Judge James C. Chalfant, Case 21STCV21723 2023-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Yan’an Chunri Warm Sun Culture and Technology Co., Ltd. (“Yan’an”) applies for a right to attach order against Defendant Yuan Hui (“Yuan”) in the amount of $2,933,376.79.

The court has read and considered the moving papers (no opposition was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. FAC

Plaintiffs Yan’an and Khorgos Haokan Pictures & TV Co., Ltd. (“Khorgos”) filed the Complaint against Defendants Tianjin Tianyishenghua Culture Comm. Co., Ltd. (“Tianjin”) and Yuan on June 10, 2021. The operative pleading is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on February 3, 2023, alleging (1) recognition and enforcement of foreign-country money judgments, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of guaranty, (4) fraud, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, (6) accounting, (7) specific performance, and (8) common law fraudulent transfer and violation of uniform. The FAC alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Defendant Yuan owns 78% of Defendant Tianjin. On May 31, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin entered into a written co-production agreement (“Co-Production Agreement”) for a TV show “Proper Way to Mark Love” (“TV Show”). Khorgos agreed to invest 10% of the TV Show’s production cost, while Tianjin agreed to manage the production of the TV Show and provide Khorgos with accounting every month.

On August 29, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin executed a supplemental agreement (“Supplementary Co-Production Agreement”) whereby Khorgos increased its investment to 20%. Under both the Co-Production Agreement and Supplementary Co-Production Agreement (collectively, “Production Agreements”), Khorgos was entitled to receive a share of the TV Show’s income proportionate to the investment.

On December 29, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin executed a Copyright Transfer Agreement (“Transfer Agreement”) whereby Khorgos sold Tianjin its interest in the TV Show for 32 million RMB (about $4.98 million). Tianjin agreed to pay half within seven days of execution of the Transfer Agreement and the other half by May 2018. Tianjin only paid 10 million RMB (about $1.56 million) on December 29, 2017. It still owed 22 million RMB (about $3,421,462).

On June 6, 2018, while Tianjin was still in breach of the Transfer Agreement, Khorgos, Tianjin, and Yuan executed a Supplementary Agreement to the Copyright Transfer Agreement (“First Supplementary Agreement”). Khorgos agreed to extend the deadline for payment of the outstanding 22 million RMB ($3,421,462) in return for Yuan’s guaranty and other promises.

On April 1, 2019, Tianjin paid 3.3 million RMB in interest owed on the 22 million RMB. It has not made any further payments of interest or principal. Khorgos deferred taking legal action in reliance of Tianjin and Yuan’s promises to repay the 22 million RMB.

On January 19, 2020, Khorgos, Tianjin, and Yuan executed a second Supplementary Agreement to the Transfer Agreement (“Second Supplementary Agreement”). Khorgos again extended the deadline to repay the 22 million RMB in exchange for Yuan’s written guaranty of Tianjin’s obligations to Khorgos. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid any of the amount owed.

At the time of default under the Second Supplementary Agreement in December 2020, Yuan told Khorgos that she had no money to honor her guaranty. In reality, she had just sold real property at 38982 Waterview Dr., Big Bear Lake, California (“Big Bear Property”), for $1,663,500. She concealed the sale and misrepresented her ability to pay Khorgos.

On April 9, 2021, Yuan agreed to execute and record a deed of trust against her real property located at 603 Chatham Place, La Canada Flintridge, California (“La Canada Property”). This property would serve as security for the Transfer Agreement, Supplementary Agreements, and Yuan’s guaranty thereunder. Yuan has not executed and recorded the deed of trust against the La Canada Property. Khorgos believes she plans to sell it and take the proceeds out of the country.

In July 2021, Khorgos filed a complaint against Tianjin and Yuan in People’s Court of Chaoyang District, Beijing, China (“Chaoyang District Court”) based on breaches of the Transfer Agreement and Yuan’s guaranty. On May 16, 2022, the Chaoyang District Court issued a judgment (“Beijing Judgment”) awarding Khorgos 16,920,324.00 RMB (about $2,493,710.43). Tianjin and Yuan have not paid the amount owed or appealed the judgment.

