Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 21STCP04159, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP04159 Hearing Date: December 8, 2022 Dept: 85
Avie Herskowitz, M.D. v.
Medical Board of California, 21STCP04159
Tentative decision on petition
for writ of mandate: denied
Petitioner
Avie Herskowitz, M.D. (“Herskowitz”) seeks a writ of mandamus directing
Respondent Medical Board of California (“Board”) to set aside its decision to place
him on probation.
The
court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply,[1]
and renders the following tentative decision.
A.
Statement of the Case
1.
Petition
Petitioner
Herskowitz commenced this proceeding on December 22, 2021, alleging a cause of
action for administrative mandamus. The
verified Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.
On
January 14, 2020, the Board filed an Accusation against Herskowitz. The Board amended the Accusation on May 20,
2020, and a second time at the administrative hearing in September 2021. Herskowitz was accused of committing professional
negligence and failing to maintain accurate records in the treatment of two
patients.
The
administrative hearing was held on September 13, 17, and 20-21, 2021 and submitted
for a decision on September 21, 2021.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the Board established
cause for discipline and recommended revocation of his license with a stay and five
years of probation. The Board adopted
the ALJ’s recommendation.
Petitioner
Herskowitz seeks (1) a writ of mandate directing the Board to set aside its decision
to place him on probation and (2) attorney’s fees and costs.
2.
Course of Proceedings
On
December 23, 2021, Herskowitz served the Board with the Petition and Summons by
substitute service, effective January 2, 2022.
On
March 8, 2022, the Board filed its Answer.
B. Standard of Review
CCP
section 1094.5 is the administrative mandamus provision which structures the
procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendered by
administrative agencies. Topanga
Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (“Topanga”)
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514 15.
CCP
section 1094.5 does not in its face specify which cases are subject to
independent review, leaving that issue to the courts. Fukuda v. City of Angels, (1999) 20
Cal.4th 805, 811. In cases reviewing
decisions which affect a vested, fundamental right the trial court exercises
independent judgment on the evidence. Bixby
v. Pierno, (“Bixby”) (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143; see CCP
§1094.5(c). An administrative decision
imposing discipline on a professional licensee is decided under the independent
judgment standard. Griffiths v.
Superior Court, (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 767.
Under
the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the
administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent
judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 143. The
court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its
own credibility determinations. Morrison
v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners,
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868. In
short, the court substitutes its judgment for the agency’s regarding the basic
facts of what happened, when, why, and the credibility of witnesses. Guymon v. Board of Accountancy, (1976)
55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1013 16.
“In
exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong
presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the
party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing
the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence.” Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 817. Unless it can be demonstrated by petitioner
that the agency’s actions are not grounded upon any reasonable basis in law or
any substantial basis in fact, the courts should not interfere with the
agency’s discretion or substitute their wisdom for that of the agency. Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 150 51; Bank of America v. State Water
Resources Control Board, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 198, 208.
The
agency’s decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at
the hearing. Board of Medical Quality
Assurance v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 860, 862. The hearing officer is only required to issue
findings that give enough explanation so that parties may determine whether,
and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, 514 15. Implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement
that the agency set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw
evidence and ultimate decision or order.
Id. at 115.
An
agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties (Evid. Code
§664), and the petitioner therefore has the burden of proof. Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission, (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137.
“[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party attacking the administrative
decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings were unfair, in excess of
jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of discretion. Afford v. Pierno, (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d
682, 691.
C. Governing Law[2]
Under the
Medical Practices Act, Bus.
& Prof. Code[3]
section
2000 et seq., the Board
shall take action against any licensee who is charged with unprofessional
conduct. “Unprofessional conduct
includes, but is not limited to, the following:…(b) Gross negligence; (c)
Repeated negligent acts. To be repeated, there must be two or more negligent
acts or omissions. An initial negligent act or omission followed by a separate
and distinct departure from the applicable standard of care shall constitute
repeated negligent acts....” §2234.
The failure of a
physician and surgeon to maintain adequate and accurate records relating to the
provision of services to their patients constitutes unprofessional
conduct. §2266.
D. Statement of Facts[4]
1. Background
Herskowitz
graduated from medical school in 1977 and served an anatomic physiology residency
at the Albert Einstein Hospital and an internal medicine residency at the Yale
School of Medicine. AR 789, 2230-31. He performed a cardiology fellowship at the Johns
Hopkins Hospital from 1983 to 1986 before joining its active staff. AR 789, 2232-33. He was an Assistant Professor of Cardiology
at Johns Hopkins Hospital from 1987 to 1995.
AR 788, 2236.
Herskowitz
received his Physician’s and Surgeon’s Certificate in California on June 5,
1998. AR 262. He was a Clinical Professor of Cardiology at
the University of California, San Francisco (“UCSF”) from 1999 to 2014. AR 788, 2240.
In
2010, Herskowitz founded his own clinic, Anatara Medicine (“Anatara”), which
practices holistic or integrative medicine.
AR 787, 2242-43. In 2013, he
founded a San Francisco Stem Cell Treatment Center. AR 787.
He has not been affiliated with a hospital since he left UCSF in
2014. See AR 787.
Herskowitz
is board-certified in internal medicine and anatomic pathology. AR 789.
Since 2018, he has been the president of the American College for
Advancement in Medicine (“ACAM”), a non-profit organization dedicated to educating
physicians on the safe and effective application of integrative medicine. AR 787, 2243-44.
2.
Patient 1
On
August 4, 2015, a 71-year-old male patient (“Patient 1”) was seen at Anatara complaining
of neck and head pain. AR 1026, 1028-29,
2139.
Naturopathic Doctor[5]
Carine Bonnist (“Bonnist”) examined Patient 1 and prepared a written report of
the results. AR 1026-28. She wrote that he was alert and oriented to
person, time, and place (“A&Ox3”).
AR 1028. He was also
well-nourished and well-developed (“WNWD”). AR 1028.
He seemed uncomfortable and in pain but not distressed. AR 1028.
She noted that Patient 1 had disc herniation between the C4-5 and C5-6
vertebrae and cervical spondylosis from trauma suffered in 1988. AR 1028.
He had undergone various treatments since 1990 and came to Anatara to
explore joint injections and stem cell therapy.
AR 1028.
Patient
1 signed a generalized Informed Consent and Request for Care Form (“Consent
Form”) that outlined his rights at Anatara, the scope of evaluation and
treatment, and potential benefits and risks.
AR 1031-32. One potential treatment
was: “Trigger point injection therapy with vitamin substances.” AR 1031.
Potential benefits were restoration of body functioning, relief of pain,
assistance with injury and disease recovery, and prevention of disease or its
progression. AR 1032. Potential risks included pain, discomfort,
blistering, minor bruising, discoloration, burns, itching, loss of
consciousness and deep tissue injury from needle injunctions. AR 1032.
Herskowitz
gave Patient 1 a prolozone injection. AR
1052. His patient chart notes do not
indicate whether he explained to Patient 1 what a prolozone injection is. AR 1052.
His chart reflects that Patient 1 had pain in his temple, neck,
shoulder, both arms, and lower back. AR
1052.
The
next morning, Patient 1 reported that the injection made him feel better until
10:30 p.m. that night. AR 1053. At that time, he felt soreness at the
injection site. AR 1053. He continued to feel soreness through
morning, but he expected as much because he had that experience with past
injections. AR 1053. His temple pain also had improved. AR 1053.
Herskowitz
gave Patient 1 additional prolozone injections on August 12 and 19, 2015. AR 1054-55.
His patient chart notes do not indicate that anyone examined Patient 1
or explained the treatment on either visit.
AR 1054-55.
3.
Patient 2
On
April 13, 2017, Patient 2 came to Anatara.
AR 1100, 2139. He was 36 years
old, and his doctor William Mora, M.D. (“Mora”), had diagnosed him with late Lyme
disease. AR 1332. He experienced the following complaints: severe
muscle weakness; extreme fatigue; weak left ankle and foot; extreme heat
sensation, entire body; extreme electrical nerve sensation, buzzing, and
pulsation throughout his entire body; and body alignment issues. AR 1101.
His condition was chronic. AR
1100. His system review form also
reflects a variety of past and present conditions in all systems. AR 1105-08.
His clinical record showed that he had diabetes that he controlled
mainly with diet. AR 1332. He had been prescribed current medications of hydroxychloroquine,
doxycycline, and testosterone gel. AR
1098. He said that these medications
stabilized his health and he stopped taking them after ten months. AR 1339.
Naturopathic
Doctor Devin Wilson (“Wilson”) examined Patient 2 for his initial visit on
April 13, 2017. AR 1133. For the physical examination, Wilson wrote
that (1) Patient 2 had normal speech and behavior and was A&Ox3 and WNWD;
(2) eyes were “PERRLA” (pupils equally round and reacting to light interiorly),
and “EOM Intact” (EOM means extraocular movements); and (3) the CN2-12 neurons
were grossly intact. AR 1135, See 1341.
Anatara
recommended multiple labs tests and asked Patient 2 to check with his primary care
physician at Kaiser about which labs Kaiser would be unwilling to complete. AR 1132, 1137. Patient 2’s consultation form does not show
that Anatara conducted any additional examinations or tests, including an
electrocardiogram (“EKG”). AR
1132-37. It also does not discuss any
treatment to address his Lyme disease or the many conditions that he
reported. AR 1132. The consultation form notes that Patient 2 may
need to use a Hermann machine – a devices that extracts blood and adds ozone
before it pumps the blood back in his body – and that Carmen will discuss
whether he can get a 20% discount. AR
123, 1132.
Anatara’s
consultation form also does not say whether doctors discussed the Hermann
treatment’s risks and benefits with Patient 2.
AR 1132. Patient 2 signed a
Consent Form similar to that signed by Patient 1 with general explanations of
rights, treatments, benefits and risks.
AR 1117. He also signed an
Advanced Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage warning him that insurance rarely
reimbursed for Anatara’s treatments because they were non-standard. AR 1115-16.
Patient
2 began the intravenous ozone therapy during his April 13, 2017 visit. AR 1140.
The next day, Anatara emailed him a treatment plan and the cost in which
the number of passes increased on each occasion of treatment. AR 1141.
