Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 21STCV22304, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Ari Chazanas (“Ari”) applies for a right to attach order against Defendant Vazgen Hakopian (“Hakopian”) in the amount of $67,500.

The court has read and considered the moving papers (no opposition was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. Complaint

Plaintiff Ari filed the Complaint on June 15, 2021, alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligence, restitution under Business and Professions Code (“Bus. & Prof. Code”) section 7031, and money had and received. The Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Hakopian owns T. Max Custom Cabinets (“T. Max”). In November 2020, Ari spoke with Hakopian about remodeling the kitchen (“Project”) at Ari’s new home at 1835 Old Ranch Road, Los Angeles, CA (“Project Property”). During these conversations, Hakopian represented he had the necessary qualifications and had performed similar remodels before. On November 11, 2020, Hakopian provided a $52,000 invoice for the work listed therein (“Invoice”). The parties later added items and increased the quote to $61,600.

Based on Hakopian’s assertions and the Invoice, in November 2020, the parties entered an oral agreement to complete the Project in 45 days for $61,600. Hakopian was to conduct all work and furnish all labor and material for the Project. The parties agreed on the type of marble and the wood for the cabinets. On November 24. 2020, Ari made the required down payment of $8,000. He then made payments totaling an additional $53,600 through April 23, 2021.

Because the agreement constituted a home improvement contract within the definition of Bus. & Prof. Code section 7159, the agreement was required to be in writing, signed by all parties, with numerous disclosures. Hakopian provided no such contract. The down payment also exceeded the $1,000 maximum under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7159.

From the beginning of the Project, Hakopian’s work was behind schedule, of low quality, and not compliant with industry standards. The Project was not finished by April 2021. Cabinets and stone slabs were not framed and installed properly, and the cabinets were made of cheap, low-quality material.

In April 2021, Ari had to engage new contractors to demolish and re-do the cabinets. He also paid $10,000 for a contractor to repair and correct a stone slab. The total cost of re-doing the Project was about $70,000.

Ari also learned Hakopian did not have the licenses he claimed to have to conduct the Project. He should have been licensed as a general contractor and held specialty licenses like a C- 6 Cabinet, Millwork, and Finish Carpentry license. Based on the definition of a contractor in Bus. & Prof. Code section 7026.1, Hakopian was required to be licensed as a contractor by the Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”). In May 2021, Ari searched and CSLB database and found Hakopian was never listed as a general or specialty contractor during this project. The CSLB later issued a Verified Certificate of non-licensure status for Hakopian.

Bus. & Prof. Code section 7031(b) allows Ari to bring an action against an unlicensed contractor to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract. Because of Hakopian’s false representations, Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160 allows him to recover a $500 penalty, attorney’s fees, and any damages sustained in reliance on those representations. Demands for the return of all amount paid have failed.

Ari seeks (1) return of the $61,600 paid to Hakopian, plus 10% annual interest; (2) $70,000 for costs to complete and repair the work; (3) $15,000 to reimburse Ari for the additional month’s lease he paid for his previous home because of Hakopian’s delay; (4) attorney’s fees per CCP section 1029.8 and Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160; (5) $10,000 in treble damages per CCP section 1029.8; (6) $13,000 to purchase three marble slabs to replace slabs Hakopian’s fabricators either damaged or lost; (7) $500 in penalties under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160; (9) exemplary damages; and (9) costs of suit.

2. Cross-Complaint

On November 10, 2021, Hakopian filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Ari, Lotus West Properties, Inc. (“Lotus”), Demetra Chazanas (“Demetra”), and Demetra Design Corp. (“DDC”), alleging (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to pay all wages upon termination; (3) failure to provide wage statements; (4) failure to provide meal periods; (5) failure to provide rest periods; and (6) unfair competition. The verified Cross-Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Ari is a real estate developer and owns Lotus. Demetra is an interior designer and owns DDC. Each company is an alter-ego of its owner.

