Judge James C. Chalfant, Case 22STCP01903 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Stanford Ventures, LLC (“Stanford”) moves for an award of $59,070 in attorney’s fees from Respondent City of Los Angeles (“City”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Stanford commenced this proceeding against Respondents City and Denver Hargis (“Hargis”) on May 18, 2022, alleging a single cause of action for a writ of mandate. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Stanford owns the real property located at 6535 Stanford Avenue, Los Angeles, CA (the “Property”), and is opening a food truck commissary thereon. Stanford obtained multiple permits from City as well as approvals from the County of Los Angeles for the food truck commissary (“Project”). However, the City began issuing conflicting requirements for permits. Stanford asked that a single inspector be assigned to the project to prevent this discrepancy moving forward. The City assigned Dexter Jackson (“Jackson”) as the inspector for the Project. Jackson then intimated that he would not allow the Project to be approved unless “he was taken care of”. Stanford refused.

In retaliation, the City (1) refused to finalize permits with conditional approvals where the conditions were met; (2) issued correction notices that required actions not supported by the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”); (3) instructed its inspectors not to communicate with Stanford when it requested clarification on correction sheets; (4) threatened to revoke prior approvals; (5) refused to finalize permits without having a plan check despite the fact that the plan checker confirmed in writing that no plan check was necessary; and (6) required Stanford to obtain a new building permit for a change in use despite the lack of such a requirement. Another inspector, James Jensen (“Jensen”), has been a party to these efforts, although he did not ask to be taken care of like Jackson did.

When Stanford complained, the City responded that Stanford must file an administrative appeal. Stanford contacted the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”), which replied that there was no administrative appeal process for correction notices. When Stanford explained this to inspector Jensen, he provided a Request for Modification of Building Ordinances, even though Stanford did not ask for a modification.

Deputy City Attorney Patrick Hagan (“Hagan”) explained that despite the misnamed forms, the forms were appropriate for Stanford’s administrative appeal issues. Stanford filed them out, and LADBS accepted the appeal on March 29, 2022. Pursuant to Hagan’s instructions, Stanford then sent an electronic copy of the appeal to LADBS Chief Inspector Denver Hargis (“Hargis”). After several follow-up emails, Hargis replied in May 2022 that the appeal had not been properly submitted. When Stanford emailed proof that LADBS headquarters, Hargis, and Hagan had accepted the appeal, Hagan replied that Stanford only handed papers to the nearest LADBS employee and walked away. When Stanford provided proof of earlier communications and the accepted appeal, neither Hargis nor Hagan responded.

Stanford seeks (1) a writ of mandate directing the City to move forward with the LADBS appeal, (2) injunctive relief, and (3) fees and costs.

On June 7, 2022, Stanford filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to compel the City to process the administrative appeal it had accepted on March 29, 2022, or to enjoin it from processing any appeal until it processed Stanford’s appeal. The court denied the application on June 9, 2022.

On June 17, 2022, the City filed an Answer on behalf of itself and Respondent Hargis.

On July 7, 2022, Stanford stipulated that this case was moot and would be dismissed after a motion for attorney’s fees.

CCP section 1021.5 (“section 1021.5”) codifies the “private attorney general” exception to the general rule that each side bears its own fees unless the parties contracted otherwise. See CCP §1021. Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award fees to a successful party in any action that: “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if (a) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery. The issue is committed to the trial court’s discretion. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 634.

Courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” in order to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565. The party seeking attorney’s fees need not prevail on all of its alleged claims in order to qualify for an award. Harbor v. Deukmejian, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103; Daniels v. McKinney, (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 55. The party is considered successful under section 1021.5 if the litigation “contributed substantially to remedying the conditions at which it was directed.” Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 174. In other words, the “successful” party under section 1021.5 is the party that succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Maria P. v. Riles, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; see Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 610. A prevailing party who qualifies for an award under section 1021.5 are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably spent by their counsel. Serrano v. Unruh, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632–33.

Unlike the separate substantial benefit doctrine, “the ‘significant benefit’ that will justify an attorney fee award need not represent a ‘tangible’ asset or a ‘concrete’ gain but, in some cases, may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.” Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939. “[T]he benefit may be conceptual or doctrinal and need not be actual or concrete; further, the effectuation of a statutory or constitutional purpose may be sufficient.” Braude v. Automobile Club of Southern Cal., (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 994, 1011. Moreover, the extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an attorney fee award. See, e.g., Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 496 (significant public benefit where litigation prompted agency to improve methods of creating and managing its CEQA records). The trial court determines “the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 939–940.

