Judge James C. Chalfant, Case 22STCP02386 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Xingfei Luo (“Luo”) applies for a writ of traditional mandamus to compel Respondent County of Los Angeles (“County”) to produce documents responsive to requests made under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition,[1] and reply,[2] and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Luo filed this lawsuit on June 24, 2022, alleging mandamus and declaratory relief claims against the County for violation of (1) the CPRA and (2) Cal. Const. Art. 1 section 3(b). The verified Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On November 20, 2021, Luo submitted a CPRA request for Chain of Custody Reports from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) (“Request No. 1”). On November 22, 2021, LASD assigned a number to her request but did not request any extension of time to produce records.

On February 3, 2022, Luo submitted a CPRA request for disclosure of factual circumstances surrounding any crime or incident under Penal Code sections 261(a)(1)-(7), 289(a)-(g), 187(a), and 189(a) between January 1 and June 30, 2019 (“Request No. 2”). As of June 24, 2022, Luo did not receive the records responsive to either Request.

Petitioner Luo seeks a writ of mandate compelling disclosure of all improperly withheld records, injunctive relief preventing the County from delaying response to CPRA requests when the circumstances do not meet the exemptions in the CPRA, a declaratory judgment that the requested public records are disclosable and that the failure to timely respond to the Requests and improper denial of record inspection are violations of the CPRA and Cal. Const. Art. 1 section 3(b), and attorney’s fees and costs.

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for either a writ of administrative mandamus (CCP §1094.5) or of traditional mandamus. CCP §1085. A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....” CCP §1085.

A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty. Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted). Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.

Where a duty is not ministerial and the agency has discretion, mandamus relief is unavailable unless the petitioner can demonstrate an abuse of that discretion. Mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of a public agency’s discretion in a particular manner. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 261. It is available to compel an agency to exercise discretion where it has not done so (Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 1, 8), and to correct an abuse of discretion actually exercised. Manjares v. Newton, (1966) 64 Cal.2d 365, 370-71. In making this determination, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, whose decision must be upheld if reasonable minds may disagree as to its wisdom. Id. at 371. An agency decision is an abuse of discretion only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.” Kahn v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 98, 106. A writ will lie where the agency’s discretion can be exercised only in one way. Hurtado v. Superior Court, (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579.

No administrative record is required for traditional mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty or as an abuse of discretion.

The people have the constitutional right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(1). A statute, court rule, or other authority shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2). If a statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision of the constitution limits the right of access, it shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2).

The CPRA, located at Government Code (“Govt. Code”)[3] section 7920 et seq. (formerly 6250 et seq.)[4], was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public. San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-72. Section 7921 declares that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” The CPRA’s purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving the public access to information in the possession of public agencies. CBS. Inc. v. Block, (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651. The CPRA was intended to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, and it makes public access to governmental records a fundamental right of citizenship. Wilson v. Superior Court, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141. This requires maximum disclosure of the conduct of government operations. California State University Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (“California State University”), (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 823.

The CPRA makes clear that “every person” has a right to inspect any public record. §7922.525(a) (former §6253(a)). The term “public record” is broadly defined to include “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the people’s business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. §7920.530 (former §6252(e)).

The right to inspect is subject to certain exemptions, which are narrowly construed. California State University, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 831. The pertinent exemptions for this case are found in sections 7923.600 (former §6254(f)), 7923.610 (former §6254)f(1)), and 7923.615 (former §6254(f)(2)).

Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, the agency shall determine within ten days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure, though that deadline may be extended up to 14 days for “unusual circumstances.” (§7922.535(a), (b)) (former §6253(c)). If the agency determines that the request for records is denied in whole or in part, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt or that the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. §§ 7922.540, 7922.000 (former §6255(a)).[5]

If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it shall make the records promptly available upon payment of fees for direct cots of duplication or a statutory fee if applicable. §7911.530. There is no deadline expressed in a number of days for producing the records. Rather, section 7911.530 says the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” Section 7922.500 (former §6253(d)) provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

“Records requests . . . inevitably impose some burden on government agencies. An agency is obliged to comply so long as the record can be located with reasonable effort.” California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-66. “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. [Citation.] In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must ‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request. [Citation.].” Ibid.

Section 7923.600(a) (former §6254(f)) exempts from disclosure “[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by any state or local police agency….[and] investigatory …files complied by any…local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes….” This provision protects both records of investigation and investigatory files. Williams v. Superior Court, (“Williams”) (1993) 5 Cal.4^th 337, 341. The exemption protects witnesses, victims, and investigators, secures evidence and investigative techniques, encourages candor, recognizes the rawness and sensitivity of information in criminal investigations, and effectively makes such investigations possible. Dixon v. Superior Court, (2009) 170 Cal.App.4^th 1271, 1276 (coroner and autopsy reports in investigative file are exempt).[6]

The exemption for investigatory files serves an important purpose and is broad in nature. Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 349, 356. Even though a document does not on its face purport to be an investigatory record, it may have extraordinary significance to the investigation warranting exemption. Id. Instead of adopting the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) case-by-case approach with specific criteria to determine the exemption, the Legislature provided for the complete exemption of such files, with disclosure of information derived from the records. Id. at 350, 353 (criminal investigatory file of two deputy sheriffs).