On August 25, 2019, the four Cross-Defendants hired Hakopian as an employee to install kitchen and bathroom cabinets in Ari’s residential developments. Hakopian was an employee because the companies dictated the projects he worked on, hours, wages, arrival and quitting time, work to complete on a particular day, which cabinets and countertops to install, kitchen and bathroom designs, and start and end dates for the projects.

In November 2020, Cross-Defendants assigned Hakopian to perform the Project. As part of this assignment, Hakopian would install kitchen and bathroom cabinets and countertops at the Project Property. Cross-Defendants chose and supplied the cabinets and countertops, only to later complain they did not like their choices. On May 17, 2021, Cross-Defendants terminated Hakopian. At the time, they owed him $25,000 in unpaid wages. Penalty wages under Labor Code section 203 have since accrued.

During Hakopian's employment, under Labor Code section 226(a), Cross-Defendants failed to provide itemized wage statements. Under Labor Code section 226(e), Hakopian is entitled to recover $50 for the first violation and $100 per violation thereafter for up to $4,000, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.

Although Hakopian often worked more than eight hours a day and forty days a week, Cross-Defendants failed to pay overtime. They also failed to provide the required 30-minute meal periods and 10-minute rest periods.

The conduct also constitutes unfair competition under Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200. Hakopian is therefore entitled to restitution of all wages and overtime of which he was deprived as of termination, compensation of missed meals and rest periods, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees.

Hakopian seeks damages, restitution for unfair competition, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees.

3. Course of Proceedings

On September 9, 2021, Ari served Hakopian with the Complaint and Summons.

On October 28, 2021, Hakopian served his Answer and filed it the next day.

On December 3, 2021, Hakopian served Ari, Lotus, Demetra, and DDC with the Cross-Complaint and Summons.

On March 7, 2022, Cross-Defendants filed and served Hakopian with separate Answers.

On September 12, 2022, Department 34 (Hon. Michael Linfield) stayed the case in its entirety.

On June 27, 2023, Department 34 lifted the stay only to allow Ari to apply for a right to attach order.

On July 24, 2023, Department 34 took Ari’s application for a right to attach order off-calendar for failure to file in the correct department.

On September 29, 2023, this court denied Ari’s ex parte application for a right to attach order against Hakopian for $99,268.11. The court granted a temporary protective order (“TPO”) enjoining the release of $67,500 from escrow related to the sale of 1565 Kings Road, Palmdale, CA 93551 (“Palmdale Property”). It also set a hearing on the application for a right to attach order for November 9, 2023.

On October 17, 2023, Ari filed and served a new application for a right to attach order in the amount of $67,500.

B. Applicable Law

Attachment is a prejudgment remedy providing for the seizure of one or more of the defendant’s assets to aid in the collection of a money demand pending the outcome of the trial of the action. See Whitehouse v. Six Corporation, (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 533. In 1972, and in a 1977 comprehensive revision, the Legislature enacted attachment legislation (CCP §481.010 et seq.) that meets the due process requirements set forth in Randone v. Appellate Department, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536. See Western Steel & Ship Repair v. RMI, (12986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1115. As the attachment statutes are purely the creation of the Legislature, they are strictly construed. Vershbow v. Reiner, (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882.

A writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500). CCP §483.010(a). A claim is “readily ascertainable” where the amount due may be clearly ascertained from the contract and calculated by evidence; the fact that damages are unliquidated is not determinative. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540-41 (attachment appropriate for claim based on rent calculation for lease of commercial equipment).

All property within California of a corporation, association, or partnership is subject to attachment if there is a method of levy for the property. CCP §487.010(a), (b). While a trustee is a natural person, a trust is not. Therefore, a trust’s property is subject to attachment on the same basis as a corporation or partnership. Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at 4.

If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a commercial claim which arises out of the defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession. CCP §483.010(c). Consumer transactions cannot form a basis for attachment. CCP §483.010(c); Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (action involving trust property was a commercial, not a consumer, transaction).

The plaintiff may apply for a right to attach order by noticing a hearing for the order and serving the defendant with summons and complaint, notice of the application, and supporting papers any time after filing the complaint. CCP §484.010. Notice of the application must be given pursuant to CCP section 1005, sixteen court days before the hearing. See ibid.