Patient
2 continued the treatment during visits on April 24 and 27 and May 1 and 5,
2017. AR 1142, 1145-47. During his April 24 visit, Patient 2 reported
fatigue from his last treatment. AR
1142. He felt lightheaded during his treatment
on May 1. AR 1146. The records do not indicate any examination
during these visits. AR 1142, 1145-47.
On
May 17, 2017 at 3:00 p.m., during another round of Hermann ozonation, Patient 2
needed oxygen, CPR, epinephrine, and defibrillation. AR 1149.
The nurse who administered the treatment reported that, after a bulb on
the machine was changed, they realized the tube was switched to reverse the
flow of blood. AR 1150-51. This caused Patient 2 to complain about
shoulder pain before he went into cardiac arrest, which caused the nurse to bring
in Herskowitz to resuscitate him. AR
1151. At 3:11 p.m., EMTs arrived and
took charge of the resuscitation. AR
1154-55. They transferred him to the ER
unit of “CPMC.” AR 1155.
4.
The Accusation
On
January 14, 2020, the Board filed the Accusation against Herskowitz. AR 236-42.
The Board amended the Accusation on May 20, 2020 (“Amended
Accusation”). AR 243-52.
For
Patient 1, the Amended Accusation alleged that Herskowitz did not provide or
document a physical examination of Patient 1’s cervical spine in his medical
records. AR 247. Herskowitz also did not obtain Patient 1’s informed
consent about the nature, risks, and alternatives to the prolozone treatment
before its administration. AR 247. On August 31, 2015, Patient 1 visited a pain
management physician who recommended that he receive stem cell therapy. AR 246-47.
Herskowitz performed stem cell harvesting with collagenase. AR 247.
Neither collagenase nor prolozone therapy are FDA-approved. AR 247.[6]
Herskowitz’s
failure to perform a physical examination of the cervical spine before he recommended
and provided ozone or prolozone therapy was a negligent act under section
2234(c). AR 247. The same is true of his failure to obtain
informed consent regarding the nature, risks and alternatives of ozone or prolozone
therapy. AR 247. He also violated section 2266 if he did the perform
a physical examination or have an informed consent discussion but did not
document them. AR 247-48.
For
Patient 2, the Amended Accusation alleged that Herskowitz did not obtain a
complete clinical history, exposure history, assessment and evaluation of
symptoms and serologic/laboratory testing for Patient 2 before he diagnosed and
treated him for Lyme disease or tick-borne recurrent fever. AR 248.
Herskowitz also did not follow the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (“CDC”) two-step process for Lyme disease diagnosis. AR 251.
He did not perform, or document, a physical examination or EKG to
identify other complications from the Lyme disease. AR 251.
He further did not obtain informed consent about the nature, risks, and
alternatives to the ozone therapy treatment using the Hermann machine during
any of Patient 2’s visits. AR 251. Finally, he did not keep adequate and
accurate procedure notes for any visit.
AR 249-50. Herskowitz’s actions for
Patient 2 provide basis for discipline as gross negligence under section
2234(b), repeated negligent acts under 2234(c), and inadequate records under section
2266. AR 251.
Based
on these allegations, the Board sought to revoke or suspend Herskowitz’s Physician's
and Surgeon's Certificate. AR 252.
5.
Bonnist’s Declaration[7]
On
June 23, 2020, before the hearing on the Amended Accusation, Bonnist submitted
a declaration about her care of Patient 1.
AR 68-69. Her declaration stated
in pertinent part that, during Patient 1’s first visit to Anatara, Bonnist followed
the normal procedure at Herskowitz’s office.
AR 69. This procedure involves
taking vitals, completing a thorough history, and conducting a physical
exam. AR 69. This intake usually took about one hour. AR 69.
She then escorts the patient to Herskowitz to discuss information
obtained from the intake. AR 69. Bonnist would leave after she signed the
intake form, and Herskowitz would continue the discussion regarding the patient
history, current complaint, and eventually a diagnosis and recommendations. AR 70.
Although
she did not remember Patient 1’s visit, her notes indicate that she followed
the usual office procedure and that she spent an hour with Patient 1. Bonnist denied the allegation that Anatara did
not conduct a physical examination of Patient 1; they always examined every
patient. AR 70.
Bonnist
left Anatara in 2016 and joined the Shalva Clinic in Connecticut as a
Naturopathic Physician from 2017 to 2019.
AR 69. She is now a Naturopathic
Physician at the New Beauty and Wellness Clinic in Westport, Connecticut. AR 69.
6.
The Hearing
The
ALJ heard the Amended Accusation on multiple days in September 2021. Pertinent testimony is as follows.
a.
Dinesh Sharma
Dinesh
Sharma, M.D. (“Sharma”) testified that he has been a licensed physician in
California since 1984. AR 1418. He has never been subject to discipline. AR 1418.
He treats patients with neck pain on a daily basis, which is the second
most common diagnosis he sees after back pain.
AR 1431.
The
typical physical examination for neck pain, back pain, or joint pain begins
with visualization of the area the doctor is examining. AR 1431-32.
The doctor then palpates the affected joint or area on the torso or neck
to identify where the pain is. AR 1432. The doctor conducts a range of motion test to
see if the patient suffers any limitations in range of motion. AR 1432.
At the same time, the doctor will use provocative maneuvers to identify
pinched nerves. AR 1432-33. Through neurological, sensory, and motor
examinations, the doctor checks sensation in the lower and upper extremities as
well as reflexes. AR 1433. The last part of the physical examination is a
vascular examination of the affected area to determine the pulse in lower
extremities and if the patient has any peripheral vascular disease. AR 1432-33.
Herskowitz’s
August 4, 2015 note for Patient 1 reflects only treatment and do not show that Anatara
performed any physical examination. AR 1447. Although his note refers to Bonnist’s August
4 note for additional information, her note suggests that she did only a brief
examination. AR 1447-48. The note’s line under “Assessment, Plan:”
starts with O, which signifies a physical examination. AR 1448-49. Her examination does not meet the standard of
care because the note does not show that Bonnist examined the cervical
spine. AR 1450-51. Her report does not even remotely suggest that
she visually examined the neck, palpated it, conducted range of motion tests,
conducted a neurological examination, or conducted a vascular examination. AR 1452-53.
Bonnist’s
declaration that Anatara always physically examined patients did not change Sharma’s
opinion that she did not adequately examine Patient 1. AR 1454-55.
Herskowitz’s
note for Patient 1’s August 12 visit reflects the information Patient 1 reported
to Herskowitz about his condition. AR
1456. There is no indication that Herskowitz
conducted an examination on the August 12 visit or on the August 19 visit. AR 1457-58.
The standard of care requires a physical examination of the cervical
spine every time the patient comes back after treatment. AR 1458.
The medical chart show that Herskowitz’s associate conducted a physical examination
a month later. AR 1459.
Herskowitz’s
failure to properly examine Patient 1 before performing three ozone injections
in August 2015 does not meet the standard of care. AR 1461.
Alternatively, the documentation of a patient’s history, the
examination, and the treatment are vital components of the record. AR 1462.
Proper documentation of the physical examination is important. AR 1461-62.
Herskowitz’s
failure to obtain informed consent from Patient 1 for his specific treatment was
a simple departure from the standard of care.
AR 1465. A trigger point
injection is an invasive treatment but the doctor can obtain an oral consent
for that treatment. AR 1466. For larger treatments like an epidural, the doctor
will provide a two-page form that indicates the treatment, body parts at issue,
and risks for the patient to sign. AR
1466. But for any treatment or
procedure, there must be a conversation.
AR 1467. An oral informed consent
must be documented. AR 1466-67.
Herskowitz’s notes from Patient 1’s visits on August 4, 12,
and 19, 2015, do not reflect an informed consent conversation about the ozone
injections. AR 1475-76. Herskowitz
should have explained to Patient 1 that he was going to receive a trigger point
injection with ozone, that it was alternative medicine, and of any alternative
treatments. AR 1480-81. Patient 1 should have had the chance to ask
questions at that time. AR 1480.
The
Consent Form for Patient 1 is insufficient because it does not mention the
ozone injections for trigger point areas.
AR 1476-78. The phrase “including
but not limited to” is a blanket disclaimer that does not explain what the
procedure will be. AR 1477-78. The listed treatment of “trigger point
injection therapy with vitamin substances” is insufficient because ozone is not
a vitamin substance. AR 1479. The fact that Patient 1 signed the document
is irrelevant because the document does not provide informed consent. AR 1480.
It does not appear that Patient 1 was informed of what he was about to
receive. AR 1480.
b.
J.D.
J.D.
testified that she is the spouse of Patient 2.
AR 1525-26. Patient 2 was bitten
by a tick when he was six years old. AR
1555. He had a high fever at the time
and lifelong symptoms that seemed related to Lyme’s disease. AR 1555.
In 2015, Mora performed blood tests that confirmed Patient 2 had a
chronic version. AR 1555.
On
the day that Patient 2 went into cardiac arrest mid-treatment, Anatara staff
told J.D. that Herskowitz took Patient 2 to the emergency room. AR 1555.
c.
Patient 2
Patient
2 testified that he first saw Mora in May 2016.
AR 1579. While Mora waited for lab
test results to see if Patient 2 had Lyme disease, he prescribed doxycycline
and hydrochloroquine for six weeks. AR
1578. Patient 2 felt better and was able
to walk more after taking the antibiotics, to the point where he returned to
teaching improv. AR 1578.
When
Patient 2 revisited him, Mora explained that the blood test came back positive
for relapsing fever, something that is not common in the United States but is
in Japan. AR 1579. Mora recommended that Patient 2 continue
taking the antibiotics for at least a year and continue for a second year if his
symptoms were bad. AR 1579. Mora planned to retest Patient 2 every six
months for Lyme disease markers, but Patient 2 could determine for himself when
to stop taking the antibiotics. AR 1579.
Patient
2 continued to see Mora through the end of 2016. AR 1579.
On the second visit, he asked about ozone therapy after he read an
article stating that celebrities used it to help recover from and live with
Lyme disease. AR 1581. Mora explained that the treatment puts the
patient’s body in a box in which ozone steam is misted and the body absorbs it
through skin pores. AR 1581. Mora had never worked with a patient who
underwent that treatment, so he could not recommend it. AR 1581-82.
