Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 21STCV31213, Date: 2023-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV31213 Hearing Date: March 7, 2023 Dept: 85
Kingfisher, LLC v. International
Capital Alliance, Inc., 21STCV31213
Tentative decision on application
for right to attach order: granted in part
Plaintiff
Kingfisher, LLC (“Kingfisher”) applies for a right to attach order against
Defendant International Capital Alliance, Inc. (“International”) in the amount
of $66,320.46. It also applies for a
turnover order.
The
court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply[1] and
renders the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of the Case
1.
Complaint
Plaintiff
Kingfisher filed the Complaint on August 24, 2021, alleging (1) breach of contract
and (2) common counts. The Complaint
alleges in pertinent part as follows.
On
September 27, 2016,[2]
Kingfisher and International entered into a written agreement in which International
promised to pay Kingfisher $34,000, plus 5% annual interest on the unpaid principal beginning September 26, 2021. The interest was to be payable monthly from
October 27, 2016 to September 27, 2017, when the full balance with interest was
due. International failed to pay the
amounts due.
Kingfisher
seeks $35,700 in damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.
2.
Course of Proceedings
On October 20, 2021,
Kingfisher served International with the Complaint and Summons.
On January 6, 2022, Department
68 (Hon. Douglas Stern) rejected Kingfisher’s request for entry of default
against International.
On February 7, 2022, Department 68 rejected
Kingfisher’s second request for entry of default against International.
On March 7, 2022, Department
68 rejected Kingfisher’s third request for entry of default against
International.
On March 10, 2022, in
response to Kingfisher’s fourth request, Department 68 entered default against
International.
On March 22, 2022, Kingfisher
requested dismissal of all Does in the action without prejudice and a court
judgment against International.
On May 5, 2022,
Department 68 entered judgment against International for $35,700 in damages and
$773.25 in costs.
On September 29, 2022,
International moved to set aside the default judgment against it pursuant to
CCPP section 473(b).
On November 30, 2022, the
parties stipulated to set aside the default judgment.
On December 13, 2022,
International filed an Answer.
B.
Applicable Law
1.
Attachment
Attachment
is a prejudgment remedy providing for the seizure of one or more of the
defendant’s assets to aid in the collection of a money demand pending the
outcome of the trial of the action. See
Whitehouse v. Six Corporation, (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 533. In 1972, and in a 1977 comprehensive
revision, the Legislature enacted attachment legislation (CCP §481.010 et
seq.) that meets the due process requirements set forth in Randone v.
Appellate Department, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536.
See Western Steel & Ship Repair v. RMI, (12986) 176
Cal.App.3d 1108, 1115. As the attachment
statutes are purely the creation of the Legislature, they are strictly
construed. Vershbow v. Reiner,
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882.
A
writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for
money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the
total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount
not less than five hundred dollars ($500).
CCP §483.010(a). A claim is
“readily ascertainable” where the amount due may be clearly ascertained from
the contract and calculated by evidence; the fact that damages are unliquidated
is not determinative. CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
537, 540-41 (attachment appropriate for claim based on rent calculation for
lease of commercial equipment).
All
property within California of a corporation, association, or partnership is
subject to attachment if there is a method of levy for the property. CCP §487.010(a), (b). While a trustee is a natural person, a trust
is not. Therefore, a trust’s property is
subject to attachment on the same basis as a corporation or partnership. Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn &
Rossi v. Wilson, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at 4.
The
plaintiff may apply for a right to attach order by noticing a hearing for the
order and serving the defendant with summons and complaint, notice of the
application, and supporting papers any time after filing the complaint. CCP §484.010.
Notice of the application must be given pursuant to CCP section 1005,
sixteen court days before the hearing. See
ibid.
The
notice of the application and the application may be made on Judicial Council
forms (Optional Forms AT-105, 115). The
application must be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the
facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the
attachment is based. CCP §484.030.
Where the defendant is a corporation, a general
reference to “all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to
subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). Where the defendant is a partnership or other
unincorporated association, a reference to “all property of the partnership or
other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP §484.020(e). A specific description of property is not
required for corporations and partnerships as they generally have no exempt
property. Bank of America v. Salinas
Nissan, Inc., (“Bank of America”) (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268.
A
defendant who opposes issuance of the order must file and serve a notice of
opposition and supporting affidavit as required by CCP section 484.060 not
later than five court days prior to the date set for hearing. CCP §484.050(e). The notice of opposition may be made on a
Judicial Council form (Optional Form AT-155).