The notice of the application and the application may be made on Judicial Council forms (Optional Forms AT-105, 115). The application must be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based. CCP §484.030.

Where the defendant is a corporation, a general reference to “all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). Where the defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to “all property of the partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). A specific description of property is not required for corporations and partnerships as they generally have no exempt property. Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc., (“Bank of America”) (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268.

A defendant who opposes issuance of the order must file and serve a notice of opposition and supporting affidavit as required by CCP section 484.060 not later than five court days prior to the date set for hearing. CCP §484.050(e). The notice of opposition may be made on a Judicial Council form (Optional Form AT-155).

The plaintiff may file and serve a reply two court days prior to the date set for the hearing. CCP §484.060(c).

At the hearing, the court determines whether the plaintiff should receive a right to attach order and whether any property which the plaintiff seeks to attach is exempt from attachment. The defendant may appear the hearing. CCP §484.050(h). The court generally will evaluate the attachment application based solely on the pleadings and supporting affidavits without taking additional evidence. Bank of America, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at 273. A verified complaint may be used in lieu of or in addition to an affidavit if it states evidentiary facts. CCP §482.040. The plaintiff has the burden of proof, and the court is not required to accept as true any affidavit even if it is undisputed. See Bank of America, supra, at 271, 273.

The court may issue a right to attach order (Optional Form AT-120) if the plaintiff shows all of the following: (1) the claim on which the attachment is based is one on which an attachment may be issued (CCP §484.090(a)(1)); (2) the plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim (CCP §484.090(a)(2)); (3) attachment is sought for no purpose other than the recovery on the subject claim (CCP §484.090(a)(3); and (4) the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero (CCP §484.090(a)(4)).

A claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will recover on that claim. CCP §481.190. In determining this issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties. Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp., (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1484. The court does not determine whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made at trial and is not affected by the decision on the application for the order. CCP §484.050(b).

Except in unlawful detainer actions, the amount to be secured by the attachment is the sum of (1) the amount of the defendant’s indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff, and (2) any additional amount included by the court for estimate of costs and any allowable attorneys’ fees under CCP section 482.110. CCP §483.015(a); Goldstein v. Barak Construction, (“Goldstein”) (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 852. This amount must be reduced by the sum of (1) the amount of indebtedness that the defendant has in a money judgment against plaintiff, (2) the amount claimed in a cross-complaint or affirmative defense and shown would be subject to attachment against the plaintiff, and (3) the value of any security interest held by the plaintiff in the defendant’s property, together with the amount by which the acts of the plaintiff (or a prior holder of the security interest) have decreased that security interest’s value. CCP §483.015(b). A defendant claiming that the amount to be secured should be reduced because of a cross-claim or affirmative defense must make a prima facie showing that the claim would result in an attachment against the plaintiff.

Before the issuance of a writ of attachment, the plaintiff is required to file an undertaking to pay the defendant any amount the defendant may recover for any wrongful attachment by the plaintiff in the action. CCP §489.210. The undertaking ordinarily is $10,000. CCP §489.220. If the defendant objects, the court may increase the amount of undertaking to the amount determined as the probable recovery for wrongful attachment. CCP §489.220. The court also has inherent authority to increase the amount of the undertaking sua sponte. North Hollywood Marble Co. v. Superior Court, (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683, 691.

In the Fall of 2020, Ari and his wife purchased the Project Property. Ari Decl., ¶4. Also in the Fall of 2020, he met Hakopian, who asserted he was T. Max’s owner and principal. Ari Decl., ¶5. Ari said he wanted a contractor to remodel his kitchen, fabricate and install new custom cabinets and countertops, and perform other work. Ari Decl., ¶5. Hakopian asserted that he and T. Max were experienced in cabinet and kitchen renovation projects. Ari Decl., ¶6. He also said they maintained the necessary licensure, certificates, and other legal requirements for the Projects. Ari Decl., ¶6. T. Max had completed numerous jobs similar to the Project. Ari Decl., ¶6.