The party seeking attorney’s fees must show that the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 941. Although cases refer to this requirement as the “financial burden” criterion, nothing in the language of CCP section 1021.5 limits the consideration of the necessity and financial burden clause to solely financial interests. Hammond v. Agran, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 125. “The idea is that the litigation for which fees are claimed must transcend one's interests, whether pecuniary or not.” Id. at 127. The question is whether advancement of the public interest was merely coincidental to the attainment of the party’s personal goals. Bowman v. City of¿Berkeley (“Bowman”) (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 181. The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of establishing that its litigation costs transcend its personal interests. Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court, (“Save Open Space”) (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 235, 247. The trial court's application of the financial burden criterion involves a “realistic and practical comparison of the litigant's personal interest with the cost of suit.” Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. Bd. of Supervisors (“Families Unafraid”), (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 505, 515.

Stanford owns the Property and is developing it as a food truck commissary – an outpost for food trucks to prepare and have inspections. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.

Stanford did not face issues getting permits from the City or the County until it tried to obtain permits from the LADBS Plumbing Department. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 10-11. After Jackson was assigned to the Project as an LADBS inspector, he stated during an inspection that he wanted to be “taken care of.” Eilenberg Decl., ¶12. When Stanford reported this bribe solicitation to Jackson’s supervisor, Tim Griffith (“Griffith”), Griffith apparently did not investigate the issue. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.

What followed was a pattern of punitive measures for reporting Jackson, including (1) refusing to finalize permits with conditional approvals where the conditions were met; (2) issuing correction notices that required actions not supported by the LAMC; (3) instructing its inspectors not to communicate with Stanford when it requested clarification on correction sheets; (4) threatening to revoke prior approvals; (5) refusing to finalize permits without a plan check despite the fact that the plan checker confirmed in writing that no plan check was necessary; and (6) requiring Stanford to obtain a new building permit for a change in use despite the lack of such a requirement.. Eilenberg Decl., ¶15.

For example, prior to Jackson’s inspection, the Property already had Permit No. 0042-90000-19687 for a water heater installed at the Property. Eilenberg Decl., ¶16-17. The original inspector gave a conditional approval reading “Water heater install OK pending health dept. approval of different unit model.” Eilenberg Decl., ¶18, Ex. 4. Stanford then received written approval from the health department for a different unit model. Eilenberg Decl., ¶19, Ex. 4. Despite this fact, the City refused to issue a final permit. Eilenberg Decl., ¶20.

Similarly, Permit No. 20042-90000-06987 was for the installation of a rainwater diversion valve. Eilenberg Decl., ¶21. After Stanford complied with many other conflict instructions, the City issued a correction sheet with only two corrections: (1) “plan check required for rainwater diversion valve” and (2) obtain a building permit for the change in building use from paint manufacturing to commissary. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 22-23, 29, Ex. 5.

Stanford submitted the rainwater diversion valve for plan check. Eilenberg Decl., ¶24. City Mechanical Engineering Associate Hagop Mertekhanian (“Mertekhanian”) replied that Stanford needed no plan check and could apply for an express permit online. Eilenberg Decl., ¶25, Ex. 6. Stanford applied online and received the express permit. Eilenberg Decl., ¶26, Ex. 7. When the permit was presented to Jackson, he insisted that there needed to be a plan check and refused to finalize the permit. Eilenberg Decl., ¶28.

Stanford reviewed LAMC section 91.106.1 cited for the building permit requirement and did not find anything suggesting that a change in use required a new building permit. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 29-31, Ex. 8. LADBS confirmed via phone that Stanford did not need a permit. Eilenberg Decl., ¶32. Despite this fact, the City refused to finalize the permits. Eilenberg Decl., ¶33.

Stanford again contacted LADBS, which claimed that Stanford needed to file a request for modification of building ordinances. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 34-35, Ex. 9. Stanford explained it did not want a modification; it wanted to contest the City’s failure to follow LADBS procedures and LAMC. Eilenberg Decl., ¶35, Ex. 9. City Attorney Hagan claimed that this was the only way to address the issue despite the confusing nomenclature. Eilenberg Decl., ¶35, Ex. 9.