He did not discuss any other form of ozone treatment like
injections. AR 1582.
Patient
2 moved to Oakland. AR 1643. He could not continue to see Mora in
Sacramento, and Mora would not prescribe antibiotics unless Patient 2 saw him in
person. AR 1643. Patient 2 stopped taking the antibiotics
because he could not make the trip. AR
1643.
Ten
weeks after stopping the antibiotics, Patient 2 began feeling muscle weakness
and fatigue. AR 1643. Patient 2 searched for ozone treatment online
and found Anatara. AR 1583. Patient 2 called Anatara and set up an
appointment. AR 1583. Antara did not describe the ozone treatment
over the phone when he set up the appointment.
AR 1583.
d.
George Melikian
George
Melikian (“Melikian”) testified that he has been a licensed physician since
2009 and has not been disciplined. AR
1684-85.
Relapsing
fever is a broader umbrella for tick-borne illnesses other than Lyme disease
that present similar symptoms. AR
1696. Lyme disease and relapsing fever
have similar symptoms, but relapsing fever does not result in the same
secondary complications like heart blocks.
AR 1697. Melikian is familiar
with the use of anti-inflammatory drugs to treat Lyme disease, although he does
not prescribe them himself. AR
1696.
For a patient with Patient 2’s complaints, the doctor should
(a) conduct a musculoskeletal examination, (b) conduct a neurological examination,
including testing motor strength, (c) review his lab work, and (d) obtain a
detailed patient history from the patient with focus on mumps, measles, and
rheumatic fever. AR 1708-09, 1734. The doctor should also evaluate the
weaknesses reported by the patient, which for Patient 2 was body alignment
weakness and burning sensations in lower extremities. AR 1713.
Mora conducted a proper physical examination. AR 1744.
Herskowitz’s
notes do not reflect any physical examination.
AR 1709-10. Wilson’s notes for
physical examination (AR 1135) show a cursory examination. Wilson wrote: “General: Normal speech, normal
behavior, A/Ox3 (which means alert and oriented times three to person, place,
and time). AR 1710. He also wrote: “WNWD (well-nourished,
well-dressed) and “NAD” (no apparent distress).
AR 1711. For eye exam, Wilson
wrote “PERLA” (pupils are equally round, reactive to light interiorly). That means shining a light in the patient’s eyes
and checking to see if the patient could follow your finger to make sure that
they track movement to all four quadrants of the visual field. AR 1711.
Finally, Wilson wrote under Neuro that cranial nerves 2 to 12 were
grossly intact. AR 1711. “Grossly intact” means there was no specific
examination, but Wilson made general observations that did not reveal a gap in
the cranial nerves. AR 1711.
In Melikian’s opinion, Wilson’s physical examination was insufficient
for someone with Patient 2’s symptoms.
AR 1713, 1716. The neurological
examination should have been comprehensive by evaluating the lower extremity
weaknesses and burning sensations that Patient 2 reported. AR 1713.
There should have been a heart and lung examination with a
stethoscope. AR 1713. There was no documentation that any of this
was done. AR 1713.
Herskowitz
was required to, and did not perform, a comprehensive appropriate evaluation,
including full physical exam, on April 13, 2017 prior to administering an
invasive procedure with a Hermann machine.
AR 1734, 1745. In this regard, Herskowitz
could not rely on Wilson’s physical examination. AR 1713-14.
The standard of care is for the physician to perform his or her own
examination. AR 1714. The purpose of the physical examination is
not only to find out what is wrong with the patient, it also is to set a
baseline. AR 1714. Even when doctors receive patients from other
specialists, the physical is repeated.
AR 1714. Melikian always does
this even if his nurse practitioner or physician’s assistant has performed the
examination; they are repeated by him personally. This is especially true for an initial
consultation. AR 1798. Herskowitz should not have relied on Wilson’s
examination results. AR 1713-14.
The standard of care for a patient with Patient 2’s symptoms
includes an EKG to check for heart block.
AR 1734. An EKG can diagnose a
heart block -- a prolongation of a specific current that runs across the heart
-- that is specific to Lyme disease. AR
1697. Herskowitz’s diagnosis of
relapsing fever without an EKG was an extreme departure from standard
practice. AR 1733, 1744-46.
At a minimum, informed consent should include a discussion
of the risks and benefits of the procedure and any alternatives. AR 1746.
The patient must have sufficient time to ask all questions the patient
considers appropriate so that the doctor and the patient are on the same page
as to the decision. AR 1747. The medical records from April 13, 2017,
which includes Wilson’s report, do not reflect that this conversation
occurred. AR 1747-48. The Consent Form signed by Patient 2 at his
home three days before his April 13, 2017 visit is insufficient because nobody
discussed it with him before he signed it.
AR 1748-50.
Although
Patient 2 signed the same form during his office visit on April 13, 2017, the
long list of treatments is broad and does not specifically discuss his
treatment and the alternatives. AR 1750. The procedure was invasive because it
accessed the vascular system and therefore had an increased risk of infection,
bleeding, and emboli. AR 1751. The Consent Form lists non-specific and more
minor risks for all the procedures, and nothing about trigger point injections
with ozone or the Hermann machine involving blood-infused ozonation. AR 1751-52.
The Consent Form talks about pain and discomfort but does not discuss where
and from what. AR 1753. The Consent Form did not meet the standard of
care. AR 1753.
e.
Allan Sosin
Allan
Sosin, M.D. (“Sosin”), testified that he has been continuously licensed as a
physician since 1995. AR 1807-08. His practice focuses on treatment without the
use of drugs or surgery because of the problems that can occur as a
result. AR 1807.
Prolotherapy
is an injection of liquid prolozone, which has sugar water, dextrose, procaine,
vitamins, minerals, and sodium bicarbonate.
AR 2028. Ozone is a gas that
doctors often inject after the prolozone.
AR 2028. Whether given
intravenously or by injection, ozone has few side effects other than the a few
days of pain and the risk of bleeding at the injection site. AR 1915. There is no added risk to the use of prolozone
as compared to ozone, whether by injection or intravenously. AR 2028.
Major
auto hemotransfusion (“MAH”) is a form of intravenous ozone therapy. AR 1894.
The machine withdraws about 200 cc’s of blood from the patient into a
sterile container, mixes it with ozone, and then reinfuses it. AR 2050.
There are other ways to administer ozone as well. AR 2050.
Traditional
medicines do not have much to offer to those persons with chronic Lyme disease
beyond anti-depressants, pain medications, and sedatives not specific to any
diagnosis. AR 1911-12. Alternative or holistic approaches are intended
to help patients for whom traditional treatment is ineffective. AR 1912.
Chronic Lyme disease does not respond to antibiotics and is such a
disease for which an alternative approach can be effective. AR 1912.
A
lot of physicians have nurses or physician’s assistants to perform a general
examination before the physician examines where the problem exists. AR 1932-33, 1945. If Bonnist performed Patient 1’s general
examination, Herskowitz did not need to repeat it. AR 1932.
The same is true for Wilson’s examination of Patient 2. AR 1944-45.
Moreover, it is necessary to do a physical examination in order to place
the needle correctly and Herskowitz would have examined the area he needed to do
so. AR 1932-33.
Based
on Patient 2’s age, problem, normal pulse, and lack of cardiological symptoms,
an EKG was not necessary. AR 1946.
Informed
consent requires the doctor to discuss the procedure and its benefits and risks
with the patient. AR 1955. The signature form is for documentation
purposes; the important thing is that the discussion occurs. AR 1955-56.
A failure to have the discussion and have a patient confirm the informed
consent in writing is simple negligence.
AR 1956-57. Herskowitz’s failure
to document a discussion with Patient 1 was simple negligence. AR 1957.
A
patient with Patient 2’s symptoms -- severe muscle weakness with fatigue, weak
left ankle and foot, extreme heat sensation, extreme electrical nuerosensation,
buzzing and polation of the entire body, and body alignment issues -- would require
a pretty thorough orthopedic and neurologic exam to find areas of tenderness,
range of motion, and lumps. AR 1988-89. The orthopedic examination would include
muscular and skeletal range of motion.
AR 1989, The neurological tests would
include tests for strength, reflexes, sensation, gait, and cranial nerves. AR 1989.
For the cranial nerves, the physician should test for facial muscle
movements, movements of the jaw, whether the eyes move symmetrically. AR 1989.
Wilson’s examination as reflected in his note was
appropriate but incomplete. AR 1998-99.
f.
Stephen Bock
Stephen Bock, M.D. (“Bock”) testified that
Prolozone combines ozone with nutritional products that help with healing. AR 2141.
Patient 2 had Lyme disease, which can affect the heart, but no
cardiac complaints or indications that he needed an EKG. AR 2172.
Bock would not run an EKG for a patient who is not complaining about
chest pain or a shortness of breath. AR
2172. Patient 2 also was not using any
drugs like Zithromax or Levaquin or any antimalarials that can affect the QT (the
interval between waves in a heartbeat) -- a prolonged QT can predispose a
person to heart rhythm problems). AR
2172-73.
g.
Herskowitz
Herskowitz
testified that ozone enters the body through the bloodstream or other methods
and binds to lipids. AR 2250. The first three seconds of intravenous ozone
therapy involve a prooxidant effect that splits blood oxygen into a negatively
charged oxygen ion, especially when the patient is depleted in antioxidants due
to fighting inflammation. AR 2250. This may lead to some transient fatigue,
which is the most common side effect. AR
2250-51. The average patient with a
chronic illness can develop fatigue for minutes or hours after the treatment,
but usually feels fine in the morning.
AR 2251. In a rare case, the
fatigue will persist for a few days, but it does not result in permanent
injury. AR 2251. As with any injection method, bleeding,
hematoma, and bruising are also concerns.
AR 2362-63.
A good faith examination would have been a focused
examination plus review of the full medical history and examination summary
from Bonnist. AR 2351. He has personally observed Bonnist and Wilson
perform physical examinations in the past.
AR 2351.
The night before a patient’s visit, Herskowitz will meet
with his two naturopaths – he now also has a medical doctor -- to review the patient’s
medical history. AR 2352. They figure out what the best plan of action
would be for taking their history and physical examination taking. AR 2352.
He assumes that the naturopaths will perform a complete
examination. AR 2352. He discusses with them that they will confirm
what the last physician did, validate that the patient is on that level, and
then focus on the exam on the body parts at issue. AR 2352-53.