Information in a file is investigatory material only when the prospect of enforcement proceedings becomes “concrete and definite”. Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 355 (citing Uribe v. Howie, (“Uribe”) (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 194). The investigatory file exemption does not terminate when the investigation ends; documents properly in the file remain exempt. Rackauckas v. Superior Court, (“Rackauckas”) (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 169, 174.

The California Supreme Court addressed the distinction between former section 6254(f)’s investigatory file and records of investigation exemptions in Haynie v. Superior Court, (“Haynie”) (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061. Plaintiff Haynie, a black male, was stopped by LASD, handcuffed, and questioned without charges filed based on a citizen complaint. Id. Haynie filed a tort claim and separately sought and writings concerning the incident. Id. LASD invoked section 6254(f) and refused to comply. Id.

The Supreme Court noted that case law had held that section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files applies only when the prospect of enforcement is concrete and definite. Once this is shown, and that a record was created for the purpose of investigation, Haynie rejected any requirement that the agency show a valid need to withhold records, such as evidence that the disclosure would endanger a witness or the investigation itself. Id. at 1071. Haynie cautioned that this does not mean that everything law enforcement does is shielded from disclosure. Officers have citizen contacts for purposes of crime prevention and public safety that are unrelated to either civil or criminal investigations, and records are exempt under section 6254(f)’s protection of records of investigation only for investigations taken for purposes of whether a violation of law has or may occur. Id. at 1071.

Not every file is an investigatory file for purposes of section 7923.600(a). The law does not provide[] that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labeled “investigatory.” Uribe supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 212-13 (routine farmer reports of pesticide spraying were not investigatory files for licensing purposes). So, if a document in the investigatory file is publicly filed in a court, it is not exempt under section 7923.600(a). See Weaver v. Superior Court, (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 746, 751 ("Because they were publicly filed, the charging documents Weaver seeks are not investigatory files exempt from disclosure under the CPRA."). Furthermore, it is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure under the investigatory file exemption. See Comm'n on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court, (“POST”) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 278, 291 (analogizing personnel files to investigatory files and citing Williams, supra, 5 Ca1.4th at 355 for the proposition that 'the law does not provide... that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled "investigatory”'.)

In sum, a file is investigatory only if the prospect of law enforcement is “definite and concrete” and the record properly belongs in the file because it relates to the investigation. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, (“Copley”) (2006) 39 Cal.4^th 1272, 1293.

In contrast to investigatory files, the Haynie court concluded that the concrete and definite prospect of enforcement standard only applies to section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files, and “records of investigation” are exempt on their face whether or not they are included in an investigatory file. Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356). Any interpretation that limited records of investigations only to those where the likelihood of enforcement has ripened would expose the public to “the very sensitive investigative stages of determining whether a crime has been committed or who has committed it.” Id. at 1070. Documents independently exempt -- Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 654 (records of complaints), American Civil Liberties Union v. Deukmejian, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 449 (intelligence information) – have been held not to be part of the concrete and definite investigatory file requirement, and no less is true for investigatory records. Id.

These records of investigation do not lose their exempt status based on the prospect of enforcement. Law enforcement officers may not know whether a crime has been committed when they undertake an investigation, and the results may be inconclusive. For example, a fire may be suspicious but found to be accidental after investigation. Id. at 1070. Even reports from routine investigations such as the traffic stop involving Haynie are protected. Id. at 1070-71.

The California Supreme Court subsequently emphasized that Haynie‘s statement that “records of investigation exempted under section 6254(f) encompass only those investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the violation and its agency.” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. Superior Court, (“ACLU”) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1040. The ACLU court then held that LAPD’s records from scanning license plates to look for stolen cars through automated license plate reader technology were not records of investigation because they were not part of targeted inquiry into particular crime. Id. at 1042.

Despite the exemptions for investigatory records and files, state and local law enforcement agencies are required to disclose to a victim, the victim’s authorized representative, and a covering insurance carrier information, inter alia, a description of the property, date, time and place of the incident, the names and addresses of involved persons and witnesses, diagrams, and witness statements, unless the disclosure would endanger a witness or involved person or any investigation. §7923.605(a) (former §6254(f)).

Additionally, state and local law enforcement shall disclose, except to the extent that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, the full name and occupation of every person arrested by the agency, the person’s physical description, the time and date of arrest and booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail, the time and manner of release or the location where the arrestee is being held, and all charges on which he or she is being held. §7923.610 (former §6254(f)(1)).

Finally, subject to the same limitation that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, and subject to the restrictions of Penal Code section 841.5,[7] a state or local law enforcement shall disclose the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency and the time and nature of the response thereto including, to the extent the information regarding the crimes or incident investigated is recorded, the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. §7923.615 (former §6254(f)(2)(A)); Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072.

Former section 6254(k) provided in relevant part: “[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are any of the following:...(k) [r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law....” This exemption “is not an independent exemption. It merely incorporates other prohibitions established by law. CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 656. “In 1998, the Legislature added an article to the PRA specifically ‘list[ing] and describ[ing]’ over 500 statutes that provide disclosure exemptions through Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k)….” Copley, supra, 39 Cal.4^th at 1283.