Stanford relented and submitted the “request for modification of building ordinances” on March 29, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶36, Ex. 10. LADBS headquarters confirmed acceptance. Eilenberg Decl., ¶37, Ex. 11. The same day, Hagan told Stanford that it could serve Hargis electronically and Stanford chose to do so. Eilenberg Decl., ¶38, Ex. 12.

Stanford did not receive any response, even after requesting a status update on April 13, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 40-41, Ex. 13. On May 17, 2022, Stanford sent another email to Hagan and Hargis asking for an update. Eilenberg Decl., ¶42, Ex. 14.

Hargis responded by forwarding his earlier email about applying for a modification to LADBS, and he claimed that Stanford had not properly submitted it. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15. He noted that the steps are that (1) the applicant submits the application, (2) LADBS staff reviews the request and assesses the fees, (3) LADBS sends a link for fee payment to the applicant, and (4) LADBS staff decides whether to approve or deny the application. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15.

Stanford responded that the email chain demonstrated that LADBS accepted the appeal on March 29, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15. Stanford accused LADBS of either incompetency or deliberate failure to follow its own purported procedures to process this submission and pursue the inspector at issue. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15.

Hagan replied that the appeal process “does not entail simply handing a stack of paper to the nearest DBS employee and walking away[,]” and that the LADBS would process the appeal when Stanford had complied with the process Hargis outlined. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15. After Stanford asked for further clarification, Hagan explained that Stanford should have given the appeal papers to Hargis, not the Plan Check department. Eilenberg Decl., ¶43, Ex. 15.

On May 18, 2022, Stanford sent Hargis and Hagan the emails where (1) Hagan said Hargis would accept the Appeal electronically, (2) Stanford sent the full appeal packet, and (3) Stanford followed up on April 13, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶44, Ex. 16. The email reminded them that Stanford had also submitted the appeal in person to the Figueroa office pursuant to their instructions and received confirmation of acceptance. Eilenberg Decl., ¶44, Ex. 16. The email threatened litigation if LADBS did not confirm that it would perform its duties. Eilenberg Decl., ¶44, Ex. 16.

Because LADBS and the City failed to respond again, Stanford filed this suit on the same day. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 45-46.

On May 27, 2022, while the parties discussed discovery and settlement via email, Deputy City Attorney Steve Blau (“Blau”) claimed that the City sent an email with a link for Stanford to pay $793.52 in appeal fees. Eilenberg Decl., ¶47, Exs. 17-18. The City sent this to the wrong email address, eilberglegal@gmail.com and not eilenberglegal@gmail.com, on May 20, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶48, Ex. 18. Stanford tested the incorrect address on June 6, 2022 and confirmed that the City would have received a bounce back email informing it of the undeliverable email. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 49-51, Ex. 19. When the City resent the link to the right email address on May 31, 2022, Stanford promptly paid the fee. Eilenberg Decl., ¶¶ 52-53, Ex. 20.

On June 7, 2022, Stanford served an ex parte application for a TRO to compel the City to process Stanford’s appeal or to enjoin it from processing any other appeal until it does. Eilenberg Decl., ¶54, Ex. 21. On June 8, 2022, one day before the hearing on the ex parte application, LADBS processed the appeal. Eilenberg Decl., ¶55, Ex. 22.

LADBS assigned Hargis to rule on the appeal. Eilenberg Decl., ¶56. Although he denied the appeal, his decision allowed Stanford to bring the matter to the Board of Building and Safety commissioners (“BBSC”). Eilenberg Decl., ¶56. On July 20, 2022, the Secretary of LADBS’s Board emailed Stanford that the BBSC would hear its appeal on August 23, 2022. Eilenberg Decl., ¶56, Ex. 23.

Stanford’s counsel billed $550 per hour on this action, a low fee for an attorney of his experience and knowledge that allows him to work on public interest matters. Jacobs Decl., ¶2. Counsel’s research of the long history of corruption at LADBS, its administrative appeal process, and relevant LAMC provisions increased the time spent on this action. Jacobs Decl., ¶4.

