Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 22STCP03428, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Michael Aguirre (“Aguirre”) seeks a writ of traditional mandate directing Respondent University of California at Los Angeles (“UCLA”) to provide public records responsive to his requests under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Aguirre filed the verified Petition on September 19, 2022, alleging a cause of action for traditional mandamus and a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

The University of California’s Board of Regents (“Regents”) governs UCLA. On June 30, 2022, without Board knowledge or consent, UCLA Chancellor Gene Block (“Block”) and Director of Athletics Martin Jarmond (“Jarmond”) released a statement online that stated: “After careful consideration and thoughtful consideration” UCLA [has] decided to transition from the Pac-12 Conference (“Pac-12”) to the Big Ten Conference (“Big Ten”), effective the 2024-25 season.

On July 19, 2022, Aguirre submitted a CPRA request to Block and Jarmond for (1) all records of communications between UCLA and Big Ten personnel regarding this transition (“Request No. 1”), and (2) any records of communications regarding the “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation” referenced in a report Block and Jarmond issued to campus on June 30, 2022 (“June 30 Announcement”) (“Request No. 2”).

UCLA Information Practices (“Information Practices”) acknowledged receipt of the request, but the acknowledgement advised that UCLA would produce documents in accordance with “University policy” as well as relevant law. On July 29, 2022, Information Practices Senior Public Records Analyst Nicholas J. Alexakis (“Alexakis”) advised Aguirre that Information Practices needed additional time to respond to the request and promised a response by August 12, 2022.

On August 3, Aguirre responded that the July 29, 2022 response was not compliant with the CPRA’s requirement that UCLA determine within ten days if disclosable records are responsive to the request.

UCLA used the 60 days after the request to brainstorm unmeritorious excuses to not produce the records sought. It eventually promised a rolling production from August 19, 2022. Despite this, they have only produced three redacted documents. On August 26, 2022, UCLA officials wrote that some responsive documents were protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege or the deliberative process doctrine.

On August 27, 2022, Aguirre sent UCLA a draft of his Petition. He gave UCLA until September 15, 2022 to produce responsive documents before he would file it. During that time, UCLA did not produce any documents with substantive information responsive to the request. It produced redacted documents, documents dated after the June 30 Announcement, and miscellaneous documents.

Aguirre seeks (1) a writ of mandate compelling the disclosure of documents pursuant to the CPRA request, (2) a declaration that the records must be produced under the CPRA and California Constitution, (3) a declaration that, to the extent the deliberative process exemptions are present, the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in concealment, and (4) attorney’s fees and costs.

The CPRA was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public. San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.4th 762, 771-72. Government Code[1] section 7921.000[2] declares that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” The CPRA’s purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving the public access to information in possession of public agencies. CBS. Inc. v. Block, (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 646, 651. The CPRA was intended to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, and it makes public access to governmental records a fundamental right of citizenship. Wilson v. Superior Court, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141. This requires maximum disclosure of the conduct of government operations. California State University Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court, (“California State University”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 823. In 2004, the voters endorsed the CPRA by approving Prop 59, which amended the state Constitution to declare that “the writings of public agencies…shall be open to public scrutiny.” Cal. Const. art. I, §3(b)(1). Accordingly, any statute, court rule, or other authority shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right. Cal. Const. art. I, §3(b)(2).

The CPRA makes clear that “every person” has a right to inspect any public record. §7922.525(a). The inspection may be for any purpose; the requester’s motivation is irrelevant. §7921.300. The term “public record” is broadly defined to include any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the people’s business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. §7920.530(a). The definition of “state agency” excludes agencies described in articles IV and VI of the state constitution, which describe the legislative and judicial branches, except the State Bar of California. §7920.540.

A CPRA request must reasonably describe an identifiable public record or records. §7922.530(a). Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, an agency must determine within ten days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure, but that deadline may be extended up to 14 days for unusual circumstances. §§ 7922.535(a), (b). Nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.” §7922.500.

Even significant expense to the agency will not excuse an agency from conducting a thorough search for responsive records unless it constitutes an undue burden. See, e.g., CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Superior Ct., (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 892, 909 ($43,000 cost to agency to compile responsive public records was not valid reason to deny CPRA request). “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (“City of San Jose”) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627 (citation omitted).

The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents and agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must “‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request...” Ibid. (citation omitted). If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it must state in the determination “the estimated date and time when the records will be made available.” §7922.535(a). There is no deadline expressed in number of days for producing the records. Rather, the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” §7922.530(a).

If the agency determines that the requested records are not subject to disclosure, the agency must promptly notify the person making the request and provide the reasons for its determination. §7922.535(a). The agency must justify withholding a responsive record by demonstrating it is exempt or that on the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record. §7922.000. The determination that the request is denied, in whole or part, must be in writing. §7922.540(a).

The right to inspect is subject to certain exemptions, which are narrowly construed. California State University, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 831. The burden of demonstrating that exemptions apply lies with the governmental entity. §7922.000. Additionally, if a state or local agency discloses a public record that is otherwise exempt to a member of the public, this disclosure shall constitute a waiver of the applicable exemptions. §7921.505(b). This does not apply to disclosures (1) made through legal proceedings or as otherwise required by law (§7921.505(c)(2)); (2) within the scope of disclosure of a statute that limits disclosure of specified writings to certain purposes (§7921.505(c)(3)); or (3) made to a governmental agency that agrees to treat the disclosed material as confidential (§7921.505(c)(5)).

In performing various duties, a lawyer must work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Hickman v. Taylor, (1947) 329 U.S. 495, 510. Preparation of a client’s case demands that the lawyer assemble information, sift relevant from irrelevant facts, prepare legal theories, and plan a strategy without undue and needless interference. Id. at 511.

In California, the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation codified in the Evidence Code. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court,¿(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1236. Its purpose is to promote full and open discussion between clients and their attorneys. Ibid. The attorney-client privilege covers all forms of communication, including transactional advice and advice in contemplation of threatened litigation. Titmas v. Superior Court,¿(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 738, 744.

A “confidential communication between client and lawyer” is “information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.” Evid. Code §952. The attorney-client privilege is the client’s privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer. Evid. Code §954.

The party claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise -- i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court,¿(2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733. These preliminary facts are (a) information transmitted between and client and lawyer, (b) in the course of a relationship, (c) in confidence, and it includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship. Evid. Code §952. Not every communication between an attorney and client is privileged, however. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, (2016) 2 Cal.5^th 296, 282. If the preliminary facts show a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish the communication was not confidential or that the privilege does not for other reasons apply. Ibid. (citing Evid. Code §917(a)).

It is the policy of the state to (a) preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial, with the degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and investigate the favorable and unfavorable aspects of those cases; and (b) prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary’s industry and efforts. CCP §2018.020. Any writing that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any circumstances. CCP §2018.030(a). Any other work product of an attorney is not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an injustice. CCP §2018.030(b). The doctrine is not limited to writings created by a lawyer in anticipation of a lawsuit. League of Cal. Cities v. Sup. Ct., (“League of Cal. Cities”) (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 976, 993. It also applies to writings prepared by an attorney while acting in a nonlitigation capacity. Id.

The party claiming the work product rule “has the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise”. Citizens for Ceres, (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 911-12 (citation omitted). The preliminary facts necessary to support a work product doctrine claim are those that establish that the documents are work product. Fellows v. Superior Court, (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 55, 61 disapproved on other grounds by Coito v. Superior Court, (“Coito”) (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480 (noting that preliminary showing must establish that documents in question qualify as attorney’s work product and establish whether absolute or condition portions of privilege apply). In the case of absolute work product protection, this means that the agency must make a preliminary showing that the disclosure would reveal the attorney’s “impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.” Coito, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 495 (citing CCP §2018.030(a)). In the case of qualified work product protection, the agency must make a preliminary showing that disclosure “would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney’s industry or efforts.” See id. at 502. For every document withheld based on this doctrine, the party seeking protection must produce a brief description of the document and its contents sufficient to determine (1) whether the document is work product, (2) whether absolute or partial work product protection applies, and (3) why the work product protection applies.