The
plaintiff may file and serve a reply two court days prior to the date set for
the hearing. CCP §484.060(c).
At
the hearing, the court determines whether the plaintiff should receive a right
to attach order and whether any property which the plaintiff seeks to attach is
exempt from attachment. The defendant
may appear the hearing. CCP
§484.050(h). The court generally will
evaluate the attachment application based solely on the pleadings and
supporting affidavits without taking additional evidence. Bank of America, supra, 207
Cal.App.3d at 273. A verified complaint may be used in lieu of or in addition
to an affidavit if it states evidentiary facts.
CCP §482.040. The plaintiff has
the burden of proof, and the court is not required to accept as true any
affidavit even if it is undisputed. See
Bank of America, supra, at 271, 273.
The
court may issue a right to attach order (Optional Form AT-120) if the plaintiff
shows all of the following: (1) the claim on which the attachment is based is
one on which an attachment may be issued (CCP §484.090(a)(1)); (2) the
plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim (CCP
§484.090(a)(2)); (3) attachment is sought for no purpose other than the
recovery on the subject claim (CCP §484.090(a)(3); and (4) the amount to be
secured by the attachment is greater than zero (CCP §484.090(a)(4)).
A
claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the
plaintiff will recover on that claim.
CCP §481.190. In determining this
issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the
respective parties. Kemp Bros.
Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp., (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474,
1484. The court does not determine
whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made at trial
and is not affected by the decision on the application for the order. CCP §484.050(b).
Except
in unlawful detainer actions, the amount to be secured by the attachment is the
sum of (1) the amount of the defendant’s indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff,
and (2) any additional amount included by the court for estimate of costs and
any allowable attorneys’ fees under CCP section 482.110. CCP §483.015(a); Goldstein v. Barak
Construction, (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 852. This amount must be reduced by the sum of (1)
the amount of indebtedness that the defendant has in a money judgment against
plaintiff, (2) the amount claimed in a cross-complaint or affirmative defense
and shown would be subject to attachment against the plaintiff, and (3) the
value of any security interest held by the plaintiff in the defendant’s property,
together with the amount by which the acts of the plaintiff (or a prior holder
of the security interest) have decreased that security interest’s value. CCP §483.015(b); see also CCP
§483.010(b) (“an attachment may not be issued on a claim which is secured by
any interest in real property arising from agreement, statute, or other rule of
law…However, an attachment may be issued where the claim was originally so
secured but, without any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom the
security was given, the security has become valueless or has decreased in value
to less than the amount then owing on the claim). A defendant claiming that the amount to be
secured should be reduced because of a cross-claim or affirmative defense must
make a prima facie showing that the claim would result in an attachment
against the plaintiff.
Before
the issuance of a writ of attachment, the plaintiff is required to file an
undertaking to pay the defendant any amount the defendant may recover for any
wrongful attachment by the plaintiff in the action. CCP §489.210.
The undertaking ordinarily is $10,000. CCP §489.220. If the defendant objects, the court may increase
the amount of undertaking to the amount determined as the probable recovery for
wrongful attachment. CCP §489.220. The court also has inherent authority to
increase the amount of the undertaking sua sponte. North Hollywood Marble Co. v. Superior
Court, (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683, 691.
2.
Turnover Order
If
a right to attach order and subsequent writ of attachment are issued, the court
also may issue a turnover order directing the defendant to transfer certain
property to the levying officer.¿ CCP §482.080.¿ The only types of property
which a levying officer may take into custody are tangible personal property in
the defendant’s possession or control, chattel paper, instruments, negotiable
documents of title, and certain securities.
See¿CCP §§ 488.435, 488.440, 488.445.¿ Intangible assets such as
deposit accounts and accounts receivable are attached by service of the writ on
the financial institution, not by taking any property into custody.¿ Pacific
Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court, (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100,
1109.¿ The turnover order must be personally served on the defendant and must
contain a notice to the defendant that failure to comply may subject the
defendant to contempt.¿ CCP §482.080(b).
C. Statement of Facts[3]
Kingfisher’s President
Hamza Sevinc (“Sevinc”) has an architecture license in Turkey. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7. He wanted to do business in the United States
by partnering with an architect licensed here.
Sevinc Decl., ¶7.
International is part of
the financial advising, real estate development, property management, and
entertainment industries. Sevinc Decl., ¶8. Sevinc and International formed Kingfisher as
a partnership so that Sevinc could do business in the United States and obtain
an E-2 Visa. Sevinc Decl., ¶8. Sevinc deposited $200,000 into Kingfisher’s bank
account. Sevinc Decl., ¶9.
