Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 23STCP002565, Date: 2024-09-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCP002565 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 85
John Doe v. Los Angeles
Community College Board of Trustees, 23STCP002565
Tentative decision on petition for writ of mandate: denied
Petitioner John Doe[1]
moves for a writ of mandate compelling Respondent California Office of
Administrative Hearings (“OAH”)[2]
to set aside its decision upholding his dismissal.
The
court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders
the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of the Case
1.
Petition
Petitioner
Doe commenced this proceeding on July 21, 2023.
He filed the the First Amended Petition (“FAP”), which is the operative
pleading, on October 4, 2023, alleging a cause of action for administrative
mandamus against Respondent OAH and also naming the District’s Board of
Trustees as Real Party-in-Interest. The
FAP alleges in pertinent part as follows.
Petitioner Doe at all relevant times was an employee of Los
Angeles City College (“LACC”). Pet., ¶1.
Extended Opportunity Programs & Services (“EOPS”) is a
state-funded program to support students who are poor and have fewer
educational opportunities. Services offered through EOPS include registration
assistance, priority registration, EOPS mandatory orientations, academic
counseling, book services, individualized and in-class tutoring, textbook
assistance, and transfer information.
Pet., ¶41.
In 2014, Senate Bill 1023 authorized the California
Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office to fund up to ten community college
districts to support the postsecondary education of current and former foster
youth through establishment of the Cooperating Agencies Foster Youth
Educational Support (“CAFYES”) program, which was later renamed “NextUp.”[3]
CAFYES is a targeted program to assist college-level foster youth in addition
to other college programs. Pet., ¶42.
CAFYES expands upon the services provided through EOPS and
is intended to serve the reduction in poverty and criminal involvement of youth
who have been in foster care in California. Students must meet strict
eligibility criteria to receive support from the CAFYES program. Pet., ¶43.
On August 28, 2016, Doe was hired as a full-time
Counselor/Coordinator for the CAFYES program at LACC. Pet., ¶58. Doe is a unicorn among foster youth, having
overcome extreme hardship, victimization including rape, and tremendous odds
(only a small percentage of foster youth graduate from college) to land a dream
position at LACC in which he could support and advocate for foster youth. Pet., ¶46.
The false allegations against Doe appear to have started
with part-time student worker A.B. Pet.,
¶70. In March 2017, at the
recommendation of the LACC bookstore manager, Doe hired A.B. as one of four
student workers in the CAFYES program (the other student workers were K.S., J.E.,
and A.P.). Pet., ¶71. A.B. proved to be unproductive, inefficient,
and had a negative attitude, complained when asked to do her job, would not
follow directions, and arrived late to work. Pet., ¶72.
It was difficult for Doe to supervise A.B. because she would become
upset, rude, and disrespectful when he tried to give her directions. Pet., ¶73.
In or around April or May 2017, about two months after she
started working for the CAFYES program, Doe informed A.B. that he intended to
remove her due to poor job performance. Pet., ¶73.
In May 2017, A.B. complained about Doe to LACC Dean and
Title IX Coordinator Jeanette McGee (“McGee”) regarding what she perceived to
be inappropriate communication of a sexual nature and the use of profanity. Pet., ¶75.
Dean McGee relocated A.B. to another department as a student worker. Pet., ¶76.
On June 1, 2017, A.B. filed a formal written complaint
against Doe for race, sex, and gender discrimination and listed Guardian
Scholars workers L.B. and L.S. and Guardian Scholars student C.A. as witnesses.
Pet., ¶77. A.B. made a false claim that Doe forced her
to work more than 25 hours without pay.
However, all the student workers clocked in and out at EOPS and Doe had
no involvement in LACC payroll. Pet., ¶79.
On June 28, 2017, Title IX Compliance Officer Victoria
Friedman (“Friedman”) provided Doe a Notice of Complaint of Discrimination
informing him that A.B. had made a complaint of discrimination against
him. Pet., ¶81. Doe was notified that A.B.’s complaint
alleged unlawful discrimination based on race, sex, and gender, but no factual
details were provided. Pet., ¶82. On July 12, 2017, Doe provided a written
response, but he could only presume that the complaint was in response to his
decision to dismiss or remove her from her student worker position. Pet., ¶83.
On August 14, 2017, LACC interviewed A.B. and then Doe two
weeks later. Pet., ¶84. LACC took no action on A.B.’s complaint until
June 2018. Pet., ¶86.
LACC staff member Veronica Garcia (“Garcia”) supervised the
Guardian Scholars and was recruiting students to complain against Doe. Pet., ¶85.
I.N. is a foster youth student who was recruited to the
CAFYES program on April 28, 2016, four months before Doe was hired at LACC. Pet.,
¶87. Doe had routine infrequent contact
with I.N., seeing her about once a month and never alone. I.N. apparently had no issues with Doe until
September 28, 2017. Pet., ¶88. On November 9, 2017, I.N. submitted a
Complaint alleging that Doe had engaged in “Unsolicited Unprofessional
Behavior” between September 28 and November 8, 2017. Pet., ¶89.
The gist of I.N.’s allegations was that, starting in late-September
2017, Doe made repeated requests for I.N. to provide a State Foster Care
Verification form and other documents required by CAFYES, making I.N. feel that
the resources she was receiving through CAFYES were being threatened. Pet., ¶90.
I.N. also complained that Doe required I.N. to attend a
workshop on October 12, 2017 in order to receive a $100 gift card that had
already been awarded to her for academic achievement. I.N. further complained
that Doe jokingly asked I.N. on October 12, 2017, in front of her peers, if she
had been “smoking weed.” Pet., ¶91. No action was taken on I.N.'s complaint
initially. Pet., ¶92.
On January 11, 2018, Doe informed Araksia “Roxy” Dovlatyan (“Dovlatyan”)
(EOPS/CAFYES Counselor), Regina Smith (“Smith”) (Vice-President Student
Services), and Drew Yamanishi (“Yamanishi”) (Dean of Student Services) that the
CAFYES program was out of compliance with the Chancellor’s Office’s rules and
regulations, and that students in the CAFYES program were not receiving the
services to which they were entitled by law. Pet., ¶93.
Doe noted that the program required additional staff that had not been
hired, despite LACC’s CAFYES budget of $362,005. Pet., ¶94.
On January 12, 2018, at the EOPS/CARE Region 7 Meeting in
Pasadena, Doe raised similar concerns while speaking to the group for about ten
minutes. Pet., ¶95. Doe reiterated these points to Dean Yaminishi
on January 16, 2018, and to Dovlatyan on January 25, 2018. Pet., ¶96.
On January 25, 2018, Doe filed a grievance against Dean
Yamanishi and Dovlatyan, reporting that he felt discrimination, retaliation,
and unfair treatment because he had been invited to speak about the CAFYES program
at a “Counselor to College Summit” on Friday, January 26, 2018, but the
invitation had been retracted and he was asked to attend a customer service
workshop instead. Pet., ¶98.
Instead of addressing Doe’s complaint, LACC’s Interim
President Mary Gallagher (“Gallagher”) reassigned Doe to split his time between
the positions of CAFYES Counselor and EOPS Counselor and terminated Doe’s
duties as CAFYES Coordinator. Pet., ¶99. All CAFYES leadership responsibilities were
turned over to Dovlatyan. Pet., ¶100.
After no activity in LACC’s investigation since mid-November
2017, on or about June 20, 2018, Doe received a Notice of Investigation and
that he was being placed on paid administrative leave. Pet., ¶102.
Compliance Officer Friedman was the sole investigator and
fact finder for the allegations against Doe. Pet., ¶104.
Investigations at LACC are supposed to be completed within 60 calendar
days, but Friedman’s investigation spanned some 568 days. Pet., ¶108.
LACC staff member Garcia was apparently the key witness and was
interviewed over three days on August 16, 20, and 21, 2018. Pet., ¶105. Doe denied the allegations that he engaged in
sexually inappropriate, discriminatory, and intimidating conduct towards any
LACC students, student workers, or staff and disputed all of the District’s
charges. Pet., ¶109. Friedman interviewed
only one of the 13 witnesses Doe identified as having specific knowledge
regarding the allegations (Pet., ¶106) and determined not to consider Doe’s
complaint of retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Pet., ¶107.
Following the investigation, LACC sought to terminate Doe’s
employment. Pet., ¶110. On May 10, 2021, LACC served Doe with Notice
of Intent To Dismiss or Penalize And Statement Of Charges (“Statement of
Charges”). Pet., ¶111. Under section 87675, the District is
precluded from introducing testimony or evidence relating to matters that
occurred more than four years prior to the date of the filing of the Statement
of Charges. Pet., ¶112.
An administrative hearing was held by videoconference before
Laurie Pearlman, Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”), on February 7 through
11, 24, and 25, March 21 through 23, and 30, April 28, May 6, July 20 and 21,
and August 2 through 4, 2022. Pet., ¶113.
On June 23, 2023, OAH notified Doe that the ALJ issue a
decision to uphold the District’s decision to terminate Doe’s employment. Pet., ¶114.
Doe alleges on information and belief that OAH failed to
conduct a fair trial and the hearing was merely a “rubber stamp” for District’s
flawed administrative process. Pet., ¶¶
117-18. The District’s presentation
during the 18-day hearing was largely a repeat of LACC’s one-sided
investigation, but this time with cross-examination. New witnesses testified that they never even
heard rumors that Doe had ever engaged in misconduct, let alone witnessed
misconduct. Pet., ¶119.
On information and belief, OAH committed abuses of
discretion that were prejudicial to Doe. Without rational basis, OAH simply ratified
the invalid decisions and actions of the District. Pet., ¶120.
