Judge James C. Chalfant, Case 22STCV28564 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Christina Development Corp. (“Christina”) applies for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant Steven Raymond Short (“Short”) from (1) contacting Christina, its employees, or tenants by any means; and (2) coming within 100 feet of any property owned or managed by Christina and its affiliates.

The court has read and considered the moving papers and supplemental briefing, the opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Plaintiff Christina commenced this proceeding on September 1, 2022, alleging (1) tortious interference with contractual relations, (2) defamation, (3) civil harassment, (4) conversion, and (5) breach of contract. The Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Christina is a real estate investment company that owns and manages rental properties in the West Los Angeles area. In 2017, it hired Short as its Vice President of Property Operations. Short represented in his application that he had significant work experience as a property manager, he had worked continuously in the industry for nearly 15 years, and that his record was clean.

In truth, Short has at least six felony convictions, multiple violent misdemeanors, and repeated driving infractions. He is also a registered sex offender; his convictions include a guilty plea to rape of and lewd acts with a 14-year-old. During the time that he claimed he was managing properties, he actually was in prison. He used fake references to give an impression of otherwise. Although Christina performed a background check, the false information kept Christina from discovering the truth.

As part of his employment, Short signed an Employee Confidentiality Agreement (“Confidentiality Agreement”) that identified all company documents as confidential information that Short could not use or disclose without written authorization. The Confidentiality Agreement also provided that Short must return all company documents and property upon termination of his employment.

In 2022, one of the tenants reported that Short had told her that he knew she showered with her bathroom door open. Short also had repeatedly entered her unit without notice and made uninvited physical contact with her. Christina suspended Short, investigated, and discovered his criminal history. Christina fired Short and told him to return his work computer, all building keys, and all other company property in his possession.

Short refused to return his computer and other property for weeks, and he evaded Christina’s calls and emails. When he returned his computer, he had wiped the hard drive of all information and documents. Christina also learned that, on the day of his suspension, Short uploaded hundreds of company documents with confidential information to an unauthorized Dropbox account in violation of his Confidentiality Agreement.

Short returned his keys after several weeks, claiming that he left other keys at Christina’s Playa del Rey building. This was a lie; there were never keys at that location.

In March 2022, Short telephoned Christina’s Chief Financial Officer and demanded $300,000 to prevent him from going “nuclear.” Christina refused and reported the threat to the sheriff.

Short then sent letters to tenants claiming that he has been onsite after his termination and will do so again. He has disclosed the private and confidential information of Christina’s executives.

On August 15, 2022, he used his claim of there being keys in one of the buildings that went missing to send a mass letter to all tenants claiming that because of the lost keys, a criminal can get into anyone’s apartment in the near or distant future and that tenants were in peril. This was intended to instill fear and panic in the tenants.

On August 24, 2022, Short mass-mailed another letter with the same allegations but also claimed that Christina does a ton of work not approved by the city, hides things from city inspectors when the work is approved, has committed mortgage/loan fraud multiple times, and uses dirty tricks to scare or evict low-paying and COVID-19 tenants protected by rent control. He further alleged that some of its executives were racist and derogatory towards women. None of these allegations are true.

Short has indicated via email that he will continue to contact tenants if he chooses and will not change his behavior.

Christina seeks a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction enjoining Short and his agents (1) from contacting or communicating any of Christina’s tenants, (2) from traveling onto or coming within 50 feet of any apartment property that Christina owns or manages, and (3) compelling Short to return all of Christina’s property in his possession. Christina also seeks compensatory damages with interest, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.

On September 8, 2022, the court heard Christina’s ex parte application for a TRO and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction (“OSC”) to enjoin Short Short and his agents (1) from contacting or communicating any of Christina’s tenants, (2) from traveling onto or coming within 50 feet of any apartment property that Christina owns or manages, and (3) compelling Short to return all of Christina’s property in his possession within two days. Also on September 8, 2022, Christina served Short with the Complaint and Summons and moving ex parte papers. At the hearing, the court granted a TRO/OSC for the first two only, concluding that the property to be returned was not specifically identified.

On September 13, 2022, the court heard and denied Short’s ex parte application to (a) modify the TRO and (b) seal the case and prevent Christina from disclosing his sex offender status and purported criminal record.

On September 28, 2022, Christina filed an ex parte application to compel production of Short’s Dropbox account for forensic examination. The I/C court, Department 29 (Hon. Elaine Lu), will hear the application on September 29, 2022.

An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. CCP §525. An injunction may be more completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[1] It is an equitable remedy available generally in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623. The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Voorhies v. Greene (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court, (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.

A preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a noticed motion. The complaint normally must plead injunctive relief. CCP §526(a)(1)-(2).[2] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based on a verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate, facts. See CCP §527(a). For this reason, a pleading alone rarely suffices. Weil & Brown, California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. O’Connell v. Superior Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. CCP §526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of “inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v. Blue Cross of California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. Doe v. Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Carlson, (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.

A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. See CCP §529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.

Christina is a real estate investment company that specializes in multi-family properties in ultra-prime locations. Whitehead Decl., ¶2. The tenants are a mix of families and individuals, all of whom signs leases with Christina. Whitehead Decl., ¶3. Christina’s business has a reputation for premium locations, professionalism, and safety. Whitehead Decl., ¶3.

On July 20, 2017, Short applied to be Christina’s Vice President of Property Operations, or Property Management Director. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7, Ex. A. This employee must interface with tenants, handle their personal information, work with them to address issues in their units, and visit tenants at home to ensure problems are addressed. Whitehead Decl., ¶6. Short claimed that he had 16 years of similar experience in two past jobs, that he never was discharged or asked to resign from employment, that he had not been disciplined in the last 12 months with his former employer, and that his colleagues rated him a nine out of ten. Whitehead Decl., ¶7, Ex. A. The signature page of the application required Short to swear to the truth of all claims therein. Whitehead Decl., ¶7, Ex. A.

The application did not ask if Short had a criminal record or was a sex offender; it only asked if he had any driving tickets to which he replied in the negative. Whitehead Decl., ¶7, Ex. A. Christina had CreditLink Corporation (“CreditLink”) run a background check on Short that did not reveal any criminal history or other discrepancies in his application. Whitehead Decl., ¶8. Christina therefore hired Short. Whitehead Decl., ¶8.

In April 2020, Short signed the Confidentiality Agreement, whereby he agreed to safeguard Christina’s confidential information. Whitehead Decl., ¶9, Ex. B. The Confidentiality Agreement broadly defined “confidential information” as “all information belonging to the Company that is not a Protected Disclosure and has actual or potential economic value to the Company from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.” Whitehead Decl., ¶9, Ex. B. Short also agreed to not disclose any confidential or proprietary information obtained from third parties for which the Company has a duty to maintain confidentiality and use only for limited purposes. Whitehead Decl., ¶9, Ex. B. Upon termination of employment, Short agreed to deliver to Christina, and not retain, all confidential information and other materials belonging to Christina, including any information or property Short developed as part of his employment. Whitehead Decl., ¶9, Ex. B.

On January 5, 2022, a female tenant at one of Christina’s buildings alleged that Short sexually harassed, stalked, and intimidated her and other female tenants. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. C. She alleged that Short told her he knows she doesn’t close the shower door when she showers. Ex. C. She had seen him look in her window, which made his comments more disturbing. Ex. C. He has also flailed his arms and claimed she was harassing him when she did nothing to provoke this response. Ex. C. Short employed overt flirtatious body language and tone while visiting the woman’s unit. Ex. C. Short has entered her unit under the pretense of needing to do maintenance but without either doing maintenance or brining someone else to do it. Ex. C. Short also entered her unit with his key and without 24-hour notice or prior discussion about his visit. Ex. C.

Other tenants have warned new tenants about him. Ex. C. His behavior and history also made the cameras around the premises unnerving, as another tenant has claimed Short watches the footage for amusement. Ex. C. Short had told the complainant that he was following management’s instructions. She requested that Christina replace Short with a property manager who is not a threat to tenants. Ex. C.

This was the first indication Christina had that Short had lied about his background. Whitehead Decl., ¶12. On February 3, 2022, it launched an investigation and placed Short on probation. Whitehead Decl., ¶12; Rosenkranz Decl., ¶5. From then on, Christina monitored Short’s email address to ensure someone else handled his responsibilities. Rosenkranz Decl., ¶4.

The investigation revealed that Short has a plethora of criminal convictions, misdemeanors, and traffic violations across California, Alabama, Utah, and Oregon. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 13-27, Exs. D-Q. This included a nolo contendre conviction in Los Angeles County on February 2, 2005 for the rape of and lewd acts with a 14-year-old girl, for which Short served three years in prison. Whitehead Decl., ¶14, Ex. D. It also included a guilty plea for forgery, identity theft, theft by false pretenses, and burglary on July 5, 2005. Whitehead Decl., ¶15, Ex. E. Christina also discovered that Short is a registered sex offender. Whitehead Decl., ¶28, Ex. R.