Whether specific material is protected work product must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. League of Cal. Cities, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at 993.

The deliberative process privilege falls under the section 7922.000 catchall’s exemption when “the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” See, e.g., Labor & Workforce Development Agency v. Superior Court, (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 12, 26-27. The deliberative process privilege protects “mental processes by which a given decision was reached” and “the substance of conversations, discussions, debates, deliberations and like materials reflecting advice, opinions, and recommendations by which government policy is processed and formulated.” Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 540. The frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing may be inhibited if the discussion is made public, with the result of poorer decisions and policies formulated. Id. (citation omitted).

In applying the privilege, “[t]he key question in every case is ‘whether the disclosure of materials would expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.’ [Citation.] Even if the content of a document is purely factual, it is nonetheless exempt from public scrutiny if it is ‘actually... related to the process by which policies are formulated’ [citation] or ‘inextricably intertwined with ‘policy-making processes.’ [Citations.]” American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court, (“ACLU”) (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 75-76 (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1342 (the public interest in non-disclosure of almost five years of the governor’s appointment calendars and schedules, covering thousands of meetings, conferences and engagements of every conceivable nature, clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure).

A CPRA claim to compel compliance with a public records request may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief. §7923.000. Because the petitioner may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief, the trial court independently decides whether disclosure is required. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 (appellate court independently reviews trial court CPRA decision). No administrative record is required, and the parties must submit admissible evidence.

A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty. Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted). Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.

Whenever it is made to appear, by verified petition to the superior court of the county where the records, or some part thereof, are situated that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the officer or other person charged with withholding the records to disclose those records or show cause why that person should not do so. §7923.100. The court shall decide the case after it has (a) examined the record in camera, if permitted by Evid. Code section 915(b); (b) examined the papers filed by the parties; and (c) considered any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow. §7923.105.

If the court finds that the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure is not justified, the court shall order the public official to make the record public. §7923.110(a). If the court finds that the public official was justified in refusing to make the record public, the court shall return the record to the public official without disclosing its content, together with an order supporting the decision refusing disclosure. §7923.110(b).

If the requestor prevails in such litigation, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, to be paid by the public agency at issue. §7923.115(a). If the case was clearly frivolous, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the public agency. §7923.115(b).

FOX Network owns 61% of the Big Ten Network, a four-hour national video programming service dedicated to the collegiate Big Ten and its programming. Severson Decl., Ex. 23 (AR 486). The biographies of the Big Ten’s executive team reveal that its President, Studio Production Vice President, and Production & Executive Producer Senior Vice President have connections to FOX Sports. Severson Decl., ¶24, Ex. 23 (AR 489, 494-97).

On June 30, 2022, UCLA and the University of Southern California (“USC”) issued press releases to announce their departure from the Pac-12. RJN Exs. 2-3. UCLA’s June 30 announcement stated that after “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation, UCLA has decided to leave the Pac-12 Conference and join the Big Ten Conference at the start of the 2024-25 season.” Severson Decl., Ex. 14 (AR 161); RJN Ex. 2. The press release asserted that entry into the Big Ten would help ensure that UCLA preserves and maintains all 25 teams and over 700 student athletes in its program. Severson Decl., Ex. 14 (AR 161); RJN Ex. 2.

Since that press release, every Pac-12 team except Oregon State and Washington State has announced its departure. RJN Exs. 4-11; Severson Decl. ¶¶ 31-32.

Minutes from the Regents meeting on November 17, 2022 reflect its discussion of the financial and legal implications of UCLA’s membership in the Big Ten instead of the Pac-12. Severson Decl., ¶22, Ex. 28 (AR 543). The Regents discussed whether it could choose to exercise its authority to withdraw UCLA from its agreement with the Big Ten. Ex. 28 (AR 543). The minutes explained that Big Ten had announced a seven-year media rights deal on August 18, 2022 that averages over $1 billion in annual revenue and will increase in later years of the deal. Ex. 28 (AR 551). This media rights revenue suggested that member schools would receive $60 million annually, potentially increasing to $70 million in later years. Ex. 28 (AR 551). Other revenue streams include ticket sales, merchandise, and media distributions. Ex. 28 (AR 551).

The LinkedIn page of Adam Neuman (“Neuman”), former Big Ten Conference Chief of Staff, Strategy and Operations & Deputy General Counsel, asserts that he was instrumental in (1) securing USC and UCLA’s addition to the conference and (2) negotiating the record-breaking media rights deal with FOX, CBS and NBC. Severson Decl., ¶18, Ex. 27 (AR 537).

On July 19, 2022, Aguirre emailed a CPRA request to UCLA Chancellor Block and Athletic Director Jarmond for the following:

(1) all records of communication between UCLA agents, officers, and employees and Big Ten agents, officers, and employees regarding the subject matter of UCLA departing from the PAC 12 as UCLA Chancellor Gene Block and Martin Jarmond reported on June 30, 2022, through the UCLA Newsroom; and

(2) any records of communications regarding the “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation” regarding UCLA's departure from the PAC 12 as represented in the June 30 report to campus. Aguirre Decl., ¶8, Ex. 2 (AR 6).

Later that day, Information Practices acknowledged receipt of Aguirre’s request in an email and promised a response by July 29, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶9, Exs. 1-2 (AR 11). The email warned that the CPRA only requires a public agency to determine within ten days whether a request seeks records that are publicly disclosable and, if so, provide an estimated date when the records will be available. Aguirre Decl., ¶9, Ex. 2 (AR 11). Nevertheless, the email stated that UCLA “prides itself” on providing all publicly disclosable records in as timely a manner as possible. Aguirre Decl., ¶9, Ex. 2 (AR 11).

On July 29, 2022, Senior CPRA Analyst Alexakis informed Aguirre that Information Practices needed additional time to search for and collect responsive records from field facilities or other establishments separate from the office processing the CPRA request. Aguirre Decl., ¶10, Ex. 3 (AR 13). Information Practices would respond to the request by August 12, 2022 with an estimated date by which it would make responsive documents available. Aguirre Decl., ¶10, Ex. 3 (AR 13).

On August 12, 2022, Alexakis notified Aguirre that Information Practices was still working on the request. Aguirre Decl., ¶11, Ex. 4 (AR 16). Alexakis estimated that Information Practices would produce responsive documents by September 30, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶11, Ex. 4 (AR 16). A rolling production potentially would start in a week. Aguirre Decl., ¶11, Ex. 4 (AR 16).

On August 15, 2022, Aguirre asked UCLA to confirm when it would begin production. Aguirre Decl., ¶12, Ex. 5 (AR 20). He stated that he would hold off filing a lawsuit if production began sometime that week. Aguirre Decl., ¶12, Ex. 5 (AR 20). Information Practices responded that a rolling production would begin on August 19. Aguirre Decl., ¶13, Ex. 6 (AR 22).

On August 17, 2022, UCLA produced three pages of responsive documents. Aguirre Decl., ¶14, Ex. 7 (AR 24-25). One of the produced documents was a June 30, 2022 application from Block and Jarmond asking Big Ten Commissioner Kevin Warren (“Warren”) to consider UCLA for full and equal membership in the conference. Aguirre Decl., ¶15, Ex. 7 (AR 30). The letter said that Block and Jarmond appreciated the Big Ten’s commitment to working with UCLA to reduce travel impact and related issues so student athletes could maintain a well-rounded college experience. Ex. 7 (AR 30). The other documents produced were an email Block sent to Warren with the application attached and Warren’s response thanking Block for the application. Ex. 7 (AR 28).

Alexakis’ cover letter to the production advised Aguirre that certain contact information had been redacted because disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, per the then-applicable provision of the CPRA. Ex. 7 (AR 25).

