Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 22STCP00008, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling

Hangar Holdco, LP v. City of Los Angeles, et al., 22STCP00008

Tentative decision on motion to (1) strike the memorandum of costs: granted; (2) tax memorandum of costs: denied as moot

Respondent City of Los Angeles (“City”) moves to strike the memorandum of costs for Petitioner Hangar Holdco, LP (“Hangar”). Alternatively, it moves to tax five of its items.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply,^{^[1]} and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Hangar commenced this proceeding on January 3, 2022 against Respondents City, Los Angeles Housing Department, Ann Sewill (“Sewill”), Marcella DeShurley (“DeShurley”), Robert Klepa (“Klepa”), Edward Jacobs (“Jacobs,” collectively, “LAHD”), the Rent Adjustment Commission of the City of Los Angeles (“RAC”), Wilshire Escrow Company (“Wilshire”), and Leslie Lim (“Lim”). Hangar alleged causes of action for traditional and administrative mandamus. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Petitioner Hangar is the owner and lessor of property located at 4206 and 4208 Franklin Avenue, Los Angeles, California (the “Property”). Petition, ¶15. Real Party-in-Interest Carl Downing (“Downing”) is a former tenant at the Property. Petition, ¶16.

On November 13, 2018, Hangar filed an Ellis Act package with the City to permanently remove the two rental units from the rental market. Petition, ¶15. Hangar escrowed $10,750 with Wilshire for Downing’s Ellis Act relocation benefits. Petition, ¶18.

On November 13, 2018, Hangar served Downing with an Ellis Act 120-day Notice to Quit. Petition, ¶18. Downing submitted a request for an extension because he was disabled. Petition, ¶19. Hangar granted the request, and Downing’s new date to vacate became November 13, 2019. Ibid.

On December 13, 2018, the City, through its relocation vendor, determined that Downing was an Eligible Tenant entitled to $10,750 in relocation benefits. Petition, ¶20. Downing appealed that determination, arguing he was entitled to a $20,450 relocation benefit because he was a Qualified Tenant. Petition, ¶21.

LAHD held a hearing on Downing’s appeal. Petition, ¶22. On January 30, 2019, LAHD issued a written decision in Downing’s favor, agreeing that he was entitled to the higher Qualified Tenant relocation benefit of $20,450. Ibid.

In early February 2019, Hangar increased the amount escrowed with Wilshire to $20,450. Petition, ¶23. Downing drew from the escrowed relocation funds in the amount of $1,620 on December 14, 2018, and $2,368 on June 7, 2019, leaving $16,462 in the escrow account. Petition, ¶24.

Hangar filed an unlawful detainer (“UD”) action against Downing premised on the Ellis Act notice. Petition, ¶26. On April 1, 2020, Hangar voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice because of the Covid-19 shut-down. Ibid.

On April 29, 2020, Hangar served Downing with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit for the months of October 2019 through February 2020 – i.e., pre-COVID-19 rent -- totaling $12,000. Petition, ¶27.

On May 17, 2020, Hangar commenced a UD action based on rent owed. Petition, ¶29. Downing was evicted from his unit on August 3, 2021. Petition, ¶32. On August 21, 2021, Downing requested the remaining $16,462 in the escrow account. Petition, ¶33.

Without copying Hangar, Wilshire sent a September 3, 2021 letter to LAHD pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of the RAC Regulations. Petition, ¶36. LAHD responded to Wilshire in a September 16, 2021 letter without copying Hangar in violation of RAC Regulations. Petition, ¶¶ 38-39.

Hangar received a copy of this letter on October 8, 2021. Petition, ¶¶ 39-42. That day, Hangar filed an appeal of LAHD’s September 16, 2021 decision. Petition, ¶43. The appeal hearing occurred on November 18, 2021. Petition, ¶46. Hangar argued that Downing was not entitled to the $16,462 funds remaining in escrow because he had not been evicted under the Ellis Act in November 2019. Instead, he was evicted in August 2021, almost two years later, for his failure to pay rent. Petition, ¶47. On December 3, 2021, the hearing officer issued a decision denying Hangar’s appeal. Petition, ¶49, Ex. A.

Hangar contends that the hearing officer’s decision is an abuse of discretion, denied Hangar a fair trial, and is not supported by the findings or evidence. Ibid. Hangar seeks a writ of administrative mandamus to set aside the decision. Petition, Prayer ¶1. Hangar also seeks traditional mandamus compelling the amendment of RAC Regulations relating to the release of escrowed relocation funds. Petition, Prayer ¶2.