During the partnership, Sevinc
came to believe that International Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) Visman Chow
(“Chow”) did not invest his money wisely.
Sevinc Decl., ¶10. International
spent $65,000 but Sevinc has not received any profit from the business. Sevinc Decl., ¶11. Sevinc invested enough money to obtain an E-2
visa but could not get one via the partnership with International. Sevinc Decl., ¶12.
Sevinc terminated the
partnership and came to the United States via tourist visa to obtain an E-2
visa through Kingfisher. Sevinc Decl.,
¶¶12-13. His visa application was approved. Sevinc Decl., ¶13.
International promised
to repay Sevinc’s investment money via two promissory notes to Kingfisher. Sevinc Decl., ¶14, Exs. A-B. Under the first note, dated April 6, 2016,
International agreed to repay principal of $86,030. Sevinc Decl., ¶15, Ex. A. Interest accrued at an annual rate of 5% and was
payable monthly beginning May 7, 2016.
Sevinc Decl., ¶15, Ex. A. On
April 6, 2017, the principal and remaining interest would become due. Sevinc Decl., ¶15, Ex. A. International transferred $15,000 to Sevinc,
followed by the $86,030 principal.
Sevinc Decl., ¶15.
After the $86,030
payment, the remaining balance owed was $34,000. Sevinc Decl., ¶16. On September 27, 2016, International signed a
note (the “September 26 Note”) in which it agreed to repay the $34,000 with 5%
annual interest, for a total of $35,700. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex. B. Interest was payable monthly from October 27,
2016 to September 27, 2017, when the principal and remaining interest would
become due. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex.
B. Default on any installment would
accelerate the remaining principal and interest. Sevinc Decl., ¶17, Ex. B. Kingfisher could also collect attorney’s fees
on any action to enforce the September 26 Note.
Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 17, 33, Ex. B.
As of February 9, 2023,
International has failed or refused to pay amounts owed under the September 26
Note. Sevinc Decl., ¶18.
The September 26 Note
does not have an interest rate after the maturity date of September 27, 2017. Sevinc Decl., ¶22, Ex. B. Kingfisher has calculated pre-judgment
interest on the original $35,700 at a 10% annual rate per Civil Code section
3289(b). Sevinc Decl., ¶24. At a daily rate of $9.70 for the 1958 days
from the breach on September 27, 2017, to February 6, 2023, total pre-judgment
interest is $19,150.85. Sevinc Decl.,
¶24.
Kingfisher incurred
court filing fees of $464.51 when it filed suit on August 24, 2021. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 26-27, Ex. C. It incurred $300 in process server fees to
serve the Summons and Complaint on September 14, 2021. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 28-29, Ex. D. Kingfisher has also incurred $705.10 in
various court costs. Sevinc Decl., ¶30,
Ex. E. Total costs in this action are $1,469.61.
Sevinc Decl., ¶31. Sevinc estimates attorney’s fees of $10,000
in this action. Sevinc Decl., ¶34.
The total sum Kingfisher
seeks to attach is $66,320.46. Sevinc
Decl., ¶¶ 35-36. Kingfisher also seeks a
turnover order to compel International to turn over documents and evidence in its
possession of the title to any property subject to levy. Sevinc Decl., ¶36. The turnover order should also include documents
and evidence in Defendant’s possession of receivables. Sevinc Decl., ¶36.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff
Kingfisher applies for a right to attach order against International in the
amount of $66,320.46, which includes $1,469.61 in costs and $10,000 in
attorney’s fees. Kingfisher also applies
for a turnover order directing International to transfer to the levying officer
possession of property in International’s possession, documentary evidence for title
of property, and documentary evidence of debt owed to International.
1.
A Claim Based on a Contract and on Which Attachment May Be Based
A
writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for
money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the
total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount
not less than five hundred dollars ($500). CCP §483.010(a).
Kingfisher’s
claim against International is based on the September 26 Note for $35,700, not
including pre-judgment interest. Sevinc
Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex. B. The contract claim
is a claim on which attachment may be based.
2.
An Amount Due That is Fixed and Readily Ascertainable
A
claim is “readily ascertainable” where the damages may be readily ascertained
by reference to the contract and the basis of the calculation appears to be
reasonable and definite. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super
DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 540-41. The fact that the
damages are unliquidated is not determinative. Id. But the
contract must furnish a standard by which the amount may be ascertained and
there must be a basis by which the damages can be determined by proof. Id.