On information and belief, OAH’s actions are invalid under CCP section 1094.5
because it committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion and failed to proceed in
the manner required by law. Pet. ¶121.
Doe prays for judgment as follows: (1) mandamus commanding OAH
to set aside the administrative findings, decision, and all sanctions against
him; (2) reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; (3) costs of suit;
and (4) such other and further relief as the court deems proper. Pet. at 17-18.
2.
Course of Proceedings
On
November 2, 2023, the District answered, demurred, and moved to strike portions
of the FAP. The demurrer was
subsequently withdrawn.
On December 12, 2023, the court mostly denied the District’s
motion to strike portions of the FAP (¶’s 49-69 were stricken).
B. Standard of
Review
CCP section 1094.5 is the administrative mandamus provision
which structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions
rendered by administrative agencies. Topanga
Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (“Topanga”)
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15.
CCP section 1094.5 does not in its face specify which cases
are subject to independent review, leaving that issue to the courts. Fukuda v. City of Angels, (“Fukuda”)
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811. In cases
reviewing decisions which affect a vested, fundamental right the trial court
exercises independent judgment on the evidence. Bixby v. Pierno, (“Bixby”)
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143. See CCP
§1094.5(c). Section 87682 expressly
requires the trial court’s independent review of a mandamus petition by either
the governing board or the employee.
Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not
only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises
its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de
novo.” Bixby, supra,
4 Cal.3d at 143. The court must
draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own
credibility determinations. Morrison
v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners,
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868. In
short, the court substitutes its judgment for the agency’s regarding the basic
facts of what happened, when, why, and the credibility of witnesses. Guymon v. Board of Accountancy, (1976)
55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1013-16.
“In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must
afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative
findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the
burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to
the weight of the evidence.” Fukuda,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at 817. Unless it can be demonstrated by petitioner
that the agency’s actions are not grounded upon any reasonable basis in law or
any substantial basis in fact, the court should not interfere with the agency’s
discretion or substitute its wisdom for that of the agency. Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 150-51;
Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Board, (1974) 42
Cal.App.3d 198, 208.
The agency’s decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing. Board of
Medical Quality Assurance v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 860,
862. The hearing officer is only
required to issue findings that give enough explanation so that parties may
determine whether, and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at
514-15. Implicit in CCP section 1094.5
is a requirement that the agency set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap
between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order. Topanga, 11 Cal.3d at 515.
An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its
official duties (Evid. Code §664), and the petitioner therefore has the burden
of proof. Steele v. Los Angeles
County Civil Service Commission, (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137. “[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party
attacking the administrative decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings
were unfair, in excess of jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of
discretion. Afford v. Pierno,
(1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.
C.
Governing Law[4]
In
a permanent employee dismissal, the District must establish (1) that the
individual charge is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) that if
the charge is sustained, it related to a specific cause as set forth under
section 44932 or 44939, and (3) after determining the charges and causes
proved, whether it renders the teacher “unfit to teach” so as to merit
dismissal. California Teachers’ Assn.
v. State of California, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327; Morrison v. State Board
of Education, (“Morrison”) (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 220.
1.
Section 87732
No
regular or academic employee shall be dismissed except for, inter alia: immoral or unprofessional
conduct, dishonesty, unsatisfactory performance, evident unfitness for service,
and persistent violation of or refusal to obey rules. §87732(a), (b), (c), (d), (f).
a.
Immoral Conduct
A
regular or academic employee can be dismissed for “immoral conduct.” §87732(a).
The courts have developed a broad and well-understood definition of
immoral conduct in teacher dismissal cases: “[...] that which is hostile to the
welfare of the general public and contrary to good morals. Immorality has not been confined to sexual
matters, but included conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, dissoluteness; or as willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to the opinions of respectable
members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.” Palo Verde
Unified School Dist. v. Hensey, (“Palo Verde”) (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d
967, 971-72 (quoting Board of Education of San Francisco Unified School
Dist. v. Weiland, (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 808). Based on this definition, a teacher’s
falsification of attendance records to add names of three students to secure
continued employment was deemed immoral conduct and dishonesty. Weiland,
supra, 179 Cal.App.2d at 808.
Similarly, a teacher’s removal of school property (a public address
system speaker) from the classroom wall was deemed immoral. Palo Verde Unified School District v.
Hensey, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at 967.
b.
Dishonesty
A regular or academic employee may be
dismissed for dishonesty under section 87732(b).
Dishonesty
indicates a “lack of honesty or integrity;” a “disposition to defraud or
deceive.” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/) “Dishonesty necessarily
includes the element of bad faith.” Small v. Smith, (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d
450, 456.) “[I]t means fraud, deception, betrayal, faithlessness; an absence of
integrity; a disposition to cheat, deceive or defraud; deceive and
betray.” Ibid. “Dishonest conduct
may range from the smallest fib to the most flagrant lie. Not every impropriety
will constitute immoral or unprofessional conduct, and not every falsehood will
constitute ‘dishonesty’ as a ground for discipline.” Fontana Unified School
Dist. v. Burman, (1998) 45 Cal.3d 208, 220, n. 12.
c.
Evident Unfitness for Service
Evident unfitness for service in section 87732(d)
means “clearly not fit, not adapted to or unsuitable for teaching, ordinarily
by reason of temperamental defects or inadequacies.’” Woodland Joint Unified School District v.
Comm’n on Prof. Comp., (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1444. Conduct constituting evident unfitness for
service will often constitute unprofessional conduct. Id. at 1445. For a school district to meet this charge, it
must demonstrate satisfaction of the Morrison factors (see post) and take the additional step
of showing that the unfitness is “evident,” meaning that the offensive conduct
is caused by a defect in temperament. Ibid.
“[T]he
term ‘evident unfitness for service’ should not be given a definite
technical meaning and that a court should not arbitrarily find that it is
subsumed under some set formula . . .
In applying the standard due consideration must be given to the
circumstances of the case at hand.” Oakland
Unified School Dist. v. Olicker, (1972) 25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1108
(citations omitted). Before an inference
can be drawn that conduct renders a teacher evidently unfit to teach, it is
necessary to show “a relationship
between that conduct and the functioning of defendant as a teacher.” Id. at 1109.
d. Persistent Violation of Rules
Pursuant to section 87732(f), a regular or academic employee
is subject to dismissal for “[p]ersistent violation of, or refusal to obey, the
school laws of the state or reasonable regulations prescribed for the
government of the community colleges by the board of governors or the governing
board of the community college district employing him or her.” The violation must be persistent or
“motivated by an attitude of continuous subordination.” Governing Board of the Oakdale Union
School District v. Seaman, (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 77, 81-82. Cause for discipline may be based on the
violation of school rules, including those requiring the timely submission of
lesson plans and policies against excessive absenteeism. San Dieguito Union High School District v.
Commission on Professional Competence, (“San Dieguito”) (1985) 174
Cal.App.3d 1176, 1180-81.
2. Unfit to Teach
A finding of misconduct is not alone enough to dismiss. Instead, that misconduct must render the
teacher unfit to teach. San Dieguito,
supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at 288. The conclusion of unfitness must be based
upon an objective standard as articulated in Morrison v. State Board of
Education, (“Morrison”) 1 Cal.3d 214, 220. See
San Dieguito, supra, 135
Cal.App.3d at 288.
In Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d at 214, the
California Supreme Court articulated factors to consider in whether a
credentialed employee’s misconduct renders him unfit for service as a
teacher. Those factors are: (a)
likelihood that the conduct at issue may have adversely affected
students/fellow teachers; (b) degree of such adversity anticipated; (c)
proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct; (d) type of teaching
certificate held by the party involved; (e) extenuating or aggravating
circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct; (f) likelihood of recurrence of
the questioned conduct; (g) praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of motives
resulting in the conduct; (h) extent to which disciplinary action may inflict
an adverse impact or chilling effect upon constitutional rights of the teacher
involved or other teachers. Id.
at 229-30. Not every Morrison
factor must be considered; a trier of fact may consider all of the factors that
are relevant to the respective case. Ibid.;
West Valley-Mission College v. Concepcion, (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1777.
3. Hearing Procedure
The
governing board of the community college district determines whether to dismiss
an employee. §87669. The written
statement of dismissal shall be in writing and served on the employee
personally. §87672. If the employee demands a hearing within 30
days, the matter shall proceed to arbitration or hearing as specified in
Article 4 (§§ 87669-678). The matter
shall be referred to an arbitrator, but if the parties do not agree on an
arbitrator, it shall be certified to OAH for appointment of an ALJ. §87678.
The
ALJ shall conduct proceedings in accordance with Government Code Chapter 5,
commencing with section 11500, except with the broader discovery rights of a
civil action in superior court. §87679. The written notice delivered to the employee pursuant
to section 87672 shall be deemed an accusation.
§87679.
The
ALJ shall determine whether there is cause to dismiss or penalize the
employee. No decision of dismissal or
suspension shall be made based on charges or evidence of any nature relating to
matters occurring more than four years prior to the filing of the notice. §87680.
The
decision of the arbitrator or ALJ may, on petition of either the governing
board or the employee, be reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction in the
same manner as a decision made by a hearing officer under Chapter 5 (commencing
with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code. The court, on review, shall exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence. §44945.
4.
LACC Policies
The
District’s rules are set forth in the Los
Angeles Community Colleges Board Rules, Chapter
XV, 15001, last amended March 9, 2016.
The
District’s grievance procedures and C-14 procedures concerning sexual
harassment and related offenses comply with the its legal obligations under federal
Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, and section 67386. The accused is entitled to “due process
rights, as defined by law, the Board Rules, the Personnel Commission, Student
Discipline Policy and Procedures, and/or any applicable collective bargaining
agreement or Memoranda of Understanding.”