In October 2021, Khorgos assigned to Yan’an 20,000,000 RMB of its 31,075,000 RMB claim against Tianjin and Yuan. Yan’an pursued its own breach of contract and guaranty claims against Tianjin and Yuan in the Intermediate People’s Court of Yan’an City, Shaanxi Province, China (“Yan’an Court”). On July 25, 2022, the Yan’an Court entered judgment (“Yan’an Judgment”) awarding Yan’an damages of 20,000,000 RMB (at the time worth $2,963,006.86). Tianjin and Yuan have not paid the amount owed or appealed the judgment. The Yan’an Court seized 200,000 RMB of property from Yuan before trial, but neither Tianjin nor Yuan have any enforceable assets left in China.

Plaintiffs seeks (1) $2,482,995.93, plus interest from May 16, 2022, to enforce the Beijing Judgment or as a standalone award for breach of contract and guaranty, (2) $2,933,376.79, plus interest from July 25, 2022, to enforce the Yan’an Judgment or as a standalone award for breach of contract and guaranty, (3) punitive damages, (4) an accounting for the TV Show; (5) a judgment compelling Yuan to execute a deed of trust against the La Canada Property, attachment of said property, and an injunctioin against its sale, and (6) avoidance of any transfer of the Big Bear Property.

2. Course of Proceedings

On July 14, 2021, the court granted an ex parte application for a right to attach order by Khorgos against Yuan for $4,447,900.

On October 14, 2021, case was reassigned from Department 49 (Hon. Stuart Rice) to Department 49 (Hon. Randolph Hammock).

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiffs served Tianjin and Yuan with the Complaint and Summons by substitute service, effective July 15, 2022.

On December 8, 2022, Department 49 (Hon. Randolph Hammock) denied a motion to quash substitute service.

On January 17, 2023, Yuan filed notice substituting herself pro per for her counsel.

On February 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the FAC and served Tianjin and Yuan.

On March 23, 2023, the court denied Plaintiffs the ex parte application for a right to attach order but issued a temporary protective order (“TPO”).

On April 6, 2023, the court clerk rejected a request to enter default against Yuan because Plaintiffs had not issued a Summons to the FAC.

B. Applicable Law

Attachment is a prejudgment remedy providing for the seizure of one or more of the defendant’s assets to aid in the collection of a money demand pending the outcome of the trial of the action. See Whitehouse v. Six Corporation, (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 533. In 1972, and in a 1977 comprehensive revision, the Legislature enacted attachment legislation (CCP §481.010 et seq.) that meets the due process requirements set forth in Randone v. Appellate Department, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536. See Western Steel & Ship Repair v. RMI, (12986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1115. As the attachment statutes are purely the creation of the Legislature, they are strictly construed. Vershbow v. Reiner, (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882.

A writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500). CCP §483.010(a). A claim is “readily ascertainable” where the amount due may be clearly ascertained from the contract and calculated by evidence; the fact that damages are unliquidated is not determinative. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540-41 (attachment appropriate for claim based on rent calculation for lease of commercial equipment).

All property within California of a corporation, association, or partnership is subject to attachment if there is a method of levy for the property. CCP §487.010(a), (b). While a trustee is a natural person, a trust is not. Therefore, a trust’s property is subject to attachment on the same basis as a corporation or partnership. Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at 4.

If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a commercial claim which arises out of the defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession. CCP §483.010(c). Consumer transactions cannot form a basis for attachment. CCP §483.010(c); Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (action involving trust property was a commercial, not a consumer, transaction).

The plaintiff may apply for a right to attach order by noticing a hearing for the order and serving the defendant with summons and complaint, notice of the application, and supporting papers any time after filing the complaint. CCP §484.010. Notice of the application must be given pursuant to CCP section 1005, sixteen court days before the hearing. See ibid.

The notice of the application and the application may be made on Judicial Council forms (Optional Forms AT-105, 115). The application must be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based. CCP §484.030.

Where the defendant is a corporation, a general reference to “all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). Where the defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to “all property of the partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). A specific description of property is not required for corporations and partnerships as they generally have no exempt property. Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc., (“Bank of America”) (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268.