(citations omitted).
Kingfisher’s
claim is for the principal and interest under the September 26 Note, pre-judgment
interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. The
total sum Kingfisher seeks to attach is $66,320.46. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 35-36. International does not dispute that it has not
paid Kingfisher under the September 26 Note.
a.
Principal and Interest Upon Maturity
Under
the September 26 Note, International agreed to repay $34,000 with 5% annual
interest. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex.
B. Interest was payable monthly from
October 27, 2016 to September 27, 2017, at which the September 26 Note would mature
and the principal and remaining interest would become due. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 16-17, Ex. B. The September 26 Note bore interest for one
year at 5% and Kingfisher has calculated that interest at $1,700. Sevinc Decl., ¶16. This makes the total owed on maturity as
$35,700. Sevinc Decl., ¶16.
b.
Pre-Judgment Interest
The September
26 Note does not provide for interest after maturity. Sevinc Decl., ¶22, Ex. B. Kingfisher has calculated daily interest at a
10% annual rate per Civil Code section 3289(b).
Sevinc Decl., ¶24.
Pre-judgment
interest is available on attachment and is owed from the time that the
obligation to pay money begins. See
Santa Clara Waste Water Company v. Allied World National Assurance Company,
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881, 890. If a
contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of
interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10% per annum after
breach. Civil Code §3289(b).
The
date of breach for the September 26 Note was the September 27, 2017 date that
it became due. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 16-17,
Ex. B. At a daily rate of $35,700 x
(0.1/365) = $35,700 x 0.0002739726 = $9.70 for the 1958 days from September 27,
2017 to February 6, 2023, the total pre-judgment interest is $19,150.85. Sevinc Decl., ¶24.
c.
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
The September
26 Note allows Kingfisher to collect attorney’s fees on any action to enforce
it. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 17, 33, Ex. B. Kingfisher provides evidence of costs that
totaled $1,469.61. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶
26-31, Exs. C-E. These costs lack
foundation as they were obviously incurred by Kingfisher’s attorney and there
is no evidence that Kingfisher has paid them.
As for
attorney’s fees, Kingfisher President Sevinc estimates attorney’s fees of
$10,000 in this action. Sevinc Decl.,
¶34. As he is not an attorney, the
estimate lacks an adequate foundation. See
Opp. at 7. The costs of $1469.61 and
estimated fees of $10,000 are disallowed.
d.
Conclusion
Ascertainable
damages total $54,859.85 ($35,700 +$19,150.85).
3.
Probability of Success
A
claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the
plaintiff will recover on that claim. CCP §481.190. In determining
this issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the
respective parties. Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric
Corp., (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1484. The court does not
determine whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made
at trial and is not affected by the decision on the application for the
order. CCP §484.050(b).
Sevinc
asserts that he and International partnered in Kingfisher so that he could do
business in the United States and obtain an E-2 visa. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 8-9. He deposited $200,000 into International’s bank
account. Sevinc Decl., ¶9. Although International spent $65,000, Sevinc
has not received any profit from the business. Sevinc Decl., ¶11. Sevinc invested enough money to obtain an E-2
visa but could not get one via the partnership with International. Sevinc Decl., ¶12. Instead, he obtained an E-2 visa after he
dissolved the partnership and applied through Kingfisher alone. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.
Sevinc
presents evidence that International then promised to repay him his investment
money via two promissory notes. Sevinc Decl.,
¶14, Exs. A-B. The second one, the September
26 Note, was for $34,000 with 5% annual interest, all of which was due by
September 27, 2017. Sevinc Decl., ¶¶
16-17, Ex. B. As of February 9, 2023,
International has failed or refused to pay amounts owed under the September 26
Note. Sevinc Decl., ¶18.
International
does not deny that it has not paid any amount owed under the September 26 Note. Instead, it argues that the September 26 Note
is unenforceable.
a.
Consideration
In
general, past consideration is not sufficient consideration to support a
contract. Past consideration will not
support a promise to the extent it exceeds an existing duty of the promisor. In re Insurance Installment Fee Cases,
(“Insurance”) (2012) 211 Cal. 4th 1395, 1415; Passante v. McWilliam,
(“Passante”) (1997) 53 Cal. 4th 1240, 1247. The key factor is that consideration must be
given in exchange for the promise. It must be bargained for at the time. Thus,
if services have been rendered with an expectation of future payment, there is
sufficient consideration for a contract.
Passante, supra, 53 Cal. 4th at 1247.
