941.

This prong encompasses two issues: (1) whether private enforcement was necessary and (2) whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys. Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn., (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1348. The necessity of private enforcement becomes clear when the action proceeds against only the governmental agencies that bear responsibility for the alleged violations. Id.; see Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941. The financial burden of private enforcement is met when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal financial interest. Id. at 941. Non-financial motivations are irrelevant. Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4^th at 1216-17.

As to the first issue, the City asserts that HCD could have brought an action but chose not to do so because it and the City were in constant communication. For example, just before the City complied with an October 15, 2021 deadline, the Attorney General compelled the City to enter into an MOU or risk legal action if the Housing Element later proved deficient. Almazan Decl., ¶¶ 22-24. The City claims that Petitioners’ private enforcement was unnecessary where the public agency that could enforce the statute chose not to do so. Opp. at 10.

Petitioners reply that the Attorney General’s threat occurred after the Petition was filed. Reply at 8-9. More importantly, Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, (“Surfrider”), (2017) 14 Cal. App. 5th 238, 279, held that when a government agency chooses not to initiate any serious enforcement action and instead only sends letters urging voluntary compliance, the government action is not serious and private enforcement may be necessary. The Attorney General’s threat is similar to the urgings in Surfrider.

As to the second issue, the City asserts that Petitioners’ counsel had an incentive to bring suit to obtain attorney’s fees. Opp. at 10-11. Petitioners correctly respond that the City conflates Petitioners’ financial interest with the financial interests of their counsel. Reply at 9. The necessity and financial burden of private enforcement merit an award of fees. It is undisputed that Petitioners have no financial interest at issue in this case.

The petitioner bears the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of any fee claim. CCP §1033.5(c)(5). This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. Martino v. Denevi (“Martino”) (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559. “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” Id. “‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.’” Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, (“Center for Biological Diversity”) (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619 (citations omitted).

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. See Hadley v. Krepel, (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez, (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.

In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable, the court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774. In adjusting the lodestar figure, the court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. EnPalm LLC v. Teitler, (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.

Petitioners assert hourly rates of $775 for Morris, $800 for Feldman, $640 for Ganata, $350 for Vaquero, $250 for Hearn, $680 for Grewal, $475 for Choi, $475 for Reyes, and $450 for Joya. Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 26-27; Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 6, 13-15. The City asserts that Petitioners provide insufficient evidence of the market rate. Opp. at 13.

In 2017, two different courts granted motions for attorney’s fees at a rate of $635 per hour for Morris. Feldman Decl., ¶¶ 28-29. This is less than the $775 rate requested in this motion. Opp. at 13. Petitioners assert that while past fee rates may be useful to show a floor below which fee calculations should not drop, but they do not support the conclusion that a court should reduce the fees to the rates awarded in the past. Reply at 12; Charlebois v. Angels Baseball LP (2012), 993 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1122. While true, Petitioners still must justify whatever rate counsel claims.

None of the cases cited in the moving papers are for as high a rate as what Morris requests. Morris’s hourly rate is reduced to $635.

Past attorney fee awards for Feldman include $560 per hour in 2014, $450 per hour in 2019, and $450 per hour in San Mateo, supra, 59 Cal. App. 5th 166. Feldman Decl., ¶¶7, 9. As with Morris, this does not preclude a higher rate but Petitioners provide no evidence to justify a higher rate. Because the awards of $450 per hour are recent, they are a more accurate indicator of the reasonable hourly rate here.

In reply, Feldman asserts that the $450 per hour award in San Mateo reflects the lower rates in Sacramento. Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 17-18. This may be true, but the court exercises its discretion to apply the same rate in Los Angeles. Feldman’s hourly rate is reduced to $450.

CBE attorney Ganata does not provide any past awards to justify her request for $640 per hour. Opp. at 13; Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 26-27. She does claim that CBE counsel bills $250 to $780 per hour. Ganata Decl., ¶26.