A defendant who opposes issuance of the order must file and serve a notice of opposition and supporting affidavit as required by CCP section 484.060 not later than five court days prior to the date set for hearing. CCP §484.050(e). The notice of opposition may be made on a Judicial Council form (Optional Form AT-155).

The plaintiff may file and serve a reply two court days prior to the date set for the hearing. CCP §484.060(c).

At the hearing, the court determines whether the plaintiff should receive a right to attach order and whether any property which the plaintiff seeks to attach is exempt from attachment. The defendant may appear the hearing. CCP §484.050(h). The court generally will evaluate the attachment application based solely on the pleadings and supporting affidavits without taking additional evidence. Bank of America, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at 273. A verified complaint may be used in lieu of or in addition to an affidavit if it states evidentiary facts. CCP §482.040. The plaintiff has the burden of proof, and the court is not required to accept as true any affidavit even if it is undisputed. See Bank of America, supra, at 271, 273.

The court may issue a right to attach order (Optional Form AT-120) if the plaintiff shows all of the following: (1) the claim on which the attachment is based is one on which an attachment may be issued (CCP §484.090(a)(1)); (2) the plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim (CCP §484.090(a)(2)); (3) attachment is sought for no purpose other than the recovery on the subject claim (CCP §484.090(a)(3); and (4) the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero (CCP §484.090(a)(4)).

A claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will recover on that claim. CCP §481.190. In determining this issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties. Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp., (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1484. The court does not determine whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made at trial and is not affected by the decision on the application for the order. CCP §484.050(b).

Except in unlawful detainer actions, the amount to be secured by the attachment is the sum of (1) the amount of the defendant’s indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff, and (2) any additional amount included by the court for estimate of costs and any allowable attorneys’ fees under CCP section 482.110. CCP §483.015(a); Goldstein v. Barak Construction, (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 852. This amount must be reduced by the sum of (1) the amount of indebtedness that the defendant has in a money judgment against plaintiff, (2) the amount claimed in a cross-complaint or affirmative defense and shown would be subject to attachment against the plaintiff, and (3) the value of any security interest held by the plaintiff in the defendant’s property, together with the amount by which the acts of the plaintiff (or a prior holder of the security interest) have decreased that security interest’s value. CCP §483.015(b). A defendant claiming that the amount to be secured should be reduced because of a cross-claim or affirmative defense must make a prima facie showing that the claim would result in an attachment against the plaintiff.

Before the issuance of a writ of attachment, the plaintiff is required to file an undertaking to pay the defendant any amount the defendant may recover for any wrongful attachment by the plaintiff in the action. CCP §489.210. The undertaking ordinarily is $10,000. CCP §489.220. If the defendant objects, the court may increase the amount of undertaking to the amount determined as the probable recovery for wrongful attachment. CCP §489.220. The court also has inherent authority to increase the amount of the undertaking sua sponte. North Hollywood Marble Co. v. Superior Court, (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683, 691.

Tianjin is primarily owned, managed, and operated by Defendant Yuan; she owns 29% of Tianjin directly. Longlong Decl., ¶9. Because Tianjin Fengxin Tourism Development Co. (“Fengxin”) owns 70% of Tianjin, and Yuan owns 70% of Fengxin, she indirectly owns an additional 49% of Tianjin, and her collective ownership percentage totals 78%. Longlong Decl., ¶9. Yuan’s relative owns another 21% and helps her exercise additional control over Tianjin. Longlong Decl., ¶9.

On May 31, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin entered into the Co-Production Agreement for the TV Show, whereby Khorgos would invest 10% of the TV Show’s production cost in exchange for a proportionate share of the income. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 13, 15, Ex. A. On August 29, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin executed the Supplementary Co-Production Agreement, which increased Khorgos’ investment and share in the profits to 20%. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 14-15, Ex. B. The Supplementary Co-Production Agreement quantified the investment as a total of 22 million RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶14, Ex. B.