After the naturopaths conduct the examination the next day,
Herskowitz reviews the updated information.
AR 2352. He can ask the
naturopaths questions and relies on their information to determine if the
patient needs additional examination. AR
2353.
Patient 1
Patient
1 came for pain relief because his past treatments were only somewhat
effective. AR 2361. They also involved a lot of opiates, and he
wanted to stop. AR 2361. When he first visited on August 4, 2015, he
had mild anxiety, was soft spoken, and a mood affected from constant pain for
so many years. AR 2363. He was interested in both injections as a
short-term solution and stem cell therapy as a long-term solution. AR 2364.
Patient
1’s medical history showed that he was complaining of multiple sites of discomfort
in his temple and between his eyes, his shoulders, upper back, and lower
back. AR 2367. The notes three weeks earlier from his
doctor, Panjabi, said that Patient 1 was losing muscle mass because the nerve
conduction had decreased and was insufficient to maintain strength and muscle
mass in both his arms. AR 2366-67. Because Panjabi reported decreased range of
motion in the neck and atrophy and weakness in both arms, the focus after the
initial examination was on a neurological exam for the head and neck. AR 2353, 2366. Herskowitz would have told Bonnist to focus
on the pain and atrophy in those areas.
AR 2367-68.
Bonnist’s notes reflect that she examined Patient 1 for 60
minutes. AR 2377. He recalled that Bonnist confirmed Patient 1’s
muscle weakness based on whether she could slip her fingers free from his grip. AR 2368.
Bonnist told Herskowitz that Patient 1 complained of multiple areas of
pain in his temple and between his eyes.
AR 2365. He also had pain in his
neck, back, and shoulder. AR 2365.
Herskowitz
met with Patient 1 for 30 minutes before he recommended treatment. AR 2377.
Patient 1 revealed that a year before that visit, Panjabi performed an
ablation procedure (destruction of tissue) on him. AR 2381.
Herskowitz thanked Patient 1 for the thoroughness of his notes. AR 2369.
After learning that Patient 1’s goals were to be on less pain
medication, he would have spent the visit validating Patient 1’s multiple sites
of pain and discussing options. AR
2369. Herskowitz would have explained
that, even if Patient 1 wanted stem cell therapy in the long term, local
injections would help his short-term pain and disrupt the inflammation in
painful areas. AR 2369. Those injections would not resolve the
underlying problem, but pain reduction was expected. AR 2369.
Patient
1 had chronic regional pain syndrome associated with “up-regulated” (higher) pain
sensitivity throughout the body in patients who have long histories of
pain. AR 2387. This matched Panjabi’s examination
results. AR 2387.
Herskowitz
would have explained the decision to use ozone along with other components of
the prolo therapy solution. AR 2370. He would have explained his experience with
hundreds of patients who underwent the injections without significant side
effects. AR 2373. Herskowitz would have admitted that there was
a chance of soreness due to Patient 1’s complex regional pain syndrome, but
that the risk of bleeding was low. AR
2373.
He
told Patient 1 that the alternative was to go straight to stem cell
therapy. AR 2373. The subcutaneous injections Herskowitz recommended
for Patient 1 get the ozone under the skin but not into the veins. AR 2270.
About half an inch of the needle remains exposed during injection. AR 2270.
Going deeper does not have added benefits. AR 2270.
The day after the first injection, Patient 1 stated that he
felt better and that his temple pain had went away. AR 2385.
He felt sore at the injection site, which was normal for him, and so
took some Vicodin. AR 2385. The results of the injections diminished over
time, but Patient 1 has improved without complications. AR 2400.
Herskowitz
denied that he failed to either perform a physical examination of Patient 1’s
cervical spine or to obtain his informed consent. AR 2396.
Patient
2
Herskowitz
did not examine Patient 2 and would have relied on Wilson’s history and
physical. AR 2351. The general concept was that Patient 2 had
suffered from febrile illness since he was six years old. AR 2406.
He began seeing Mora in May 2016, who diagnosed him with relapsing
fever. AR 2406. Mora put him on a regimen of antibiotics and
hydroxychloroquine that lasted about ten months. AR 2406.
Although Patient 2’s condition improved, he refused to get additional
blood work done because of how expensive it would be. AR 2406-07.
Thus, when Patient 2 came to Anatara, they had a diagnosis, treatment,
and treatment response. AR 2407.
Wilson’s
note shows that on April 13, 2017, he examined Patient 2 and took his medical
history for 60 minutes. AR 2410. Herskowitz would have reviewed Wilson’s
history for Patient 2. AR 2411. He then saw Patient 2 for 70 minutes and reviewed
some additional history with him. AR
2410. Herskowitz asked Patient 2 about
his goals. AR 2411. Patient 2 explained that he wanted to be more
functional and overcome the weakness, fatigue, and pain syndrome that kept him
from normally functioning with family and professionally. AR 2411-12.
He complained of brain fog, and weakness, fatigue, and pain that would
not allow him to function as he normally would like. AR 2412-13.
The cognitive dysfunction that Patient 2 described is common for Lyme disease
patients but not specific to that disease.
AR 2412.
He
and Mora both diagnosed Patient 1 with relapsing fever. AR 2413.
Herskowitz reviewed Mora’s diagnosis with Patient 2 and told him that
relapsing fever may indicate Lyme disease, but it is not specific to classical
Lyme disease. AR 2413. This did not surprise Patient 2 because Mora
reached the same conclusion. AR
2413. Herskowitz and Patient 2 discussed
a differential diagnosis of other conditions that could lead to the same
nonspecific severe symptoms, including other forms of Lyme disease. AR 2417-18.
He mentioned hygenics tests for diagnostic purposes, but Patient 2 said
he could not afford any and wanted to focus his entire resources on treatment
rather than diagnosis. AR 2418. Herskowitz also considered mold bloods -- multiple
molds that can result in Lyme-like organisms – but Patient 2 refused to do the
$600-800 urine panel to test for it. AR
2418, 2427. Herskowitz also considered
tests such as an adrenal stress index (“ASI”) and a $99 “23 and Me” genetic
test. AR 2418-2419. The genetic test would allow Patient 2 to see
if he had any gene abnormalities that forced his detoxification system not to
work well, which would enable a more targeted approach with supplements. AR 2419.
In
the end, Herskowitz accepted a diagnosis of a Lyme-like illness because Patient
2 had one. AR 2419. Ozone therapy is not for Lyme disease but it
could help Patient 2 with inflammation and autoimmune disease independent of
the diagnosis. AR 2419.
Patient
2 began treatment at his first visit.
AR 2428. He received treatment
twice a week and reported that he felt energized from it. AR 2428.
The
nurse on duty for Patient 2’s final ozonation replaced the tubing partway
through but forgot to put it through the same safety fail safe sensor. AR 2276.
This is a mistake that training focuses on avoiding. AR 2276.
She then hit the button that allows a patient to receive ozonated blood
and not the button that extracts blood.
This was a problem because there was no blood in the machine; it was
just ozonated oxygen. AR 2276. This caused Patient 2 to receive pure air in
the wrong direction. AR 2276.
h.
Thomas Grogan
Thomas
Grogan, M.D. (“Grogan”), testified that he has been licensed as a physician since
1981. AR 2303. He usually does informed consents for
surgical interventions. AR 2309. He never has patients sign consent forms for
prolozone injections or injections of other steroids because it is not a
surgical intervention. AR 2309.
The
prolozone injections Patient 1 received in 2015 were generally helpful. AR 2307.
Herskowitz’s choice of trigger point injections demonstrate that there
must have been a physical examination to find the points. AR 2309.
7. The Decision
On
October 21, 2021, the ALJ issued a Proposed Decision on the Amended Accusation. AR 969-1003.
The ALJ noted that the Complainant alleged that Herskowitz committed
professional negligence and failed to maintain adequate and accurate medical
records. AR 970. For both Patient 1 and Patient 2, he performed
or obtained inadequate physical examinations, made inadequate disclosure of
risks and benefits before securing patient consent to treatment, and kept
inadequate records. AR 970.
a.
Patient 1
Patient
1 had suffered chronic head, neck, shoulder, and back pain for more than 25
years since a work injury in 1988 and had a fusion of three vertebrae in late
1990. AR 972. He received treatment for his neck injury in
the past and regularly saw pain management specialist Panjabi along with his
primary physician. AR 972. Panjabi had ablated Patient 1’s nerves a year
before Patient 1 visited Herskowitz. AR
972.
On
August 4, 2015, Bonnist spent 60 minutes with Patient 1. AR 972.
According to Herskowitz’s testimony, he had instructed her to perform
complete physical examinations of new patients and he had observed her do so in
the past. AR 973. Therefore, he assumed that Bonnist did so
with Patient 1. AR 973.
According to Herskowitz’s note, Bonnist interviewed Patient
1 and prepared detailed notes regarding his neck injury and treatment history. AR 972.
Neither Bonnist’s notes nor Herskowitz’s note includes any description
of any examination of Patient 1’s cervical spine, range of motion, or pains
with palpation. AR 973. They also do not indicate that Herskowitz
used any tests to identify motor or sensory neurological deficits or check the
vascular system in the head and neck. AR
973.
Herskowitz
testified that Bonnist had observed muscle atrophy in Patient 1’s arms and poor
grip strength because of permanent damage to nerves connecting his cervical
spine to his arms and hands. AR 973. This is inconsistent with Bonnists’ notation
that Patient 1 is well-developed, and her notation is the only note on the
subject. AR 973-74.
Patient
1’s medical records show that he signed the two-page Consent Form on August 4,
2015, and Herskowitz credibly testified that the signing occurred after he
spoke to Patient 1 about the injection therapy.
AR 974. The Consent Form contains
a long list of therapies and potential risks and benefits, but it does not
attribute particular risks and benefits to particular treatments. AR 974.
Nothing in Patient 1’s record shows that Herskowitz explained the risks
and benefits of injection therapy compared to other treatment options on August
4, 2015 or during any subsequent visit.
AR 975.
Herskowitz
credibly testified that he recommended the injection therapy as a short-term
pain relief measure and that they discussed other options to improve Patient 1’s
long-term condition. AR 975-76. He explained that the injections might cause
temporary soreness, bleeding, or bruising but not serious or permanent adverse
effects. AR 975-76.
