Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 22STCV25303, Date: 2024-02-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV25303 Hearing Date: February 29, 2024 Dept: 85
LaundryLux Funding
Services, LLC, v. Cleotilda Ortiz and Alberto Castro, individually and dba
Lavanderia Rio Grande, 22STCV25303
Tentative decision on applications
for right to attach orders: denied
Plaintiff LaundryLux Funding Services, LLC (“LaundryLux”) applies
for right to attach orders against Defendants Cleotilda Ortiz (“Ortiz”) and
Alberto Castro (“Castro”) in the amount of $168,091.76, including $18,369.30 in
attorney’s fees and $2,096.11 in costs.
The
court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition,[1]
and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of the Case
1.
First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff
LaundryLux filed the Complaint on August 5, 2022. The operative pleading is the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) filed against Ortiz and Castro, both individually and each doing
business as Lavanderia Rio Grande (“Lavanderia”), on April 19, 2023. The FAC alleges (1) breach of promissory note,
(2) breach of guaranty, (3) money lent, (4) foreclosure of security agreement, and
(5) claim and delivery. The FAC alleges
in pertinent part as follows.
On
March 28, 2018, Ortiz and Castro executed and delivered to LaundryLux a Secured
Promissory Note and Agreement (“Note”) for $119,786.93, secured by all of
Defendants’ machinery, equipment, furniture, fixtures, inventories, and other
assets wherever located to secure payment, including the equipment listed on
Schedule A (“Equipment”) (collectively, “Collateral”). Pursuant to the Note, Lavanderia agreed to
repay the principal of $119,786.93 plus interest at an annual rate of
8.49%.
To
perfect its interest, LaundryLux filed two UCC-1 Statements for the Collateral.
On
June 17, 2020, Ortiz, on behalf of both Defendants, executed and delivered to
LaundryLux an Amendment to the Note (“Amended Note”) whereby Lavanderia would
make 135 payments of $1,500 and a final payment of $2,738.70 on October 10,
2031. Both the Note and Amended Note
provide that failure to make timely payments would result in a 5% or $5 late
charge, whichever is greater.
To
induce entry into the Note, Ortiz and Castro, individually and doing business
as Lavanderia, signed an Irrevocable Guaranty to the Agreement (“Guaranty”) for
the full amount owed under the Note.
Ortiz
and Castro last made a payment on the Amended Note on April 29, 2022. They have not cured the default despite
demand letters to do so. Lavanderia,
Ortiz, and Castro now owe $122,462.34 plus interest at the default rate of
15.9% per year. The Note also permits
repossession of the Equipment after default and recovery of attorney’s fees and
costs incurred to enforce the Note.
LaundryLux
seeks damages of $122,462.34, interest at an annual rate of either 15.9% or 10%
from April 29, 2022, repossession of the Collateral, including the items listed
on Schedule A, and attorney’s fees and costs.
2.
Cross-Complaint
On
January 7, 2024, Cross-Complainants Ortiz and Castro filed a Cross-Complaint
against LaundryLux alleging (1) recission, (2) fraud or intentional
misrepresentation, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, (4) unjust enrichment, (5) breach of contract, and (6) violation of
Business and Professions (“Bus. & Prof.”) Code section 17200. The Cross-Complaint alleges in pertinent part
as follows.
To
induce entry into the Note, LaundryLux told Ortiz and Castro that the Note would
be funded by payment to a third party which would deliver the equipment on
Schedule A (“Equipment”) to them. Laundrylux
asserted that it did not make the equipment, which would come from a third-party
supplier in good working order.
Contrary
to these representations, LaundryLux never funded the Note or lent money to Ortiz
and Castro. The delivered equipment was
sometimes defective, of substandard quality, or owned and sold by Laundrylux
itself. LaundryLux refused to repair the
defective equipment. LaundryLux also charged
an usurious interest rate and recorded an illegal UCC security lien.