C-14(XII)(A).
D. Statement of Facts
The
following statement of facts is taken almost exclusively from Doe’s opening
brief.
1. Doe’s Background and CAFYES
Doe is a former foster
youth and a first-generation immigrant from Mexico, brought to the U.S. in the
trunk of a car by his mother. AR 264. When he was ten years old, Doe’s father left. A few years later, Doe became homeless and
entered the foster care system. AR 1029. During his time in the foster care system, Doe
was raped and otherwise victimized---experiences he has openly discussed to
bring light to the types of victimization that occur in the foster care
system. AR780, 1029.
Undeterred by his
circumstances, Doe received his Associate of Arts degree (AR 3215), a
bachelor’s degree in political science (AR
3216), a master’s degree in educational counseling (AR 3216), and a Ph.D. in Education and
Leadership in 2009 (AR 3229). In 2012, he
founded a non-profit student/mentor program modelled on EOPS and focused on the
college recruitment, retention, graduation, and transfer of current and former
disadvantaged foster youth. AR 3218.
Doe was hired as a
full-time Counselor/Coordinator for CAFYES starting on September 1, 2016. AR 3210.
Garcia, who had been the program director of Guardian Scholars since
2009 (AR 2651), applied to be director of
CAFYES (AR 3222). However, LACC offered the position to Doe. AR 3210-11.
Guardian Scholars and CAFYES shared the same office space. AR 1900-01.
Doe’s relationship with Garcia had
soured in the first few weeks. AR 3222-23.
Becoming director of the
CAFYES program was a dream come true for Doe.
AR 3210. Doe counselled not only CAFYES students, but
also EOPS students, mentoring some 150-175 students. AR 3785. He had a strong interest in growing the
number of students in CAFYES, which would increase the program budget. AR 3747.
In his first year, Doe successfully recruited 50 former foster youth
students to the CAFYES program, an increase from the 15 students served in
2015-2016. AR1466.
In 2016 and 2017, Doe was
evaluated by all students in the CAFYES program and received 100% positive
evaluations in 2016 and 99 % positive evaluations in 2017. AR 1813,
3285. In 2017, Doe
received a commendation from the California Chancellors Office for the
“Exponential Program Growth” of the program.
AR
1667. Doe received third- and fourth-year contracts
by his tenure review committee. AR 3768, 3226.
2.
Evelyn Robles
Student
Evelyn Robles (Robles”) interned with Doe from 2017 to 2018. See AR 4204. Robles typically worked with Doe five to six
hours a day, five days a week -- a total of 24 to 30 hours a week -- helping
students with academic counseling, transferring to four-year universities, and
accessing resources. AR 4205, 4209-10. She also helped with Doe’s workshops for
CAFYES students. AR 4210-11. Robles spoke highly of Doe: “He would help
everyone. He had a lot of students that
were of different ethnicities. I just
saw him as a very respectful person who would help and go out of his way to get
you the support that you needed.” AR 4215.
Robles never heard Doe use inappropriate language or behave
inappropriately with students, not even rumors, and she has no tolerance for
such behavior. AR 4213-14.
Justin
Pitts (“Pitts”) is a former student employee in the EOPS office who helped
students check in, distributed supplies, assisted counselors, and worked with Doe
five hours a day, four days per week. AR 4310. Pitts saw Doe engaging with students and
staff, often exchanging high five greetings and providing support. AR 4319-20. Doe was approachable, sometimes hugging female
students and staff in a “one-arm church hug.” AR 4321. The
interactions appeared normal within the office’s culture, and he did not
witness or perceive any inappropriate behavior in the hugs. AR 4314-15, 4326. Pitt denied hearing any allegations that Doe had
used inappropriate language or exhibited any conduct that was racist or
sexually inappropriate. AR4314-15.
Since 2013, Chiuang Lee (“Lee”) has
handled finances and payments for EOPS, the CARE program (supporting single
parents), and the CAFYES program. AR 4117-19.
Lee is also responsible for the gift cards (typically Target cards) used
as incentives for students. AR 4135-39. Lee described the office as a collegial
atmosphere that included morning greetings and occasional hugs, which she
associates with an embracing office culture, especially among Hispanic
staff. AR4151-53.
She denied ever seeing or hearing
complaints about inappropriate behavior by Doe.
AR 4144.
Ester Sunday (“Sunday”) is the LACC
college store supervisor, a position she has held since 2001. AR 4170. Sunday helped CAFYES students with vouchers
for textbooks, supplies, and meal vouchers, and has seen Doe interact with
students in a similar manner. AR 4171-73.
Her interactions with Doe were always professional and she had never
heard any complaints from students or colleagues about his conduct. AR 4173-74. She described Doe as caring deeply about
students, often going above and beyond to assist them. AR 4173. Sunday’s son, Justin Pitts, worked with Doe
and never reported any issues. AR 4174. Sunday had never seen Doe act inappropriately
and has been hugged by him more than once without ever feeling uncomfortable. AR 4180.
She did not believe the charges against
Doe were true. AR 4197.
Oscar Enrique Flores (“Flores”) has
been an academic counselor at LACC since 2008. AR
4366. Flores had not heard of any
student complaints about Doe’s conduct. AR 4384-86.
He and Doe would walk students to different offices so they could get
the help they needed. AR 4384. Doe was very hands-on and would come into the
office early. AR 4374.
Doe has a doctorate, and he came in with a lot of new energy and a lot
of positive ideas for CAFYES. AR 4373.
Some staff would hug each other,
but everybody is different. AR 4385-87.
Flores had a run-in with Guardian
Scholars director Garcia when he tried to assist a student. AR 4383.
He was surprised when he learned
that Doe had been escorted out of the building. AR 4383.
Flores recalled a conversation in which Doe voiced concerns about how
resources were being spent on students for the CAFYES program. AR 4380.
Kassandra Sagrero (“Sagrero”) started
at LACC in 2010, dropped out in 2013, and returned in 2017. AR 4014-15. She was involved with the Guardian Scholars
program beginning in 2010 when Garcia was the director. AR 4016. In 2017, she learned about the CAFYES program
and became an intern for CAFYES working with Doe. AR 4018. Sagrero helped with paperwork and data entry
and was a “social butterfly” who would go out and meet students and just talk
to them about every program. AR 4022.
Doe’s sharing of his personal experiences and his openness helped her feel
understood and supported. AR 4099.
Doe’s guidance on professional attire and grooming for student workers
was mentorship. AR 4065-66,
4114-15. Doe was supportive and
respectful, and she denied seeing him hug any students or commit other
inappropriate behavior. AR 4027,
4031-33. Sagrero was questioned by
Garcia about Doe and maintained that she witnessed no inappropriate actions by Doe
and they (counselors) were trying to “dirty up” Doe and saying things that were
not true. AR 4031-32.
Sandra Novoa (“Novoa”) testified
that she is Senior Office Assistant in the EOPS program and an adjunct Spanish
professor. AR 4280. She assisted Doe with his scheduling, student
appointments, and maintaining records in the SARS system. AR 4288, 4904-5062. Doe
was successful in recruiting students to the CAFYES program. AR 4288.
Novoa never heard any complaints
about Doe from students. AR 4291.
She witnessed colleagues hug each other on campus but not students. AR 4293-94. She personally never hugged student workers
either. AR 4293. No one ever said that LACC forbids
hugging. AR 4293-94. She never heard any complaints from students
about Doe, or any other counselors; students
just came to say hello. AR 4291-92.
Yessica Del Campo (“Del Campo”) is
an EOPS counselor in the CAFYES program (AR
2146) and worked with Doe from 2016 to 2018.
AR 2149. Once when passing his office, she heard Doe
talking to a male student who had been ditching classes. AR 2154. Doe told the student “You need to stop
fucking around” and the male student nodded in agreement. AR 2154, 2209.
If a student needed money for food or ran out of gas, Doe would provide
money out of his own pocket, regardless of the gender of the student. AR 2160.
Doe said: “If a student has a need, I'm going to meet it, if I can.” AR 2231.
LACC has a hugging culture. AR 2172-73.
Doe would hug a female that “came in for a hug”. AR 2170.
“I mean that's how he used to greet everyone.” AR 2170.
Doe was even-handed in complimenting male and female students and staff
on their abilities, intelligence, and appearance. AR 2205-06, 2225. She never heard Doe use racist
language. AR 2233.
In February 2017, Doe learned that Guardian
Scholars director Garcia had been interviewing students about possible
complaints to bring against Doe. AR 1216,
3231. In approximately November 2017, Garcia
filed her own formal complaint. AR 1375.
In May 2017, A.B. complained about Doe
to Dean Magee about inappropriate communication of a sexual nature and the use
of profanity. AR 1347.
Dean McGee relocated A.B. to another department as a student worker. AR 1347. On June 1, 2017, A.B. filed a formal written
complaint against Doe for race, sex, and gender discrimination and listed
Guardian Scholars student workers L.B. and L.S. and Guardian Scholars student
C.A. as witnesses. AR 5233. A.B. also claimed that Doe forced her to work
beyond 25 hours without pay. However,
all student workers clocked-in and clocked-out in EOPS, which was out of Doe’s
control, and Doe had no involvement with LACC payroll. AR 1949, 2015.
A.B. graduated from LACC in June
2017. AR
1894. On June 28, 2017, Compliance
Officer Friedman sent Doe a Notice of Complaint of Discrimination, notifying
him that A.B. alleged unlawful discrimination based on race, sex, and gender,
and making “racially charged and/or sexually suggestive comments to her on
multiple occasions”. AR 5246.
On August 14, 2017, LACC interviewed
A.B. and then Doe two weeks later. AR 1830.