Christina determined that Short lied on his job application about prior employment. Whitehead Decl., ¶29. Neither of the listed employers existed at the addresses provided. Whitehead Decl., ¶29. Christina therefore terminated his employment on February 15, 2022. Whitehead Decl., ¶30, Ex. S.

Pursuant to the Confidentiality Agreement, Christina informed Short that another employee would arrange for pickup of all company property and that he needed to disconnect his devices from any applications that may enable access to company data or property. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 30-31, Ex. S.

When Chief Financial Officer Vincent Chan (“Chan”) called Short to arrange for pickup of the property, Short demanded that Christina pay him $300,000 and threatened to “go nuclear” if it did not. Chan Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. He threatened to take down a tenant who had reported him for misconduct and ruin Christina’s reputation with renters and business partners. Chan Decl., ¶5. Short also threatened to contact the attorney general. Chan Decl., ¶5. Christina refused to give in to extortion. Chan Decl., ¶6.

For weeks after termination, Short evaded calls and emails and did not return company property; he occasionally scheduled a drop-off time but then cancelled. Whitehead Decl., ¶32. When he did return the company laptop in March 2022 after the sheriff contacted him, Christina discovered that Short had deleted all files and documents on it without explanation. Whitehead Decl., ¶33. To date, he has not returned the data that was on the laptop. Whitehead Decl., ¶33.

Short also waited weeks before he returned a set of keys to Christina properties. Whitehead Decl., ¶34. He then claimed that he left some of his other keys at Christina’s Playa del Rey building. Whitehead Decl., ¶34. When Christina checked the building, it found no keys there. Whitehead Decl., ¶34. Christina now believes that Short lied about leaving the keys there. Whitehead Decl., ¶34.

On March 2, 2022, Christina filed a report with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department; the investigation is ongoing. Chan Decl., ¶6; Whitehead Decl., ¶35. Since then, Short contacted Christina’s tenants on multiple occasions claiming it only fired him because he had reported shady dealings at some properties. Whitehead Decl., ¶36, Ex. T.

On March 3, 2022, in response to Christina’s requests that he not contact Christina tenants, Short sent an email (“March 3 email”) to its counsel Ira Steinberg, Esq. (“Steinberg”) contending that development owner Larry Taylor (“Taylor”) is an idiot posing as a genius just because he made money in real estate and ridiculing another employee and Steinberg for their loyalty to Taylor. Whitehead Decl., ¶39, Ex. W.

The March 3 email said that Short would not stop telling “the truth” about Christina to anyone, including residents. Whitehead Decl., ¶39, Ex. W. He would contact residents whenever he wanted, whether because he found it necessary and advantageous, wanted to say hello, help them out, or just offer advice, and Christina could not do anything to stop him. Ex. W. Short asserted that the $300,000 he asked for in response to Taylor’s offer of severance pay was fair. Ex. W. Short was willing to honor any document that he signed without fraudulent inducement, whereas everyone at Christina was a liar and cheater. Ex. W. His behavior was not going to change, so if Christina was going to do something about it, it should just do it. Ex. W.

On August 15, 2022, Short mass-mailed a letter (“August 15 Letter”) to tenants at each of Christina’s approximately 80 apartment units. Whitehead Decl., ¶37, Ex. U. Entitled “MASTER KEYS TO YOUR APARTMENT STOLEN,” the letter claimed that master keys at Christina’s Playa del Rey building were either lost or stolen. Ex. U. Short stated that Christina has not changed the locks or even informed tenants of the breach. Ex. U. Short then explained the ramifications, saying that a criminal could use the master keys to get into apartments whenever they wanted, especially since the keys are labeled with the address of the apartments. Ex. U. Changing the locks would be a smart and cheap option for Christina, yet it had not done so despite how much money Short claimed the company has wasted. Ex. U. This was a critical breach in the lease. Ex. U. Short alleged that Christina’s owner Taylor had changed the lock for his corporate office. Ex. U.

On August 22, 2022, Short sent another letter (“August 22 Letter”) with the same title and with additional accusations. Whitehead Decl., ¶38, Ex. V. The letter pointed out that Christina’s responses to his last letter never said that there were no master keys, that Short never had any, or that said keys were not lost; it just said they were not stolen. Ex. V. Whatever the explanation was, even if Short in fact had the keys, the only point that mattered was that the keys are unaccounted for. Ex. V.

The August 22 Letter then goes on to disparage Christina, contending that it does a lot of work not approved by the city and hides things from building inspectors when working on city-approved projects. Ex. V. Short also alleged that Christina had committed mortgage and loan fraud, and that it used dirty tricks to scare and evict low-paying or COVID-19 tenants protected by rent control. Ex. V. Short accused David Whitehead (“Whitehead”) of making disgusting comments about female rental applicants and making their lives hell through petty arguments. Ex. V. He also accused Taylor of making multiple racist comments. Ex. V.