On February 14, 2022, the City filed its Answer and filed an Amended Answer on April 18, 2022.

On October 20, 2022, the court denied Hangar’s motion to augment the record with emails and requests for admissions, with the caveat that it may provide 12-point font versions of emails already in the record. Hangar did not choose to do so.

On February 14, 2023, the court granted the Petition’s cause of action for administrative mandamus.

Prejudgment costs allowable under statute shall be claimed and contested in accordance with rules adopted by the Judicial Council. CCP §1034(a). Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs shall be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in CCP section 1013. CRC 3.1700(b)(1). These time limitations are not jurisdictional, and a trial court has broad discretion in allowing relief from a late filing where there is absence of a showing of prejudice by the opposing party. Hoover Community Hotel Development Corp. v. Thomson, (1995) 168 Cal.App.3d 485. CRC 3.1700(b)(3) also allows the parties to agree to extend the time for serving and filing the cost memorandum and a motion to strike or tax costs.

CCP section 1032 defines the term “prevailing party” as the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, or a defendant who avoids all liability. Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants, Inc., (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 612; Childers v. Edwards, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548; Coltrain v. Shewalter, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 101-02. CCP section 1032(a)(4) provides that when any party recovers other than monetary relief, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court in its discretion may allow costs or not. Building Maintenance Services Co. v. AIL Systems, Inc., (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1025.

The statutory scheme clearly establishes two mutually exclusive sets of trial preparation expenses – one set which is allowable as a matter of right to the prevailing party (CCP §§1032(b), 1033.5(a)), and one which is not (CCP §§ 1033.5(b), 1032(b)). Expenses which do not fit into either of these two categories fall into a special statutory safety net: they may be recovered only at the discretion of the court. CCP §1033.5(c). Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court, (“Science Applications”) (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103. CCP section 1033.5(a) contains a list of expenses which are allowable as costs, and includes filing fees, deposition transcripts, models, blowups, exhibits and copies of exhibits if reasonably helpful to the trier of fact. Michell v. Olick, (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200; Science Applications, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at 1102 & n.7.

Even where a party receiving a favorable judgment is entitled to costs “as of course,” the trial court has broad discretion to disallow unnecessary costs. Perko's Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (“Perko’s”), (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244. It is generally held that costs awarded should be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. Thon v. Thompson, (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548.

When items claimed as costs do not appear on their face as proper and necessary and the items are properly challenged by a motion to tax costs, the burden of establishing the necessity of the items is on the party claiming them as costs. Whitney v. Whitney, (“Whitney”) (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 577. A properly verified memorandum of costs is considered prima facie evidence that the costs listed in the memorandum were necessarily incurred. Bach v. County of Butte, (“Butte”) (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 294, 308. Documentation must be submitted only when a party dissatisfied with the costs claimed in the memorandum challenges them by filing a motion to tax costs. Id. at 308.

On May 1, 1979, the City passed the Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“RSO”). The purpose of the RSO is to safeguard tenants from excessive rent increases while providing landlords with just and reasonable returns from their rental units. Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) §151.01.

Under the RSO, a landlord may terminate a tenancy only for one of 14 just cause reasons listed in LAMC section 151.09(A). As relevant here, “just cause” includes when “[t]he landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of [a] rental unit . . . to remove the rental unit permanently from rental housing use,” under the Ellis Act (Govt. Code §7060 et seq.). LAMC §§ 151.09(A)(10), 151.22.

A landlord removing a rental unit from the housing market under the Ellis Act must pay relocation assistance to the tenant. LAMC §151.09(G). The landlord shall provide the relocation assistance within 15 days of service of the landlord’s notice terminating the tenancy under Civil Code section 1946. LAMC §151.09(G)(2). “However, the landlord may in its sole discretion elect to pay the relocation benefits “to an escrow account to be disbursed to the tenant upon certification of vacation of the rental housing unit.” LAMC §151.09(G)(2); Zhong Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1 (RAC Regulation §964.01). The escrow account “shall provide that, in the event of disputes between the landlord and the tenant as to the release of funds from escrow, the funds in dispute shall be released to [LAHD] for final determination.” LAMC §151.09(G)(2).

The escrow instructions shall contain a dispute resolution procedure providing for LAHD to resolve disputes as to the disbursement of funds. Zhong Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1 (RAC Regulation §967.01). The escrow instructions must state that the owner and the escrow holder will indemnify and hold harmless the City and its employees, and any hearing officers selected by LAHD, from all liability. Zhong Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1 (RAC Regulation §964.04(f)).