Elias has known A.B. since
2014. AR
1946. Elias told A.B. about the LACC
bookstore job (AR 1946-47), and A.B. worked
for Sunday for a few months. AR 1947. A.B. then was hired by Doe and worked with
Elias at CAFYES about 2½ months until the end of May 201. AR 1954-55, 1959. Elias backed A.B.’s allegations against Doe.
On November 9, 2017, I.N. submitted
a complaint that Doe had engaged in “Unsolicited Unprofessional Behavior”
between September 28 and November 8, 2017. AR 1360. Doe had made repeated requests for I.N. to
provide a State Foster Care Verification form. AR 5268.
I.N. also complained that Doe (a) required her to attend a workshop in
order to receive a $100 gift card[6]
that had already been awarded to her for academic achievement, (b) told her she
looked like shit and should wear makeup and represent the CAFYES program
better, and (c) jokingly asked I.N. in front of her peers if she had been
“smoking weed.” AR 2406, 5269.
In the Spring of 2018, I.N.
transferred out of LACC to attend a four-year college. AR 2765.
Lilliana Medrano (“Medrano”) was
employed as a student worker at the EOPS office from 2015 to 2018 and was
supervised by Novoa. AR 2044, 2064.
In 2018, she was contacted by LACC
and asked about any incidents involving Doe. AR 2114-15.
Medrano relayed two times in 2016 that Doe had made her feel
uncomfortable. The first was when she
shared personal information at lunch on campus about being a victim of an
assault in New York. Doe responded with
career advice and encouragement. AR 2098.
When they stood up, Doe put his hand on her back as they were standing
side-to-side, which made her uncomfortable.
AR 2102. The second instance was an occasion on which
they ate lunch. When they stood up, Doe put
his hands on her lower back for five to seven seconds, which made her
uncomfortable. AR 2049-50.
14. Doe’s Whistleblower Claim
On January 11, 2018, Doe informed EOPS/CAFYES
Counselor Dovlatyan, Vice President Student Services Smith, and Dean of Student
Services Yamanishi that the CAFYES program was out of compliance with the
Chancellor’s Office’s rules and regulations, and that students in the CAFYES
program were not receiving the services to which they were entitled by
law. AR
1678. Doe noted that the program
required additional staff that had not been hired, despite the current CAFYES
budget of $362,005. AR 1678.
On January 12, 2018, at the
EOPS/CARE Region 7 Meeting at Pasadena City College, Doe raised similar
concerns while speaking to the group for about ten minutes. AR 1679, 4452. On January 16, 2018, Doe wrote to Dean
Yamanishi that LACC was out of compliance with the CAFYES program. AR 1680.
On January 22, 2018, Dean Yaminishi
sought unsuccessfully to place a memorandum in Doe’s personnel file with the
District Human Resources and LACC personnel. See AR
1689. On January 25, 2018, Doe filed a
grievance against Dean Yamanishi and Dovlatyan, reporting that he felt
discriminated against, retaliated against, and treated unfairly after he was
invited by Dovlatyan to present about the CAFYES program at a “Counselor to
College Summit” on Friday, January 26, 2018, but the invitation had been retracted. AR 1697.
Interim President Gallagher reassigned
Doe to split his time between CAFYES Counselor and EOPS Counselor and
terminated Doe’s duties as CAFYES Coordinator.
AR 1705. All CAFYES leadership responsibilities were
turned over to Dovlatyan. AR 1718.
15. The Investigation
Doe testified that he heard nothing further
about the complaints for about a year. AR 3353.
On June 20, 2018, LACC issued a Notice of Investigation and placed Doe
on paid administrative leave. AR 702,
734. LACC asserted there were six
complainants. AR 990-93.
Compliance
Officer Friedman was the investigator.
AR 187. Doe was interviewed for
three days, August 16, August 20, and August 21, 2018. AR 992. Doe denied that he engaged in sexually
inappropriate, discriminatory, and intimidating conduct towards any LACC
students, student workers, or staff, and disputed all of the District’s
charges. AR
436. Friedman’s investigation continued
for 568 days. AR 788.
On May 10, 2021, the District served
Doe with the Statement of Charges. AR
901, 917.
16. The Hearing
The matter was certified
to OAH and assigned to ALJ Laurie Pearlman (the “ALJ”) pursuant to section 87678. During the pendency of the
administrative hearing, the District amended its Statement of Charges to
reflect Doe’s unlawful access of student data. AR
565-71.
Doe and the District
presented evidence and testimony over 18 days of hearings from February to
mid-August 2022. Of the six
complainants, only A.B., I.N., and Medrano testified at the hearing. AR 982-1346, 1876-4510. The parties submitted written briefs and the
record was closed on December 24, 2022. AR 1821-22.
17.
The ALJ’s Decision
On March 28, 2023, the ALJ issued a 53-page decision
affirming that Doe committed misconduct sufficient to support his termination
from his faculty role at LACC. AR 1821.
The ALJ found as follows:
District is a community college
district. The District hired Doe in
August or September 2016 to work at LACC as the Counselor/Coordinator for
CAFYES, which assists college level foster youth, and as a counselor for
EOPS. Doe primarily served students from
disadvantaged backgrounds and students who were current or former foster
youth. AR 1822-23.
Guardian Scholars is a program for
students who have been in the foster care system at any point. It is designed
to assist current or former foster youth to meet academic goals and provide an
easier adjustment into college life. Guardian
Scholars, unlike CAFYES, is not part of EOPS. Both CAFYES and Guardian Scholars provide a variety
of services including academic support workshops, specialized counseling services,
career guidance, financial aid information/assistance, and meal and book vouchers. AR 1824.
Student
Complaints
In April, late May, and November
2017, and January, July, and August 2018, six students brought complaints
against Doe. The students alleged that Doe had engaged in verbal and physical
sexual harassment, discrimination based on sex or gender, harassment based on
race or ethnicity, and retaliation. AR
1824.
Students I.N. and B.C. were
participants in the Guardian Scholars program. Student A.B. was a paid student worker for the
Guardian Scholars program. Student L.M.
was an EOPS student worker. Student S.M.
was a CAFYES student participant. Student
N.B. was not in CAFYES, EOPS, or Guardian Scholars. AR 1824.
On June 25, 2018, the District
placed Doe on paid administrative leave while it investigated the student complaints.
After the first notice of investigation,
additional complaints were received in July and August 2018. AR 1824.
The
Investigation
The investigation was conducted by Friedman,
a Compliance Officer with LACC’s Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Investigator Friedman testified credibly at
the hearing. She interviewed 16
complainants and witnesses. She interviewed
Doe on August 30, 2017, and July 20 and October 19, 2018, for a total of ten
hours. Investigator Friedman prepared a
365-page investigative report dated March 5, 2019. AR 1525.
Many of the individuals interviewed
by Investigator Friedman testified at the hearing. Their hearing testimony was consistent with
their complaints and with their statements to Investigator Friedman as set
forth in her investigative report (the “Report”). AR 1825.
Doe denied the accusations against
him. He told Friedman that it is “no coincidence” the majority of complainants
were former foster youth, asserting their accounts are unreliable because of
their foster youth status. He stated that the students in CAFYES were very
emotional and “manipulative” and were generally “disturbed.” He told Friedman that he did not inform
students that attendance at CAFYES workshops was mandatory or that failing to
attend could jeopardize their meal or book vouchers. He never used the term “nigga” and never
commented on anyone’s appearance or the way a student dresses or does their
hair or make-up. Doe denied any physical
contact with Student I.N. and denied making any comments about her appearance.
He denied initiating any physical contact with students unless requested to do
so and in that instance engaged only in side hugs. AR 1825.
Friedman’s’ Report sustained the
allegations. She concluded that Doe’s
conduct constituted verbal and physical sexual harassment, discrimination based
on sex or gender, discrimination based on race or ethnicity, and retaliation. Friedman concluded that Doe’s denials were not
credible and were refuted by witnesses and documentary evidence. AR 1826.
The
Dismissal
By
letter dated July 31, 2019, the District informed Doe that it had determined
that, by a preponderance of the evidence standard, he had engaged in
discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity and sex/gender, sexual harassment,
and retaliation, as alleged by Students N.B., S.M., I.N., B.C., A.B., and L.M. AR 1826.
President Gallagher testified
credibly at the hearing. She first met Doe in Spring 2018 and found his conduct
with her “flirtatious” which she considered “odd” in a professional setting. She also observed Doe’s interactions with
young female students, which included Doe placing his hand on a female
student’s back for more than “just a quick tap” and standing behind a student
and whispering in her ear rather than talking to her face-to-face. Gallagher
found this behavior “unusual”. AR 1826.
On November 12, 2019, Doe and his
attorney met with President Gallagher and an attorney for the District. Doe “looked [President Gallagher] straight in
the eye and said ‘they’re all lying.’” Gallagher did not find Respondent’s
blanket denial of each of the allegations to be credible. Based on her own observations of Doe, as well
as her review of his explanations and the Report, she concluded that Doe had engaged
in discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity and sex/gender, and had engaged
in sexual harassment and retaliation, as alleged in the complaints by students N.B.,
S.M., I.N., B.C., A.B., and L.M. AR
1827.
Gallagher found that Doe’s conduct violated
Board Rule 15001 and Administrative Regulation C-14, which prohibits
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He failed to follow Board Rule 9803.12, the
standard of conduct regarding dishonesty. He failed to follow Board Rule
9803.21, the standard of conduct regarding discriminatory behavior, including
harassment. AR 1827.
On December 10, 2019, Doe was
provided Gallagher’s final decision. AR
1827.