LaundryLux
is not authorized to conduct business in California. It is not licensed with the Department of
Financial Protection & Innovation to operate as a finance lender in
California.
Ortiz
and Castro would not have entered the Note if they knew LaundryLux’s
representations were false at the time.
LaundryLux discussed the terms of the Note with Ortiz and Castro in
Spanish because it knew they could not read or write in English. Despite this, LaundryLux had them sign the
Note in small-print English.
LaundryLux’s
fraud has damaged Ortiz and Castro’s credit reputation and compelled them to
hire attorneys to defend them in the current action.
Ortiz
and Castro seek rescission of the Note, return of all consideration paid to
LaundryLux, an injunction enjoining LaundryLux from making any untrue or
misleading statement that would violate Bus. & Prof. Code section 17500,
attorney’s fees and costs, prejudgment interest, and special, general,
exemplary, and punitive damages.
3.
Course of Proceedings
On
August 27, 2022, LaundryLux served Castro with the Complaint, Summons, and
application for writ of possession with notice.
On
September 28, 2022, LaundryLux requested entry of default against Castro. Department 53 (Hon. Robert B. Broaddelt)
denied a default on October 3, 2022 for failure to match the name of the
Defendant on the Complaint and Summons.
On
October 6, 2022, LaundryLux served Ortiz with the Complaint and Summons through
substitute service, effective October 16.
On
November 15, 2022, this court denied LaundryLux’s applications against Ortiz
and Castro for writs of possession for the Equipment.
On
December 2, 2022, Department 53 entered a default against Ortiz. On January 9, 2023, the court set the default
aside pursuant to a stipulation between the parties.
On
March 2, 2023, Department 53 denied Castro and Ortiz’s motion to dismiss this
action for forum non conveniens.
On
April 19, 2023, LaundryLux filed the FAC and served Ortiz and Castro on April
26, 2023.
On
May 16, 2023, LaundryLux dismissed the FAC’s fifth cause of action.
On
June 16, 2023, this court denied LaundryLux’s ex parte applications for
writs of possession for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.
On
January 5, 2024, Department 53 overruled Castro and Ortiz’s demurrer to the
FAC.
On
January 7, 2024, Castro and Ortiz filed and served the Cross-Complaint.
On
January 8, 2024, Ortiz and Castro filed an Answer to the FAC.
B.
Applicable Law
Attachment
is a prejudgment remedy providing for the seizure of one or more of the
defendant’s assets to aid in the collection of a money demand pending the
outcome of the trial of the action. See
Whitehouse v. Six Corporation, (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 533. In 1972, and in a 1977 comprehensive
revision, the Legislature enacted attachment legislation (CCP §481.010 et
seq.) that meets the due process requirements set forth in Randone v.
Appellate Department, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536.
See Western Steel & Ship Repair v. RMI, (12986) 176
Cal.App.3d 1108, 1115. As the attachment
statutes are purely the creation of the Legislature, they are strictly
construed. Vershbow v. Reiner,
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882.
A
writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for
money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the
total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount
not less than five hundred dollars ($500).
CCP §483.010(a). A claim is
“readily ascertainable” where the amount due may be clearly ascertained from
the contract and calculated by evidence; the fact that damages are unliquidated
is not determinative. CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc., (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
537, 540-41 (attachment appropriate for claim based on rent calculation for
lease of commercial equipment).
All
property within California of a corporation, association, or partnership is
subject to attachment if there is a method of levy for the property. CCP §487.010(a), (b). While a trustee is a natural person, a trust
is not. Therefore, a trust’s property is
subject to attachment on the same basis as a corporation or partnership. Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn &
Rossi v. Wilson, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at 4.
If
the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be
issued only on a commercial claim which arises out of the defendant’s conduct
of a trade, business, or profession. CCP
§483.010(c). Consumer transactions
cannot form a basis for attachment. CCP
§483.010(c); Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, (1987)
197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (action involving trust property was a commercial, not a
consumer, transaction).