Sharma testified that the standard of care for
a patient with neck pain includes a complete physical examination of the
patient's cervical spine. AR 977. The doctor should look carefully at the
patient's head, neck, and shoulders; palpate the area to identify painful or
swollen areas; conduct neurological tests to identify altered motor function or
sensation in the head, neck, shoulders, or arms; and examine range of motion
and blood supply. AR 977. This testimony was credible and none of the
other expert testimony contradicted it.
AR 977.
Sosin,
Bock, and Grogan testified that Bonnist examined Patient 1’s cervical spine,
but Bonnist did not testify and the medical records do not support that
conclusion. AR 977. All three doctors were credible when they opined
that Herskowitz could not have identified where to administer injections
without a physical examination of Patient 1’s spine to determine where to
inject. AR 977. Nevertheless, Herskowitz did not record his observations
from the examination. AR 977. Nor does it show that he personally performed
any portion of the examination other than palpating the cervical spine and some
adjacent muscles. AR 977.
Sharma
opined that Herskowitz’s failure to conduct a complete physical examination of
the cervical spine before offering Patient 1 the injections was a simple
departure from the standard of care. AR
977. Sosin, Bock, and Grogan each
testified that a complete examination by Bonnist followed by Herkowitz’s brief
examination of the neck before injection would meet the standard of care. AR 977-78.
The ALJ found their opinions irrelevant because the assumption that
Bonnist performed a complete examination of Patient 1’s cervical spine is
unfounded. AR 978.
As
to informed consent, Sharma testified that Herskowitz had a professional
responsibility to highlight any special risks Patient 1 faced from injection of
prolozone instead of a corticosteroid.
AR 979. The ALJ found the opinions
of Sosin, Bock, and Grogan that there was no elevate risk more persuasive. AR 979.
Nevertheless,
the standard of care required Herskowitz to discuss foreseeable risks and
benefits from subcutaneous trigger point injections, secure Patient 1’s consent
only after that discussion, and then document the consent. AR 979.
Disclosable risks included (1) bruising or bleeding from the skin
puncture and (2) transient pain in the tissue surrounding the injection
site. AR 979. The expert witnesses all agreed that trigger
point injections are low-risk and not so complex that a physician need provide
extensive written information to ensure informed consent. AR 979-80.
Sharma and Sosin both testified that Herskowitz’s failure to
document in Patient 1’s records that he discussed these risks and benefits was a
simple departure from the standard of care.
AR 980. The ALJ found their
opinions more persuasive than the opinions of Bock and Grogan that the Consent Form
provided sufficient disclosure of risks and benefits. AR 980.
b.
Patient 2
Patient
2 visited Herskowitz for the first time in April 2017. He was 38 years old and believed that he had chronic
Lyme disease. AR 980. He had read about ozone treatments online and
found Herskowitz by an internet search.
AR 980.
Patient
2’s medical history showed steadily declining health before he visited
Herskowitz. AR 980. In April 2016, he went to a hospital
emergency room because of extreme dizziness and weakness. AR 980.
He had high blood glucose concentration consistent with diabetes and
took medication to control it but later stopped. AR 980.
In
May 2016, Mora diagnosed Patient 2 with “a form of late Lyme disease” based on Patient
2’s self-reported exposure and health history, a physical examination, and
laboratory testing. AR 981. Mora prescribed doxycycline and
hydroxychloroquine, which Patient 2 took for at least ten months. AR 981.
Although Mora recommended that Patient 2 continue with these
medications, Patient 2 stopped taking them sometime between his last appointment
with Mora on March 20, 2017 and his first appointment with Herskowitz. AR 981.
Before
Patient 2 visited Anatara, Herskowitz received his medical records from Mora
and lab results from Kaiser Permanente.
AR 981. He did not seek additional
information from any other provider who recently treated Patient 2, and he
never coordinated care with them. AR
981-982.
During
Patient 2’s first visit on April 13, 2017, Wilson documented Mora’s diagnosis
and treatment for Lyme disease. AR
982. Patient 2 reported that he used
supplemental testosterone because of hypogonadism and he had hyperglycemia
without diabetes. AR 982. He complained of a recent relapse, including
fatigue, electrical shocks throughout his body, heat sensations, numbness, and
tingling. AR 982.
Wilson documented a partial physical examination of Patient
2. AR 982. Wilson observed that Patient 2’s cranial
nerves were grossly intact but did not document any neurological examination of
Patient 2’s torso or extremities, abdomen or genitourinary system, heart, lungs,
or circulation, or testing of Patient 2’s motor strength. AR 982.
Herskowitz’s
notes show a conversation with Patient 2 and do not include a physical
examination, separate diagnosis, or differential diagnostic plan. AR 982.
These notes mention some testing the results of which Wilson or
Herskowitz would discuss with Patient 2 another day, but this discussion never
happened. AR 982.
Patient
2 signed the Consent Form both before and during his visit on April 13,
2017. AR 982-83. Herskowitz proposed to treat Patient 2 with
intravenous ozone therapy in which blood is withdrawn from the body, mixed with
ozone, and returned to the body. AR
983. He advised Patient 2 that there
would be one or two therapy sessions per week over two months at a cost of
several thousand dollars. AR 983. Herskowitz provided Patient 2 with literature
and patient testimonials about intravenous ozone therapy, but the evidence did
not show what medical information he gave Patient 2 about its potential benefits
beyond the general literature information.
AR 983-84. Patient 2 testified
that he asked Herskowitz about risks and Herskowitz did not identify any. AR 983.
The ALJ found Herskowitz’s testimony credible that he disclosed the risk
of pain and bruising. AR 984.
Patient
2 had intravenous ozone therapy on April 13, 24, and 27, and May 1 and 5,
2017. AR 984. Herskowitz did not interact directly with Patient
2 during treatment; a nurse used a checklist to document each session. AR 984.
The nurse’s failure, on May 17, 2017, to assemble the Hermann device
properly when replacing a tube led to an air embolism and cardiac arrest. AR 984.
Patient 2 spent ten days in the hospital and described his current
day-to-day health as “challenging.” AR
984.
Melikian
criticized Herskowitz for adopting Mora’s diagnosis, and Patient 2’s
self-diagnosis, of chronic Lyme disease.
AR 985. Meikian asserted that lab
testing is important to determine whether a patient's health problems stem from
infection by the organisms that cause Lyme disease or related organisms. AR 985.
The lab results Mora were inconsistent with Lyme disease. AR 985.
Further, Lyme disease causes long-term health problems that
outlast the active infection, and a doctor therefore should conduct a careful
physical examination to distinguish long-term consequences of Lyme disease from
other phenomena that might cause similarly poor health but require different
therapy. AR 985-86. This examination should include a
neurological examination, examination of the heart and lungs, and evaluation of
motor strength and gait. AR 986. It should also include an EKG because secondary
cardiac conduction abnormalities are a known complication. AR 986.
He opined that Herskowitz’s reliance on Mora and Patient 2 for the chronic
Lyme disease diagnosis was an extreme departure from the standard of care. AR 985.
Sosin
also was skeptical about Mora’s diagnosis but testified that intravenous ozone
therapy was a reasonable treatment choice regardless of the cause of Patient
2’s health complaints. AR 986.
Bock agreed with Sosin and testified that laboratory testing
is not reliable in diagnosing Lyme disease.
AR 986. A physician can meet the
standard of care by diagnosing long-term Lyme disease consequences using just clinical
and exposure history and a current physical examination without laboratory
testing. AR 986-87. He further testified that neurological and
cardiac evaluations are appropriate if a physician suspects long-term Lyme
disease consequences. AR 987.
Bock
testified that Herskowitz did not deviate from the standard of care for failure
to obtain an EKG. AR 987. The ALJ did not find this persuasive because
both premises of Bock’s conclusion were false.
AR 987. Bock said that Patient 2
did not complain of heart-related symptoms, but he in fact complained of
chronic fatigue. AR 987. Bock said that Patient 2 was not taking any
medication that might cause heart rhythm abnormalities, but he was taking hydroxychloroquine
for the previous ten months which Bock admitted has the potential to alter
heart rhythm. AR 987.
Sosin
also testified that Herskowitz did not deviate from the standard of care for
failure to obtain an EKG. AR 987. Patient 2 had a normal heart rate, had no
symptoms suggesting heart dysfunction, and was relatively young. AR 987.
Sosin’s opinion failed to address the possibility that long-term
consequences from Lyme disease and treatment with hydroxycholoroquine include heart
rhythm abnormalities. AR 987-88. Therefore, his testimony was less persuasive
than that of Melikian. AR 988.
Herskowitz
testified that he did not diagnose Patient 2 with Lyme disease. Rather, he accepted Mora’s diagnosis but also
gave careful consideration to other explanations. AR 988.
The ALJ found this testimony not to be credible. She found it more reasonable that Herskowitz,
like Sosin and Bock, considered intravenous ozone therapy appropriate for
Patient 2 no matter what disease caused his poor health. AR 988.
Herskowitz viewed Patient 2 as coming to him for treatment, not
diagnosis, and considered himself responsible only for providing a safe
treatment. AR 988. Therefore, the ALJ rejected Melikian’s opinion
that Herskowitz misdiagnosed Patient 2 because he did not diagnose Patient 2 at
all. AR 988.
However, the ALJ found Melikian’s opinions persuasive that
(1) Herskowitz did not conduct or rely reasonably on Wilson to conduct a
physical examination that was adequate to diagnose Patient 2’s illness or
establish a baseline; (2) if Herskowitz suspected Lyme disease, he should have given
special attention to a neurological examination and should have performed an
EKG; (3) Herskowitz did not document any baseline or follow-up physical
examination; and (4) Herskowitz did not review subsequent laboratory test results
as planned. AR 989. Herskowitz decided to embark on an expensive
course of intravenous ozone therapy without a clear understanding why Patient 2
was ill or how he (Herskowitz) would evaluate the therapy’s effectiveness, and
this was an extreme departure from the standard of care. AR 989.
As
to informed consent, all medical witnesses agreed that the standard of care
required Herskowitz to discuss foreseeable risks and benefits from intravenous
ozone therapy, secure consent only after that discussion, and document such
consent. AR 989-90.