Hakopian gave Ari a $52,000 Invoice from T. Max with a list of anticipated Project work. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. This work included fabrication of countertops and kitchen cabinets. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. The Invoice said that Hakopian would need 45 days to finish it, starting from when he can deliver the boxes. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. Hakopian informed Ari that this was a higher quote than usual because these cabinets would be of “high quality.” Ari Decl., ¶5.

On November 19, 2020, Ari and Hakopian entered an oral contract for the Project. Ari Decl., ¶7. In addition to the items listed in the Invoice, Hakopian would fabricate and install additional bathroom cabinetry and countertop. Ari Decl., ¶7. Hakopian agreed to use solid walnut and oak materials for the cabinets and experienced and licensed fabricators for the counters. Ari Decl., ¶7. The total contract price increased to $61,600, with an $8,000 down payment. Ari Decl., ¶7. Hakopian agreed to provide all labor, material, supervision, coordination, storage, and shop drawings. Ari Decl., ¶7. He agreed to ensure the Project’s workmanlike and substantial completion. Ari Decl., ¶7. Hakopian would complete the Project in 45 days. Ari Decl., ¶7.

On November 24, 2020, Ari paid T. Max the $8,000 down payment. Ari Decl., ¶8, Ex. B. Between November 25, 2020 and April 23, 2021, Ari paid an additional $53,600 in five checks. Ari Decl., ¶8, Ex. C. The total amount paid was $61,600. Ari Decl., ¶8.

From November 2020 through April 2021, Ari visited the Project Property many times to check Hakopian’s progress on the Project. Ari Decl., ¶9. By April 2021, far after the 45-day deadline, the Project was less than 50% complete. Ari Decl., ¶9. Hakopian also performed the work in an unworkmanlike manner that did not conform to industry standards. Ari Decl., ¶9. The materials were of low quality and the framing was improper compared to other contractors with whom Ari had worked. Ari Decl., ¶9. The cabinet material was low-quality veneer instead of the promised walnut. Ari Decl., ¶9. The grain was oak, and the color was not walnut. Ari Decl., ¶9.

Ari hired a licensed contractor to demolish and remove the work Hakopian had performed and start the Project anew. Ari Decl., ¶10. Ari paid this contractor $70,000. Ari Decl., ¶10.

In May 2021, Ari began to suspect Hakopian had defrauded him. Ari Decl., ¶11. On May 19, he filed a complaint with the CSLB. Ari Decl., ¶11; Kawahito Decl., ¶4, Ex. E. On May 25, the CSLB issued a Verified Certificate of non-licensure status. Ari Decl., ¶11, Ex. D. A diligent search revealed no records that Hakopian, doing business as T. Max, was registered as a contractor since January 2018. Ari Decl., ¶11, Ex. D.

On July 8, 2021, the CSLB notified Hakopian in writing about Ari’s complaint and the CSLB’s finding that he was not a licensed contractor. Kawahito Decl., ¶4, Ex. E. The notice gave Hakopian ten days to contact the CSLB to discuss the investigation. Kawahito Decl., ¶4, Ex. E. If he had contracted without a license, a criminal action against him could follow. Kawahito Decl., ¶4, Ex. E.

Ari would never have hired Hakopian if he knew Hakopian was not a licensed contractor and could not complete the Project. Ari Decl., ¶17.

On June 15, 2021, Ari filed the Complaint in this action. Ari Decl., ¶12, Ex. F. It alleges breach of an oral contract and recovery of amounts paid to an unlicensed contractor. Ari Decl., ¶12, Ex. F.

On August 12, 2022, the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office filed the criminal case The People of the State of California vs. Vazgen Hakopian, Case No. 2CJ01131, alleging violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 7028(a) and 7159.5(a)(3). Ari Decl., ¶13, Ex. G. On May 12, 2023, Department 45 (Hon. Kim Nguyen) ordered Hakopian to pay $67,500 in restitution. Ari Decl., ¶14, Ex. H.