On August 23, 2022, Aguirre replied that he needed “a substantial production of documents” that week. Aguirre Decl., ¶16, Ex. 8 (AR 32). If UCLA failed to provide this, he would have no choice but to seek judicial relief. Ex. 8 (AR 32).

On August 26, 2022, Information Practices Director Robert Baldridge (“Baldridge”) replied via email that, while no further non-exempt records were available at the time, UCLA was still looking for such records from the periods both before May 1, 2022 and between July 1 and 19, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶17, Ex. 9 (AR 37). Baldridge noted some responsive records were withheld as exempt under either the attorney-client privilege or the deliberative process doctrine. Ex. 9 (AR 37).

On August 27, Aguirre responded that he did not want to have to take his “good friends as UCLA” to court to obtain the requested documents. Aguirre Decl., ¶18, Ex. 10 (AR 39). He attached a draft of his Petition as part of a last-ditch effort to compel UCLA to comply with its duties under the law. Ex. 10 (AR 39).

On August 29, UCLA’s counsel asked for time to “look into” the Petition before Aguirre filed it. Aguirre Decl., ¶19, Ex. 11 (AR 41). Counsel stated his belief that there was some misunderstanding or miscommunication and wanted to see if the parties could either resolve the issue without litigation or clearly identify the issues a court would need to resolve. Ex. 11 (AR 41). Aguirre agreed to honor this request. Ex. 11 (AR 41).

After a phone call on September 2, 2022, UCLA’s counsel thanked Aguirre for clarifying that he wanted the CPRA production to include administrative communications about scheduling meetings. Aguirre Decl., ¶21, Ex. 12 (AR 44). Counsel promised to include scheduling communications in future productions to the extent they are not exempt. Ex. 12 (AR 44). He also asked Aguirre to wait until September 30, 2022 to file the Petition. Aguirre Decl., ¶21, Ex. 12 (AR 44). He indicated that date was UCLA’s original estimate for completing production and only six weeks after the date of Aguirre’s requests. Aguirre Decl., ¶21, Ex. 12 (AR 44).

On September 15, 2022, UCLA produced 55 pages of documents in what Baldridge identified in his cover letter as two separate batches. Aguirre Decl., ¶22, Ex. 13 (AR 51). The first batch of 41 pages included a series of emails for scheduling meetings about UCLA’s move to Big Ten. Ex. 13 (AR 51-65).

The second batch of 14 pages was a series of documents UCLA found responsive to another party’s request – one of about 12 different requests – for emails received and sent by Block and Jarmond between May 1 and July 1, 2022 pertinent to joining the Big Ten. Ex. 13 (AR 51, 66). Information Practices estimated that this request incorporated about 90% of Aguirre’s request. Ex. 13 (AR 51). The produced documents in this batch consisted of July 1, 2022 emails summarizing press releases announcing various universities’ departure from Pac-12. Ex. 13 (AR 84).

Baldridge explained that Information Practices continued to search for any additional records. Ex. 13 (AR 51). It expected to complete this production by the September 30 estimate Alexakis had provided on August 12, 2022. Ex. 13 (AR 51). It would notify Aguirre of any delays as promptly as possible. Ex. 13 (AR 51). Baldridge asked Aguirre for his patience as Information Practices processed all the requests on this subject. Ex. 13 (AR 51).

Aguirre and his attorney reviewed these documents and concluded that none reflected communications with the Big Ten or demonstrated that UCLA gave careful consideration to the change of conferences. Aguirre Decl., ¶23. Aguirre never agreed to let UCLA limit his request to only emails received and sent by Block and Jarmond between May 1 and July 1, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶24. He also did not agree that this reflected 90% of his request. Aguirre Decl., ¶24.[4]

On September 30, 2022, Information Practices produced two more batches of documents. Aguirre Decl., ¶26, Ex. 14 (AR 265). Baldridge explained the first batch was UCLA’s New Member Agreement with the Big Ten (“Big Ten Member Agreement”). Ex. 14 (AR 265). The second batch was a series of July 2022 emails from Chancellor Block’s email address containing the terms “Big Ten,” “Big Ten,” “USC,” “SEC,” or “Realignment.” Ex. 14 (AR 265).

The production included a June 30, 2022 email in which Blake Livesay from UCLA’s Registrar’s Office told Block that whatever careful and thoughtful consideration occurred had not included the UCLA community. Aguirre Decl., ¶27, Ex. 14 (AR 168). The decision to throw away over 100 years of conference history was outrageous, a disgrace, and a shock to the whole country. Ex. 14 (AR 168).

The Big Ten Member Agreement, dated July 13, 2022, included a confidentiality clause in which the Big Ten and UCLA agreed to treat as confidential all materials received from each other during negotiations or preparation of the agreement. Aguirre Decl., ¶28, Ex. 14 (AR 245, 252). If the subject transactions were not consummated, each party was required to return any copies of nonpublic documents and materials received during negotiation. Ex. 14 (AR 252). The parties could not use these materials except to evaluate the transactions and could not communicate them to a third party. This obligation of confidentiality shall not apply to information which is required to be disclosed by law. Ex. 14 (AR 252-53).

Baldridge’s September 30 cover letter recognized that UCLA had originally promised to complete production by this date. Aguirre Decl., ¶26, Ex. 14 (AR 265). However, the process of reviewing records was taking longer than expected. Ex. 14 (AR 265). This was “almost exclusively” because of the challenging task of identifying records related to the “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation” Aguirre described in Request No. 2. Ex. 14 (AR 265). Baldridge gave a new estimated completion date of October 31, 2022. Ex. 14 (AR 265).

On October 17, 2022, Information Practices produced another batch of 37 pages of documents and asserted exemptions for other responsive documents based on the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product (CCP §2018), and deliberative process doctrine. Aguirre Decl., ¶29, Ex. 15 (AR 268). Baldridge also asserted that some information was redacted as preliminary notes or drafts not retained in UCLA’s normal course of business and the public interest in withholding those records clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure. Ex. 15 (AR 268). Information Systems expected to provide its complete response by October 31, 2022. Ex. 15 (AR 268).

Some records produced on October 17 were duplicates of scheduling emails the UCLA had already produced. Aguirre Decl., ¶30, Ex. 15 (AR 273-86).

On October 24, 2022, Alexakis asserted via letter that UCLA had completed its review of responsive records and produced all non-exempt records. Aguirre Decl., ¶31, Ex. 16 (AR 313).

On September 22, 2023, UCLA’s counsel emailed Aguirre two documents. Severson Decl., ¶20, Ex. 18 (AR 331). The first was the equivalent of a Vaughn Index with the exempt portions redacted. Ex. 18 (AR 331). The second was one page responsive to the CPRA requests. Exs. 18, 20 (AR 331, 406). UCLA had learned during the Vaughn Index’s preparation that it had not disclosed the one-page document. Ex. 18 (AR 331).

On September 22 and October 20, 2023, UCLA produced the same set of 68 pages. Severson Decl., ¶21, Exs. 19, 22 (AR 336, 415). These documents were heavily redacted based on the attorney-client privilege, deliberative process, and the status of attachments as drafts. Ex. 19 (AR 336). Some of the emails are dated after June 30, 2022. Ex. 19 (AR 358-71).

Also on October 20, 2023, UCLA emailed Aguirre a key to the Vaughn Index of the withheld documents and attachments to the produced emails. Severson Decl., ¶21, Ex. 21 (AR 408).

On May 12, 2023, Regents provided documents in response to Aguirre’s Request for Production of Documents. Severson Decl., ¶9, Exs. 25-26. Pertinent documents are as follows.

On July 19, 2022, Alexakis informed UCLA Chancellor Assistant Rena Torres (“Torres”) and UCLA Athletic Department Chief Strategy Officer Matt Elliott (“Elliott”) in separate emails of Aguirre’s CPRA request. Severson Decl., ¶¶ 10, 12, Ex. 26 (AR 522, 534). Alexakis asserted that because Aguirre’s request was encompassed by another request, no action was required on Aguirre’s request yet. Ex. 26 (AR 522, 534).