The CPRA now provides a non-exhaustive list of all laws that may restrict disclosure. §§ 7930.000-7930.215.

A CPRA claim to compliance with a public records request may proceed through mandamus or declaratory relief. §7923.000 (former §§ 6258, 6259). A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” CCP §1085. Because the petitioner may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief, the trial court independently decides whether disclosure is required. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 (appellate court independently reviews trial court CPRA decision). No administrative record is required, and the parties must submit admissible evidence.

On November 20, 2021, Luo submitted Request No. 1 for LASD Chain of Custody Reports for (1) Lab Case #19-039897 through Lab Case #19-039907 and (2) Lab Case #19-039886 through Lab Case #19-039895. Luo Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. On November 22, 2021, the LASD Discovery Unit acknowledged Request No. 1 and assigned it PRA case number 21-1804. Luo Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. As of November 10, 2022, Luo had not received requested records. Luo Decl., ¶2.

LASD Manual of Policies and Procedures (“MPP”) Rule 5-04/000.20 identifies the Property, Evidence and Laboratory Information Management System (“PRELIMS”) as the system for the entry, movement, and tracking the chain of custody of all property and evidence. Luo Decl., ¶3, Ex. 2. Chain of custody reports for each piece of evidence list the date and time of each transfer, the party who receives custody, and the location or person who holds the evidence. Luo Decl., ¶4, Ex. 3. It does not list the analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer. Luo Decl., ¶4, Ex. 3.

On February 3, 2022, Luo submitted Request No. 2 for the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident regarding any complaint or request for assistance made or referred to LASD between January 1 and June 30, 2019 pertaining to (1) Penal Code section 261(a)(1)-(7) (“Rape Complaints”); (2) Penal Code section 289(a)-(g) (“Sexual Penetration Complaints”); and (3) Penal Code sections 187(a) and 189(a) (“Murder Complaints”). Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4. For each request, Luo clarified that the factual circumstances included (1) general victim description such as sex, age, and race, (2) date of offense, (3) date of report, (4) date of arrest, and (5) final case disposition. Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

On March 3, 2022, upon request from the LASD, Luo further clarified that a “complaint or request for assistance” respectively included (1) a statement that a situation is involved with any criminal conduct or activities; and (2) a request based on reasonable suspicion or observation asking LASD to provide assistance to civilians pertaining to terminating ongoing criminal activities or investigating past criminal conduct or activities. Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

On November 9, 2022, the County’s attorney explained that LASD was still reviewing and gathering information responsive to Request No. 2 and hoped to provide a partial production by the end of the next week. Luo Decl., ¶6, Ex. 5. As of November 10, 2022, Luo has not received any documents responsive to Request No. 2. Luo Decl., ¶5.

On information and belief, LASD’s Scientific Services Bureau prepares chain of custody reports to document evidence submitted to the crime laboratory for analysis in connection with a criminal investigation. Aguirre Decl., ¶4. On information and belief, these reports are not the same as the information LASD keeps about inmate property and other evidence in PRELIMS. Aguirre Decl., ¶5. The chain of custody reports fall under the CPRA exemption in section 6254(f)[8] because they record what evidence is received and account for the sequence of custody, control, transfer, analysis, and disposition of evidence. Aguirre Decl., ¶4.

On November 18, 2022, the Discovery Unit provided a first partial production of the responsive information subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2) (2019). Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A. This included information for 51 Rape Complaints, 1 Sexual Penetration Complaint, and 13 Murder Complaints. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A.

LASD explained that some information was exempt from disclosure under the California Constitution; Government Code sections 6254(c), (f), and (k) and 6255, W&I Code sections 827[9] and 828, and relevant case law. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A. The victim’s sex and race were exempt under section 6254(f)(2). Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A. LASD also asserted that it was only required to disclose arrestee information for contemporaneous activity, or activity less than a year old, whereas Request No. 2 asked for arrests over three years old. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A.

On December 29, 2022, the Discovery Unit provided a second partial production of the responsive information subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2). Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. B. This included 76 Rape Complaints and 3 Murder Complaints. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. B.

The LASD Discovery Unit will conduct a final review of records and produce any additional non-exempt information subject to disclosure. Aguirre Decl., ¶6. The information it has withheld includes (1) information not subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2); (2) information pertaining to matters still currently under active investigation, the disclosure of which would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, as per section 6254(f); and (3) information pertaining to matters involving minors, per the CPRA and W&I Code. Aguirre Decl., ¶7.

Disclosed complaint information of Rape Complaints includes in pertinent part the following.[10]

A report dated March 4, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for an offense that occurred throughout a three-month period between January and March 2013. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. A, pp. 3-4. The suspect sexually assaulted the 42-year-old victim (“Doe 1”) throughout that timeframe. Ex. A, pp. 3-4.

A report dated April 8, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 6. The suspect approached and grabbed the 36-year-old female victim (“Doe 2”) to pull her into his bedroom, where he sexually assaulted her. Ex. A p. 6.