Melikian
opined that the failure to warn Patient 2 of the risk of a fatal air embolism
is a simple departure from the standard of care. AR 990.
None of the articles he cited identify this as a risk specific to
intravenous ozone therapy with the Hermann device. AR 990.
Bock and Sosin opined that this was not a foreseeable risk, and their
opinions were more persuasive. AR 990.
Bock,
Sosin, and Herskowitz all testified that transient fatigue and possible
hematoma at the venipuncture site are potential risks, and the benefits are
“anti-inflammatory” and “anti-infective”.
AR 991. Bock opined that the
general information on the Consent Form memorializes the oral disclosures
Herskowitz made to Patient 2, but the ALJ did not find this opinion to be
persuasive. AR 991. More persuasive was Sosin’s opinion that Herskowitz’s
failure to document any conversation about the benefits and risks was a simple
departure from the standard of care. AR
991. Thus, the evidence did not show
that Herskowitz failed to obtain Patient 2’s informed consent, but it did show that
Herskowitz’s failure to document the informed consent violated the standard of
care. AR 991.
c.
Legal Conclusions
As
to Patient 1, the evidence established negligence for failure to perform a
thorough examination of his cervical spine before recommending and providing prolozone
injections. AR 993. These multiple acts of negligence are cause
for discipline under section 2234(c)
The evidence did not establish negligence for failure to
obtain informed consent for trigger point injections, but it did establish
negligence under section 2266 for failure to document a thorough initial
examination of Patient 1’s cervical spine or any follow-up focused examination,
and for failing to document an informed consent discussed. AR 993.
The inadequate records are cause for discipline under section 2266. AR 993.
As
to Patient 2, the evidence established gross negligence for failure to perform
a thorough, complete assessment before treatment. AR 993.
The evidence also established gross negligence for failure to perform a
thorough physical examination that should have included an EKG. AR 993.
These acts constitute cause for discipline under sections 2234(b) and
2234(c). AR 994.
The evidence did not establish negligence for failure to
obtain informed consent to intravenous ozone treatment, but it did establish
negligence under section 2266 for failure to document the information
Herskowitz gave to Patient 2 about intravenous ozone therapy and Patient 2’s consent. AR 994.
The inadequate records are cause for discipline under section 2266. AR 994.
The
evidence did not support a finding of incompetence under section 2234(d). AR 994.
d.
Discipline
Herskowitz
practiced medicine with skill and distinction for many years. AR 994. At the same time, the evidence suggested that
the proven allegations were typical of his practice and posed a risk to public
safety. AR 995. They were not isolated incidents warranting
only a public reprimand. AR 995. The ALJ recommended that the Board revoke
Herskowitz’s Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate, stay the revocation, and
place Herskowitz on probation for five years.
AR 996.
On
November 23, 2021, the Board adopted the ALJ’s Proposed Decision as its Final
Decision. AR 968.
E.
Analysis
Petitioner
Herskowitz contends that the weight of the evidence does not support the
charges for which the ALJ found him guilty.[8]
1. Patient 1
The ALJ found that the evidence established Herskowitz’s multiple
acts of negligence in failing to perform a thorough examination of Patient 1’s
cervical spine before recommending and providing prolozone injections. AR 993.
The evidence also established Herskowitz’s failure to document a
thorough initial examination of Patient 1’s cervical spine or any follow-up
focused examination, and failure to document an informed consent discussion, in
violation of section 2266. AR 993.
a. The Physical Exam
As Herskowitz states (Pet. Op. Br. at 9), the experts for
both sides were in basic agreement regarding the standard of care for the
initial examination of Patient 1, who presented with neck pain. The Complainant’s expert, Sharma, testified
that the typical physical examination for neck pain, back pain, or joint pain
begins with visualization of the area the doctor is examining. AR 1431-32.
The doctor then palpates the affected joint or area on the torso or neck
to identify where the pain is. AR
1432. The doctor conducts a range of
motion test to see if the patient suffers any limitations in range of
motion. AR 1432. At the same time, the doctor will use
provocative maneuvers to identify pinched nerves. AR 1432-33.
Through neurological, sensory, and motor examinations, the doctor checks
sensation in the lower and upper extremities as well as reflexes. AR 1433.
The last part of the physical examination is a vascular examination of
the affected area to determine the pulse in lower extremities and if the patient
has any peripheral vascular disease. AR
1432-33. Herskowitz’s experts, Sosin,
Bock, and Grogan, agreed.
Because Bonnist did not testify,[9]
the ALJ relied heavily on her written report of Patient 1’s initial visit of
August 4, 2015. Bonnist’s report lists a
detailed history of the patient’s medical condition, followed by a single line:
“O: Patient is A&Ox3” (which means alert and oriented as to person, time,
and place), “WNWD” (which means well-nourished, well-developed), and “[h]e is
not distressed, though appears uncomfortable and in pain.” AR 1028.
Sharma testified that this single line gives no indication of an
examination beyond a visual inspection.
AR 1448-49, 1451-53. Bonnist’s report
does not suggest that she palpated the neck, conducted range of motion tests,
conducted a neurological examination, or conducted a vascular examination. AR 1452-53.
Her examination does not meet the standard of care because the note does
not show that Bonnist examined the cervical spine. AR 1450-51.
Herskowitz argues that the deficits in Bonnist’s written
report are insufficient to establish that she failed to conduct the other
components of a physical exam. Herskowitz testified that his office’s
customary practice is for the naturopathic doctor, Bonnist or Wilson, to do a
complete history and perform a physical examination, and he has witnessed them
doing so in the past. Pet. Op. Br. at
9-10. Herskowitz’s experts testified
that he could properly delegate the exam of Patient 1 to his assistants. Reply at 2-3.
Herskowitz adds that the ALJ also unreasonably discounted his
testimony that Patient 1 showed muscular atrophy in his arms and poor grip
strength due to permanent nerve damage.
Panjabi’s notes three weeks earlier said that Patient 1 was losing
muscle mass because the nerve conduction had decreased and was insufficient to
maintain strength and muscle mass in both his arms. AR 2366-67.
Because Panjabi reported decreased range of motion in the neck and
atrophy and weakness in both arms, the focus after the initial examination was
on a neurological exam for Patient 1’s head and neck. AR 2353, 2366. Herskowitz would have told Bonnist to focus
on the pain and atrophy in those areas.
AR 2367-68.
The Board’s reason for discounting Herskowitz’s testimony on
this point was that Bonnist’s report stated that Patient 1 was “well-nourished
and well-developed” with no mention of muscular atrophy or poor grip strength. AR 973-74.
Therefore, Herskowitz’s testimony that Bonnist observed and reported the
muscular atrophy and poor grip strength findings to him was inconsistent with
her notation. AR 973-73. Herskowitz argues that Panjabi’s findings
were in the medical record for Patient 1, and he was aware of them. See AR 2366-67. Pet. Op. Br. at 10.
Finally, Herskowitz contends that the ALJ ignored the fact
that he performed a physical exam when he identified and marked trigger points
on Patient 1. AR 2309, 2396. Herskowitz concludes that the weight of the
evidence is that Bonnist conducted a sufficient physical exam and he reasonably
relied upon her exam. Pet. Op. Br. at
10-11.
The court agrees that the office’s custom and practice by
itself is some evidence that a physical exam was performed by Bonnist. The Board argues that Herskowitz is asking
the court to find him and some of his experts more credible than the ALJ’s
findings, but merely rearguing the credibility of the witnesses that might lead
to a different result is insufficient. See Medical Bd. of California v.
Superior Court, (1991)
227 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1461). Opp. at
10-11. Herskowitz correctly replies that the court makes its own determinations
of witness credibility on independent review of the facts and does not defer to
the ALJ’s findings. See Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service
Commission, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658-60. Reply at 2.
The court finds Herskowitz’s testimony of his office practice to be
credible.
However, the Board is correct that Bonnist’s
report is the best evidence of the examination that she actually performed, and
it suggests that she was unaware of the necessary components for an appropriate
physical exam for Patient 1. Opp. at 10. As Sharma testified, nothing in Bonnist’s
report indicates that she addressed Patient 1’s cervical spine, the area of his
chief complaint, by palpation, neurological examination, range of motion
examination, and vascular examination. Rather,
Bonnist performed only a “brief, terse physical examination” on Patient 1’s August
4, 2014 first visit, which was insufficient for Herskowitz to rely upon. AR 1448.
It is true that Herskowitz read
Patient 1’s medical records and knew that Panjabi found muscular atrophy and
poor grip strength. AR 2366-67. Herskowitz testified that he would have told
Bonnist to focus on the pain and atrophy in those areas (AR 2367-68), and he
recalled that Bonnist confirmed Patient 1’s muscle weakness based on the fact
that she could slip her fingers free from his grip. AR 2368.
Bonnist also told Herskowitz that Patient 1 complained of multiple areas
of pain in his temple and between his eyes and that he had pain in his neck,
back, and shoulder. AR 2365. This evidence is credible and suggests that
Bonnist performed some portion of a proper cervical examination. Yet, it does not undermine the ALJ’s point
that Herskowitz’s testimony is inconsistent with Bonnists’ notation that
Patient 1 is well-developed, which is her only note on the subject. AR 973-74.
Moreover, Sharma explained that Herskowitz’s
own notes for Patient 1 dated August 4, August 12, and August 19, 2015 show
that he also failed to do the necessary physical exams on Patient 1’s cervical
spine as he treated Patient 1 with ozone injections on those dates. AR
1455-58. Opp. at 11. The standard of
care required Herskowitz to conduct a physical examination of the cervical spine
each time Patient 1 came back after treatment.
AR 1458. Herskowitz’s note for Patient
1’s August 12 visit reflects only the information Patient 1 reported to
Herskowitz about his condition. AR
1456. There is no indication that
Herskowitz conducted an examination on the August 12 visit or on August
19. AR 1457-58.
As a result, the office custom and
practice for Bonnist or Wilson to conduct the initial physical examination
cannot alone support the dearth of information in Bonnist’s initial August 4
report, and it does not bear at all on Herskowitz’s failure to mention an exam
in his own notes. This is not just a
documentation failure. Rather, the
repeated failures of the medical notes to reflect a complete physical
cervical examination shows that it was not performed.