On May 7, 2021, Doe was served with
the Board-approved Statement of Charges notifying him of the District’s intent
to seek his dismissal from employment. Based
on new information revealed at the hearing, the District was granted leave to file
an Amended Statement of Charges on June
27, 2022. AR 1827.
Doe timely requested a hearing
pursuant to section 87673. AR 1827.
McGee
McGee testified credibly at the
hearing. She worked at LACC from March
2015 to October 2017. Her duties as Dean
of Student Services and Title IX Coordinator included oversight of EOPS,
CAFYES, and Guardian Scholars staff and programs. AR 1828.
On April 14, 2017, Student Services
Specialist Krixa Lim (“Lim”), a LACC Veterans’ Program Coordinator, told Dean
Magee that Student N.B. had said that Doe’s behavior made N.B. uncomfortable. N.B. stated that Doe told her she must see him
in order to submit financial aid documents -- which was not the case -- told
her she is beautiful and touched her face, asked her whether she has a
boyfriend, told her that students “hit” on him, and told her that she needs to
text him and let him know how she is doing. N.B. alleged that Doe then got upset with her
when she told him she is busy and not able to come to campus to meet with him. AR 1828.
Dean McGee spoke to Doe about this,
and he told her that he understood this interaction with Student N.B. was “not
appropriate.” AR 1829.
A.B.
Student A.B. worked for Doe in the
CAFYES office from February to June 2017. In May 2017, A.B. complained about Doe to Dean
McGee, alleging his inappropriate communications of a sexual nature and his use
of profanity from March to May 2017. AR
1829.
On May 25, 2017, three female
students and A.B. met with Dean McGee. All
four students were “passionate” and “all of one accord” regarding Doe’s
inappropriate conduct. Student A.B. was
very anxious and stressed by Respondent’s behavior and Dean McGee relocated her
to a student worker position in another department. AR 1829.
On June 1, 2017, A.B. filed a
formal written complaint against Doe for “race, sex, and gender discrimination
and sexual harassment.” She alleged that
Doe made racially charged comments, statements regarding her appearance, suggestive
comments, and engaged in inappropriate behaviors. A.B. requested a remedy that Doe receive
counseling on what is acceptable behavior towards women. AR 1829.
On June 28, 2017, Friedman provided
Doe with a notice of A.B.’s complaint. On
July 12, 2017, Doe provided a written response, asserting that A.B. was an unproductive
and inefficient student employee, had a very poor attitude, arrived late to
work, and that he had “intended to release” her from employment. AR 1829.
On August 6, 2017, Dean McGee met
with Doe regarding complaints made regarding the 2016-2017 school year. Doe agreed
to eliminate his use of profanity but denied all other accusations. AR 1829.
On August 14, 2017, Investigator
Friedman interviewed A.B. and interviewed Doe two weeks later. AR 1829.
B.C.
In November 2017, Student B.C.
filed a complaint alleging Doe’s unsolicited comments about her appearance and
unprofessional behavior by Doe from November 2016 to November 2017. B.C. suggested that Doe has boundary issues
with students as evidenced by grabbing her elbow, looking her up and down while
making an “mhm” sound under his breath, and suggesting she not date men from
LACC because they are “broke.” She
alleged that Doe retaliated against her when she stood up for another student whom
she felt he was mistreating because Doe claimed B.C. did not have the proper
documentation to remain in the CAFYES program and threatened her with loss of
her meal vouchers. AR 1830-31.
I.N.
Student I.N. testified credibly at
the hearing. She is a former foster youth who attended LACC from 2014 to
2018. I.N. was involved in the Guardian Scholars
and CAFYES programs and interacted with Doe from Fall 2017 to Fall 2018. She saw Doe four times per week on campus
during that period. AR 1831.
Doe informed I.N. that attendance
at CAFYES meetings was mandatory and failing to attend would jeopardize her
meal and book vouchers. AR 1831.
I.N. observed Doe hugging students,
grabbing students by the arm, using profanity -- including “shit“ and “fucking”
-- and commenting on females’ appearances.
AR 1831.
On November 9, 2017, I.N. submitted
a complaint alleging that Doe had engaged in unsolicited unprofessional
behavior between September 28 and November 8, 2017. Her complaint alleged verbal and physical sexual
harassment and retaliation. AR 1831.
S.M.
Student S.M. is Black. She alleged
that between November 2016 and November 2017, Doe made racist comments to her,
including stating that her hair looked dirty when worn in an Afro, exhibiting a
discriminatory preference for students of Latin descent, and speaking
inappropriately about non-school related topics in program meetings, including
telling students that Doe married his wife because she was a virgin. AR 1832.
L.M.
Student L.M. alleged that between Doe’s
hire date and July 2018, he made attempts to gather personal information about
her and her boyfriend although there was no professional reason for Doe to obtain
that information. He hugged her in a way
that was unwelcome, uncomfortable, and inappropriate, made inappropriate
comments as to the appearance of various women, and improperly delegated work
to male students. AR 1832.
Veronica Garcia
Garcia testified credibly at the
hearing. Garcia has been employed at LACC for 12 years and served as the
Guardian Scholars Counselor/Coordinator from 2009 until 2020. At one point, her office and Doe’s office were
next to each other. AR 1832.
Garcia saw Doe hugging female students
and heard him comment on female students’ appearances. She also heard Doe tell
students that attendance at workshops was mandatory. AR 1832.
At the end of Fall 2016, a student
told Garcia that she and other female students felt uncomfortable with Doe hugging
them. Garcia immediately shared the
student’s comments with Dean McGee. AR
1832.
In the Spring of 2017, Doe confronted
Garcia, accusing her of approaching students to ask them about his interactions
with them. Garcia denied doing so. Doe told
Garcia he “would not ruin [his] career for some pussy” and insisted he “didn’t
touch a woman’s pussy, grab her ass, or touch her tits.” AR 1833.
On November 6, 2017, Doe told
Garcia in a loud stern voice: “You need to tell them this needs to stop.”
Garcia understood this as a direction to tell students to stop complaining to
the dean about him. AR 1833.
Garcia submitted a complaint dated
January 12, 2018, alleging that Doe engaged in sex/gender discrimination and
retaliation against her from February through November 2017. Garcia felt threatened and bullied by Doe. Garcia felt that his behavior towards female
students was particularly inappropriate.
In her complaint, Garcia detailed how Doe retaliated against her. AR 1833.
Efforts
to Counsel Doe
President Gallagher, Dean McGee,
and Dean of Student Services Yamanishi counseled Doe on numerous occasions about
the complaints made against him and emphasized the need to maintain
professional boundaries with students and staff. AR 1834.
Doe received Title IX training, was
spoken to repeatedly by Dean McGee about his conduct, was warned about his
actions, had complaints filed against him, and was counseled via written
memoranda. Nevertheless, Doe continued to engage in similar misconduct and
inappropriate behavior. AR 1834.
On August 16, 2017, President
Gallagher and Dean Jeremy Villar met with Doe and LACC Counselor Mario Escalante
regarding student complaints from the 2016-2017 academic year. Doe admitted to using profanity around
students but otherwise categorically denied every allegation against him,
asserting that each of those accusations was a lie. AR 1834.
Bases
for Termination
The District concluded that Doe
engaged in discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity and sex/gender, and engaged
in sexual harassment and retaliation, as alleged by students, student workers,
and staff. AR 1835.
Sexual
Harassment
Students, student workers, and
other staff testified credibly regarding acts by Doe of sexual harassment and
retaliation. AR 1835.
From May and November 2017 through
the Winter of 2018, Doe frequently made suggestive comments about the
appearance and bodies of female students and/or staff, either directly to
students and student workers or in the presence of students and student
workers, including that he would “try to get with” certain women if he were not
married, commenting that females were “beautiful,” have “nice ass” or
good-looking body, or commenting on how females looked while wearing certain
clothing. AR 1835.
He told Student A.B. that it was
“mandatory” that she “look nice” every day and commented on her appearance,
including stating how he thought she looked on a particular day, giving
frequent “rundowns” regarding her hair and make-up, and critiquing the way she
was dressed. AR 1836.
Student L.M. often heard Doe talk
about how other females looked, dressed, wore makeup, or would look better if they
dressed or wore makeup in a certain way.
AR 1836.
Doe engaged in suggestive and lewd
conduct towards females on campus while in the presence of students or student
workers, including assessment of women’s’ looks by glancing up and down their
bodies and openly staring at their behinds as they walked away. AR 1836.
Doe made unsolicited critiques
about the appearance of his students and student workers, either directly to
them or in their presence. He made unsolicited
remarks in Fall 2017 about Student I.N.’s appearance, telling her she needed to
look more “ladylike.” He would often tell I.N. she “looked like shit” when she was
wearing sweatpants or other casual wear and advised her to wear makeup every day
to cover her flaws. Doe was aware that I.N.
suffered from diagnosed depression, in part from her turbulent time in the
foster care system. Doe’s comments
reduced I.N. to tears and made her feel “ugly.”
AR 1836.
Doe instructed student employees to
recruit younger, attractive female students to participate in EOPS and CAFYES. Student L.M. heard Doe instruct male student
employees to recruit young and beautiful females to work for him. AR 1836.
Elias
Jonathan Elias (“Elias”) testified
credibly at the hearing. Elias was hired
by Dean McGee as a student worker for the CAFYES program and worked there from
Fall 2016 to June 2017. Elias continued to work at LACC after graduating but
eventually left to attend California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. AR 1837.
In 2017, Elias was the only male
student worker in the CAFYES program office.
Doe walked across campus with Elias at least once or twice per week.
During these walks, Doe often made inappropriate comments about the women he
saw, stating that a particular woman was attractive or “has a nice ass.” AR 1837.