A report dated April 23, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 7. The 59-year-old female victim (“Doe 3”) asked the suspect for a ride to her house in his truck, and the suspect agreed. Ex. A p. 7. The suspect parked the vehicle and ordered Doe 3 to stay in the back seat, which the suspect then entered to sexually assault her. Ex. A p. 7. When she resisted, the suspect threatened to hurt her children. Ex. A p. 7. This scared Doe 3 into compliance. Ex. A p. 7. After the suspect was finished, he ordered her out of the truck and drove away. Ex. A p. 7.

A report dated April 24, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred on April 22, 2019. Ex. A p. 7. The 31-year-old female victim (“Doe 4”) was in her vehicle in the parking lot when the suspect walked over and started a casual conversation. Ex. A p. 7. As Doe 4 drank blue “Gatorade” that was next to her in the car, she began to feel funny. Ex. A p. 7. After that, all she remembers is that the suspect sexually assaulted her and that she later woke up still inside her vehicle in the parking lot. Ex. A p. 7.

A report dated April 24, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 7. As the 32-year-old victim (“Doe 5”) walked northbound, one suspect grabbed her and dragged her to a dessert field where two other suspects waited. Ex. A p. 7. They threw her onto her back, and two suspects sexually assaulted her while the third pinned her down. Ex. A p. 7. When finished, the three suspects walked away. Ex. A p. 7.

A report dated May 18, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 10. The 27-year-old female victim (“Doe 6”) was in her vehicle when the suspect asked to have a cigarette with her. Ex. A p. 10. Doe 6 allowed the suspect to sit in the front passenger seat and have a cigarette. Ex. A p. 10. The suspect slapped her three times, pulled her pants off, and sexually assaulted her. Ex. A p. 10. Doe 6 blacked out and does not remember when the suspect left. Ex. A p. 10.

The Rape Complaint for a 20-year-old female victim (“Doe 7”) is also dated May 18, 2019 and also details sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 10. She was standing in front of a donut shop when the suspect drove up to her and asked if she wanted to go to his motel room to smoke marijuana. Ex. A p. 10. She agreed. Ex. A p. 10. Once inside the suspect’s motel room, he asked if she would have sex for money. Ex. A p. 10. She agreed but said the suspect needed to wear a condom. Ex. A p. 10. The suspect refused and sexually assaulted her before he drove her back to the donut shop. Ex. A p. 10.

A report dated May 23, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred on May 20, 2019. Ex. A p. 10. The 39-year-old female victim (“Doe 8”) invited the suspect to her house, where the suspect began sexually assaulting her and continued even when she told the suspect to stop. Ex. A p. 10.

A report dated May 23, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred on May 21, 2019. Ex. A p. 11. The suspect approached the crying 64-year-old female victim (“Doe 9”) and offered assistance. Ex. A p. 11. Doe 9 invited him to her motel room but emphasized that she would not have sex with him. Ex. A p. 11. Upon arrival, the suspect became violent and demanded that Doe 9 strip her clothes off. Ex. A p. 11. When she sternly refused, the suspect physically assaulted her and threatened her life if she did not comply with his request. Ex. A p. 11.

A report dated May 26, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred the day before. Ex. A p. 11. The 30-year-old female victim (“Doe 10”) was walking when a vehicle pulled up next to her and the driver offered a ride. Ex. A p. 11. She entered the vehicle and saw it had four other male occupants. Ex. A p. 11. She asked to go northbound but later noticed that the vehicle was going the opposite direction. Ex. A p. 11. When she asked them to let her out, the suspects punched her, tied her wrists, and sexually assaulted her before pushing her out of the vehicle. Ex. A p. 11.

A report dated June 3, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred on May 31, 2019. Ex. A p. 11. The 21-year-old female victim (“Doe 11”) was leaving work when she was approached by her then-boyfriend, the suspect. Ex. A p. 11. They later entered his vehicle, where she told him she was breaking up with him. Ex. A p. 11. When she tried to leave, he physically prevented it, sexually assaulted her, and strangled her until she lost consciousness. Ex. A p. 11. When Doe 11 regained consciousness, the suspect sexually assaulted her again until he took a phone call. Ex. A pp. 11-12. She used that opportunity to escape and drive away in her own vehicle. Ex. A p. 12.

A report dated June 11, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred that day. Ex. A p. 12. The 36-year-old female victim (“Doe 12”) dated the suspect before marrying her soon-to-be ex-husband. Ex. A p. 12. The suspect picked up Doe 12 from a parking lot, drove to a park, and parked the vehicle. Ex. A p. 12. As they talked, the suspect began to sexually assault Doe 12. Ex. A p. 12. When she resisted, he punched her repeatedly in different areas of the body until he got her to comply. Ex. A p. 12. Doe 12 then asked the suspect if he could take her back. The suspect later dropped Doe 12 off next to the parking lot where he picked her up before he drove off. Ex. A p. 12.

A report dated June 16, 2019 details a Rape Complaint for sexual assault that occurred that day. Ex. A p. 12. The 20-year-old female victim (“Doe 13”) drove to the suspect’s residence for a work gathering. Ex. A p. 12. When Doe 13 needed the restroom, the suspect walked her there, followed her inside, closed the door, and sexually assaulted her. Ex. A p. 12. Doe 13 left and returned home. Ex. A p. 12.