The
plaintiff may apply for a right to attach order by noticing a hearing for the
order and serving the defendant with summons and complaint, notice of the
application, and supporting papers any time after filing the complaint. CCP §484.010.
Notice of the application must be given pursuant to CCP section 1005,
sixteen court days before the hearing. See
ibid.
The
notice of the application and the application may be made on Judicial Council
forms (Optional Forms AT-105, 115). The
application must be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the
facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the
attachment is based. CCP §484.030.
Where
the defendant is a corporation, a general reference to “all corporate property
which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil
Procedure Section 487.010” is sufficient.
CCP §484.020(e). Where the
defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to
“all property of the partnership or other unincorporated association which is
subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure
Section 487.010” is sufficient. CCP
§484.020(e). A specific description of
property is not required for corporations and partnerships as they generally
have no exempt property. Bank of
America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc., (“Bank of America”) (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 260, 268.
Where
the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property must be
reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property
sought to be attached. CCP §484.020(e). Although the property must be specifically
described, the plaintiff may target for attachment everything the individual
defendant owns. Bank of America v.
Salinas Nissan, Inc., (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268.
A
defendant who opposes issuance of the order must file and serve a notice of
opposition and supporting affidavit as required by CCP section 484.060 not
later than five court days prior to the date set for hearing. CCP §484.050(e). The notice of opposition may be made on a
Judicial Council form (Optional Form AT-155).
The
plaintiff may file and serve a reply two court days prior to the date set for
the hearing. CCP §484.060(c).
At
the hearing, the court determines whether the plaintiff should receive a right
to attach order and whether any property which the plaintiff seeks to attach is
exempt from attachment. The defendant
may appear the hearing. CCP
§484.050(h). The court generally will
evaluate the attachment application based solely on the pleadings and
supporting affidavits without taking additional evidence. Bank of America, supra, 207
Cal.App.3d at 273. A verified complaint may be used in lieu of or in addition
to an affidavit if it states evidentiary facts.
CCP §482.040. The plaintiff has the
burden of proof, and the court is not required to accept as true any affidavit
even if it is undisputed. See Bank
of America, supra, at 271, 273.
The
court may issue a right to attach order (Optional Form AT-120) if the plaintiff
shows all of the following: (1) the claim on which the attachment is based is
one on which an attachment may be issued (CCP §484.090(a)(1)); (2) the
plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim (CCP
§484.090(a)(2)); (3) attachment is sought for no purpose other than the
recovery on the subject claim (CCP §484.090(a)(3); and (4) the amount to be
secured by the attachment is greater than zero (CCP §484.090(a)(4)).
A
claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the
plaintiff will recover on that claim.
CCP §481.190. In determining this
issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the
respective parties. Kemp Bros.
Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp., (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474,
1484. The court does not determine
whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made at trial
and is not affected by the decision on the application for the order. CCP §484.050(b).
Except
in unlawful detainer actions, the amount to be secured by the attachment is the
sum of (1) the amount of the defendant’s indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff,
and (2) any additional amount included by the court for estimate of costs and
any allowable attorneys’ fees under CCP section 482.110. CCP §483.015(a); Goldstein v. Barak
Construction, (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 852. This amount must be reduced by the sum of (1)
the amount of indebtedness that the defendant has in a money judgment against plaintiff,
(2) the amount claimed in a cross-complaint or affirmative defense and shown
would be subject to attachment against the plaintiff, and (3) the value of any
security interest held by the plaintiff in the defendant’s property, together
with the amount by which the acts of the plaintiff (or a prior holder of the
security interest) have decreased that security interest’s value. CCP §483.015(b). A defendant claiming that the amount to be
secured should be reduced because of a cross-claim or affirmative defense must
make a prima facie showing that the claim would result in an attachment
against the plaintiff.
Before
the issuance of a writ of attachment, the plaintiff is required to file an
undertaking to pay the defendant any amount the defendant may recover for any
wrongful attachment by the plaintiff in the action. CCP §489.210.