In August 29, 2022 email, Alexakis asked Torres and Elliott to search the Chancellor’s and the Athletic Director’s respective private emails for documents responsive to both of Aguirre’s requests. Severson Decl., ¶¶ 13, 15, Ex. 26 (AR 526, 535). He asked them to focus on documents responsive to Request No. 1. Ex. 26 (AR 526, 535). In a follow-up email to Torres later that day, Alexakis advised him to look for emails Jarmond exchanged with Warren, Neuman, and Anil Gollahalli (“Gollahalli”). Ex. 26 (AR 535).

On September 23, 2022, Alexakis checked in with Torres about the status of Aguirre’s requests. He recognized that Request No. 2 was quite subjective but asked her to do her best to identify responsive documents. Ex. 26 (AR 529).

In an October 11, 2022 email, Torres told Alexakis she used the search terms “Big Ten,” “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation,” “careful consideration,” “thoughtful deliberation,” and the combination of “Pac-12” and “Big Ten.” Ex. 26 (AR 528).

During his deposition, Alexakis testified that he did not speak to Chancellor Block but he did speak to Block’s office about whether he had any responsive writings. Severson Decl., ¶19, Ex. 25 (AR 509). He could not remember when, but it was soon after he received Aguirre’s request. Ex. 25 (AR 509-10). He spoke to a representative, not Block himself. Ex. 25 (AR 510-11). He also spoke to Athletic Director Jarmond’s representative. Ex. 25 (AR 511-12). Alexakis did not attempt to talk to either Block or Jarmond personally to ask if they had responsive records. Ex. 25 (AR 512).

When asked if he found any records showing the substantive thoughtful deliberations described in the June 30 Announcement, Alexakis testified that he did, but the contents of the responsive emails were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Ex. 25 (AR 513-14). These emails were between counsel for UCLA and certain stakeholders within UCLA. Ex. 25 (AR 514).

Alexakis could not remember from whom he received documents showing thoughtful communication related to the authors of the June 22 Statement. Ex. 25 (AR 515). He could not remember if he obtained any such documents other than privileged documents received from Bobby Swerdlow. Ex. 25 (AR 516). There are responsive records on his computer that were not produced. Ex. 25 (AR 517-18). Alexakis estimated this was about 50 pages on a server. Ex. 25 (AR 518).

If Alexakis concluded that a document was part of the deliberative process, he concluded this was sufficient to find the document exempt. Ex. 25 (AR 519). Alexakis made the exemption determinations. Ex. 25 (AR 520). He did not “have an understanding” that he is required by the CPRA to identify himself as the decisionmaker on exemptions. Ex. 25 (AR 520).

UCLA has not produced any records of the purported “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation,” including communications between UCLA and Big Ten personnel. Severson Decl., ¶27. This includes communications from Warren, Neuman, and Gollahalli, the Big Ten officers who negotiated the Big Ten Member Agreement. Severson Decl., ¶27.

UCLA has not produced any records showing the financial benefits it was told it would receive if it joined Big Ten. Severson Decl., ¶26. It has not produced records of what inducements the conference made for UCLA to withdraw, or of what financial data UCLA considered. Severson Decl., ¶29. UCLA has not produced communications between television executives and Block, Jarmond, or their agents. Severson Decl., ¶29.

UCLA has not produced any communications about the transition with donors like Alice and Nahum Lainer, the family for whom Jarmond’s position is named. Severson Decl., ¶30.

Information Practices receives about 3,323 CPRA requests per year via about 786 submissions. Baldridge Decl., ¶2.

Senior CPRA Analyst Alexakis reports to Ayse Donmez, who in turn reports to Baldridge. Alexakis Decl., ¶3; Baldridge Decl., ¶4. Alexakis understands UCLA’s obligations under the CPRA and competently carries out all related duties. Baldridge Decl., ¶3. This is true for his management of all requests pertaining to the change in conferences. Baldridge Decl., ¶3.

Elliott, the Chief Strategy Officer in the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, manages the Department’s response to almost all CPRA requests, about 10-15 per year. Elliott Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.

Victoria Forman (“Forman”), the Senior Executive Assistant to Athletics Director Jarmond, has processed any CPRA requests involving Jarmond’s emails, a total of 45 since February 2016. Forman Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.

Torres has been the Executive Assistant to the Chancellor for 14 years. Torres Decl., ¶1. She has handled CPRA requests for the Chancellor from 50 requesters since late 2019 or early 2020. Torres Decl., ¶2.

Previous to Aguirre’s request, Information Practices received three CPRA requests related to the Big 10 announcement, one on June 30, four on July 1, one on July 6, and one on July 12. Forman Decl., ¶6; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. 36 (AR 2758-68). Alexakis was assigned to all CPRA requests concerning the announcement of the move from the Pac-12 to the Big Ten. Alexakis Decl., ¶4. Information Practices received Aguirre’s request on July 19, almost three weeks after the announcement and after the other requests. Alexakis Decl., ¶7.

On July 6, 2022, nearly two weeks before Aguirre’s request, Alexakis provided custodians like Torres and Elliot with a color-coded spreadsheet of the requests, with urgent ones marked red and those that temporarily could be ignored in black. Torres Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Elliot Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, Exs. 31, 40 (AR 584, 5405). He asked that they search for documents responsive to blue-marked requests and estimate the quantity without providing them to Information Practices. Torres Decl., ¶5; Elliot Decl., ¶6; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, Exs. 31, 40 (AR 584, 5405). Alexakis acknowledged that some requests were worded more clearly than others and invited any questions or concerns about them. Torres Decl., ¶6; Elliot Decl., ¶6; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, Exs. 31, 40 (AR 584, 5405).

Alexakis asked Francis Avecilla, manager of the Chancellor’s Communications Service, to check Chancellor Block’s public email account. Alexakis Decl., ¶9. He asked Torres to search Block’s private email account. Torres Decl., ¶7; Alexakis Decl., ¶9, Ex. 31 (AR 583). Torres emailed Alexakis that she doubted she would find anything because she did not remember written communications about the decision to change conferences despite activity related to it. Torres Decl., ¶8. Torres asked Block to search his text messages and his “Mednet” account, an account associated with the School of Medicine that Block uses for his academic research. Torres Decl., ¶¶ 8-9. Block sent Torres responsive Mednet emails, but he did not find any responsive text messages. Torres Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.

Information Practices received Aguirre’s request on July 19, almost three weeks after the announcement. Alexakis Decl., ¶7, Ex. 32 (AR 937). Information Practices acknowledged the request the same day. Alexakis Decl., ¶13. By then, Information Practices already had a “high volume” of requests on this subject. Alexakis Decl., ¶8. Alexakis had already contacted custodians of records to collect records potentially responsive to received requests. Alexakis Decl., ¶8. Information Practices would ultimately collect and release a high volume of records in response to the prior requests. Alexakis Decl., ¶11.

Between August 3 and November 17, 2022, five more CPRA requests followed Aguirre’s request. Alexakis Decl., ¶12.

The day Information Practices received Aguirre’s request, Alexakis forwarded it to the Chancellor’s Office and the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics. Alexakis Decl., ¶15; Elliot Decl., ¶9; Torres Decl., ¶10. Based on his work on the other requests, Alexakis knew those two offices would be the only ones with responsive documents because they were the two key decisionmakers behind the move between conferences. Alexakis Decl., ¶15. Torres and Elliott were the custodians of such records for those offices. Forman monitors the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics’ email inbox and forwarded the email to Elliot. Alexakis Decl., ¶16; Elliot Decl., ¶9.