LASD Field Interview Reports include spaces to enter the sex and race of the victim and other involved individuals. Luo Reply Decl., ¶2, Exs. 1-2.

Petitioner seeks mandamus and declaratory relief compelling LASD to comply with Request Nos. 1 and 2.

Request No. 1 seeks LASD Chain of Custody Reports (Lab Case #19-039897 through Lab Case #19-039907 and Lab Case #19-039886 through Lab Case #19-039895).

The County contends that these records are exempt under former section 6254(k). As Luo argues (Reply at 4), CPRA exemptions are narrowly construed, and the County has the burden to show that the records should not be disclosed. California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 167. Reply at 4.

The threshold question is: What is a chain of custody report and what is it used for? Luo contends that LASD uses PRELIMS for the entry, movement, and tracking of all property and evidence (i.e., chain of custody) Luo Decl., ¶3. During the time the item is in the possession of a LASD employee, that individual is responsible for maintaining proper chain of custody. Luo Decl., ¶3. Pet. Op. Br. at 2.

Luo’s declaration does not explain how she knows that LASD uses PRELIMS for chain of custody. That is, her declaration does not lay a foundation for her knowledge. Therefore, it is of marginal utility. On the other hand, the County’s declarant states only “on information and belief” that LASD’s Scientific Services Bureau prepares chain of custody reports and that these reports are not the same as the information LASD keeps about inmate property and other evidence in PRELIMS. Aguirre Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. Consequently, neither party presents significant evidence about chain of custody reports and what software LASD uses for them.

Despite this lack of evidence, the specific chain of custody reports at issue are for “Lab Cases”, which the court construes to mean chain of custody reports for scientific investigation by LASD’s Scientific Services Bureau. The court generally accepts Luo’s argument that chain of custody reports record the control, transfer, and disposition of evidence in a criminal case. Such evidence may include DNA samples, photographs, documents, personal property, or bodily fluids that were taken from a defendant or discovered at the scene of an alleged crime. Chain of custody is necessary to assure that evidence in LASD’s custody is never unaccounted. The purpose of chain of custody report is not to document the analysis conducted or investigative techniques used. Nor does the report contain any sensitive information for the criminal investigations such as the name of an informant or astute observer. Reply at 1-2.[11]

Luo contends that, because chain of custody reports do not reflect the analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer (Luo Decl., ¶4), they are not an investigatory file for purposes of section 6254(k). See Uribe, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d 194, 212-13 (routine farmer reports of pesticide spraying were not investigatory files for licensing purposes). It is the nature of the document, not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure under the investigatory file exemption. See POST, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at 291 (analogizing personnel files to investigatory files and citing Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 355) for the proposition that “the law does not provide... that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labeled “investigatory”.) Pet. Op. Br. at 2.

The County notes that Luo seeks chain of custody reports for approximately 21 cases (Lab Cases #19-039886-95 and Lab Case #19-039897-907. These reports are prepared and maintained by the LASD’s Scientific Services Bureau when evidence is submitted to the crime laboratory for analysis in connection with a criminal investigation. See Aguirre Decl., ¶4. The chain of custody report records what evidence is received by the crime laboratory and accounts for the sequence of custody, control, transfer, and disposition of evidence. See Aguirre Decl., ¶4. Like the records in Haynie (i.e., records relating to a traffic stop), the chain of custody reports sought by Luo are records of investigation exempt on their face because the primary purpose for which they were prepared was to track evidence being analyzed for a criminal investigation. As such, they are not akin to “commonplace business cards” or “receipts of transportation” that the California Supreme Court advised were not exempt on their face but could nevertheless constitute “investigatory files” if the prospect of enforcement proceedings becomes “concrete and definite.” See Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 341. Opp. at 3.

The County is mixing concepts. Investigatory files include documents which do not “on [their] face purport to be an investigatory record and, thus, have an independent claim to exempt status.” Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 356. Examples of investigatory files include a commonplace business card may reveal the name and endanger the safety of an informant. Receipts for transportation may tell the astute observer which clues the police have checked and which they have not yet found. Id. at 356. While chain of custody reports could be part of an investigatory file, a file is investigatory only if the prospect of law enforcement is “definite and concrete” and the record properly belongs in the file because it relates to the investigation. Copley, supra, 39 Cal.4^th at 1293. The County has presented no evidence that the Scientific Services Bureau chain of custody reports at issue were created for a definite and concrete criminal investigation.

The County also contends that the chain of custody reports are records of investigation because they reflect what evidence is being analyzed in connection with a criminal investigation. Opp. at 3-4.

Luo replies that the animating concern behind the records of investigation exemption appears to be that a record of investigation may reveal certain choices that should be kept confidential—an informant's choice to come forward, an investigator's choice to focus on particular individuals, the choice of certain investigatory methods. Such choices are far less likely to be revealed by the physical location of evidence. See ACLU, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 1041. The County offers no authority which suggests that where a document is prepared and kept – LASD’s Scientific Services Bureau -- is a basis for exemption under the record of investigation exemption.