In a June 2023 asset search on Hakopian, Ari discovered he owned two residential real property assets that could satisfy the restitution order. Ari Decl., ¶15. Hakopian had already sold one of them, and the other, Palmdale Property, was on the market. Ari Decl., ¶15. Ari requested that Hakopian fulfill the restitution order by paying the $67,500 out of the escrow. Ari Decl., ¶15. Ari would then use this restitution to offset against the amount owed in this case. Ari Decl., ¶15. Hakopian refused. Ari Decl., ¶15.

On September 13, 2023, Ari learned the Palmdale Property had gone into escrow. Ari Decl., ¶16, Ex. J. Ari interpreted this as an attempt to move assets and hide money. Ari Decl., ¶16. He therefore applied for and was granted a TPO. Ari Decl., ¶16. On October 2, 2023. Ari posted the $10,000 undertaking for this TPO. Ari Decl., ¶16, Ex. I.

Ari seeks attachment of $67,500 against Hakobian, solely to recover amounts owed. Ari Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19. The oral agreement was not secured by any collateral or real property. Ari Decl., ¶18.

Ari’s claim is based on breach of an oral contract and violation of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 7031(b) and 7160. Ari Decl., ¶12, Ex. F. Courts have granted prejudgment writs of attachment in disgorgement cases against unlicensed contractors. See Goldstein, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 853-54. The damages for each claim are at least $61,600. Ari Decl., ¶8, Exs. B-C. Ari has claims on which to base attachment.

A claim is “readily ascertainable” where the damages may be readily ascertained by reference to the contract and the basis of the calculation appears to be reasonable and definite. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540-41. The fact that the damages are unliquidated is not determinative. Id. But the contract must furnish a standard by which the amount may be ascertained and there must be a basis by which the damages can be determined by proof. Id. (citations omitted).

A person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract. Bus. & Prof. Code §7031(b). A contractor is any person, consultant to an owner-builder, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or company, who or which undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to construct any building or home improvement project or part thereof. Bus. & Prof. Code §7026.1(a)(2)(A).

Any person who is induced to contract for a work of improvement, in reliance on false or fraudulent representations or false statements knowingly made, may recover from such contractor a $500 penalty plus reasonable attorney’s fees, in addition to any damages sustained by him by reason of such statements or representations made by the contractor or solicitor. Bus. & Prof. Code §7160.

The initial Invoice for the Project listed a price of $52,000. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. The scope of this work included fabrication of countertops and kitchen cabinets. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. The parties later expanded the scope of the Project and increased the cost to $61,600, with an $8,000 down payment. Ari Decl., ¶7. Ari paid Hakopian $61,600 across six checks. Ari Decl., ¶8, Exs. B-C. Readily ascertainable damages under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7031(b) total $61,600.

Mem. at 7. In addition to the $61,600 paid pursuant to the oral agreement, Ari paid $70,000 to have another contractor redo the Project after Ari’s breach thereof. Ari Decl., ¶10. The court in the Criminal Case awarded Ari $67,500 in restitution from Hakopian. Mem. at 7, 10; Ari Decl., ¶14, Ex. H. Ari asserts that the ascertainable damages total $67,500.

The maximum attachment available to Ari is $61,600. Ari may be awarded $70,000 as damages at trial, but this amount is not readily ascertainable from the agreement. Nor does the restitution order in the Criminal Case control. The criminal court issued this order based on violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 7028(a) and 7159.5(a)(3). Ari Decl., ¶13, Ex. G. This does not bear on readily ascertainable damages for breach of contract or in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code section 7031(b).

Ari asserts that he will be entitled to attorney’s fees under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160. Mem. at 9. Ari does not present any evidence of estimated attorney’s fees and they are disallowed. Mem. at 9. Ari would be entitled after trial to the $500 penalty in Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160, but penalties are not available for attachment.

If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a commercial claim which arises out of the defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession. CCP §483.010(c). Consumer transactions cannot form a basis for attachment. CCP §483.010(c); Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, (“Kadison”) (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (action involving trust property was a commercial, not a consumer, transaction).