In November 2018, Hangar escrowed $10,750 with Wilshire for Downing’s relocation benefits. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 365, 369). Under the escrow instructions, each tenant shall sign an affidavit after he permanently vacates his unit. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366). The affidavit will indicate the date on which the tenant vacated the unit and his current mailing addresses. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366). The affidavit also will confirm that the tenant has returned his keys to the landlord. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366). Once Wilshire receives the affidavit, it shall release payment of all remaining funds to the tenant within three business days. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366).

The escrow instructions provide that Wilshire should request in writing that the LAHD resolve any dispute regarding release of escrow funds. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366). Hangar agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the City and any hearing officer from all liability resulting from its resolution of any dispute about escrowed funds. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366).

The City hired a court reporter for a March 21, 2023 hearing for this case. Zhong Decl., ¶7, Ex. C. The reporter charged $675 for the half-day of recording plus $17.50 for parking, for a total of $692.50. Zhong Decl., ¶7, Ex. C.

Hangar filed this action against the City and other necessary parties on January 3, 2022. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶5. On February 14, 2023, the court granted the Petition. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶5. All costs that Hangar incurred in this action were necessary and reasonably incurred to prove its case. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶6.

Hangar filed a motion to augment with a good faith belief that the administrative record was incomplete. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7(a). Hangar intended to rely upon the evidence it wanted added to the record. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7(a). The filing fee for the motion was $60. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7, Ex. A.

Hangar named all the necessary parties in this action. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8(a). It could not guess which parties would respond to the lawsuit. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8(b). Service fees were $50 each for the LAHD, RAC, City, Wilshire, Lim, and Downing, $45 each for Sewill and Jacobs, and $40 each for Klepa and DeShurley. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8, Ex. B.

On September 6, 2022, the court ordered Hangar to lodge a trial notebook, the administrative record, and a memory stick with the parties’ briefs. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(a), Ex. G. The record and requests for judicial notice were hundreds of pages. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(c). Invoices from January, March, and September 2022 show $100 each in charges for delivering courtesy copies. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(e), Ex. C.

Hangar retained a court reporter for the February 14, 2023 hearing. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶10, Ex. D. The reporter charged $675 for a half-day of work, $202.40 for creation of a 22-page certified transcript, and $45 for production and repository. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶10, Ex. D. The $922.40 was properly incurred. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶10(b), Ex. D.

Invoices show that Hangar incurred $210.72 in electronic filing fees. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶11, Ex. E. The memorandum of costs increases this by $51.68 by accident. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶11(b). Filing fees related to the motion to augment the record include $74.92 on August 31, 2022, and $13.12 on each of September 19, October 14, and October 24, 2022. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶11(b), Ex. E.

Hangar now only seeks the $210.72 in electronic filing costs it actually incurred. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶11(c).

To prepare the courtesy copies for trial, Hangar had to print 717 pages of the administrative record in color at $0.25 per page for a total of $179.25. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(a), (d), Ex. F. Hangar also had to print the 471-page court filings in black and white at $0.15 per page, for a total of $70.65. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(b), (d), Ex. F. The printing costs totaled $179.25 + $70.65 = $249.90. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(c)-(d), Ex. F.

After deducting the $51.68 in excess electronic filing fees, Hangar’s costs total $3,241.02. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶13.

A written release generally extinguishes any obligation covered by its terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence. Tarpy v. County of San Diego, (“Tarpy”) (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 267, 276. When a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, in the absence of fraud he is bound by its contents and estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding. Id.

The City moves to strike the memorandum of costs. The City does not deny that Hangar was the prevailing party for cost purposes. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶5. Rather, it asserts that Hangar waived recovery of costs through the escrow instructions. Mot. at 4. Under Wilshire’s escrow instructions, Hangar agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the City and any hearing officer from all liability resulting from its resolution of any dispute about escrowed funds. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366). The RSO requires such a provision to be in escrow instructions. Zhong Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1 (RAC Regulation §964.04(f)).

Hangar assumes that the release of liability in the Wilshire escrow instructions applies to it and argues that the release is invalid. Opp. at 2. Hangar cites Health Net of California, Inc. v. Department of Health Services, (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 224, which holds that Civil Code section 1668 invalidates a contractual clause that prohibits recovery of damages for any future violations of statutory or regulatory law.^{^[2]} Id. at 135. A party cannot contract away liability for his fraudulent or intentional acts or for his negligent violations of statutory law, regardless of whether the public interest is affected. Id. at 234. The statute’s prohibitions against contractual provisions that exculpate violations of statutory law has been construed to include regulatory violations. Id.