Morris and Feldman are the most senior attorneys, each with over five years’ more experience than Ganata. Opp. at 13; Feldman Decl., ¶¶ 4, 25. As the most senior member of CBE, Ganata cannot claim a higher hourly rate than Feldman’s rate of $450. Ganata’s hourly rate is reduced to $450.

Vaquero graduated from the UCLA law school in May 2021, joined CBE in September 2021, and became a member of the California bar in December 2021. Vaquero Decl., ¶¶ 9-10. She was not a member of the bar when she began this case. Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 15, 25, Exs. D-E.

The City asserts that because she incurred a third of her hours before she became an attorney, an hourly rate of $350 is excessive. Opp. at 13-14. Ganata asserts that Vaquero’s rate before passing the bar are in line with non-attorney time. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶3. Yet, she fails to explain wny Vaquero should receive the same rate before and after she passed the bar.

Vaquero’s hourly rate is reduced to $250 per hour through November 2021. The hourly rate for December 2021 and afterwards is reduced to $300 per hour.

Hearn was a CBE legal clerk from May 2021 to December 2021 before she graduated from law school in May 2022. Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. H. The City asserts that a $250 rate for a legal clerk or intern is excessive. Opp. at 14. As a CBE clerk, Hearn helped research and write memoranda on environmental law and land uses critical to drafting the documents in this case. Ganata Decl., ¶14. Further, an hourly fee of $250 is consistent with a Vaquero’s pre-bar admission rate. Hearn’s requested rate of $250 is reasonable.

Grewal is DRC’s litigation counsel. Grewal Decl., ¶2. As with Ganata, Grewal provides no reason to give her a higher rate than Feldman. Grewal’s hourly rate is reduced to $450.

Choi is a seventh-year attorney. Grewal Decl., ¶13, Ex. D. She provides no specific reason for a rate of $475 per hour (Opp. at 13), which is higher than the approved rates for attorneys with more experience. Choi’s hourly rate is reduced to $400.

Reyes was a staff attorney from October 2016 through February 2021. Grewal Decl., ¶14. She provides no specific reason for a rate of $475 per hour (Opp. at 13), and her experience is roughly akin to that of Choi. Reyes’s hourly rate is reduced to $400.

Joya was a staff attorney from June 2018 through February 2021 who specialized in CPRA requests. Grewel Decl., ¶15, Ex. H. Of the attorneys involved, her area of expertise is least relevant to this action. Joya’s hourly rate is reduced to $300.

The approved hourly rates are $635, $450, $450, $300, $250, $450, $400, $400, and $300. Although Grewal and Feldman worked the most hours, there is no reason to use a higher rate than the average to calculate the reasonable fees. The average hourly rate is $400, and the court will use this blended rate.

To avoid duplication of work, counsel divided responsibility for tasks based on area of expertise. Feldman Decl., ¶16. All firms still reviewed hours and deleted any hours they thought may be duplicative. Feldman Decl., ¶14; Grewal Decl., ¶10; Ganata Decl., ¶24. DRC did not count any paralegal time. Feldman Decl., ¶14. Only one person per firm can claim time editing each pleading or attending conference calls that involved Petitioners’ entire legal team to discuss strategy. Feldman Decl., ¶14.

Petitioners claim (1) Feldman spent 223 hours, (2) Morris spent 71.3 hours, (3) Ganata spent 178.7 billable hours, (4) Vaquero spent 49.5 hours, (5) Hearn spent 43.7 hours, (6) Grewal spent 210.7 hours, (7) Choi spent 63.6 hours on the merits, (8) Reyes spent 68.3 hours, and (9) Joya spent 24.6 hours. The total is 932.70 hours. Feldman Decl., ¶¶ 14, 31, Exs. A, C; Ganata Decl., ¶¶ 15, 25, Exs. A, D, G; Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 10, 13-15, Exs. B, E, G-H.