On December 29, 2017, Khorgos and Tianjin executed the Transfer Agreement whereby Khorgos sold Tianjin its interest in the TV Show for 32 million RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶16, Ex. C. At an exchange rate of 6.43 RMB per U.S. dollar, this was equivalent to $4,976,672. Longlong Decl., ¶16. Tianjin agreed to pay 15 million RMB within seven days of execution of the Transfer Agreement, with the other 17 million RMB due by the end of May 2018. Longlong Decl., ¶16, Ex. C.

On December 29, 2017, Tianjin only paid 10 million RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶17. Tianjin still owed 22 million RMB, or about $3,421,462 based on an exchange rate of 6.43 RMB per U.S. Dollar. Longlong Decl., ¶17. Tianjin did not make any additional payment by May 2018. Longlong Decl., ¶18.

On June 6, 2018, while Tianjin was in breach of the Transfer Agreement, Khorgos, Tianjin, and Yuan executed the First Supplementary Agreement in which Khorgos agreed to extend the deadline for payment of the outstanding 22 million RMB to December 20, 2018, with a 15% annual interest rate. Longlong Decl., ¶19, Ex. D. In the First Supplementary Agreement, Yuan acknowledged that she is Tianjin’s controlling shareholder and actual controller and she agreed to bear joint and several liability for Tianjin’s debt as guarantor. Longlong Decl., ¶19, Ex. D.

On April 1, 2019, Tianjin paid 3.3 million RMB of interest accrued on the 22 million RMB during 2018. Longlong Decl., ¶20. Tianjin has not made any further payments on the interest or principal. Longlong Decl., ¶20. Khorgos deferred taking legal action in reliance of Tianjin and Yuan’s promises to repay the 22 million RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶21.

On January 19, 2020, Khorgos, Tianjin, and Yuan executed the Second Supplementary Agreement, whereby Yuan reaffirmed her guaranty of the 22 million RMB still owed under the Transfer Agreement. Longlong Decl., ¶22, Ex. E. In exchange, Khorgos extended the deadline to pay under the Transfer Agreement to December 20, 2020, at which point the debt would accrue 24% annual interest beginning December 21, 2018. Longlong Decl., ¶22, Ex. E. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid any of the amount owed. Longlong Decl., ¶24.

On December 10, 2020, ten days before the due date, Yuan sold the Big Bear Property for $1,663,500. Longlong Decl., ¶57. None of the proceeds went to Khorgos. Longlong Decl., ¶57. Yuan concealed the sale and said that she could not repay the debt. Longlong Decl., ¶57.

On March 22, 2021, Luxin Certified Public Accountants (“Luxin”) wrote to Tianjin a letter with the results of a 2020 audit confirming that Tianjin owes 22 million RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶29, Ex. F. Tianjin stamped the letter with its corporate seal to verify the validity of the information therein. Longlong Decl., ¶29, Ex. F.

Khorgos asked Yuan to provide a security interest in the La Canada Property. Longlong Decl., ¶32. On April 9, 2021, Yuan agreed via WeChat to execute and record a deed of trust against the La Canada Property. Longlong Decl., ¶31. When Khorgos informed her that it had found a licensed U.S. attorney to prepare the documents, Yuan replied that she would sign them when she receives them. Longlong Decl., ¶32, Ex. G.

In July 2021, Khorgos filed a complaint against Tianjin and Yuan in the Chaoyang District Court based on breachers of the Transfer Agreement and Yuan’s guaranty. Longlong Decl., ¶33. On May 16, 2022, the Chaoyang District Court issued the Beijing Judgment awarding Khorgos 16,920,324 RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 34-35, Ex. I[1]. At a conversion rate of 6.7852 RMB per U.S. Dollar, this was $2,493,710.43. Longlong Decl., ¶35. Tianjin and Yuan were obligated to pay this amount ten days after the Beijing Judgment’s effective date. Longlong Decl., ¶35, Ex. I. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid the amount owed or appealed the judgment. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.

Before trial, the Chaoyang District Court seized 72,700 RMB from Yuan and could not find any other enforceable assets for either Defendant. Longlong Decl., ¶37.