Elias was present when Doe told
Students A.B. and Ashley Perez that they “look beautiful.” Elias heard Doe tell
women they were beautiful on more than ten occasions. One time, a student walked into the office
with a question. Doe saw her and
exclaimed: “You’re so beautiful. You should be our intern.” AR 1837.
Doe spent significantly more time
meeting and counseling female CAFYES participants than male participants and
had a pattern of hiring primarily female students to work in the CAFYES office.
Doe also recruited female students to
serve as his unpaid “interns” even though such a position did not officially
exist. AR 1837.
Unwanted
Physical Contact With Students
Doe frequently called Student A.B.
and other student staff while they were off duty. During these telephone calls, he would
sometimes comment on how A.B. had looked that day. AR 1837.
Doe engaged in unsolicited and
unwelcome contact with students and student workers, including touching them on
the back and hugging women without first obtaining their consent. Student I.N.
testified that Doe hugged her whenever he saw her on campus. These included
side hugs and front hugs, with their chests touching and Doe’s arms wrapped
around her. On one occasion, Doe grabbed I.N. forcefully by the elbow/upper
arm, pulled her towards him, and would not let go while “berating” her that she
needed to be grateful for all Doe did for her.
AR 1838.
Doe kissed Students A.B., Perez,
and Sagrero on the forehead after a CAFYES/Guardian Scholars “Etiquette Dinner”
at a restaurant off-campus. AR
1838. Doe kissed female student Claire
Araujo on the forehead and hugged her after she assisted with an event, making
her so uncomfortable that she stopped coming to the CAFYES office. AR 1838.
Multiple female witnesses testified
that Doe placed his hand on their lower back.
Other witnesses testified that they saw Doe do so.
Doe placed his hand on Student I.N.’s
back for several minutes. President Gallagher observed Doe walk up behind a
female student and place his hand on her lower back for an extended period
while speaking to her. AR 1839.
Doe came up behind I.N. and began
squeezing and massaging her shoulders, which startled her. On another occasion, President Gallagher was
concerned when she observed Doe rubbing the shoulders of a young female
student. Several witnesses observed Doe rubbing female students’ shoulders. President Gallagher observed that Doe had his
hand on a female student’s back for some time while he was speaking to her. Gallagher found this to be very unusual
conduct for a male in a counseling position.
President Gallagher was concerned about the manner in which Doe interacted
with young female students in CAFYES and ultimately gave the direction to move him
of the CAFYES program. AR 1839.
Student A.B. complained that Doe engaged
in inappropriate physical conduct with her. Doe hugged A.B. and other female
students with his “arms wrapped around [them]” which made A.B. feel awkward and
unsettled. She felt shocked and
disgusted when Doe gave her a full contact, enclosed hug and then kissed her on
the forehead. AR 1839.
Multiple witnesses testified that Doe
hugged female students in full contact, enclosed hugs, often without the
women’s consent or any indication of consent. Doe initiated unwelcome physical contact with
Student L.M. which involved placing and keeping his hand on her lower back for
an extended period and caused her to feel uncomfortable. Doe also hugged L.M. by surprise as they were
passing each other in a hallway, without her consent, in a full forward-facing hug
with their torsos touching. L.M.
testified that the hug was “his chest to my chest” using “two hands” to hug her
“long enough to make me feel uncomfortable.”
AR 1839.
Doe initiated unwelcome physical
contact with Student I.N. almost every time he saw her, giving her front or
side hugs and not letting go right away, touching her arm, standing close to
her while grabbing her arm, holding her lower back while speaking, squeezing
her shoulder, using physicality to get her attention, and/or coming up from
behind and touching her when she did not know he was there. AR 1840.
Doe hugged I.N. at least four times
per week during Fall 2017. On one
occasion during that period, I.N. and a male friend, Chris, were together
on-campus, away from the CAFYES office. Doe
came up to I.N. and gave her an unwelcome side hug. He held on to I.N. for so long that Chris
could see she was uncomfortable and asked Doe to let go of her. Doe asked whether Chris was her boyfriend. AR 1840.
On October 12, 2017, I.N. attended
a workshop held by Doe. She cancelled her
pre-existing plans because Doe informed her that she must attend to retrieve a
gift card he had in his possession that she had already earned from Guardian
Scholars. Following the workshop, Doe finally handed the gift card to her. As she turned to leave, Doe grabbed I.N.’s arm
and turned her around to face him, stating that he is patient with her because
she is his “favorite,” and that she needs to be more grateful to him. His conduct intimidated I.N. and made her feel
uncomfortable. AR 1840.
Discrimination Based on Gender
Doe engaged in discriminatory
conduct against women in favor of men. He told student workers working at the
EOPS front desk to seek out young, beautiful female students to work for him. He openly subscribed to stereotypes about
women. Doe instructed student workers to
target potential female participants for CAFYES, asserting that females are
more receptive and listen better than men do. He also expressed his belief that women need more
guidance than men. As a result,
significantly more women than men were in the CAFYES program, which did not
reflect the overall student population.
AR 1841.
Multiple witnesses confirmed that Doe
exhibited a generally sexist attitude towards women, especially when their
behavior did not conform to his views on gender roles. AR 1841.
Harassment
Based on Race
Doe engaged in unprofessional and
discriminatory conduct toward Blacks. When
Doe and CAFYES student workers Elias, Perez, and A.B., were walking across
campus, Doe asked Perez and A.B. whether they had boyfriends. Doe stated to A.B:
“I bet you like those niggas, huh?” AR
1842.
Another incident occurred in the
CAFYES office during a conversation about A.B.’s boyfriend. When Doe saw a photograph of A.B.’s boyfriend,
he told her: “I had a feeling you would date a nigga before you even showed
[your friend] that picture.” AR 1842.
Doe told A.B.: “Comb your nappy
hair for once” and “don’t come to work with your hair looking all nappy.” Doe also
described A.B. as having “nappy hair” in conversations with other people.
Student I.N. confirmed that she heard Doe describe people’s hair as “nappy.” On one occasion, Elias heard Doe tell A.B.
that her hair looked “nice, not nappy as usual.” Elias heard Doe use the term “nappy” to describe
A.B.’s hair on more than one occasion.
AR 1842.
Retaliation
Doe threatened A.B.’s job on campus
if she continued objecting to demands she felt were unethical or inappropriate,
such as when Doe directed her to review applications for a scholarship for
which she herself was a candidate. AR
1843.
Doe retaliated against Student I.N.
In late September 2017, Doe questioned I.N.’s
eligibility to be in the CAFYES program because she had been adopted by her
foster parents. After I.N. explained she
was eligible through her number of years in the foster system and her age and explained
that she receives a Chafee grant (a state grant for foster youth), Doe seemed
to accept her eligibility for the CAFYES program. AR 8143.
However, on October 3, 2017, Doe sent
a text message to I.N. stating that she needed to bring to his office a Foster
Care Verification Document certifying that she had been in foster care. I.N. emailed the requested document, which
contained the seal of the County of Los Angeles. Doe assured I.N. that the paperwork was
sufficient. AR 1843.
Later that same week, Doe informed I.N.
that he needed foster care verification paperwork with the State seal, not the
County seal. I.N. explained that foster
care is run by the County, not the State, but she would look in her file for
the State document. I.N. was unable to
find the requested documentation because it appears the State does not issue
such a document. AR 1843.
On October 12, 2017, Doe grabbed I.N.’s
arm and told her that she needed to be more grateful to him because she was his
“favorite.” Shortly thereafter, I.N. contacted Dean McGee to make a complaint
against Doe. Dean McGee told I.N. that
she would speak to Doe and I.N. consented to the use of her name. AR 1844.
On October 26, 2017, Doe sent a
text message to I.N. that she had to come to his office as soon as possible to
turn in her State Foster Care Verification form or she would jeopardize the
meal and book vouchers provided by CAFYES. Minutes later, Doe emailed I.N. that she had
to bring her form or she would jeopardize her meal and book vouchers and her
grants. Student I.N. contacted adoption
and foster care professionals at the Children’s Bureau who confirmed that the
document Doe requested did not exist. AR
1844.
On October 29, 2017, I.N. asked Doe
to provide her with a blank form of the document he was requesting. Doe replied that he had such a form but could
not email it, and he insisted that I.N. come to his office to pick it up. I.N. felt intimidated by Doe’s actions and did
not want to be in the same space as him.
This back and forth over the form continued. After I.N. stated: “I wish for you to respect
my boundaries otherwise I will consider this harassment”, Doe replied “noted”
and provided her with a telephone number to call the Ombudsman’s Office to
receive the verification form. AR 1845.
Shortly thereafter, Doe approached I.N.
while she was in the office area for Guardian Scholars and insisted that she
come with him into his office to handle the documentation issue. I.N. no longer felt comfortable going to the
CAFYES or Guardian Scholars area to receive services and benefits, and even
avoided entering the building where Doe worked. AR 1845-46.
Confidential
Student Information
Doe received District documents
containing confidential student information after he had been placed on
administrative leave. The documents were records, reports, and emails
containing confidential student information, student counseling records for students
in the EOPS and CAFYES programs, documents with students’ full names, student identification
numbers, and their recorded contacts with the EOPS and CAFYES program. AR 1846.
Novoa, the Senior Office Assistant
in EOPS and CAFYES, testified credibly at the hearing. After Doe was placed on
leave, he telephoned Novoa at work and asked her to print out the student
documents and provide them to him. Doe told
Novoa which documents he needed and directed her to bring the documents to him.
Novoa understood that Doe did not want
to come onto campus to get the documents and wanted to meet her off-campus. AR 1847.