The City asserts that the level of detail on the logs is insufficient because the description of each task is vague. Opp. at 14. The City also alleges that it has identified several instances of double-billing, which include (1) one hour for both Ganata and Reyes for a conference call on December 9, 2020 (Ganata Decl., ¶15, Ex. A; Grewal Decl., ¶14, Ex. G); (2) one hour for both Ganata and Grewal for a housing workshop on April 20, 2021 (Ganata Decl., ¶15, Ex. A; Grewal Decl., ¶10, Ex. B); (3) time from both Ganata and Reyes for a discussion about the Environmental Justice element on August 24, 2021 (Ganata Decl., ¶15, Ex. A; Grewal Decl., ¶14, Ex. G); (4) 0.6 hours Feldman billed for a team call on August 30, 2021, for which Ganata billed one hour (Ganata Decl., ¶15, Ex. A; Feldman Decl., ¶14, Ex. A); (5) one hour by Ganata, Feldman, and Grewal for the same settlement phone call with the City on January 13, 2022 (Ganata Decl., ¶15, Ex. A; Feldman Decl., ¶14, Ex. A; Grewal Decl., ¶10, Ex. B); and (6) time generally spent by all counsel on the opening brief and Ganata’s declaration. Opp. at 14.

Petitioners note that there were two Petitioners. CBE represented itself, while DRC attorneys – Grewal, Choi, Reyes, and Joya – represented Quesada. Grewal Decl., ¶¶ 11, 13. While a single Petition was appropriate, there are still situations where their interests may not align. It is logical to have counsel for both clients at certain events. Petitioners also note that some duplication among attorneys is reasonable. Horsford v. Board of Trustees, (2005) 132 Cal. 4th 359, 396-397 identified three reasons that billing may reflect reasonable duplicate hours. Reply at 10-11.

The court need not address the City’s issues because it is obvious that the hours expended by Petitioners’ counsel is grossly excessive.

The court need not address the City’s particularized issues because the 932.70 hours requested for nine attorneys is grossly excessive.

First, Petitioners billed for activities not part of the lawsuit, including (1) general advocacy as to the Housing and Environmental Justice Elements, (3) participation in public workshops, (4) making CPRA requests, and (5) excessive hours of co-counsel communication. Petitioners are not entitled to charge the City for actions related to the Housing and Environmental Justice Elements that were not part of prosecuting the lawsuit.

Second, and more important, Petitioners simply cannot obtain a fee award for the work of nine attorneys. Petitioners are entitled to hire the lawyers they want to work on the case. They are free to hire nine lawyers from three different non-profit entities to work on the matter if they choose to do so. But they cannot expect a fee award against the City for the work of nine lawyers from three entities. This case would reasonably have been staffed by one senior attorney and one or two junior associates.

Additionally, the work on the case was not extensive or particularly complex. As Petitioners note (Mot. at 9-12), the case involved the research and preparation of a demand letter and the Petition, an ex parte hearing for an oversized brief, Petitioners’ 25-page opening brief, an MOU for settlement that fell through, the City’s confession to judgment, and supplemental briefing and court appearances before the final judgment was entered. There was no trial and no reply brief prepared.

The court has no doubt that the nine attorneys actually worked the collective 932.70 hours. But that does not make the hours reasonable. The court has reviewed the logs and limits recovery to 316.1 reasonable hours.

As of the reply, Petitioners claim for the fee motion (1) 16.1 hours by Ganata (Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. A); (2) 14.8 hours by Vaquero (Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. B); (3) 25.6 hours by Grewal (Grewal Supp. Decl., ¶3, Ex. A); (4) 16.5 hours by Choi (Grewal Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. B); and (5) 53.6 hours by Feldman (Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶4, Ex. A). Petitioners claim that part of their counsel’s effort on the fee motion is time spent to respond to the request from City’s counsel to categorize time records by major task. Ganata Supp. Decl., ¶12; Feldman Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. The City does not raise any arguments as to hours claimed for work on this motion. See Opp. at 14.