When Alexakis told Torres and Elliott about Aguirre’s request, he kept it in black font on his spreadsheet and asked them not to take action. Torres Decl., ¶10; Elliot Decl., ¶8; Alexakis Decl., ¶17. Alexakis believed another item highlighted blue on that spreadsheet encompassed Aguirre’s Request No. 1. Alexakis Decl., ¶17. This item was a request from The Athletic for all emails Block or Jarmond received or sent, between May 1 and July 1, 2022, about joining Big Ten. Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 6(h), 17. Alexakis believed that Aguirre’s Request No. 1 for all records of communication between UCLA and Big Ten employees about the departure from Pac-12 was either identical to or narrower than The Athletic’s request. Alexakis Decl., ¶18.

Alexakis chose to briefly defer action on Aguirre’s Request No. 2 until the custodians had completed production for requests predating Aguirre’s request. Alexakis Decl., ¶19. Request No. 2 was less clear than Request No. 1. Alexakis Decl., ¶20. He concluded that asking custodians to restart the search and inspect all documents to see which were responsive to this request would hamper efforts to efficiently complete the prior requests. Alexakis Decl., ¶20. He also believed that records responsive to Request No. 1, coupled with records responsive to the prior requests, would be responsive to Request No. 2. Alexakis Decl., ¶21. He intended to provide further instructions after the search for records responsive to Request No. 1 was completed, and he did. Alexakis Decl., ¶21.

After Alexakis informed Torres and Elliott of the request, he regularly followed up to monitor progress on the search for responsive records. Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 22, 24. On July 29, 2022, Alexakis asked Torres how long Block’s office needed to respond to Aguirre’s request. Alexakis Decl., ¶22. Torres said she would have the information by the next week. Alexakis Decl., ¶22. Per section 7922.535, Alexakis informed Aguirre that Information Practices needed additional time, until August 12, to search for and collect responsive records from facilities and establishments other than the establishment processing the CPRA request. Alexakis Decl., ¶23; Baldridge Decl., ¶5.

On August 3, 2022, Aguirre objected that this notice failed to comply with section 7922.535, accused UCLA of stonewalling, and threatened to file suit. Baldridge Decl., ¶6; Alexakis Decl., ¶25, Ex. 33 (AR 1060). On August 5, Baldridge replied that this objection was without merit. Baldridge Decl., ¶7; Alexakis Decl., ¶25, Ex. 33 (AR 1059). The CPRA states that within ten days of a request, subject to the 14-day extension, an agency must estimate when the records would be available. Alexakis Decl., ¶25, Ex. 33 (AR 1059).

On August 8, 2022, Alexakis sent Torres emails from Block’s public account, apparently received from the Chancellor’s Communication Service Manager, so that Block could review them before production. Torres Decl., ¶13, Ex. 31 (AR 593). Torres forwarded those emails to Block. Torres Decl., ¶13, Ex. 31 (AR 593).

Later that day, Alexakis sent Torres emails from Block’s private email address (that Torres had provided to Alexakis), with notice that he intended to produce them on or soon after August 12. Torres Decl., ¶14, Ex. 31 (AR 616). He asked if the Chancellor’s Office had any questions or concerns about the release or any markups on the documents. Torres Decl., ¶14, Ex. 31 (AR 616). Torres asked Alexakis to confirm that he would redact Big Ten Commissioner Warren’s cell phone number, and he confirmed it. Torres Decl., ¶14, Ex. 31 (AR 616). Torres forwarded this email chain to Block. Torres Decl., ¶14, Ex. 31 (AR 616).

On August 12, 2022, Alexakis emailed Aguirre that responsive records would be available on September 30, 2022. Baldridge Decl., ¶9; Alexakis Decl., ¶29, Exs. 33, 35 (AR 1072, 1918). Aguirre responded he would refrain from filing suit based on the representation that rolling production would begin the next week. Alexakis Decl., ¶29, Ex. 33 (AR 1072).

After the first round of production, on August 23, 2022, Aguirre expressed dissatisfaction with the production and threatened to file suit unless he received a substantial production of documents that week. Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 31, 33, Ex. 33 (AR 1079). Baldridge advised Alexakis to inform the Office of Legal Affairs. Alexakis Decl., ¶33, Ex. 33 (AR 1082). Alexakis explained to a colleague that Information Practices was handling Aguirre’s request as well as it could, given the number of CPRA requests on the same issue. Baldridge Decl., ¶10; Alexakis Decl., ¶33, Ex. 33 (AR 1132).

In his August 26, 2022 letter to Aguirre, Baldridge explained that Information Practices production was reviewing documents over a broader time period than its original review because the CPRA request did not specify a date range aside from the date of the June 30 Announcement. Baldridge Decl., ¶11. The next day, Aguirre sent the draft Petition as a “last ditch effort” to compel compliance with the CPRA and production or the desired records. Baldridge Decl., ¶12, Ex. 34 (AR 1190).

On August 29, 2022, Alexakis asked Torres and Elliot to search Block and Jarmond’s email accounts for any records specifically responsive to Request No. 1. Torres Decl., ¶15; Forman Decl., ¶8; Elliot Decl., ¶10; Alexakis Decl., ¶35, Ex. 31 (AR 631, 941). Alexakis wanted to confirm that the production of documents responsive to broader requests from other groups had not omitted any documents responsive to the more specific Request No. 1. Alexakis Decl., ¶35. Alexakis also suggested specific Big Ten agents as a place to begin the search. Torres Decl., ¶15; Forman Decl., ¶8; Elliot Decl., ¶10; Alexakis Decl., ¶35, Exs. 31-32 (AR 638, 980).

Torres conducted searches for responsive documents in Block’s email account, including searches with all the names Alexakis provided. Torres Decl., ¶15. Because Forman monitors Jarmond’s work email and the Athletic Department’s general email inbox, Elliot had her review them for potentially responsive documents. Elliot Decl., ¶11. She also checked Jarmond’s work phone for telephone calls or texts responsive to the request. Forman Decl., ¶10. Forman does not have access to Jarmond’s personal email, but he rarely uses it for work purposes and never used it to discuss UCLA’s change of conferences. Forman Decl., ¶11; Jarmond Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. Forman and Torres did not limit their search beyond the restrictions on dates and search terms listed in the request itself. See Forman Decl., ¶9; Torres Decl., ¶20.

On September 2, 2022, Senior Principal Counsel Michael Goldstein, Esq. (“Goldstein”) asked Aguirre via telephone if he wanted administrative emails memorializing efforts to schedule meetings about the conference change. Goldstein Decl., ¶4. Aguirre confirmed that he did and that he would file his Petition on September 16 if he was not satisfied with the progress of Information Practices’s production. Goldstein Decl., ¶4. Goldstein asked him to wait until September 30, the day Information Practices had estimated it would finish production, because he believed they could informally resolve any outstanding issues. Goldstein Decl., ¶4.

Later that day, Goldstein informed Information Practices that Aguirre wanted records relating to scheduling of meetings in connection with the UCLA’s decision to change conferences. Alexakis Decl., ¶36. On September 7, Alexakis sent such records to various team members for review and privilege assessment. Alexakis Decl., ¶36, Ex. 34 (AR 1317, 1322, 1325). Alexakis still intended to release these documents by September 15. Alexakis Decl., ¶36, Ex. 34 (AR 1317, 1322, 1325).

On September 12, 2022, upon Alexakis’s request for an update, Elliot told him that Forman had not found any responsive documents from Jarmond, the only person in the Department who would have such records. Forman Decl., ¶12; Elliot Decl., ¶12, Ex. 32 (AR 941).

After the second round of production on September 15, 2022, Goldstein asked Aguirre if he still planned to file the Petition. Goldstein Decl., ¶7. Aguirre filed the Petition on September 19 and emailed a POS-15 packet on October 7. Goldstein Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.

On September 23, 2022, Alexakis asked Torres, Elliott, and Forman to search for records responsive to Request No. 2. Torres Decl., ¶18; Forman Decl., ¶13; Elliot Decl., ¶13; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 42-43, Exs. 31-32 (AR 698, 973).