Counsel spent (1) 6.7 hours researching LADBS procedures and LAMC provisions on administrative appeals; (2) 7.2 hours drafting the Petition and supporting documents; (3) 10.3 hours drafting the ex parte application for a TRO; (4) 1.6 hours reviewing the opposition to the application; (5) one hour attending the June 9, 2022 hearing on the ex parte application; (6) 16.7 hours investigating corruption cases against LADBS; (7) 2 hours on meet and confer sessions with the City; (8) 6.7 hours for client meetings; (9) 1 hour attending a July 7, 2022 status conference for this case; (10) 0.7 hours reviewing the Answer; (11) 2.3 hours overseeing how the appeal moved forward; and (12) 8.4 hours drafting the motion for attorney’s fees. Jacobs Decl., ¶3.

Counsel expects to spend another (1) 2.5 hours reviewing the opposition to this motion, (2) 3.5 hours drafting a reply, and (3) 1 hour attending the hearing for the motion. Jacobs Decl., ¶3. This yields a total of 71.6 hours, or $39,380 as the lodestar. Jacobs Decl., ¶3.

Counsel requests a multiplier of 1.5 in light of the public good this action yielded as well as the action’s complexity as the intersection of civil law, criminal law, and administrative law. Jacobs Decl., ¶5. The total attorney’s fees sought is $59,070. Jacobs Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.

LAMC Section 98.0403.1 grants LADBS the authority to enforce local, state, and federal building regulations and to hear and act upon requests for slight modifications to local ordinances in individual cases. RJN Ex. F (LAMC §98.0403.1(a)(6), (8), (10)). Before LADBS acts, the applicant must pay an appeal processing fee of $130.00 for the first item and $39.00 for each additional item, plus an $84 fee per inspection and miscellaneous fees for preparation of a written report. RJN Ex. F (LAMC §98.0403.2(a)(2)).

The BBSC has the authority to hear and act upon appeals of the decisions LADBS makes for requested modifications to local ordinances. RJN Ex. F (LAMC §98.0403.1(b)(1)). The LAMC does not set a deadline for either LADBS or BBSC decision on appeal. RJN Ex. F (LAMC §98.0403).

Benjamin Eilenberg (“Eilenberg”), who has acted as Stanford’s agent throughout this matter, is not eligible to practice law in California. RJN Ex. C. However, the address of a law office in his name on the State Bar website matches Stanford’s business address on both Statements of Information filed in January 2022. RJN Exs. C-E. Eilenberg signed one Statement of Information as Stanford’s Manager and the other as Administrator. RJN Exs. D-E.

On March 24, 2020, LADBS issued Stanford Permit Number 20042-90000-06987 for the installation of two grease interceptors. RJN Ex. B. LADBS conditioned the permit on Stanford incorporating a rainwater diversion valve to prevent cross-contamination or overwhelming the storm water system, and this valve requires plan check approval. RJN Ex. B.

Despite this, Stanford applied for and obtained an interceptor license online with only an inaccurate plan check on January 30, 2020. RJN Ex. B. Mertekhanian’s statement that this sufficed stemmed from a misunderstanding of the scope of work and the specific requirements of the listing approval of the new rainwater diversion valve. RJN Ex. B. Said valve does not qualify for an express permit. RJN Ex. B.

LADBS therefore issued correction notices to obtain plan check approval for the rainwater diversion valve as well as a building permit for new plumbing fixtures and a building change of use to a new kitchen commissary, pursuant to LAMC sections 91.8204 and 91.106.1. RJN Ex. B. The senior plumbing inspector also noticed several new systems and issues correction notices to obtain plumbing plan check approval for the added piping, equipment, and construction. RJN Ex. B. LADBS also issued correction notices on October 26, 2021 for failure to comply with previous notices. RJN Ex. B.

Stanford then alleged that Jackson tried to solicit a bribe, that LADBS retaliated against Stanford for reporting Jackson, and that LADBS was causing inappropriate delay of the Project. RJN Ex. B.

On August 8, 2022, the LADBS determined that none of the allegations had merit. RJN Ex. B. Stanford never provided evidence of Jackson’s misconduct, and LADBS’s decision to not issue the disputed permits and otherwise assert that Stanford could not proceed with the Project were justified. RJN Ex. B.

After a long exchange on the proper appeal process, Stanford submitted the appeal on March 28, 2022. LADBS sent the email demanding payment of fees on May 20, 2022 but did not receive payment until May 31. RJN Ex. B. LADBS denied the appeal the next day. RJN Ex. B.