The process of documenting the control, transfer, and disposition of evidence does not produce a record of investigations because it is not part of a targeted inquiry into a particular crime. Rather, the documentation is conducted to prevent the evidence from getting lost. A contrary rule would enable an agency to exempt everything simply by classifying it as a record of investigations regardless of its nature or content. Reply at 3.

In contrast to investigatory files, “records of investigation” are exempt on their face whether or not they are in an investigatory file. Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356). Records of investigation do not lose their exempt status based on the prospect of enforcement. Law enforcement officers may not know whether a crime has been committed when they undertake an investigation, and the results may be inconclusive. For example, a fire may be suspicious but found to be accidental after investigation. Id. at 1070. Even reports from routine investigations such as the traffic stop involving Haynie are protected. Id. at 1070-71. Records of investigation encompass only investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the violation. ACLU, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 1040.

The Scientific Services Bureau’s chain of custody reports meet this requirement. It is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure. See POST, supra, 42 Cal. 4th 291. The nature of the Scientific Services Bureau’s chain of custody reports is to evidence the custody and control of specific evidence in a criminal investigation. The reports only exist to aid the investigation whether a crime has been committed and, if so, who committed it. The fact that the chain of custody report itself does not analyze the evidence and is only a support document so that LASD can prove that particular evidence was analyzed, does not undermine its status as a record of investigation. Such reports are not business cards or transportation receipts which appear non-investigatory but are in fact part of an investigative file. See Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 356. Instead, the Scientific Services Bureau’s chain of custody reports are part of the record of investigation itself.

The County need not produce the records in Request No. 1 because they are records of investigation and exempt under section 7923.600(a).

State and local law enforcement shall disclose, except to the extent that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, the full name and occupation of every person arrested by the agency, the person’s physical description, the time and date of arrest and booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail, the time and manner of release or the location where the arrestee is being held, and all charges on which he or she is being held. §7923.610 (former §6254(f)(1)).

Subject to the same limitation that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, and subject to the restrictions of Penal Code section 841.5,[12] a state or local law enforcement shall disclose the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency and the time and nature of the response thereto including, to the extent the information regarding the crimes or incident investigated is recorded, the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. §7923.615 (former §6254(f)(2)(A)); Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072.

Request No. 2 seeks the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident regarding any complaint or request for assistance made or referred to LASD between January 1 and June 30, 2019 pertaining to (1) Penal Code section 261(a)(1)-(7) (“Rape Complaints”); (2) Penal Code section 289(a)-(g) (“Sexual Penetration Complaints”); and (3) Penal Code sections 187(a) and 189(a) (“Murder Complaints”). Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

Luo interpreted a “complaint or request for assistance” to include (1) a statement that a situation is involved with any criminal conduct or activities, and (2) a request based on reasonable suspicion or observation asking LASD to provide assistance to civilians pertaining to terminating ongoing criminal activities or investigating past criminal conduct or activities. Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4. Luo clarified that the factual circumstances she seeks include: (1) a general victim description such as sex, age, and race, (2) the date of offense, (3) the date of report, (4) the date of arrest, and (5) final case disposition. Luo Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

LASD’s Discovery Unit provided two partial productions of responsive information subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2) on November 18 and December 29, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶6, Ex. B. The Discovery Unit will conduct a final review of records and produce any additional non-exempt information subject to disclosure. Aguirre Decl., ¶6. LASD has withheld (1) information not subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2); (2) information pertaining to matters still currently under active investigation, the disclosure of which would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, as per section 6254(f); and (3) information pertaining to matters involving minors, per the CPRA and W&I Code. Aguirre Decl., ¶7.

Luo does not dispute the three categories of information withheld from production. She contends, however, that the information produced is incomplete. She notes that a law enforcement agency may be required to produce the information listed in section 6254(f) (e.g., the “substance” of complaints or requests for assistance, and any recorded description of the “factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident”). Williams v. Superior Court, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 360–361, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 852 P.2d 377). For the complaints or requests for assistance made between January 1 and June 30, 2019, pertaining to specific crimes of rape, sexual penetration and murder, Luo sought the “factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, general victim description (such as sex, age, and race etc.), date of offense, date of report, date of arrest, and final case disposition. Pet. Op. Br. at 2-3.

The County argues that the victim’s “sex” and “race” are not categories subject to disclosure under section 6254(f)(2). Opp. at 6.

Luo replies that the victim’s sex and race are part of the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident. The public's interest for access to information regarding law enforcement is particularly acute where victims are more susceptible to crimes. LASD routinely records the sex and race of victims. Luo Reply Decl., ¶2. Therefore, they should be disclosed as factual circumstances. See Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach, (“Long Beach”) (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 72 (when a shooting by a peace officer occurs during an arrest (§6254(f)(1) ) or in the course of responding to a complaint or request for assistance (§6254(f)(2)), and the officer's name is recorded as one of the "factual circumstances" of the incident, disclosure of the officer's name is generally required). Reply at 4-5.