The fee motion again reflects the unreasonableness of the hours. Five attorneys spent 126.6 hours on a single, relatively simple motion for which they seek $83,609.50 in fees. The hours for the fee motion are limited to 62.7 hours.

“[T]he unadorned lodestar figure reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under Serrano III.” Ketchum v. Moses, (“Ketchum”) (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138. The factors to consider for adjustment to the lodestar include the novelty and difficulty of the litigation, the extent to which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, the contingent nature of the fee award, the fact that an award against the state would ultimately fall on the taxpayers, the fact that the attorneys received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character involved, and the fact that the moneys awarded would inure not to the benefit of the individual lawyers but the organizations employing them. Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (“Ramos”) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 622-23.

“[T]he unadorned lodestar figure reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under Serrano III.” Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1138. “The adjustment to the lodestar figure, e.g., to provide a fee enhancement reflecting the risk that the attorney will not succeed, constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous.” Id. “Rather, it is unintended to approximate market level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of non-payment or delay in payment of attorney fees.” Id.

The factors to consider for a multiplier include the novelty and difficulty of the litigation, the extent to which the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, the contingent nature of the fee award, the fact that an award against the state would ultimately fall on the taxpayers, the fact that the attorneys received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character involved, and the fact that the monies awarded would inure not to the benefit of the individual lawyers but the organizations employing them. Ramos, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 622-23.

Petitioners seek a multiplier of 1.25 for the lodestar. City requests a negative multiplier, but it relies on several arguments it repeated in challenging the lodestar like duplicative hours and inflated rates.

CBE suggests that this is the first case that challenges the compliance of a jurisdiction’s Environmental Justice Element with the Govt. Code. Ganata Decl., ¶19. CBE was required to research laws related to a city’s general plan and legal obligation to develop a Housing Element and Environmental Justice Element. Ganata Decl., ¶19.

This case is the opposite of a novel and complex case and was more like shooting fish in a barrel. Petitioners engaged in work that had no risk because of statutory entitlement to the relief sought. It was clear from the beginning that the City had to adopt a Housing Element and Environmental Justice Element compliant with the law. The court has had at least four other cases involving Housing Element compliance and all settled because the city had no defense. Similarly, the City in this case filed a proposed confession, demonstrating that it had no defense and that the only real dispute was for the compliance timeline. This factor works strongly against a multiplier.

None of the three non-profit entities bill their clients; all rely on attorney’s fees awards to finance future litigation. Feldman Decl., ¶¶ 12, 24; Ganata Decl., ¶17; Grewal Decl., ¶12. There was no contingent risk for their attorneys. On the other hand, fee awards finance future advocacy cases and inure to the benefit of the non-profits. The latter factor supports a multiplier.

Petitioners claim that their counsel had to forego other meritorious litigation to spend time on this action. Mot. at 20-21. Petitioners present no specific evidence of a lawsuit that was not filed due to this case. In any event, Petitioners’ attorneys all work for non-profit entities and lost work does not affect them financially. This factor does not favor a multiplier.

Although neither party discusses taxpayer burden, any attorney’s fee would fall on the taxpayer because the City will pay an award. This factor disfavors a multiplier.

Multiplying the reasonable hours for the merits and the fee motion by the blended hourly rate of $400 yields $151,520 ($400 per hour x (316.1 hours + 62.7 hours). The motion for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $151,520.

[1] Respondents failed to lodge a courtesy copy of their opposition in violation of the Presiding Judge’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory Electronic Filing. Their counsel is admonished to provide courtesy copies in all future filings.

[2] The court has ruled on Petitioners’ written objections to the City’s evidence. The clerk is directed to scan and electronically file the court’s rulings.

[3] Petitioners also cite to this, but from declarations in earlier hearings. Mot. at 10.