Doe also took with him numerous
pages of year-end CAFYES reports that included students’ full names and information. Doe was initially evasive as to his
possession of these year-end reports. He subsequently testified he took the
reports on his way out of the office after being informed that he had been
placed on administrative leave. AR 1847. Doe also was initially evasive as to when,
how, and why he obtained them. He later testified: “Whether it’s appropriate or
not appropriate, I needed documentation to defend myself and prove that I did
not do the things I was accused of.” AR
1847. Doe admitted that all the student counseling
records he submitted in this proceeding were printed by Novoa at his request. AR 1847.
Doe’s
Evidence
The ALJ summarized Doe’s testimony
concerning his background, job as Counselor/Coordinator, and the 2016 and 2017
evaluations by students. AR 1847-48.
Doe denied the allegations that he
engaged in sexually inappropriate, discriminatory, or intimidating conduct
towards LACC students, student workers, or staff and disputed each of the
District’s charges. He contended that
the District’s investigation and decision were replete with an obvious bias
against him based on his gender and ethnicity. Doe based this assertion on the fact that some
of the complaining individuals used the term “macho” in describing his behavior.
AR 1849.
Doe claimed the District never
brought to his attention that he was violating any rules or regulations. The
ALJ noted, however, that the evidence established that he was counseled
numerous times following complaints to the District. AR 1849.
Doe testified that he engaged in no
blameworthy, wrongful, or inappropriate conduct at LACC and that there is
nothing he would have done differently. He described the charges against him as
“utterly ridiculous” and stated he is simply “an outgoing person.” He blamed
his dismissal on Students A.B., I.N., L.M., and Elias, Investigator Friedman,
President Gallagher, Dean Yamanishi, and Garcia. Doe insisted that these eight people were absolutely
part of a conspiracy to get [him] fired” and he “could probably think of
others.” AR 1849.
Doe asserted that Guardian Scholars
counselor Garcia resented him because he was popular with students, had the
biggest office, more grant money, and a tenure track position. Doe contended that in 2018 Garcia and the
students conspired to make false accusations against him. However, the evidence
established that separate students raised complaints against Doe well before 2018.
Many of these students were unknown to
each other and not aware that others had filed complaints. AR 1850.
Doe also contended that each of the
students who filed a complaint was either counseled by Garcia through the
Guardian Scholars program or worked for her.
However, of the six student complainants, only Students I.N. and B.C.
were affiliated with the Guardian Scholars program. The remaining four students
were not affiliated with the Guardian Scholars program in any way. AR 50.
Doe noted that there were students
who did not cooperate with the investigation and/or did not testify at the
hearing. He also asserted that certain
students interviewed by Investigator Friedman only supported some of the allegations
made against him or stated that no one told them that Doe made them feel
uncomfortable. This does not negate the direct, credible testimony of those
individuals who did experience harassment, discrimination, or retaliation by
Doe. AR 1850.
Doe justified making physical
contact with students by asserting that LACC had a “huggy culture.” Several witnesses denied this, including
Student Robles, who testified on behalf of Doe. Robles opined that if a counselor engaged in
“front hugs” with students or made comments about students’ appearances, such
behavior would be unprofessional. AR
1850-51.
Doe contended that no one accused
him of engaging in any sexual behavior. He did not concede that hugging is
inappropriate without consent or if it makes the recipient uncomfortable. Nor did Doe acknowledge he engaged in
inappropriate touching other than hugging, such as grabbing a student’s elbow,
placing his hand on a female student’s back or shoulders. AR 1851.
Doe’s testimony was inconsistent whether
he hugged students. He claimed that he is
an affectionate person and would give hugs freely because LACC had a “huggy
culture.” He then claimed that he only
engaged in high fives and fist bumps with students, except when a student asked
for a hug, asserting that hugging is not something he would initiate. Doe further claimed that he did hug students,
but never hugged any of the complaining students. Doe also testified that he only hugged
students by giving them side hugs at graduation and award ceremonies. He did not recall any other times he hugged
students. He later gave contradictory
testimony: “I didn’t touch students in any way, appropriate or inappropriate.” AR 1851.
Doe testified that it is
appropriate for someone in his position to hug student workers, which
contradicted his deposition testimony that it would not be appropriate for a
counselor to hug students. AR 1851.
Doe fails to recognize the potential
abuse of authority when a counselor and coordinator of a financial aid/supportive
services program engages in physical contact with female students who need
those services. The evidence established that Doe informed students they could
jeopardize their access to vouchers for meals and books if they failed to show
up for in-person meetings with him. AR
1852.
In March 2017, Doe hired Student A.B.
to be a student worker in the CAFYES program. The evidence established that he
discussed A.B.’s appearance with Elias in selecting her as a CAFYES student
worker. AR 1852. doe asserted that he hired A.B. at the
recommendation of LACC bookstore manager Esther Sunday. Sunday testified at the hearing and, while she
recognized A.B.’s name, she did not recall anything else about her and did not confirm
that she recommended to Doe that he hire A.B. AR 1852.
Doe insisted that A.B. was rude,
disrespectful, and a poor worker who was unproductive, inefficient, and had a
negative attitude. Her co-workers credibly
disputed this description. Doe contended
that A.B. lodged a complaint against him after he informed her that he would dismiss
her due to her poor job performance. No
documentation supports this assertion and Doe did not establish that he had the
authority to dismiss student workers. AR
1852.
Doe asserted that he never hugged A.B.,
kissed her on the forehead, or commented on her appearance. He “absolutely never” told A.B. to “comb her
nappy hair” because that would be “out of line and disrespectful.” Doe also “never used the “N” word towards [A.B.]
or anybody.” AR 1853.
Doe’s closing brief asserts that his
comments to female students about their clothing, hair and makeup were
justified because he was enforcing the LACC Employee Handbook dress code. AR 1853.
However, a comment that a female student has a “nice ass,” assessing
female students’ looks, staring at their bodies, or telling them they are
gorgeous (or alternatively, “look like shit”) does not constitute enforcement
of a dress code. AR 1853.
Doe argued that his workplace
comments were acceptable because they were “compliments and pleasantries”
rather than negative remarks. Numerous
witnesses testified credibly that Doe used profanity, called women “bitches,”
and made other inappropriate comments that were neither complimentary nor
pleasant, including telling Student I.N. that she “looked like shit” and needed
to dress better and wear makeup. AR 1853.
Doe told A.B. that he had cropped
certain female students out of a photograph because they are “ugly bitches.” He also told A.B. that her hair was “nappy.” Doe
disparaged the appearance of female students, threatened them into complying,
and insulted them, while at the same time openly admiring other women’s bodies
and commenting on their attractiveness.
AR 1853.
Doe’s insistence that he never
referred to any woman as a “bitch” lacks credibility. There was substantial
evidence from multiple sources that he did use the term in reference to more
than one female. AR 1854.
Doe testified that it would
“absolutely” be okay to use the words “ass,” “bitch,” and “fuck” around
students. During cross-examination, Doe refused
to confirm that he never used these words with student workers. Doe attempted to justify his use of these
words by asserting he did not use them with sexual intent or to refer to a
sexual act. AR 1854.
Doe testified that he had
infrequent contact with Student I.N., only saw her approximately once a month,
and never met with her alone. He insisted
that he was not retaliating against I.N. by insisting that she come to his
office with a State Foster Care Verification form. He continued to insist that a State-issued
form is required by the CAFYES program because it is state-funded. The evidence does not support that contention. AR 1854.
Doe asserted that the District
violated his due process rights by charging him with dishonesty for, among
other things, lying in response to the complaints against him. Dishonesty is an explicit statutory ground for
dismissal. Doe cited no authority that he may not be deemed dishonest if the
evidence establishes that he lied during the investigation, deposition, or at
hearing. AR 1854.
Doe characterized himself as a
victim and argued that he was being unfairly targeted by the District because
he is a whistleblower. “I spoke up so
they came to get me,” asserting that the LACC administration sought to
discredit and then dismiss him because he questioned LACC’s expenditure of
CAYFES program funds. AR 1856.
On January 11, 2018, Doe asserted
to EOPS/CAFYES Counselor Dovlatyan, Vice-President of Student Services Smith,
and Dean Yamanishi that the CAFYES program was out of compliance with the Chancellor’s
Office’s rules and regulations and students in the CAFYES program were not
receiving all the services to which they were entitled by law. AR 1856.
Doe’s contentions appear to be based
upon documents that state various services may be provided by the CAFYES
program but do not state they are required.
Some of these items may be provided by CAFYES only “if budget permits”
and/or “if approved by the Chancellor’s Office.” AR 1856.
Doe asserted that he shared his
concerns about the CAFYES program at the January 12, 2018 EOPS/CARE Region 7 meeting
at Pasadena City College, and reiterated these points to Dean Yamanishi on
January 16, 2018 and to Dovlatyan on January 25, 2018. Doe testified that the student complaints
against him “were simultaneously filed” after that date. AR 1857.
Doe’s claim that he was dismissed
in retaliation for being a whistleblower lacks credibility and is not
persuasive. The student complaints were not simultaneously filed, and they also
were lodged well before January 2018. The
students had no motive to retaliate against Doe for being a supposed whistleblower.
In addition, the students’ allegations describe
a pattern of inappropriate behavior over an extensive period. Their claims have added credibility because
many of the students did not know each other or were unaware that others were making
similar complaints against Doe. AR 1857.
Effective February 12, 2018,
President Gallagher reassigned Doe. He
was directed to split his time between the CAFYES and EOPS programs as
counselor and his duties as CAFYES Coordinator were terminated. All CAFYES leadership responsibilities,
including recruiting, staff supervision, drafting reports, and budgeting, were
turned over to Dovlatyan. AR 1858.
The ALJ analyzed the Morrison
factors. AR 1859-60. The ALJ also made credibility findings. She found the testifying complaining
witnesses to be credible and convincing, with no discernible motivation to
fabricate their testimony, and that Doe’s testimony was implausible and
inconsistent with his own testimony and that of other witnesses. AR 1863.