The CPRA is a statutory scheme requiring the disclosure of public records, and the CPRA “does not require [agencies] to create new records….” Sander v. Superior Court, (2018) 26 Cal.App.5^th 651, 665-66. Section 6254(f)(2)(A) differs in that it requires the disclosure of information, not records. As such, section 6254(f)(2)(A)’s plain language requires disclosure of specified information and nothing more. This information may be provided in summary fashion. To construe the provision otherwise would eat away at the investigatory file and record exemptions. It would also unduly enlarge the limited public disclosure required by section 6254(f)(2)(A), in contrast to the broader disclosure required for victims and insurance carriers in section 6254(f).

While the victim’s sex is implicit in the use of pronouns in the information provided by the County, there is nothing in section 6254(f)(2) that requires disclosure of the victim’s sex. The provision expressly requires disclosure of the victim’s name and age unless it would compromise the person’s safety or the investigation. It does not expressly require disclosure of the victim’s sex. The fact that the statute’s requirement for specific disclosures is followed by a more general requirement for disclosure of the factual circumstances surrounding the crime cannot broaden this list. Disclosure of the factual circumstances of the incident is a different requirement.

Nor are the victim’s sex and race necessarily a factual circumstance surrounding the crime or incident under section 6254(f)(2). Whether they are will depend on whether the victim’s sex or race was a component of the crime or incident. This is a fact dependent issue.

It is true that the California Supreme Court in Long Beach, in holding that the names of two police officers involved in a fatal shooting must be disclosed in that particular case, relied on the fact that a police officer’s name recorded as a “factual circumstance” of the incident generally must be disclosed under section 6254(f)(1) if made during an arrest or (2) under section 6254(f)(2) if made in response to a complaint or request for assistance. 59 Cal.4^th at 72. This reliance does not support a conclusion that the sex or race of the victim must be disclosed as part of the factual circumstances under section 6254(f(2). While this might be information a requester would like to know, the required disclosures are limited to the statute.

Thus, the sex or race of the victim may be disclosed by the County if it is part of the factual circumstances of the crime or incident. Since Luo sought only the factual information about rapes, sexual penetrations, and murder, the sex of the victim is likely to be part of the factual circumstances. Less likely will race be part of those circumstances. The County must evaluate these issues.

The County argues that, while the “date of arrest” and “final disposition” are categories subject to disclosure if made during an arrest under section 6254(f)(1), this provision is subject to a contemporaneous limitation. See County of L.A. v. Superior Court, (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 588, 601 (arrest information required to be disclosed under section 6254(f)(1) is “limited to current information and records of the matters described in the statute and which pertain to contemporaneous police activity.”). Opp. at 5, n. 1. The County implicitly argues that it has no obligation to provide this information in response to a complaint or request for assistance under section 6254(f)(2). Opp. at 5.

Luo replies that the County cites no authority that section 6254(f)(2)’s requirement for disclosure of the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance, as well as the time and nature of the response thereto, is limited to the first response and not a subsequent response by law enforcement. Such an interpretation would deny access to information of law enforcement’s subsequent response to complaints or requests for assistance and substantially hinder the public’s ability to verify that government officials are acting responsibly and held accountable to the public they serve. CBS, Inc. v. Block, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 651. Reply at 5.

Luo argues that the County’s contention that section 6254(f)(2) applies only to contemporaneous police activity under Kinney v. Superior Court of Kern County, (“Kinney”) (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 168 is misplaced. Reply at 5-6.

In Kinney, addressed a CPRA request for disclosure of the names of every individual arrested for DUI by the Kern County Sheriff's Department from March 1 through April 1, 2020. Id. at 171. The court noted that County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Kusar), (“Kusar”) (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 588, held that only contemporaneous law enforcement information is disclosable arrest information under section 6254(f)(1). Id. at 177-78. The court noted that Fredericks v. Superior Court (City of San Diego), (“Fredericks”) (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 209, 223, concluded the disclosure mandates of section 6254(f)(2) are not limited to contemporaneous law enforcement information, distinguishing Kusar’s contemporaneous requirement as limited to section 6254(f)(1) and stating that the disclosure mandates of section 6254(f)(2) are not limited to contemporaneous law enforcement information. 77 Cal.App.5th at 183.

Kinney concluded that the arrest information sought by the petitioner was not subject to disclosure but that holding was limited to the facts of the case. Id. at 183. Requests for arrest information will often pit two very important rights against each other - the public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy – and the Legislature may want to define what contemporaneous information means for purposes of section 6254(f)(1). Id. at 183-84.

Luo argues that she did not request any arrestee information under section 6254(f)(1) and there is no individual's right to privacy implicated in her request. The “date of arrest” and “final disposition” fall within the time and nature of the response thereto under section 6254(f)(2) and the County is trying to prevent the public from having a full picture of law enforcement’s performance by restricting the disclosure of criminal information. Reply at 6.

The court agrees that the contemporaneous requirement applies to arrests under section 6254(f)(1) and not to complaints or requests for assistance and responses thereto under section 6254(f)(2). However, section 6254(f)(2) is limited to complaints/requests for assistance and responses to them and there is a clear temporal component to this provision. For this reason, the law enforcement agency must only disclose the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. §7923.615 (former §6254(f)(2)(A). There is no obligation to disclose the “date of arrest” and “final disposition” of a criminal matter.