The undertaking ordinarily is $10,000. CCP §489.220. If the defendant objects, the court may
increase the amount of undertaking to the amount determined as the probable
recovery for wrongful attachment. CCP
§489.220. The court also has inherent
authority to increase the amount of the undertaking sua sponte. North Hollywood Marble Co. v. Superior
Court, (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683, 691.
C. Statement of Facts
On
March 28, 2018, Ortiz and Castro entered into the Note for $119,786.93 in
exchange for a security interest in the Equipment. Miguel Decl., ¶4, Ex. 1.[2] Under the Note, Ortiz and Castro promised to
pay $119,786.93 plus 8.49% annual interest.
Miguel Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1. Should they
default for failure to make payments within ten days of the due date, they
would be charged a 5% late penalty.
Miguel Decl., Ex. 1. All future
payments would also become immediately due and payable with 15.9% annual
interest. Miguel Decl., ¶10, Ex. 1. LaundryLux would be entitled to recover
attorney’s fees for enforcement of the Note, defined as 15% of the amount then
owed, plus costs. Miguel Decl., ¶10, Ex.
1.
Ortiz and Castro also signed a Guaranty that
held each personally liable for the debts incurred through the Note. Miguel Decl., ¶4, Ex. 1.
On
June 12, 2020, Ortiz, on behalf of herself and Castro, executed and delivered
the Amended Note. Miguel Decl., ¶6, Ex.
2. The Amended Note changed the payment
schedule to 135 payments of $1,500 and a final payment of $2,738.70 on October
10, 2031. Miguel Decl., ¶6, Ex. 2. Any missed payment would automatically result
in default on the Note. Miguel Decl.,
¶6, Ex. 2.
Ortiz
and Castro’s payment history shows they have not made a payment since April 29,
2022, and therefore have defaulted.
Miguel Decl., ¶9, Ex. 3. They owe
$122,462.34 of the principal balance, plus $27,260.12 in interest at the
default rate of 15.9% from April 29, 2022.
Miguel Decl., ¶¶ 9-10, Ex. 3. They
also owe attorney’s fees of 15% of $122,462.34, or $18,369.30. Miguel Decl., ¶10. Financial Manager Antonio Miguel (“Miguel”)
asserts that LaundryLux has incurred
$2,096.11 in costs. Miguel Decl., ¶¶ 1, 10.
LaundryLux
seeks attachment to recover on amounts owed and not for any other purpose. Miguel Decl., ¶11.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff
LaundryLux applies for right to attach orders against Defendants Ortiz and
Castro in the amount of $168,091.76, including $18,369.30 in attorney’s fees
and $2,096.11 in costs.
1. Procedural Defect
The notice of the application and
the application may be made on Judicial Council forms (Optional Forms AT-105,
115). A separate form must be used for
each Defendant. LaundryLux submits a
single application for right to attach orders against both Defendants. The application is procedurally defective.
2. Evidentiary Defects
When any matter is required or
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn
statement, declaration, or affidavit in writing of the person making the same, such
matter may be proven by unsworn declaration in writing of such person which
recites that it is certified or declared by him or her to be true under penalty
of perjury, is subscribed by him or her, and (1) if executed within this state,
states the date and place of execution; or (2) if executed at any place, within
or without this state, states the date of execution and that it is so certified
or declared under the laws of the State of California. CCP §2015.5.
LaundryLux’s only evidence submitted
with the moving papers is Miguel’s declaration.
Defendants object that Miguel did not make this declaration under
penalty of perjury. Opp. at 4. The court agrees. Additionally, the declaration was executed in
New York and Miguel did not state that it was made under the perjury laws of
California. It also does not state that the
information is true and correct. The
declaration fails to comply with CCP section 2015.5 and iis inadmissible.
LaundryLux attempts
to cure these defects in reply with a substantively identical declaration from
Miguel that complies with CCP section 2015.5.
LaundryLux cites Runkle v. Lane, (“Runkle”) (1940) 40 Cal.