In the letter to Aguirre accompanying production on September 30, 2022, Baldridge explained that the records review process was taking longer than expected “almost exclusively” because of Request No. 2. Alexakis Decl., ¶45, Ex. 39 (AR 5259). UCLA gave a new estimated completion date of October 31, 2022. Alexakis Decl., ¶45, Ex. 39 (AR 5259).

On October 4, 2022, Elliot told Alexakis that Elliot and Forman had not found any documents responsive to Request No. 2. Forman Decl., ¶14; Elliot Decl., ¶14, Ex. 32 (AR 942).

On October 7, 2022, Alexakis reminded Torres to search for records responsive to Request No. 2. Torres Decl., ¶19, Ex. 31 (AR 702). She replied on October 11 that she had conducted this search during her first review. Torres Decl., ¶19, Ex. 31 (AR 706). Alexakis explained that because Aguirre had filed suit, UCLA needed to cover all bases and ensure it had exhausted every search possibility. Torres Decl., ¶19, Ex. 31 (AR 710). As for Request No. 1, he asked Torres to search for correspondence with Warren and Gollahalli. Torres Decl., ¶19, Ex. 31 (AR 710).

On October 17, 2022, Torres sent Alexakis three more emails she found through the search terms Alexakis provided. Torres Decl., ¶19, Ex. 31 (AR 719). Information Practices then produced the last batch of documents to Aguirre, subject to the attorney-client privilege, the deliberative process privilege, and exclusion of drafts not retained in the normal course of business. Alexakis Decl., ¶49, Ex. 39 (AR 5334).

Aguirre asserts the production lacks any financial analysis records as well as communications to or from Fox Network or UCLA donors. Forman Decl., ¶15; Jarmond Decl., ¶6. Torres, Forman, and Jarmond have never seen any such records. Torres Decl., ¶21; Forman Decl., ¶15; Jarmond Decl., ¶6.

To prepare for his deposition, Alexakis asked Torres, Elliot, Forman, and Bobby Swerdlow about the processes they used to identify and collect potentially responsive records after Alexakis asked them to do so as custodians of records. Alexakis Decl., ¶52. Their answers persuaded him that they all understood his instructions and performed a thorough, diligent, vigilant, and competent job. Alexakis Decl., ¶52.

Sometime after Information Practices completed production, Aguirre requested a Vaughn Index of all responsive documents Information Practices withheld in whole or part and under what exemptions. Alexakis Decl., ¶55. Per instructions, Alexakis prepared a Vaughn-type Index insofar as he made copies of all responsive records with partial or complete redactions. Alexakis Decl., ¶56, Ex. 40 (AR 5337-404). He marked each copy with the list of applicable exemptions. Id.

None of the unredacted body text in the Vaughn Index documents was new to Aguirre. Alexakis Decl., ¶57. Any unredacted text was included in one of the earlier sets of production. Alexakis Decl., ¶57. If a document in the Vaughn Index was new to Aguirre, Information Practices had completely withheld it for lack of any non-exempt information. Alexakis Decl., ¶57.

On October 5, 2023, Aguirre’s counsel asked for more information about the attachments to emails in the Vaughn Index because it was not clear that all the attachments were exempt. Goldstein Decl., ¶13. On October 20, 2023, Goldstein provided a key of exemptions claimed for each attachment, including when Information Practices had produced a final version of a withheld draft. Goldstein Decl., ¶13. Aguirre never challenged the listed exemptions or otherwise responded to the Vaughn Index. Goldstein Decl., ¶14.

Although Aguirre references a September 15, 2022 CPRA request, Alexakis is unaware of any such request. Alexakis Decl., ¶58. The September 15 production was all in response to the CPRA request at issue in this Petition. Alexakis Decl., ¶58.

Aguirre did not submit another request related to the June 3 announcement until October 4, 2023, when he submitted a new CPRA request. Alexakis Decl., ¶53(a). On October 30, 2023, Aguirre submitted another new CPRA request. Alexakis Decl., ¶53(b). Finally, on November 2, 2023, Aguirre submitted a third new request. Alexakis Decl., ¶53(c).

Information Practices promptly processed all three requests but has not completed all production thereunder. Alexakis Decl., ¶54.

Petitioner Aguirre seeks to compel the production of records pursuant to his CPRA request. He raises issues concerning (a) the timeliness of UCLA’s response, (b) the reasonableness of its search, and (c) in camera review.

Unless an exemption applies, “each agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records.” §7922.500. Should there be an “unusual circumstance”, the time limit “may be extended by written notice… [by no] more than 14 days.” §7922.535. “Unusual circumstances” include “[t]he need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request.” §7922.535(c). Nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.” §7922.500.

“If the agency determines that the requested records are not subject to disclosure, . . . the agency promptly must notify the person making the request and provide the reasons for its determination.” Filarsky v. Superior Court, (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 426. A public agency's “inability or unwillingness to locate and produce [the records] … is tantamount to withholding requested information from a [CPRA] request.” Sukumar v. City of San Diego, (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 451, 466.

Aguirre argues that UCLA’s response to his Request was untimely. The Request was made on July 19, 2022. Within ten days from receipt of the request – i.e., by July 29, 2022 -- UCLA was required to “determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency,” and to “promptly notify the person making the request of the determination.” §7922.535. UCLA failed to meet this legal duty. Instead, on July 29, 2022, UCLA stated that it needed “additional time to respond to your request” without stating that it possessed responsive documents. Aguirre Decl., ¶10, Ex. 3 (AR 13). On August 12, 2022, almost two weeks after the July 29, 2022 deadline, UCLA told Aguirre that it will be “able to provide you with the estimated date that responsive documents will be made available” by September 30, 2022. Aguirre Decl., ¶11, Ex. 4 (AR 15-18). Pet. Op. Br. at 17.

This argument is untenable for two reasons. First, the CPRA provides no remedy for a claim that the agency’s response was untimely. City of Gilroy v. Superior Court, (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 818, 832. The sole remedy is to compel disclosure of unproduced records. Id.

Second, UCLA fully complied with the CPRA’s timing requirements. Information Practices issued a ten-day letter on July 29, 2022, which informed Aguirre that it was extending the deadline for its written determination another 14 days, until August 12, due to “[t]he need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request.” Alexakis, Decl., ¶23 (AR 5251). This letter complied with sections 7922.500 and 7922.535.

Unlike the time limits governing notification, the CPRA imposes no such fixed time limit on the release of responsive non-exempt records. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs, Inc. v. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1349. It provides that only that the release be made “promptly”, and that the agency provide the requester with an estimated time of release. §7922.535(a).

On August 12, 2022, Information Practices provided Aguirre with an estimate that responsive records would be made available to him on September 30, 2022. Alexakis Decl., ¶29 (AR 1918). In the letter accompanying production on September 30, 2022, Baldridge explained that the records review process was taking longer than expected “almost exclusively” because of Request No. 2. Alexakis Decl., ¶45, Ex. 39 (AR 5259). UCLA gave a new estimated completion date of October 31, 2022. Alexakis Decl., ¶45, Ex. 39 (AR 5259). This fully complied with section 7922.535(a).

Finally, Information Practices began releasing responsive non-exempt records to Petitioner on August 17, 2022, and there were three more rolling releases of records on September 15, September 30, and October 17. On October 24, Information Practices notified Aguirre that it had no further responsive non-exempt records to release to him and considered the request fulfilled. Alexakis, Decl., ¶50 (AR 5336). With the exception of a single page inadvertently not provided until September 22, 2023 (Ex. 18 (AR 331)), the release of records was completed within 90 days Aguirre’s July 19, 2022 request.[5] As stated, there is no CPRA time limit for production of records. UCLA’s production of virtually all records within 90 days was eminently reasonable.[6]

Aguirre argues that UCLA’s search for responsive records was unreasonable. The scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (“City of San Jose”) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents and agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must “‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request...” Ibid. (citation omitted).