Hangar also cites Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal., (“Tunkl”) (1963) 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, to assert that the agreement is void as against the public interest. Opp. at 2-3. The Tunkl court found that the releasing party did not acquiesce voluntarily to the contractual shifting of risk at issue. 60 Cal. 2d at 101. Nor was it clear that the releasing party received adequate consideration for the transfer. Id.

Hangar’s escrow account with Wilshire concerns relocations funds that it may owe Downing, its tenant. LAMC §151.09(G)(2); Zhong Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1 (RAC Regulation §964.01). The purpose of the RSO as a whole is to safeguard tenants from excessive rent increases while providing landlords with just and reasonable returns from their rental units. LAMC §151.01. A landlord removing a rental unit from the housing market under the Ellis Act must pay relocation assistance to the tenant. LAMC §151.09(G). The landlord shall either (1) pay the tenant the relocation assistance within 15 days the notice terminating the tenancy, or (2) deposit the assistance in escrow. LAMC §151.09(G)(2).

The City and LAHD’s sole capacity under the escrow agreement is as a decisionmaker in the event of a dispute over distribution of those funds. Zhong Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2 (AR 366).

As the City notes, the liability waiver required for the escrow instructions is reasonable because the escrow system is completely optional for the landlord. Reply at 3. The escrow system provides the City and LAHD a way to ensure that tenants get the relocation benefits they are entitled to, but only if the landlord chooses not to pay the benefits directly to the tenant. The City’s role as decisionmaker, free of liability if a court reverses its decision, is necessary to allow it to ensure that any disbursement or lack thereof complies with the RSO.

The City relies on County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 968, 972, which refused to find that an indemnification clause is an illegal contract of adhesion. Reply at 4. Distinguishing Tunkl, the court noted that this was not “a case where a public entity attempts to exculpate itself from its negligence toward members of the public by exacting a waiver of liability as a condition to rendering an essential public service.” Id. at 972-73.

Although Hangar does not explain how, the court will assume that it found the City in violation of statutory or regulatory law. It did not, however, find these violations to be intentional or even negligent. Nor did the City attempt to exculpate itself from negligence by exacting a liability waiver as a condition of providing an essential public service. Rather, LAHD’s services as decisionmaker are not necessary and within the sole discretion of the landlord, which can avoid escrow and pay relocation benefits to the tenant directly. Reply at 4.

Hangar asserts that this puts the cart before the horse when, as here, the underlying eviction was for failure to pay rent. Opp. at 3. This is a problem of the landlord’s own making. The City is not responsible for the fact that a tenant facing an Ellis Act eviction may not pay rent.

Hangar also forgets that, in granting the Petition decision because Hangar’s appeal was timely and not barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata, the court rejected Hangar’s assertion that it did not owe Downing relocation benefits just because it evicted him for failure to pay rent. If Hangar wanted to avoid paying Downing’s relocation benefits under the RSO, it should have withdrawn its Ellis Act tenancy termination. So long as that termination remained in place, Downing was entitled to relocation benefits even if he was evicted for non-payment of rent.^{^[3]}

In sum, Hangar fails to demonstrate that the waiver of costs in the escrow instructions is unenforceable. Because it bars recovery, the City’s motion to strike the cost memorandum is granted.

Assuming arguendo that the waiver is unenforceable, the City originally moved to tax (1) filing costs by $60, (2) service of process costs by $350 for service to parties, (3) service of process costs by another $300 for lodging courtesy copies, (4) court reporter fees by an unspecified amount, (5) electronic filing costs by an unspecified amount, and (6) copying costs by $249.90.

In reply, the City amends its request to tax the lodging of courtesy copies from $300 to $200. Reply at 5. It also specifies that the court should tax court reporter fees by $247.40 and electronic filing costs by $105.96. Reply at 5.

Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. CCP §1033.5(c)(2). Hangar asserts that, if claimed costs appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of propriety and the City must prove the costs were neither reasonable nor necessary. Opp. at 3. The opposite is also true. When items claimed as costs do not appear on their face as proper and necessary and the items are properly challenged by a motion to tax costs, the burden of establishing the necessity of the items is on the party claiming them as costs. Whitney, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d 577. In any case, the trial court has broad discretion to disallow unnecessary costs. Perko’s, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at 244.

Hangar incurred a $60 filing fee for a motion to augment. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7, Ex. A. It asserts that it made the motion with a good faith belief that the record was incomplete. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7(a). It intended to rely upon the evidence it wanted added to the record. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶7(a).