In October 2021, Khorgos assigned 20,000,000 RMB of its 31,075,000 RMB claim against Yuan to Yan’an. Longlong Decl., ¶43. Yan’an then pursued its own breach of contract and guaranty claims against Tianjin and Yuan in the Yan’an Court. Longlong Decl., ¶44. On July 25, 2022, the Yan’an Court entered the Yan’an Judgment awarding Yan’an damages of 20,000,000 RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 45-46, Ex. H. At a conversion rate of 6.7499 RMB per U.S. dollar, this was $2,963,006.86. Longlong Decl., ¶46. Tianjin and Yuan were obligated to pay this amount ten days after the Yan’an Judgment’s effective date. Longlong Decl., ¶46, Ex. H. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid the amount owed or appealed the judgment. Longlong Decl., ¶47.

Before trial, the Yan’an Court seized 200,000 RMB, or $29,630.07, of property. Longlong Decl., ¶48. There are no other enforceable assets for either Defendant. Longlong Decl., ¶48.

On July 14, 2021, the court granted Khorgo’s application for a right to attach order against the La Canada Property. Longlong Decl., ¶56(a). As of February 2023, a title report for the La Canada Property reflects both the writ of attachment and that Yuan is still the owner. Longlong Decl., ¶56(a), Ex. J.

A title report for another property in Palmdale, California (“Palmdale Property”), APN: 3111-012-029, lists Yuan as owner. Longlong Decl., ¶56(b), Ex. K. Khorgos believes its value is $200,000. Longlong Decl., ¶56(b). Yuan also has three vehicles with a combined estimated value of $86,000. Longlong Decl., ¶56(c). There are no assets in California in Tianjin’s name. Longlong Decl., ¶56(d).

According to declarations of reasonable diligence, Plaintiffs tried to serve Yuan and Tianjin with the Complaint six times in June 2021. Jin Decl., ¶4, Exs. 3-4. There was never an answer at the residential address. Jin Decl., ¶4, Exs. 3-4.

On December 8, 2022, Department 49 (Hon. Randolph M. Hammock) denied a motion to quash substitute service. Jin Decl., ¶5. The court found that all three Defendants had made a general appearance. Jin Decl., ¶5. Plaintiffs then tried to serve the FAC by email, by U.S. Mail to the La Canada Property, and to two addresses in China that Yuan had provided by DHL mail. Jin Decl., ¶5, Exs. 5-6. DHL returned both packages from China and reported that no one with Yuan’s name was at either address. Jin Decl., ¶5.

Yan’an’s claim for $2,933,376.79 is for enforcement of a foreign judgment, the Yan’an Judgment. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 45-46, Ex. H. The Yan’an Judgment is based on an assignment to Yan’an of part of Khorgos’ claims against Yuan and Tianjin under the Transfer Agreement, the Supplementary Agreements, and Yuan’s guaranty under each Supplementary Agreement. Longlong Decl., ¶43. Longlong Decl., Exs. C-E. Yan’an has a claim on which to base attachment.

A claim is “readily ascertainable” where the damages may be readily ascertained by reference to the contract and the basis of the calculation appears to be reasonable and definite. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540-41. The fact that the damages are unliquidated is not determinative. Id. But the contract must furnish a standard by which the amount may be ascertained and there must be a basis by which the damages can be determined by proof. Id. (citations omitted).

In the Second Supplementary Agreement, dated January 19, 2020, Yuan reaffirmed her guaranty of the 22 million RMB that Tianjin still owed under the Transfer Agreement. Longlong Decl., ¶22, Ex. E. In exchange, Khorgos extended the deadline to December 20, 2020, at which point the debt would accrue 24% annual interest calculated from December 21, 2018. Longlong Decl., ¶22, Ex. E. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid any of the amount owed. Longlong Decl., ¶24.

Yan’an alleges that in October 2021, Khorgos assigned 20,000,000 RMB of the then 31,075,000 RMB claim against Yuan to Yan’an. Longlong Decl., ¶43. Although Ya’nan does not provide the assignment, it does provide proof of the assignment insofar as the Yan’an Judgment bases its 20,000,000 RMB award on that assignment. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 45-46, Ex. H.