Since Short’s letters, at least 14 tenants have requested that Christina change its locks; Christina complied despite knowing that Short’s claims were false. Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶7, Ex. 7 (Whitehead Supp. Decl., ¶4).

Christina has obtained declarations from seven tenants – Connor Wilks, Lauren Ryker, Mark Leventen, Paul Weinberger, Mikol Biljanic, Barbara Tfank, and Peter Markham -- expressing their concerns with Short, either in general or as to the letters he sent. Frid Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, Exs. 2-7; Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶4, Ex. 9. Other have refused to sign declarations for fear of Short retaliating. Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶6, Ex. 7 (Whitehead Supp. Decl., ¶3).

After the August 15 Letter, Christina mass-mailed a response that denied the keys were stolen and alleged that Short’s letter was baseless retaliation for his termination. Opp. Ex. 3. The response warned tenants not to trust Short of allow him onto the property. Opp. Ex. 3. When Short sent the August 22 Letter in response, he attached emails from March 2022 between himself and Christina in which the company told Short that the keys were not where he said they were. Opp. Ex. 5.

On February 17, 2022, Christina asked Short via email if he would be interested in some form of termination pay. In response, he later asked for $300,000 over the phone. Opp. Ex. 7. The email also reaffirmed Christina’s position that it fired him because he lied on his application about his criminal background, not because a tenant complained about him. Opp. Ex. 7.

On November 25, 2018, another employee DJ Chomyk (“Chomyk”) accused Taylor of only hiring him to find a way to (1) circumvent rent control laws by re-instituting a two-tier lease structure, and (2) get employees to rent vacant apartments under construction. Opp. Ex. 9. When Taylor realized that Chomyk would not do so, he minimized Chomyk’s role and created a hostile work environment. Opp. Ex. 9.

Rent Stabilization Information Coordinator Anwar Zraikat (“Zraikat”) has sent two letters to Christina asking to meet to resolve tenant issues, including the improper service of 3-day notices, confusion with leases, and alleged threats from the landlords. Opp. Exs. 10-11.

Short sent one of the August Letters to a tenant that he called a “Certified Unhinged Unemployed Nasty Tenant.” Rosenkranz Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. The beginning letters were all capitalized as if to spell “CUUNT.” Rosenkranz Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1.

Short objected to the TRO because he had friends at Christina’s property and needed to visit them when a serious matter like the missing keys arose. Frid Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. An injunction that prevented him from warning tenants that they should switch their locks would infringe on his First Amendment freedom of speech. Ex. 1. The court replied that while Short’s desire to protect his friends could be grounds to exempt them from any injunction, but he no longer had a business reason for contacting anyone else after being fired. Ex. 1. If the keys are missing, Christina is responsible; Short is not. Ex. 1. The court stated that the restraint did not limit what Short said – just to whom he could say it. Ex. 1. At the same time, the court ordered Christina to obtain declarations from tenants that Short’s presence and communication made them uncomfortable. Ex. 1.

Plaintiff Christina seeks a preliminary injunction against Defendant Short to enjoin him from (1) contacting Christina, its employees, or its tenants by any means; and (2) coming within 100 feet of any property owned or managed by Christina and affiliates.

Christina alleges it can prevail on its claims for tortious interference with contractual relations, defamation, civil harassment, breach of contract, and conversion. App. at 15-18. The court has already held that it cannot grant a preliminary injunction based on defamation. Frid Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. In any case, the court need only address the claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.

To prevail on a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. Reeves v. Hanlon (2004), 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1148.

The contracts at issue are the leases Christina has with each tenant. Whitehead Decl., ¶3. Short knew about them because he was Christina’s Vice President of Property Operations, in which role he handled tenants’ personal information. Whitehead Decl., ¶6. He sent two August Letters to tenants alleging that the master keys were stolen and could be used to break into any apartment. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 37-38, Exs. U-V. The letters categorized this as a breach by Christina. Whitehead Decl., ¶37, Ex. U. As a result of Short’s letters and at its own expense, Christina has had to change the locks for 14 tenants. Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶6, Ex. 7 (Whitehead Supp. Decl., ¶4). To the extent that Christina’s business stems from its reputation for safety, Short has compromised that image for current and prospective tenants. Whitehead Decl., ¶3.

At issue is whether those letters disrupt Christina’s contractual relationships with its tenants. App. at 16. Short contends that the letters merely informed tenants of legitimate concerns to their safety. Opp. at 5.