The City argues that these costs are not allowable because the court agreed there was no basis to grant the motion. Mot. at 6; Reply at 4. The City in effect asks the court to deny recovery for costs related to a motion just because that motion was denied. The City fails to demonstrate that the motion was so unreasonable and unnecessary as to exclude related costs.

The memorandum of costs shows that Hangar served nine entities and individuals, each for a $50 fee. The City objects to costs for service of any party except itself and Wilshire. Mot. at 6.

Hangar provides invoices for service of process to the nine entities and individuals on the memorandum plus Downing. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8, Ex. B. Some of these are for less than $50. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8, Ex. B. Hangar also asserts that it could not guess which parties would respond to the lawsuit. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶8(b).

The seven parties served by Hangar were sued in their capacity as City and Wilshire employees. Mot. at 6; Reply at 5. Service against the City and all the named employees was unnecessary. The $350 in service fees is taxed except $50 for service of LAHD, which could be served in addition to the undisputed proper service of the City and Wilshire.

The memorandum of costs includes three $100 charges for delivery of courtesy copies to this court. Hangar provides invoices from January, March, and September 2022 for this amount. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(e), Ex. C.

Hangar explains that on September 6, 2022, the court ordered it to lodge a trial notebook, the administrative record, and a memory stick with the parties’ briefs. Opp. at 5; Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(a), Ex. G. The record and requests for judicial notice were hundreds of pages. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶9(c). The City notes that the submitted invoices are from the year before the record or trial notebook could have been lodged. Reply at 5.

The court agrees. The invoices provided do not support delivery of a trial notebook and the record.

Court reporter fees as established by statute are allowable as costs. CCP §1033.5(a)(11). Transcripts of court proceedings are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law or ordered by the court. CCP §1033.5(b)(5).

The City questioned why the memorandum lists reporter fees of $922.40 when it paid a reporter only $692.50 for an earlier motion. Zhong Decl., ¶7, Ex. C. Hangar provides an invoice that shows a $675 fee for a half-day of work, $202.40 for a 22-page certified transcript, and $45 for production and repository. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶10, Ex. D.

Because the court did not order a transcript, the $247.20 is not recoverable under CCP section 1033.5(b)(5). Reply at 4. This $247.20 is taxed.

The memorandum asserts electronic filing fees of $262.40. Hangar provides invoices for

$210.72 in electronic filing fees and admits that the $51.68 difference was in error. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶11 (b), Ex. E.

The City asserts that electronic filing and service fees for the motion to augment the record should also be taxed. Reply at 5-6. The City only argues that the court should tax them because the motion was denied. The request is denied.

Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges, except for exhibits or when expressly authorized by law, are not allowable as costs. CCP §1033.5(b)(3).

To prepare the courtesy copies for trial, Hangar printed the administrative record in color at $0.25 per page for 717 pages, or $179.25. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(a), (d), Ex. F. It also had to print the 471-page court filings in black and white at $0.15 per page, for a total of $70.65. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(b), (d), Ex. F. The printing costs totaled $179.25 + $70.65 = $249.90. Cordero-Sacks Decl., ¶¶ 12(c)-(d), Ex. F.

The City asserts that the full $249.90 must be taxed because none of it can be associated with making copies of exhibits. Reply at 6. There is no basis for that assertion. The administrative record is a necessary exhibit for any mandamus case. The court also considered several judicially noticed documents at trial. The printing costs are not prohibited under CCP section 1033.5(b)(3).

The City then asks why Hangar needed to copy the administrative record when the memorandum of costs shows that it paid $613 to obtain it. Reply at 6. Hangar paid $613 for its copy of the administrative record and $249.90 for the copies of the record and other documents provided to the court; Hangar was entitled to keep its own copy.

The motion to strike the memorandum of costs is granted. If it were not, the costs therein would be taxed by $898.88.

^{^[1]}Hangar failed to provide a courtesy copy of its opposition in violation of the Presiding Judge’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory Electronic Filing. Its counsel is admonished to provide courtesy copies in all future filings.

^{^[2]} Civil Code section 1668 prohibits all contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent. Hangar frames the liability waiver in the escrow instructions as an attempt to excuse the City from any responsibility for its failure to follow the law in an administrative hearing.

^{^[3]} In reply, the City argues that Hangar contends that there is no consideration for the escrow contract but governments routinely regulate contracts without consideration, citing Interstate Marina Dev. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 3d 435, 448. Reply at 3. Hangar makes no such argument in its opposition.