International
contends that enforcement of the September 26 Note is barred because it
violates applicable regulations for an E-2 visa transaction. For INA purposes, the concept of investment
connotes the placing of funds or other capital assets at risk, in the
commercial sense, in the hope of generating a financial return. RJN Ex. A (9 FAM 402.9-6(B)(c)). If the funds are not subject to partial or
total loss if business fortunes reverse, then it is not an investment in the
sense intended by Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) section
101(a)(15)(E)(ii). RJN Ex. A (9 FAM
402.9-6(B)(c)).
Sevinc’s investment of $200,000 into Kingfisher was an
investment to qualify for an E-2 visa. Sevinc
Decl., ¶¶ 8-9. For the $200,000 to
qualify as an equity investment, Sevinc cannot now seek a refund of those
monies as a loan transaction. Opp. at
5.
International
is conflating two transactions. The
first transaction was Sevinc’s $200,000 deposit into Kingfisher. Under the INA, this money was required to be
an at-risk investment. However, the
transaction at issue is not the $200,000 investment but International’s September
26 Note to repay a portion of those funds.
Nothing prevents a company from agreeing to return all or part of an
at-risk investment. See Reply at
2.
International’s
second argument has more traction. It
contends that the September 26 Note lacks consideration because Sevinc cannot
treat the invested monies as a loan transaction. Opp. at 4.
This may be true. International,
which apparently held the Kingfisher partnership’s funds, had no obligation to
return Sevinc’s invested money. To the
extent that it agreed to do so, Sevinc’s investment looks like a disguised loan
to secure an E-2 visa and a fraud on the INS.
The
problem is that International presents no evidence why its CFO singed the September
27, Note, which expressly states that it was issued “for value receieved (sic.)”. Sevinc Decl., Ex. A. Without such evidence, International’s
defense that the transaction lacked consideration is unsupported.
b.
Unclean Hands
A
plaintiff who has been guilty of improper conduct connected with the
controversy at hand will be denied by equity any recognition or relief with
regard to the controversy. Moriarty
v. Carlson, (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 51.
The actions of the party alleged to have soiled hands must relate
“directly to the transaction concerning which the complaint was made....” Pond v. Insurance Co. of North America,
(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 280, 290. While
equity does not demand that a plaintiff lead a blameless life as to other
matters, it does require that he have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit
as to the controversy in issue. A
plaintiff’s failure to do so is a complete defense to the complaint. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole,
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 446. The
defense of unclean hands applies to both equitable and legal claims. Pond v. Insurance Co. of North America,
151 Cal.App.3d at 290.
The
defense of unclean hands does not apply in every instance where the plaintiff
has committed some misconduct in the matter in controversy, but only where it
would be inequitable to grant any relief.
Dickson, Carlson, 83 Cal.App.4th at 447. The court must consider the material facts
affecting the equities between the parties, including the nature of the
plaintiff’s misconduct, the degree of harm caused, and the extent of the
plaintiff’s damages. Id. The decision whether to apply the defense in
a particular case is committed to the trial court’s discretion. Id.
International
points out that Sevinc invested $200,000 to obtain an E-2 visa and now seeks
the return of a portion of those monies because he never got any profit nor a
visa. Opp. 5-6; Sevinc Decl., ¶¶ 11-12. International argues that Sevinc has
attempted to disguise a loan as an investment to secure an E-2 visa, he misled
INS officials, and is guilty of unclean hands.
Opp. at 5-6.
It
is certainly possible that Sevinc is guilty of unclean hands by misleading INS
officials. On the other hand, his main
purpose in investing the $200,000 was to obtain an E-2 visa, which he did not
achieve through the Kingfisher partnership with International. It is not a fraud on the INS to seek the
return of funds when an immigration-related purpose is not achieved.
4.
Attachment Sought for a Proper Purpose¿
Attachment
must not be sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon
which attachment is based.¿ CCP §484.090(a)(3).
Kingfisher seeks attachment for a proper purpose.
E. Conclusion
The
applications for a right to attach order is granted in the amount of
$54,859.85. No writ of attachment shall
issue until Kingfisher posts a $10,000 bond.
Kingfisher seeks a turnover order to the levying officer of documentary
evidence of title to property or to a debt owed to International. CCP 21482.020(a). Sevinc Decl., ¶36. The request is granted.
[1]
International failed to lodge a courtesy copy of its opposition in violation of
the Presiding Judge’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory Electronic
Filing. Counsel is admonished to provide
courtesy copies in all future filings.