On June 13, 2022, Stanford appealed the denial to the BBSC, which considered it on August 23, 2022. RJN Ex. A. On August 25, 2022, the BBSC denied the appeal and found that LADBS did not abuse its discretion. RJN Ex. A.

On June 6, 2022, Stanford’s counsel emailed Hagan with an offer to resolve the matter. Atwood Decl., ¶2, Ex. A. Counsel offered to dismiss the litigation and ignore any future improprieties by LADBS inspectors if (1) the City agreed to finalize all outstanding permits for the Project and not take any other actions to block it; (2) the City enforced its orders to cease operations at the illegally operating concrete grinding operation on the same street; and (3) the City paid Stanford $250,000 and its agent Eilenberg $100,000. Atwood Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.

On July 7, 2022, Stanford’s counsel emailed Hagan and Blau with the same offer, except that it added that (1) the City have LADBS finalize all outstanding permits for the Project and not take any other actions to block it; (2) Stanford would agree not to cooperate with any ethics investigations unless subpoenaed; and (3) the demand for payment increased to $750,000 for Stanford and $150,000 for Eilenberg. Atwood Decl., ¶3, Ex. B.

Courts take a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party’” in order to effectuate the policy underlying section 1021.5. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 565. A successful party under section 1021.5 is the party that succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 1292.

Stanford’s traditional mandamus claim sought to compel the City to move forward with a first-level appeal before LADBS. Stanford did not receive a judgment in its favor. Instead, it contends that its Petition and its ex parte application were catalysts for the first-level appeal. Stanford notes a timeline in which it submitted the administrative appeal on March 29,2022, the City failed to take action despite follow-up emails from Stanford’s counsel, Stanford filed the Petition on May 18, 2022, the City claimed that Stanford had not paid the appeal fees and Stanford paid them on May 30, 2022, the City still took no action, Stanford filed its ex parte application for a TRO on June 7, 2022, and the City processed the appeal the next day. Because the first level-appeal was processed, the court denied the ex parte application as moot on June 8, 2022. Reply at 7-8.

The “catalyst theory” permits an award of attorneys’ fees even when the litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation. A plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense; and (3) the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, (2004), 34 Cal. 4th 604, 608.

The City argues that Stanford’s lawsuit was premature because Stanford failed to exhaust its administrative remedies through two levels of administrative appeal, before both LADBS and the BBSC. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. Opp. at 12-14.

Not so. The Petition sought to compel only the first-level appeal by LADBS. Stanford had no obligation to take any action before BBSC until this first-level appeal occurred. Stanford did not fail to exhaust its administrative remedies for the Petition’s claim.

The City contends that Stanford’s Petition and its ex parte did not catalyze the appeal. Rather, the City followed its normal appeal procedure. LAMC section 98.0403.2(a)(2) states that the applicant must pay an appeal processing fee. RJN Ex. F. Stanford did not pay the appeal fee until May 31, 2022, after it had filed the Petition on May 18, 2022. Therefore, Stanford’s Petition did not catalyze the first-level LADBS appeal. Opp. at 13-14.

Stanford replies that the City only processed the appeal after the ex parte was served. Reply at 6. Prior to that, the City committed a series of delays, false claims, and emailing of the payment link to the wrong address. Reply at 7.

The court need not decide whether the City is at fault for not processing the March 29 appeal or whether Stanford acted prematurely in filing suit. As the City points out, a plaintiff relying on the catalyst theory to be a successful party must reasonably attempt to settle the litigation prior to filing suit. Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4^th at 608. This is not done simply by notifying the defendant of the grievance and proposed remedies. Carian v. Department of Fish & Wildlife, (2015) 235 Cal.App.4^th 806, 816. The court must consider all of the relevant circumstances in determining whether the plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to settle the dispute before filing the lawsuit. Id. at 816-17. Stanford makes no attempt to show that it sought to settle prior to filing suit, and the City demonstrates that Stanford made two unreasonable settlement demands after filing suit. Atwood Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Exs. A, B. Opp. at 14.

Stanford is not a successful party under a catalyst theory for purposes of section 1021.5.

The first prong of the section 1021.5 test — whether a petitioner’s action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest — requires a determination of the strength or societal importance of the right involved. Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist., (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1148. The right, whether constitutional or statutory, must be an important right affecting the public interest, not something involving trivial or peripheral public policies. Ibid. The societal importance of a right generally is determined by realistically assessing the significance of that right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals. Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 394.