App. 2d 654, 656, which held that the plaintiff unquestionably had the right to
file an amendment to the affidavit for attachment. The timing of that affidavit is unstated in
the opinion and it was based on a CCP section 558 which has been repealed. Id.
This case does not establish that the moving party cure a defective
declaration after the defendant objects.
LaundryLux asserts
that Defendants cannot claim any prejudice because they had the opportunity to
respond to the merits of Miguel’s unsworn declaration, which are identical to
the merits of his reply declaration.
Reply at 2.
Prejudice is not the
issue. Strict compliance is required
with statutory requirements for affidavits for attachment (Anaheim National
Bank v. Kraemer, (1932) 120 Cal.App. 63, 65), and technical defects in a
declaration for failure to comply with CCP section 2015.5 precludes its use as
an evidentiary document. CCP §482.040
(facts stated in affidavit must be set forth with particularity); Witchell
v. Korne, (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 965, 975.
The court must apply the same evidentiary standard to the declarations
in an attachment hearing as to a case tried on oral testimony. VFS Financing, Inc. v. CHF Express, LLC,
(2009) (C.D. Cal.) 620 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1096-97.
The declarant must show personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and
such evidence must be admissible and not objectionable. Id.
LaundryLux asserts that, if this
court will not consider Miguel’s declaration, it can treat the verified FAC as
an affidavit in support of the application.
CCP §482.040. Reply at 2. Not so because LaundryLux is a limited
liability company. When the plaintiff is
a non-natural person and its officer verifies the complaint, it cannot be used as
an affidavit or declaration establishing the facts therein alleged. CCP §446(a).
The FAC cannot serve as evidence.
LaundryLux also asserts that Law
Revision Commission Comments to CCP section 484.030 indicates that the
application itself may contain the necessary supporting evidence. Reply at 2-3.
The application may therefore constitute a sufficient affidavit. Id.
The application
suffers from the same defect as the verified FAC. It is signed by Migeul, an officer, and not
an individual plaintiff. Additionally, the
application includes evidence and only refers to the inadmissible FAC and
Miguel’s declaration. It cannot provide
the necessary support for the application.
LaundryLux alternatively asks the
court to exercise its authority under CCP section 484.090(d) to receive and
consider additional evidence at the hearing “upon good cause shown,” including
Miguel’s reply declaration. Reply at
3.
LaundryLux has
failed to show good cause. It cannot
explain why Miguel did not make his original declaration under penalty of California
perjury law. Moreover, this is
LaundryLux’s third failed application for a provisional remedy and the court is
not inclined to exercise its discretion favorably towards it.
Because LaundryLux failed to provide
any admissible evidence to support its application, the application is denied.[3] LaundryLux
may not renew its application without full compliance with CCP section 1008(b),
including its due diligence requirement.
[1] Defendants
Castro and Ortiz failed to lodge a courtesy copy of their opposition, in
violation of the Presiding Judge’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory
Electronic Filing. Their counsel is
admonished to provide courtesy copies in all future filings for this case or
they will not be considered.
[2] The submitted
copy of the Note is a low-quality scan that is barely legible. Miguel Decl., ¶5, Ex. 1. Counsel is advised to ensure that exhibits
are readable.
[3] The
application also fails to address, for both Defendants who are natural persons,
that LaundryLux’s claim is based on a commercial claim which arises out of the
defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession. CCP §483.010(c). Consumer transactions cannot form a basis for
attachment. CCP §483.010(c); Kadison,
Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson, (“Kadison”) (1987)
197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (action involving trust property was a commercial, not a
consumer, transaction).
The application further seeks to attach, aside from the
Equipment, “All property subject to attachment” under CCP section
487.010(c). Where the defendant is a
natural person, the description of the property must be reasonably adequate to
permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be
attached. CCP §484.020(e). The description fails to provide Castro and
Ortiz with sufficient notice of what property LaundryLux seeks to attach and is
inadequate.