To determine if a search was adequate under the CPRA, California courts apply the standard used in Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") cases, which provides that a search "need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents" given the circumstances. ACLU supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 85 (citing Meerepol v. Meese, (“Meerepol”) (D.C. Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 942, 951-56. "[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate" in light of the relevant circumstances. Meerepol, supra, 790 F.2d at 951. An agency's search must be "reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents." Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National City, ("CYAC"), (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1420 (citation omitted).

The scope of the search is dictated by the scope of the request. Id. "An agency is... obliged to search for records based on criteria set forth in the search request." California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, ("CFAC"), (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. Based on the language of the request, an agency must "determine whether it has such writings under its control and the applicability of any exemption." Id. at 166. The agency's search "should be broad enough to account for the problem that the requester may not know what documents or information of interest an agency possesses." CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1425 (citation omitted).

“Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. [Citation.] In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches.” Id.

Ultimately, it is the agency's burden to prove the adequacy of its search by proffering evidence showing its search was reasonably calculated to locate all responsive records. Baltranena v. Clinton, 770 F.Supp.2d 175, 182 (D.D.C. 2011); CYAC, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1418 (quoting CFAC, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 167). An agency can show its search was adequate with affidavits showing where and how it searched for the records. Citizens Comm. on Human Rights v. FDA, ((9^th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 1325, 1328. In evaluating the agency's evidence on this issue, courts should consider "such relevant factors as the amount of time and staff devoted to the request and whether the agency attempted to limit its search to one or more places when other sources likely would have contained [the] information requested." Landmark Legal Foundation v. E.P.A., (D.D.C. 2003) 272 F.Supp.2d 59, 62.

Aguirre argues that, although UCLA knew Chancellor Block may have responsive documents, the search was inadequate because Alexakis did not speak to Chancellor Block. Pet. Op. Br. at 17; Reply at 3.

This argument is spurious. During his deposition, Alexakis testified that he did not speak to Chancellor Block but he did speak to Block’s office about whether he had any responsive writings. Severson Decl., ¶19, Ex. 25 (AR 509). He spoke to a representative, not Block himself. Ex. 25 (AR 510-11). He also spoke to Athletic Director Jarmond’s representative. Ex. 25 (AR 511-12).

Regents’ opposition adds that Information Practices conveyed the request to the staff member responsible for the Chancellor’s public email account and also contacted the Executive Assistant to the Chancellor, who has access to the Chancellor’s other email accounts. Alexakis, Decl., ¶9. The Executive Assistant, in turn, communicated with the Chancellor and they both participated in the process of searching for potentially responsive records both in the Chancellor’s office email accounts, research email account, personal email account, and cell phone. Torres Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14, 16, 20.

Information Practices followed a similar process with respect to the Athletic Director’s records. The staff member who manages the Department’s communications, as well as the Athletic Director himself, participated in the process of searching for potentially responsive records both in the Department’s email accounts and in the Athletic Director’s personal email account and cell phone. The two worked side-by-side for part of the process. Forman, Decl., ¶¶ 8-11; Jarmond Decl., ¶¶ 3-5. Opp. at 8. These efforts were "reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents." CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1420.

Aguirre argues that the public has the right to understand the extent of communications and what was discussed leading up to UCLA leaving the Pac-12. The calendar entries show meetings, but UCLA has failed to disclose communications from the meetings. Ex. 13 (AR 103, 107). UCLA did not produce any records showing the details of the “careful consideration and thoughtful deliberation” that the Chancellor and Athletic Director said occurred before the decision to join the Big Ten was made. UCLA produced no records of communication between UCLA agents, officers, and employees and Big Ten agents, officers, and employees regarding the subject of UCLA departing from the Pac-12. UCLA did not produce records from the Big Ten personnel who negotiated the agreement with UCLA, especially Big Ten Commissioner Warren, Big Ten Chief of Staff, Strategy and Operations & Deputy General Counsel Neuman, and the Big Ten’s Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel Gollahalli. Severson Decl., ¶27. Pet. Op. Br. at 19.

Neuman admits that he was “instrumental in securing the historic additions of USC and UCLA to the conference and negotiating the record-breaking media rights deal with FOX, CBS and NBC.” Ex. 27 (AR 528-33). Commissioner Warren was the person to whom the UCLA Chancellor sent the June 30, 2022 application requesting that UCLA be admitted to the Big-10 Conference. Ex. 7 (AR 28-30). Alexakis told UCLA Chancellor assistant Torres that she should search for the names of Warren, Gollahalli, and Newman. Ex. 26 (AR 527). Pet. Op. Br. at 19.

Yet, UCLA officials did not produce any of the following records that would relate to the decision to withdraw from the Pac-12 and join the Big Ten: (1) records from Athletic Director Jarmond; (2) substantive records from Chancellor Block; (3) substantive records to or from the Big Ten; (4) records to or from Fox Network (Big Ten’s majority owner); (5) records of communications to or from UCLA major donors such as Nahum Lainer; (6) financial analysis records; (7) records showing consideration of the pros and cons including financial advantages or disadvantages; (8) records showing consideration of the effect on student athletes that would be forced to be away longer and further from classes and endure traveling between time zones for games; and (9) records showing any discussion about the ethics or morality of withdrawing from the Pac-12 on the applicable circumstances. Severson Decl., ¶28. Pet. Op. Br. at 19-20; Reply at 5.

Regents’ opposition correctly responds (Opp. at 9) that Aguirre does not meet his burden by listing records that he believes should exist that were not produced. “[T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Fredericks v. Superior Court, (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 209, 227 (quoting Duenas Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, (D.C. Cir. 2003) 354 U.S. App. D.C. 230 [315 F.3d 311, 315]). Speculation that documents should exist does not undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search for the requested records. Wilbur v. CIA , (D.C. Cir. 204) 355 F.3d 675, 678.

Aguirre suggests, but does not actually argue in his opening brief (see Reply at 4), that the search was unreasonably truncated. He notes that on September 15, 2022 Information Practices produced records found responsive to another party’s request. Ex. 13 (AR 51, 66). Baldridge estimated that this request incorporated about 90% of Aguirre’s request. Ex. 13 (AR 51). Baldridge explained that Information Practices continued to search for any additional records subject to release. Ex. 13 (AR 51). Aguirre and his attorney never agreed to let UCLA limit his request to emails between May 1 and July 1, 2022 as the other party’s request did. Aguirre Decl., ¶24. He also did not agree that its scope reflected 90% of his request. Aguirre Decl., ¶24.

Aguirre ignores the fact that the search did not stop with the September 15, 2022 production. When Alexakis told Torres and Elliott about Aguirre’s request, he believed that Aguirre’s Request No. 1 was encompassed within a request from The Athletic for all emails Block or Jarmond received or sent, between May 1 and July 1, 2022, about joining Big Ten. Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 6(h), 17, 18. He also chose to briefly defer action on Aguirre’s Request No. 2 until the custodians had completed production for requests predating Aguirre’s request. Alexakis Decl., ¶19.

However, on August 29, 2022, Alexakis asked Torres and Elliot to search Block and Jarmond’s email accounts for any records specifically responsive to Request No. 1. Torres Decl., ¶15; Forman Decl., ¶8; Elliot Decl., ¶10; Alexakis Decl., ¶35, Ex. 31 (AR 631, 941). Alexakis wanted to confirm that the production of documents responsive to requests from other groups had not omitted any documents responsive to Request No. 1. Alexakis Decl., ¶35. Alexakis suggested specific Big Ten agents as a place to begin the search. Torres Decl., ¶15; Forman Decl., ¶8; Elliot Decl., ¶10; Alexakis Decl., ¶35, Exs. 31-32 (AR 638, 980). Forman and Torres did not limit their search beyond the restrictions on dates and search terms listed in the request itself. See Forman Decl., ¶9; Torres Decl., ¶20. On September 23, 2022, Alexakis also asked Torres, Elliott, and Forman to search for records responsive to Request No. 2. Torres Decl., ¶18; Forman Decl., ¶13; Elliot Decl., ¶13; Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 42-43, Exs. 31-32 (AR 698, 973). See Opp. at 14-15. The search covered Aguirre’s entire request.