Finally, Herskowitz is incorrect in arguing that the ALJ failed
to consider that he would have had to examine Patient 1’s neck for the purpose
of identifying the injection site. The
ALJ correctly found that, while Herskowitz must have looked at Patient 1’s
cervical spine to decide where to inject him, that does not mean that he performed
all the components of the required physical examination. AR 977.
Thus, the ALJ thus properly found
Petitioner to have committed repeated simple departures from the standard of
care (repeated negligent acts under section 2234(c)) on August 4, 12, and 19,
2015, when he and Bonnist failed to perform complete physical
examinations of Patient 1’s cervical spine.
AR 978, 993.
b. Informed Consent
Herskowitz points out
that all experts, including Sharma, agreed that the trigger point injections
administered to Patient 1 are low risk procedures, and the risks are bruising
or bleeding from the skin puncture and transient pain. The ALJ found that the Consent Form signed by
Patient 1 did not mention those risks.
AR 979-80. However, the Consent Form
indicates that “trigger point injections” were a potential treatment (AR 1031),
and that potential risks included “[p]ain, discomfort, blistering, minor
bruising, discoloration, infections, burns, itching, loss of consciousness and
deep tissue injury from needle insertions.”
AR 1032.
Sharma found the Consent Form to be insufficient because it
does not mention the ozone injections for trigger point areas and the phrase
“including but not limited to” is a blanket disclaimer that does not explain
what the procedure will be. AR
1477-78. The listed treatment of
“trigger point injection therapy with vitamin substances” is insufficient
because ozone is not a vitamin substance.
AR 1479.
Herskowitz
argues that the uncontradicted evidence showed that ozone itself has very few
side effects, other than pain at the injection site, which is a risk of any
injection and was disclosed on the Consent Form. AR
1915. On its face, the Consent Form
adequately disclosed the risks to Patient 1.
Pet. Op. Br. at 11; Reply at 4.
The Consent Form generally disclosed the trigger point
injection of ozone as a potential treatment and the potential risks. The ALJ also found credible Herskowitz’s testimony
that he spoke to Patient 1 about the potential risks and benefits of ozone
trigger point injections. AR 975-76.
However, both Sharma and Sosin agreed that Herskowitz should have
documented in Patient 1’s medical record a discussion with Patient 1 about the
risks and benefits of the ozone trigger point injections he was to
receive. AR
980. As Sharma testified, a trigger
point injection is an invasive treatment, and the doctor can obtain an oral
consent for that treatment. AR
1466. But there must be a conversation
with the patient that is documented; a generalized form is insufficient. AR 1466-67.
Herskowitz’s notes from Patient 1’s visits on August 4, 12, and 19,
2015, do not reflect an informed consent discussion about the ozone
injections. AR 1475-76.
Because there is no documentation of that discussion, the
Board is correct that it is uncontroverted that Herskowitz was negligent in the
medical care and treatment of Patient 1 and violated section 2266. Opp. at 12-13.[10]
2.
Patient 2
The ALJ found that Herskowitz was grossly negligence in
failing to perform a thorough, complete assessment, and in failing to perform a
thorough physical examination, including an EKG, before treatment of Patient 2. AR 993.
Herskowitz further was negligent in failing to document the information
he gave to Patient 2 about intravenous ozone therapy and Patient 2’s
consent. AR 994.
a.
The Physical Exam
Melikian testified for the Board regarding the standard of
care for the physical examination of Patient 2, who presented with possible
Lyme disease. For a patient with Patient
2’s complaints, the doctor should (a) conduct a musculoskeletal examination,
(b) conduct a neurological examination, including testing motor strength, (c)
review his lab work, and (d) obtain a detailed patient history from the patient
with focus on mumps, measles, and rheumatic fever. AR 1708-09, 1734. The doctor should also evaluate the
weaknesses reported by the patient, which for Patient 2 was body alignment
weakness and burning sensations in lower extremities. AR 1713.
Mora conducted a proper physical examination. AR 1744.
Melikian testified that Herskowitz’s notes do not reflect
any physical examination (AR 1709-10), and Wilson’s notes for physical
examination (AR 1135) show a cursory examination. Wilson wrote “General: Normal speech, normal
behavior, A/Ox3 (which means alert and oriented times three to person, place,
and time). AR 1710. He also wrote: “WNWD (well-nourished, well-dressed)
and “NAD” (no apparent distress). AR
1711. For eye exam, Wilson wrote “PERLA”
(pupils are equally round, reactive to light interiorly). That means shining a light in the patient’s eyes
and checking to see if the patient could follow your finger to make sure that
they track movement to all four quadrants of the visual field. AR 1711.
Finally, Wilson wrote under “Neuro” that cranial nerves 2 to 12 were
grossly intact. AR 1711. “Grossly intact” means there was no specific
examination, but Wilson made general observations that did not reveal a gap in
the cranial nerves. AR 1711.
In Melikian’s opinion, Wilson’s physical examination was
insufficient for someone with Patient 2’s symptoms. AR 1713, 1716. The neurological examination should have been
comprehensive by evaluating the lower extremity weaknesses and burning sensations
that Patient 2 reported. AR 1713. There should have been a heart and lung
examination with a stethoscope. AR 1713. There was no documentation that any of this
was done. AR 1713.
Herskowitz argues (Pet. Op. Br. at 12, n. 6) that the ALJ
rejected Melikian’s testimony regarding the significance of laboratory testing
for Lyme disease, crediting Bock’s and Sosin’s testimony that lab testing is
not particularly reliable for diagnosing Lyme disease, as well as finding the
issue to be irrelevant because Herskowitz had concluded the treatment would be
helpful even if the patient did not have Lyme disease. AR 986-88.
Not quite. The ALJ
did not credit the experts’ testimony so much as she found it to be irrelevant
because Herskowitz did not purport to diagnose Patient 2. AR 988.
Herskowitz notes that Sosin testified that it is common and
acceptable practice to delegate the initial physical exam to another
clinician. AR 1944-45. Sosin
testified that a proper physical examination of Patient 2 would involve a
thorough neurologic and orthopedic exam, palpation, and checking for range of
motion. AR 1988-89. Sosin concluded that Wilson’s exam was
adequate because some neurological examination was documented. AR 1998-99.
Hershowtiz contends that, as for Patient 1, the lack of evidence in
Wilson’s written report that these tasks were performed is insufficient to
establish that Wilson did not conduct them.
Nor does it rebut Herskowitz’s testimony that the custom and practice was
for Wilson to conduct a full physical exam.
The finding to the contrary is not supported by the weight of the
evidence. Pet. Op. Br. at 12-13.
The court does not agree.
As with Patient 1, Herskowitz could delegate the initial physical
examination to Wilson, but Wilson’s record shows the physical examination was
insufficient for someone with Patient 2’s symptoms because there is no evidence
of a comprehensive neurological examination evaluating the lower extremity
weaknesses and burning sensations, no evidence of a heart and lung examination
with a stethoscope. AR 1713. This is not just a documentation failure;
there simply was not a complete examination.
Moreover, Melikian explained that Herskowitz could not solely
rely on Wilson’s physical examination because he had a responsibility to set the
baseline for Patient 2 himself. AR 1713–14, 1798. Herskowitz admitted that he conducted no initial
physical examination of Patient 2. AR
2351. Finally, Herskowitz did not
document any physical examination of Patient 2 in the follow-up visits.
The ALJ found that Herskowitz’s assessment of Patient 1 was grossly
negligent, relying on Melikian’s opinion that (1) Herskowitz did not conduct,
or rely reasonably on Wilson to conduct, a physical examination that was
adequate to diagnose Patient 2’s illness or establish a baseline; (2) if
Herskowitz suspected Lyme disease, he should have given special attention to a
neurological examination and should have performed an EKG; (3) Herskowitz did
not document any baseline or follow-up physical examination; and (4) Herskowitz
did not review subsequent laboratory test results as planned. AR 989.
Hence, Herskowitz decided to embark on an expensive course of
intravenous ozone therapy without a clear understanding why Patient 2 was ill
or how he (Herskowitz) would evaluate the therapy’s effectiveness, and this was
an extreme departure from the standard of care.
AR 989.
Herskowitz argues that, in finding him
guilty of gross negligence rather than simple negligence as for Patient 1, the
ALJ concluded that he failed to consider diseases other than Lyme disease as
the cause of Patient 2’s symptoms. The
ALJ rejected Herskowitz’s testimony that “he gave careful consideration to
explanations other than Lyme disease for Patient 2’s symptoms” in favor of a
conclusion that he, like Sosin and Bock, believed that intravenous ozone
therapy was appropriate not matter what disease was causing Patient 2’s poor
health. AR 988. The failure to consider other causes “left
Patient 2 at risk of substituting [his] intravenous ozone therapy for other
treatments that might have addressed or even cured the diseases that caused his
health complaints.” AR 995. Pet. Op. Br. at 13.
Herskowitz contends that the ALJ ignored credible evidence
that he discussed and documented alternative potential diagnoses for the
patient’s symptoms and tests that could be done to rule them out, such as a
urine test for toxic mold, an adrenal test (ASI) because energy is related to
thyroid and adrenal function, and a genomics test (23 and me test) that could
help rule out other potential causes.
However, Patient 2 wanted to focus his resources on treatment rather
than diagnosis. AR 2417-19, 2427-22, 1338
(lower left hand corner documenting recommended urine screen, ASI, and
genomics, ’23 and me’ test). Pet. Op.
Br. at 13.
Considering that Patient 2 had seen Mora recently, had not
achieved significant symptom relief, and was refusing testing to rule out other
possible causes, Herskowitz argues that he proceeded reasonably under the
circumstances. Sosin testified that
traditional medicine does not have effective treatments for chronic Lyme
disease or Lyme disease-like symptoms, consisting primarily of medications for
symptom relief, such as antidepressants, sedatives, and pain medications. AR 1911-12.
Given Patient 2’s long history of symptoms and Mora’s suspicions that he
had Lyme disease or a similar tick-bite related disease, Herskowitz’s
treatments of the patient based on the examination and other available information
was within the standard of care. Pet.
Op. Br. at 13-14.
The court accepts Herskowitz’s
testimony that he discussed a differential diagnosis with Patient 2. AR 2147-18.