The initial Invoice was in the name of T. Max. Ari Decl., ¶5, Ex. A. Ari asserts that “T. Max” is a fictitious business name that cannot insulate Hakopian from liability. Mem. at 8. This is true. In addition, Ari shows that he made the oral agreement with Hakopian, not T. Max. Ari Decl., ¶7. Hakopian represented that he was the owner of T. Max, a company experienced in cabinet and kitchen renovation projects. Ari Decl., ¶6. He also asserted that he had the licenses necessary to complete the Project. Ari Decl., ¶6. The action arises out of Hakopian’s conduct of a business or profession.

A person who utilizes services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract. Bus. & Prof. Code §7031(b).

Ari and Hakopian entered the oral agreement for the Project in November 2021. Ari Decl., ¶7. By April 2021, Ari had paid $61,600 for Hakopian and T. Max to complete the Project. Ari Decl., ¶8, Exs. B-C. In May 2021, the CSLB informed Ari it had no records of Hakopian or T. Max’s licensure since 2018. Ari Decl., ¶11, Ex. D.

Ari has demonstrated a probability of success under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7031(b).

Any person induced to contract for a work of improvement, in reliance on false or fraudulent representations or false statements knowingly made, may recover from such contractor a $500 penalty plus reasonable attorney’s fees, in addition to any damages sustained by him by reason of such statements or representations made by the contractor or solicitor. Bus. & Prof. Code §7160.

Ari asserts that when he discussed the Project with Hakopian before the agreement, Hakopian said that he had the necessary credentials and experience to complete the Project. Mem. at 9; Ari Decl., ¶6. Ari would not have hired Hakopian if he knew otherwise. Ari Decl., ¶17. Although Ari fails to provide an evidentiary foundation for Hakopian’s representations of when and where they were made, there is no opposition and this defect is waived.

Ari has demonstrated a probability of success under Bus. & Prof. Code section 7160.

Attachment must not be sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which attachment is based. CCP §484.090(a)(3). Ari seeks attachment for a proper purpose. Ari Decl., ¶¶ 17, 19.

Where the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property must be reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be attached. CCP §484.020(e). Although the property must be specifically described, the plaintiff may target for attachment everything the individual defendant owns. Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc., (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268. The requirement of specificity avoids unnecessary hearings where an individual defendant is willing to concede that the described property is subject to attachment. Ibid. A general list of categories - e.g., “real property, personal property, equipment, motor vehicles, chattel paper, negotiable and other instruments, securities, deposit accounts, safe-deposit boxes, accounts receivable, general intangibles, property subject to pending actions, final money judgments, and personal property in decedents’ estates” – is sufficient. Ibid.

Ari seeks to attach Hakopian’s interests in real property except leasehold estates with unexpired terms of less than one year; accounts receivable; chattel paper; equipment; farm products; inventory; general intangibles and final money judgments arising out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession, except when an individual claim has a principal balance of under $150; money on the premises where a trade, business, or profession is conducted and elsewhere, except for the first $1,000; deposit accounts; negotiable documents of title; instruments; securities; minerals or the like to be extracted; money from an escrow account related to the sale of the Palmdale Property; and any community property that would be subject to enforcement of judgment obtained in this case. The description of attachable property is adequate.

The application for a right to attach order is granted in the amount of $61,600. Ari has already filed a $10,000 undertaking and no additional undertaking is required. Mem. at 10; Ari Decl., ¶16, Ex. I.

[1] Ari requests judicial notice of (1) the Complaint in this action (Ari Decl. Ex. F); (2) (2) the Criminal Case Summary in The People of the State of California vs. Vazgen Hakobian (“Criminal Case”) Case No. 2CJ01131 (Ari Decl., Ex. G); (2) the May 12, 2023 minute order in the Criminal Case (Ari Decl. Ex. H); and (4) the Notice of Posted Undertaking in this case (Ari Decl. Ex. I). The court need not judicially notice Exhibits F or I because it is always free to review prior filings in the current action. The request to judicially notice Exhibits G and H is granted. Evid Code §452(d).