Aguirre argues that the search terms were artificially limited. Severson Decl., ¶¶13-16, Ex. 26 (AR 520-27). Pet. Op. Br. at 12; Reply at 3. The searches incorporated all of Aguirre’s request and accompanied by specific names. Torres, Decl., ¶15; Forman Decl., ¶ 9. Aguirre fails to explain what was wrong with the search terms and he never suggested any others.

The court agrees with Regents that the search process was thorough and complete, perhaps attributable in part to the fact that there were multiple CPRA requests for essentially the same information. Aguirre’s contention that records should exist to and from Athletic Director Jarmond, Chancellor Block, Big Ten officials, and major UCLA donors ignores the fact that some records were withheld as exempt. As for Aguirre’s belief that there must be records of financial analysis or communications with the Fox Network or major donors, the custodians of record testified that they did not see such records. Torres Decl., ¶21; Forman Decl., ¶15; Jarmond Decl., ¶6.

Aguirre does not challenge any of the documents in UCLA’s Vaughn Index as not exempt. He merely argues that there is an overriding public interest in the role intercollegiate athletics plays in the life of California’s public universities and its students. This public interest supersedes any interest in nondisclosure. “The weight of the public’s interest [in disclosure] is proportionate to the gravity of governmental tasks sought to be illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will serve to illuminate. The existence and weight of this public interest are conclusions derived from the nature of the information…[T]he issue is ‘whether disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding of government activities.” Fredericks v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at 226-28 (reviewing catch-all exemption of former section 6255). The public has a right to know whether UCLA considered the effects longer travel across time zones will have on the physiological health and academic and athletic performance of the students. The public also has the right to know what financial projections and weighed against the physical impacts on the student athletes. Pet. Op. Br. at 20.

Regents’ opposition correctly notes that the public interest is irrelevant to disclosure of non-exempt records. If records are not exempt, they must be disclosed. A balancing of public interests only occurs when the agency is relying on the catch-all exemption of section 7922.000 (formerly §6255) or privileges that rely on the balancing test such as the deliberative process privilege (Labor & Workforce Development Agency v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 26-27) and the official information privilege in section 7927.705 CBS, Inc. v. Block, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 656.

UCLA’s Index withheld 68 pages as exempt under the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and deliberative process under section 7927.705. Of these, only deliberative process requires a balancing of public interests. Aguirre never challenged any of the records as exempt. Goldstein Decl., ¶14.[7] Nor does he do so in his opening brief. As a result, Regents never had an obligation to meet their burden of proof to show withheld documents are exempt. See §7922.000.

In reply, Aguirre argues that he is challenging the exemptions in the purported Vaughn Index. He argues that the entries are insufficient to determine whether or not there is a proper basis for asserting attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine and the court should order an adequate privilege log based on those exemptions. Reply at 6-7.

Aguirre asks for an in camera review of any records withheld. Pet. Op. Br. at 20. To determine a claim of exemption from the CPRA, the trial court may, but is not required to, examine the disputed records in camera. Section 7923.105(a) provides that the court shall decide the case after examining “the record in camera, if permitted by subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code,” papers filed by the parties, and such oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow. Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 900 (citation omitted). However, the in camera hearing provisions of Evidence Code section 915(b) are permissive. Id. Thus, under section 7923.105(a) “in camera inspection of the record in question is not required as a matter of law, but is trusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. (quoting Yarish v. Nelson, (1972)) 27 Cal.App.3d 893, 904).

There are circumstances where it is self-evident that the information sought to be protected is covered by the privilege. Torres v. Superior Court, (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 867, 873. If not, the party claiming privilege must show in open court why the matter is privileged or declare that doing so would compromise the privilege. Id. If it appears to the trial court that this claim cannot be determined without an in camera review, it may call for one. Id. But simply requesting an in camera hearing without explaining why the privilege applies to the requested information, or declaring that the agency cannot provide that explanation open court without betraying a privilege, cannot justify an in camera review.

Aguirre cannot make a blanket argument that none of the records withheld are privileged and then ask for an in camera review. In camera review is burdensome for trial courts, “is not a substitute for the government’s burden of proof, and should not be resorted to lightly.” ACLU, supra, 202 Cal.App.4^th at 87 (citation omitted). It should be invoked only when the issue cannot otherwise be resolved. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Regents are correct (Opp. at 13-14) that documents withheld for attorney-client privilege, and those records based on the absolute attorney work product privilege in CCP section 2018.030(a), cannot be reviewed in camera at all. Evid. Code §915(a). The court declines to review any withheld records in camera.

[1] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.

[2] In 2023, the Legislature re-codified the CPRA.

[3] The parties have consolidated their exhibits into a single administrative record (“AR”). The following citations reflect both the exhibit number and AR pagination.

Aguirre requests judicial notice of (1) the history of Pac-12 from its website (RJN Ex. 1), (2) press releases announcing the Pac-12 departures of the following universities: UCLA (RJN Ex. 2), University of Southern California (RJN Ex. 3), University of Colorado (RJN Ex. 4), University of Washington (RJN Ex. 5), University of Oregon (RJN Ex. 6), University of Arizona (RJN Ex. 7), Arizona State University (RJN Ex. 8), University of Utah (RJN Ex. 9), University of California at Berkeley (RJN Ex. 10), and Stanford University (RJN Ex. 11), and (3) a Wall Street Journal article “The Nightmare Travel Days Coming for USC and UCLA Athletes” dated August 16, 2022 (RJN Ex. 12).

Aguirre cites these articles as containing facts subject to immediate and accurate determination under Evid. Code sections 452(g) and (h). RJN, pp. 3-4. The facts contained in these articles are not so universal as to not be reasonably subject to dispute. However, the court can and does judicially notice the media attention associated with UCLA’s move to the Big Ten but not the truth of the articles’ content. The requests to judicially notice RJN Exs. 1-11 are granted only on that basis. The request to judicially notice RJN Ex. 12 is denied.

[4] Aguirre notes that UCLA sent another set of records consisting of news clippings responsive to a CPRA request Aguirre made on September 15, 2022, not the CPRA requests at issue. Aguirre Decl., ¶25. Regents respond that there was no such September 15 request. Alexakis Decl., ¶58. See Opp. at 11.

[5] Aguirre states that the production took almost a year: “Almost One Year Later, UCLA Produced 68 Records…most of which were heavily redacted.” Pet. Op. Br. at 13. This is incorrect. With the exception of a single page, UCLA released all records within 90 days. UCLA’s provision of the equivalent of a Vaughn Index on October 20, 2023 did not extend the time of production. All the redacted records had been previously provided. Alexakis Decl., ¶57.

[6] In reply, Aguirre argues that UCLA failed to comply with section 7922.540(a) and (b), which requires that a notice of denial be in writing and set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial. Reply at 3-4.

Each release of records was accompanied by a cover letter, signed by Alexakis or his supervisor, Baldridge, including their respective titles. Alexakis Decl., ¶¶ 31, 42, 45, 49 (AR 1448, 1529, 5258, 5259, 5334-35. On October 17, 2022, Banbridge produced the last batch of documents to Aguirre, subject to the attorney-client privilege, the deliberative process privilege, and exclusion of drafts not retained in the normal course of business. Alexakis Decl., ¶49, Ex. 39 (AR 5334). Alexakis made the exemption determinations. Severson Decl., ¶19, Ex. 25 (AR 520). UCLA substantially complied with section 7922.540.

[7] Aguirre’s opening brief recites the law relevant to the deliberative process privilege (Pet. Op. Br. at 16) but does not rely on it to challenge any document withheld as exempt.