Stanford’s theory is that LADBS is plagued by a corruption scandal, Jackson solicited a bribe, LADBS retaliated against Stanford when it refused to pay the bribe, and the City refused to process Stanford’s first-level appeal until Stanford’s ex parte application to compel compliance. Mot. at 4-9.

While corruption and bribery are important matters, the problem with Stanford’s argument is that it did not prove, or obtain a judgment for, a claim concerning corruption, bribery, or retaliation. Stanford merely obtained a first-level appeal of permit denial. The right to this administrative appeal is personal to Stanford and not an important right affecting the public interest.

The second prong of the section 1021.5 test is whether plaintiff’s action has conferred a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons. The trial court is required to determine the significance of the benefit as well as the size of the group favorably impacted by making a realistic assessment, in light of all the circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case. Bui v. Nguyen, (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366.

Stanford asserts that it provided a significant public benefit by (1) bringing the corruption scandal out of “filibuster” to the neutral oversight of the LADBS Board, (2) exposing the solicitation of bribes and the LADBS cover-up, which will discourage other solicitations, (3) forcing LADBS to comply with due process in Stanford’s case and hopefully others’ by proxy, (4) creating a public record of corruption issues to help future allegations of corruption, and (5) forcing LADBS to conduct oversight over inspectors who refuse to perform investigation after attempts to solicit a bribe fail. Mot. at 10-11.

Stanford did none of these things. All it did was obtain a first-level appeal hearing at which it could make these contentions. The outcome of the appeal is not within the scope of Stanford’s Petition. The Petition did not yield any significant benefit to the public at large.[4]

The third prong asks whether the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate. This prong encompasses two issues: (1) whether private enforcement was necessary and (2) whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys. Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn., (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1348.

Stanford meets the necessity of private enforcement element because it sued the only governmental agency that bears responsibility for permitting a first-level appeal. See Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941.

However, the City is correct (Opp. at 17-18) that Stanford fails to show that the cost of the litigation outweighs its financial stake in bringing this action. See Millview County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 759, 768. Stanford presents no evidence that the $59,070 in attorney’s fees it incurred is disproportionate to its financial interest in the lawsuit. Stanford wants to open its food truck commissary and admits that it has lost “in excess of $100,000 per month as a result of LADBS’s malfeasance”. Reply at 10. Stanford has not shown that the financial burden of private enforcement makes a section 1021.5 attorney’s fee award appropriate.[5]

The motion for attorney’s fees is denied. Stanford does not meet the definition of a successful party catalyst, the Petition did not enforce an important right affecting the public interest, it did not yield a significant benefit to the public or a large class of persons, and any financial burden stems from Stanford’s private interests.

[1] The court has ruled on the City’s written evidentiary objections by placing “O” for “overruled” and “S” for “sustained” next to the objection. The clerk is directed to scan and electronically file the rulings.

[2] The City requests judicial notice of (1) LADBS’s August 25, 2022 Letter of Determination for Stanford’s appeal (RJN Ex. A); (2) LADBS’s staff report for Stanford’s appeal to the Board (RJN Ex. B); (3) an attorney record for Benjamin Eilenberg (“Eilenberg”) from the State Bar of California’s website (RJN Ex. C); (4) two Statements of Information filed by Stanford with the Secretary of State (RJN Exs. D-E); and (5) LAMC section 98.0403 (RJN Ex. F). The requests for Exhibits A-E are granted. Evid. Code §452(c). The request for Exhibit F is granted. Evid. Code §452(b).

[3] The City notes that Stanford failed to serve the motion properly because it was served on the “City Attorney’s Office” by mail without listing an address. See CCP §1013a (proof of service must state name and address of the person served). Opp. at 6, n. 2. While the City is correct, it was able to file an opposition and has not been prejudiced.

[4] In reply, Stanford relies on the public policy behind the SLAPP statute (CCP §425.16) which protects against civil lawsuits that are aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, (1996) 42 Cal.App.4^th 620, 645. Stanford asserts that these policy reasons preclude the court from punishing it for pursuing the City after an inspector solicited a bribe. Reply at 4-5. The short answer is that a refusal to award attorney’s fees is not punishment.

[5] Given Stanford’s lack of entitlement, the court need not address the reasonableness of its attorney’s fees.