Plainly, if the law enforcement agency responds to a new complaint or request for assistance involving the same incident, the information would have to be disclosed. But there is no obligation under section 6254(f)(2) to create an information file concerning the investigation of a crime or incident such that subsequent events are disclosed. To do so would swallow the exemptions for investigatory files and records of investigation in section 7923.600(a).

Luo then argues that the production is deficient for specific incidents, alleging that the following is missing: (1) the gender of the victim is unclear, the circumstances in which the victim was sexually assaulted for three months is not provided, and there is a lack of the location and time of the incidents, (2) how did the victim end up in the suspect’s residence? What is the time of the occurrence? (3) lack of the time of the occurrence, (4) lack of the time of the occurrence, (5) lack of time of the occurrence. Where was the victim walking? (6) lack of the time of the occurrence, (7) lack of the time of the occurrence, (8) lack of time of the occurrence? What was the reason for the victim inviting the suspect over to her house? (9) lack of time of the occurrence? Where and how did the suspect approach the victim? (10) lack of time of the occurrence, (11) lack of the time of the occurrence, (12) lack of the time of the occurrence, (13) lack of the time of the occurrence, and (14) lack of time of the occurrence. Reply at 6-10.

The court agrees that LASD must disclose both the time and the date of the occurrence. §7923.615 (former §6254(f)(2)(A). No further disclosure of factual circumstances is required, however. Section 6254(f)(2)(A)’s plain language requires disclosure of factual circumstances which may be provided in summary fashion. To construe the provision otherwise would eat away at the investigatory file and record exemptions. It would also unduly enlarge the limited public disclosure required by section 6254(f)(2)(A), in contrast to the broader disclosure required for victims and insurance carriers in section 6254(f). The County need not respond to Luo’s questions by providing more facts.[13]

The County must produce information as to the time of occurrence for the incidents at issue pursuant to 7923.615.

The Petition is mostly denied. The County is ordered to remedy the defects in the response to Request No. 2 by providing information about (a) the time of occurrence, and (b) the sex or race of the victim where it is part of the factual circumstances of the crime or incident.

[1] The trial notebook lodged by the County does not include every page of opposition Ex. A, or any portion of Ex. B. The County’s attorney is admonished to ensure that future trial notebooks include all required documents.

[2] Luo’s reply exceeds the ten-page limit of CRC 3.1113(d). The court has exercised its discretion to read and consider only the first ten pages.

[3] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.

[4] The Legislature has confirmed that the 2023 changes in recodifying the CPRA were not intended to substantively change the law relating to inspection of public records. §7920.100.

[5] Section 7922.000 is the CPRA’s catch-all provision and “contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.” Michaelis v. Superior Court, (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1066, 1071. The court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests, evaluating the weight of the public interest by the gravity of the public tasks sought to be illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will illuminate those tasks. See Humane Society of the United States v. Superior Court, (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 12133, 1267-68.

[6] Section 7923.600(a) does not involve a public interest balancing test. The courts have consistently refused to apply additional criteria to CPRA exemptions that are not explicitly provided in the statute. See Williams, supra, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 354 (“The Legislature has carefully limited the exemption for law enforcement investigatory records … It is not our task to rewrite the statute.”).

[7] Except as otherwise required by Penal Code section 1054 et seq. or the U.S. or California Constitution, no law enforcement officer or employee of a law enforcement agency shall disclose to any arrested person, or to any person who may be a defendant in a criminal action, the address or telephone number of any person who is a victim or witness in the alleged offense. Penal Code §841.5(a).

[8] To avoid confusion, the court will cite the former CPRA provisions when the parties do so.

[9] A juvenile case file may be inspected only by a defined list of judicial personnel, Department of Social Services Staff, and relevant caretakers of the child in question. Welfare and Institutions Code (“W&I Code”) §827.

[10] Although Luo cites 44 complaints in her reply, her brief exceeded the ten-page limit. The court’s review of the first ten pages limits the decision to 13 complaints.

[11] The County argues that Luo’s contention that chain of custody reports do not reflect any analysis or conclusions by the investigating officer is mistaken. Opp. at 3. Luo replies that chain of custody reports simply reflect what personal properties or other types of evidence are in LASD’s custody, and their physical location and transfer. The reports do not reflect what analysis has been or will be done. The County could collect personal property and dispose of it without conducting any analysis. Whether the evidence was analyzed is reflected in supplementary investigative reports, not chain of custody reports. Reply at 2.

Neither party has presented sufficient evidence whether the Scientific Services Bureau chain of custody reports at issue contain any analysis. As the County has the burden of proof, the court will assume that Luo is correct.

[12] As stated ante, Penal Code section 841.5(a) proscribes a law enforcement officer or employee of a law enforcement agency from disclosing to any arrested person, or to any person who may be a defendant in a criminal action, the address or telephone number of any person who is a victim or witness in the alleged offense. Penal Code §841.5(a).

[13] The remaining insufficiencies alleged on pages 12-19 of Luo’s reply are commended to LASD’s attention for review consistent with the court’s ruling but will not be further discussed.