Yan’an alleges that because the conversion rate at the time of the Yan’an Judgment was 6.7499 RMB per U.S. dollar, the 20,000,000 RMB award is worth $2,963,006.86. Longlong Decl., ¶46. Yan’an fails to provide evidence of the conversion rate but Defendants fail to oppose Yan’an’s conversion.

The Yan’an Court seized 200,000 RMB, or $29,630.07, of Defendants’ property. Longlong Decl., ¶48. When subtracted from the Yan’an Judgment award, the difference is $2,933,376.79 ($2,963,006.86 - $29,630.07), which is the amount Yan’an seeks to attach. The damages are readily ascertainable.

The conduct of a trade, business, or profession is generally activity “which occupies the time, attention and effort. . . for the purpose of livelihood or profit on a continuing basis.” Nakasone v. Randall, (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 757, 764 (quoting Advance Transformer Co. v. Superior Court, (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 127, 134). “The term ‘business,’ therefore, embraces any activity engaged in for profit or for gain. The phrase ‘engaged in business,’ however, generally is held to imply business activity of a frequent or continuous nature.” Id. There is a distinction between one who spends his time and effort in carrying on an activity for livelihood or profit on a continuing basis and one who merely conserves his personal investments. Id.

Yuan admits in the First Supplementary Agreement that she is Tianjin’s controlling shareholder and controls its business. Longlong Decl., ¶19, Ex. D. She signed the guaranties in the Supplementary Agreements to induce Khorgos’s entry into the agreements with Tianjin. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 19, 22, Exs. D-E. This is sufficient to demonstrate that the agreements were a commercial transaction and that the claim is commercial in nature arising out of Yuan’s conduct of a business.

The Yan’an Judgment shows that in October 2021, Khorgos assigned 20,000,000 RMB of its claim against Yuan and Tianjin to Yan’an. Longlong Decl., ¶43, Ex. H. The Yan’an Court has found that Yuan and Tianjin breached the Copyright Transfer Agreement, Supplementary Agreements, and guaranties thereunder. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 45-46, Ex. H. It therefore awarded Yan’an damages of 20,000,000 RMB. Longlong Decl., ¶¶ 45-46, Ex. H. Tianjin and Yuan have not paid the amount owed or appealed the judgment. Longlong Decl., ¶47.

The Yan’an Judgment demonstrates the validity of Yan’an’s claim because another court has adjudicated the same claim in Yan’an’s favor. Mem. at 8. Yan’an has demonstrated a probability of success on the merits.

Attachment must not be sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which attachment is based. CCP §484.090(a)(3). This application for a right to attach order does not seek attachment for any purpose other than to recover upon Yan’an’s claim in this action. Yan’an seeks attachment for a proper purpose.

Where the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property must be reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be attached. CCP §484.020(e). Although the property must be specifically described, the plaintiff may target for attachment everything the individual defendant owns. Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc., (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268. The requirement of specificity avoids unnecessary hearings where an individual defendant is willing to concede that the described property is subject to attachment. Ibid. A general list of categories - e.g., “real property, personal property, equipment, motor vehicles, chattel paper, negotiable and other instruments, securities, deposit accounts, safe-deposit boxes, accounts receivable, general intangibles, property subject to pending actions, final money judgments, and personal property in decedents’ estates” – is sufficient. Ibid.

Yan’an seeks to attach the Palmdale Property and presents evidence that Yuan is still its owner. Longlong Decl., ¶56(b), Ex. K. Yan’an also seeks to attach three vehicles with a combined estimated value of $86,000. Longlong Decl., ¶56(c). Yan’an also seeks to attach money and deposit accounts, including with East West Bank, beyond the first $1,000 in any such account. This description is sufficiently specific.

The application for a right to attach order in the amount of $2,933,376.79 is granted. Although Yan’an submitted an ex parte right to attach order, it has not submitted such an order to be issued after hearing. Yan’an is ordered to do so within two court days or it will be waived. The TPO expires after the instant hearing. No writ shall issue until Yan’an posts a $10,000 bond.

[1] Yan’an has misidentified Exhibits H and I as each other in its declarations. Longlong Decl., Exs. H-I.