Additionally, Sosin, like Melikian, was skeptical about Mora’s diagnosis,
but he testified that intravenous ozone therapy was a reasonable treatment
choice regardless of the cause of Patient 2’s health complaints. AR 986.
Finally, Patient 2 was interested in treatment, not diagnosis. Consequently, the court concludes that Herskowitz
was not required to perform a diagnosis of Patient 2.
As for the ALJ’s finding that Herskowitz
was grossly negligent in putting Patient 2 on a “an expensive, multi-month
course of intravenous ozone therapy” without a clear understanding of how he would
evaluate the therapy's effectiveness, Herskowitz argues that the ALJ naively assumes
that there is always a clear
answer for what the patient’s condition is and how to treat it. For patients such as Patient 2 with complex
medical conditions, there is no clear-cut answer how to appropriately treat such
conditions. Herskowitz did his due
diligence in determining the causes of Patient 2’s condition and attempting to
treat it, as evidenced by Wilson’s examination, the opinions of Sosin and Bock,
and his own testimony. Given Patient 2’s
long history of symptoms, Mora’s concerns, and the fact that it was likely that
Patient 2 had Lyme disease or similar tick-borne illness, his treatment of
Patient 2 was well within standard of care.
Reply at 5-6.
While the court agrees that Herskowitz was not required to make
a diagnosis or know exactly how to treat Patient 2, a proper assessment is always
required. The ALJ’s conclusion is
correct that it was grossly negligent to (a) assess Patient 2 without a proper initial
physical examination that established a baseline, paid special attention to a
neurological examination, and was properly documented, (b) fail to conduct physical
examinations in follow-up visits, and (c) fail to review subsequent laboratory
test results as planned. AR 989.
b. An EKG Was Required
The ALJ accepted Melikian’s
opinion that it was grossly negligent not to perform an EKG as part of Patient
2’s physical examination. AR 993. Melikian testified that the physical examination
should have included an EKG because secondary cardiac conduction abnormalities
are a known complication of Lyme disease.
AR 986. One of the known
complications of Lyme disease is secondary cardiac conduction anomalies,
particularly “cardiac block,” which involves a delay or prolongation of a
specific current that runs from one side of the heart to the other. AR 1697, 1734. Melikian explained that, because heart block
occurs in patients with Lyme disease, Herskowitz should have ordered an EKG for
Patient 2, who presented with a chief complaint of Lyme disease. Id.
Bock testified that Herskowitz did not deviate from the
standard of care for failure to obtain an EKG.
AR 987. The ALJ did not find this
persuasive because both premises of Bock’s conclusion were false. AR 987.
Bock said that Patient 2 did not complain of heart-related symptoms, but
he did complain of chronic fatigue. AR
987. Bock said that Patient 2 was not
taking any medication that might cause heart rhythm abnormalities, but he was
on hydroxychloroquine for the previous ten months which Bock admitted has the
potential to alter heart rhythm. AR 987.
Sosin
also testified that Herskowitz did not deviate from the standard of care for
failure to obtain an EKG. AR 987. Patient 2 had a normal heart rate, had no
symptoms suggesting heart dysfunction, and was relatively young. AR 987.
This opinion failed to address the possibility that long-term
consequences from Lyme disease and treatment with hydroxycholoroquine include heart
rhythm abnormalities. AR 987-88. Therefore, his testimony was less persuasive
than that of Melikian. AR 988.
Herskowitz argues these findings
are not supported by the evidence or logic.
An EKG was unnecessary because Patient 2 showed no sign or symptom of
cardiac problems such as chest pain or shortness of breath, and his pulse was
normal. AR 1946, 2172. In 30 years of having Lyme disease, he never
had any cardiac condition identified in his medical record. AR 2172-73. Bock testified that Patient 2 did not show
signs of any cardiac rhythm abnormalities even while on hydroxychoroquine, when
it would be expected to produce or exacerbate such symptoms. AR 2172.
Bock added that an EKG may be appropriate in Lyme disease patients who
have a cardiac history, but Patient 2 was a relatively young man of 38 without
such a history. AR 2172. Pet. Op. Br. at 14.
While Herskowitz is correct that Patient
2’s previous use of hydroxychloroquine did not require an EKG because he was no
longer taking that medication, he complained about chronic fatigue. He was a
long-term victim of either Lyme disease or a relapsing disease, and the former
can have secondary complications of a heart block. AR 1696-97.
He complained of chronic fatigue, which can be a heart-related symptom. This fact supported the need for an EKG even
though he was a relatively young man with no history of cardiac problems. Herskowitz should have ordered an EKG for
Patient 2, and Melikian’s opinion that it was an extreme departure from the
standard of care not to do so is supported by the weight of the evidence.
c. Informed Consent
The
ALJ found that Bock, Sosin, and Herskowitz all credibly testified that
transient fatigue and possible hematoma at the venipuncture site are potential risks
and the benefits are “anti-inflammatory” and “anti-infective”. AR 991.
While Bock opined that the general information on the Consent Form memorializes
the oral disclosures Herskowitz made to Patient 2, this opinion was not persuasive. AR 991.
The ALJ relied on Sosin’s opinion that Herskowitz’s failure to document
any conversation about the benefits and risks was a simple departure from the
standard of care. AR 991. Thus, the evidence did not show that
Herskowitz failed to obtain Patient 2’s informed consent, but it did show that
Herskowitz’s failure to document the informed consent violated the standard of
care. AR 991.
Herskowitz argues that the Consent Form
signed by Patient 2 was the same form signed by Patient 1 and, as was the case
with Patient 1, it adequately set forth the risks of the ozone injections, in
noting that potential risks of “[p]ain, discomfort, blistering, minor bruising,
discoloration, infections, burns, itching, loss of consciousness and deep
tissue injury from needle insertions… aggravation of pre-existing
symptoms.” AR 1328. The risk of transient fatigue is indicated by
possible “aggravation of pre-existing symptoms,” which included fatigue. The risk of possible hematoma was covered by
“deep tissue injury from needle injections.”
On its face, the Consent Form adequately disclosed the risks to Patient
2. Pet. Op. Br. at 15.
As with Patient 1, Herskowitz was negligent
in the medical care and treatment of Patient 2 because there is no
documentation of an informed consent discussion between himself and Patient
2. Both Sharma and Sosin agreed for Patient 1 that
Herskowitz should have documented a discussion about the risks and benefits of
the ozone trigger point injections he was to receive. AR 980.
Similarly, Melikian explained that informed consent requires a specific
discussion with the patient prior to engaging in a therapeutic plan, especially
if it is invasive. That discussion
should be particularized enough to address the actual treatment being
considered. AR 1746-47.
Patient 2’s medical records do not show a discussion between Herskowitz and
Patient 2 that would satisfy the standard of care. AR
1747-48.
The general Consent Forms in Patient 2’s medical record were not
sufficient because they were not specific to the Herrmann machine intravenous
ozone treatment for Patient 2. AR 1748-53.
Herskowitz may have talked to Patient
2 about the risks, benefits and alternatives to the proposed treatment during the
April 13, 2017 office visit, but his failure to document the conversation
violated section 2266.
E.
Conclusion
The Petition is denied.
The Board’s counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it
on Petitioner Herskowitz’s counsel for approval as to form, wait ten days after
service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then
submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the
existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for January 31,
2023 at 1:30 p.m.
[1]
Petitioner Herskowitz failed to include the bates-stamped version of the
Board’s decision in the trial notebook as ordered by the court at the trial
setting. This failure was disruptive of
the court’s review. Petitioner’s briefs
also cite to line numbers on transcript pages from the Administrative Record, again
which the court ordered the parties not to do.
Petitioner’ counsel is directed to follow the court’s instructions in
future cases.
[2]
The Board requests judicial notice of its Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders
and Disciplinary Guidelines (“Guidelines”).
RJN Ex. 1. While the Guidelines generally
would be subject to judicial notice, they concern the penalty of
probation. As Petitioner notes in reply
(Reply at 7), he has not challenged the severity of the penalty, and there was
no reason for the Board to include a penalty discussion in its opposition. See Opp. at 16-17. The Guidelines are irrelevant and the request
for judicial notice is denied.
[3]
All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code
unless otherwise stated.
[4]
The parties cite to AR 1011-25, 1030, 1033-51, and 1056-96 but failed to
include them in the Joint Appendix. The
court has reviewed these Administrative Record pages anyway.
[5]
The parties do not define the term “naturopathic doctor”, but he or she is not a
medical doctor and is separately educated and licensed. See AR 69.
[6]
The stem cell harvesting allegation is not part of this case.
[7]
Bonnist’s declaration was excluded at the administrative hearing, but the
parties do not cite to the ALJ’s decision on this issue. It is set forth herein for completeness.
[8]
For convenience, the court will refer to the ALJ’s Proposed Decision and not
the Board’s final decision.
[9] Herskowitz
speculates that the most likely reason Bonnist did not testify is that she had
resided and practiced in Connecticut since 2019 and was not subject to California
subpoena. See e.g., Civil Code
§1989 (non-California residents are not subject to subpoena). See AR 772. Her declaration was excluded on the basis
that it stated that she did not specifically recall the details of her exam of
Patient 1 some five or six years earlier, and her discussion of her move to
Connecticut was not specifically excluded.
Pet. Op. Br. at 10, n. 5; Reply at 3-4.
The Board correctly responds that it is speculative to
conclude that (a) Bonnist would have testified that she completed all
components of an appropriate physical exam and (b) she did not testify because
she lives in Connecticut. The Board
notes that the administrative hearing was held remotely, all witnesses appeared
via videoconference, and Bonnist could have appeared remotely. Opp. at 11, n. 3.
In reply, Herskowitz argues that, under the relaxed
rule of administrative hearsay, Bonnist’s declaration was improperly
excluded. Reply at 3-4. The court need not consider this argument as
it is raised both for the first time in reply and unsupported by citation. See Regency
Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323,
1333. Moreover, administrative
hearsay is admissible only if it supplements or explains an independent fact in
evidence. Govt. Code §11513(d). Herskowitz fails to show what independent fact
Bonnist’s declaration corroborates.
[10] Herskowitz
replies that his failure to document the conversations with Patient 1 is a
lesser offense than not informing a patient of the risk and benefits of a
procedure altogether. Reply at 4-5. This is true, but it is not relevant to the
issue of guilt.