The parties do not dispute that Christina does not have the master keys Short claims to have lost, but their explanations differ. Short alleges that he left the keys at a building owned by Christina. Opp. Ex. 5; Whitehead Decl., ¶34. Because Christina failed to retrieve the keys on time, a malicious third party might have them, so he decided to warn tenants. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 37-38, Exs. U-V. Christina responds that Short never left the keys at that location but kept them to give credence to his letters. Whitehead Decl., ¶34. Short’s letters claim that a criminal can enter at any time, which Christina views as a threat that the person entering would be Short. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 37-38, Exs. U-V. In opposition, Short asks why he would wait five months between telling Christina that the keys were lost and sending those letters. Opp. Ex. 5. Since neither party provides evidence where the keys are, neither party has proved that Short has the keys or plans to use them himself to fulfill his threat.

Although it has not shown that Short has the keys, Christina has shown that Short’s communications with its tenants are disruptive. Short’s opposition suggests that the keys are missing, he has a legitimate cause for concern for the tenants, and Christina had not taken any action to protect its tenants. Whitehead Decl., ¶¶ 37-38, Exs. U-V; Opp. Ex. 5. Although he claimed in his March 3 email that Christina cannot stop him from seeing the tenants, he never intended this to be a threat to hurt them. Opp. at 7; Whitehead Decl., ¶39, Ex. W.

Short’s position is untenable. As the court informed him, he no longer works for Christina and has no legitimate reason to contact Christina’s tenants as tenants. Any further contact with tenants by him is deliberately disruptive. The court asked Short to provide evidence of any tenants who want to remain in contact with him in pursuit of a friendship or personal relationship and he has provided none. Frid Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. Christina also shows that Short addressed one such letter to “Certified Unhinged Unemployed Nasty Tenant,” which may be inferred to use an offensive acronym. Rosenkranz Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. This fact supports a conclusion that Short motives are vindictive, and this conclusion is supported by fact that the August 22 Letter contains allegations unrelated to the master keys that are prejudicial to Christina’s business relationship with its tenants. Whitehead Decl., ¶38, Ex. V.

Christina has demonstrated a probability of success on the claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the second factor which a trial court examines is the interim harm that plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach, (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177. This factor involves consideration of the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. Id.

The opposition fails to show that Short would any harm suffer if a preliminary injunction is granted. He claims that a restraint would allow Christina to keep him from disclosing harmful information to tenants. Opp. at 5. That harm is not a harm to Short. In any event, the court has determined that tenant welfare is no longer his concern. As stated, the court gave Short the opportunity to identify tenants with whom he has a personal relationship and he failed to do so. Frid Reply Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1; Reply at 4.

Christina has shown harm to its business reputation if injunctive relief is not granted. Christina has provided declarations from seven tenants who do not want any further contact from Short. Short points out that the declarations are identical in wording and tone, thereby showing that Christina’s counsel drafted them. Opp. at 4. True, but the tenants signed the declarations as their own words. Short also claims that two of the tenants (Connor Wilks and Paul Weinberger) are Christina’s employees, but he provides no evidence of that fact. Opp. at 4. Short further asserts that the other five tenants live in the property where the complaining tenant told everyone else that he is a sex offender. Opp. at 4. Again, there is no evidence. But even if this is true, it does not affect the fact that numerous tenants do not want to hear from him. Christina also presents evidence that other tenants do not want any further contact from Short but are too afraid of retaliation to sign a declaration. Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶6, Ex. 7 (Whitehead Supp. Decl., ¶3).

Christina also has shown monetary harm. The company has had to change the locks for 14 tenants because of Short’s claim. Frid Sept. 13 Decl., ¶6, Ex. 7 (Whitehead Supp. Decl., ¶4). While Short frames this as an admission that the master keys are lost, the company’s decision to put those tenants at ease is understandable. Opp. at 5. Without an injunction, Short can continue to spread his rumor and increase the cost to Christina from lock changes. The balance of harms favors granting the preliminary injunction.

The application for a preliminary injunction is granted. The court must require a bond supporting the preliminary injunction.¿ The purpose of a bond is to cover the defendant’s damages from an improvidently issued injunction.¿ CCP §529(a).¿ In setting the bond, the court must assume that the preliminary injunction was wrongly issued.¿ Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 15.¿ As noted above, Short has not alleged harm to himself beyond his capacity as a former Christina employee. The bond will be set at $1000.

[1] The courts look to the substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.

[2] However, a court may issue an injunction to maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).

[3] Because the scope of the OSC does not include the return of Christina’s documents, the evidence on this subject is mostly excluded.