The ALJ found Doe guilty of immoral
conduct (AR 1864-65), dishonesty (AR 1866), evident unfitness for service (AR 1867-69)
persistent violation of laws or regulations (AR 1869-70), and willful refusal
to obey laws and reasonable regulations (AR 1879-71). She found cause to dismiss him for these
charges under the Morrison factors.
The ALJ noted Doe’s lack of remorse and candor and found him unsuited to
continue as a counselor. Dismissal was
the only appropriate remedy and the District’s decision to terminate his
employment was sustained. AR 1872.
On May 23, 2023, OAH
served Doe notice that the ALJ had issued a decision upholding the District’s
decision to terminate his employment. AR 1874.
E.
Analysis
Petitioner Doe contends
that the ALJ’s decision must be set aside because (1) it is not supported by the
weight of the evidence, (2) the District improperly denied him the opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses and the ALJ improperly relied on hearsay
summaries of the testimony of non-appearing witnesses, , and (3) the Morrison factors do not support his
dismissal in light of the positive feedback he received on his student evaluations.
Doe argues that the District’s presentation
during the 18-day hearing was largely a repeat of Friedman’s one-sided
investigation, but this time there was an opportunity for cross-examination and
the presentation of new witnesses -- other students and staff who interacted
with Doe on a daily basis and never heard so much as rumor that Petitioner had
ever engaged in misconduct, let alone witnessed misconduct. Accordingly, the ALJ committed an abuse of
discretion by ignoring exculpatory evidence that eviscerated the false
allegations against Doe. This abuse of
discretion was extremely prejudicial to Doe in that no rational person (or
hearing officer) could conclude that he violated any applicable rule or
policy. Pet. Op. Br. at 18-19.
Petitioner Doe has
the burden of proof. Afford v. Pierno,
supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at 691. A
reviewing court starts with a presumption that the record contains sufficient
evidence to sustain every finding of fact.
Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875,
881. When a petitioner challenges an
administrative decision as unsupported by the evidence, the petitioner must set
forth all material evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Id.
The burden to provide a fair summary “grows with the complexity of the
record.” Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739. Unless this is
done, the error is deemed to be waived. Foreman
& Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at 881; Oak Valley Hosp. Dist. v. State Dept. of
Health Care Services, (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 212, 237.
The administrative
record covers 18 days of testimony and the ALJ issued a 51-page decision. AR
1820-73. The ALJ discussed the evidence in
some detail, assessed the credibility of the various witnesses, including Doe,
and issued a well-reasoned decision upholding the District’s intention to
terminate him. The court’s only
criticism of the ALJ’s decision is that it does not identify the witnesses who
testified and discuss their specific testimony, and it does not explain when
the ALJ is relying on investigative witness interviews and their content. The court can glean who testified from some
of the credibility findings, but the court and parties would have been better
served by a decision that provided this information.
Despite this
criticism, Doe has the burden to present this information to the court in
arguing that the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision. He fails to do so. His argument does not set forth a full and
fair statement of facts from the administrative record, and almost exclusively
discusses the favorable testimony of his witnesses: LACC employees Lee, Sunday,
Florese, Novoa, and Del Campo, intern Robles, and student worker Pitts. Doe specifically fails to materially discuss the
District’s evidence and how its witnesses impact the weight of evidence.
Doe inadvertently
admits his failure in reply. He
acknowledges that he was accused by former student-employees A.B. and Elias,
former CAFYES student I.N., CAFYES intern Sagrero, and EOPS student worker Medrano. Reply at 4.
All these witnesses testified. Garcia
and President Gallagher also testified to their observations of his misconduct. Yet, Doe failed to present any testimony of these
seven witnesses, only noting that A.B. made a complaint and that Elias backed
her allegations. See Pet. Op. Br.
at 12-13.[7] This
is woefully inadequate.
Because neither Doe
nor the District has significantly discussed the evidence, the court
deliberately has set forth the ALJ’s findings in considerable detail. These findings reflect the witness testimony
unless shown otherwise.
With this in mind, Doe’s
reliance on his witnesses does not meet his burden of proof on the weight of
the evidence. The court acknowledges
that it is difficult to prove a negative – in this case that Doe did not
sexually harass or racially harass, female students. In defending such an accusation, the court
also acknowledges that it is useful to present testimony from witnesses who did
not observe anything that was untoward.
Yet, Doe’s witnesses cannot carry the day. All of Lee, Sunday, Flores, Novoa, and Del
Campo were LACC employees. In their roles,
they may or may not have been in a position to observe Doe’s physical contact
with female students. Intern Robles and
student worker Pitts may have been in a better position to observe such
contact, but their testimony does not overcome the detailed observations set
forth by the ALJ. As the District
argues, Doe’s witnesses only establish that there are employees and student
workers within his orbit with whom he did not have problematic interactions.
These witnesses do not refute the misconduct charged. Opp. at 15.[8]
In reply, Doe argues
that the ALJ’s decision is essentially a substantial evidence review that did
not weigh the evidence and considered only evidence that supported Friedman’s Report. Reply at 8.
The short answer to this argument is “how would the court know that from
Doe’s presentation of evidence?”
Doe also argues
that “zero favorable witnesses were required here because the District and ALJ
relied nearly solely on the hearsay ’evidence’ which as LACC admits, cannot
support the findings and decision of the ALJ.”
Reply at 9. There are two answers
to this argument. First, again how would
the court know that the ALJ relied on hearsay?
Doe does not even identify or cite the hearsay evidence that he contends
is “mountainous”. Second, his argument
ignores the testimony of A.B., Elias, I.N., Sagrero, Medrano, Garcia, and President
Gallagher, which is not hearsay.
Doe has not shown
that the ALJ’s findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.
2. Doe Fails to Show that the ALJ’s
Decision Improperly Relied on Hearsay
Doe notes that, in an administrative
proceeding where a hearing officer “makes a decision based on a party’s
testimony, the adversary is entitled to question his or her opponent.” Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County
of San Luis Obispo, (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 705, 711 (cross-examination
“essential” where the findings rely on witness testimony); Denny H. v. Superior Court, (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 1501, 1513-14 (“In a contested hearing, the precise words and
demeanor of a witness during direct as well as cross-examination bears on the
credibility and weight the trier of fact accords the witness’s testimony.”). Doe further notes that, while reasonable
persons often rely on statements and reports, in the conduct of serious affairs
a reasonable adjudicator “will not rely solely on written statements but will
demand that witnesses be produced so that their credibility may be tested and
their testimony weighed against conflicting evidence when their testimony
appears readily available and there is no substantial reason why their
testimony may not be produced.” John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School
Dist., (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301, 307-08.
Pet. Op. Br. at 19-20.
Doe argues that the witness statements in
Friedman’s Report (see AR 984) are all hearsay evidence. Evid.
Code §1200(a).[9] The Report does not include original or
firsthand statements from any of the witnesses but is comprised of summaries
prepared by Friedman that consist of multiple levels of hearsay. Mere uncorroborated hearsay does not
constitute even substantial evidence, much less a preponderance of evidence. In re
Lucero L., (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1244-1245. Reliance by the ALJ on hearsay evidence was
insufficient to support the termination decision. It was unfair for the District to rely on the
unchallenged, unverified, unauthenticated written summaries of witness accounts
rather than testimony. AR 980-1346. Doe was denied due process because he was not
allowed to cross examine witnesses and the ALJ relied to excess upon stale,
written testimony from witnesses who could appear and testify. Pet. Op. Br. at 20-21.
As the District argues, while Doe repeatedly
complains about the ALJ’s recourse to the investigative report, he fails to
specify where this occurred. Doe is
obliged to cite to the hearsay and where the ALJ relied on it specifically. Guthrey
v. State of California, (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 (“It is the
duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record…”). Doe’s generalized complaint, merely citing
the existence of the Report is insufficient to discharge his obligation. Opp. at 17-18.
Friedman’s Report obviously contains witness
interviews, which would be hearsay.
However, Doe’s general statements that the District (and the ALJ) relied
on witness summaries is insufficient for any inferences to be drawn. What witness summaries? Did the witnesses testify? What did the witnesses say that differed
from, or supplemented, witness testimony at the hearing? Was the interview admissible as a party
admission or other form of hearsay exception?
Doe does not say, and his arguments about hearsay fail for lack of
specificity.
The District also acknowledges that there are
hearsay witness statements in the Report,[10] but that does not make them
inadmissible. The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) prescribes
the somewhat relaxed evidentiary standards of administrative adjudications to
formal hearings, permitting admission and consideration of relevant evidence
notwithstanding the “technical rules” of evidence. Govt.
Code §11513(c); see also Webster
v. Board of Dental Examiners, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 534, 538. Instead, evidence must be “the sort of
evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs.” Govt. Code §11513(c). This standard permits flexible consideration
of germane evidence by the administrative tribunal, including matter such as
unsworn official reports containing percipient observations. Hildebrand
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1570-72. Hearsay also is treated in a flexible manner. By itself, hearsay cannot be the sole evidence
supporting a fact. Govt. Code §11513(d). But it can be considered to support and
explain other admissible evidence. Id.
To some extent at least, the Report’s
witness statements supplement facts from other evidence. The ALJ considered testimony
from complaining students, percipient witnesses, Friedman, LACC officials, cross-examination
of Doe’s witnesses, and documentary evidence.
This blend of documentary sources and
testimony satisfies the requirement for consideration of hearsay under Govt.
Code section 11513(d).
Moreover, the District points out that Doe
had the broad discovery rights available for Tier I hearings, which authorize
administrative litigants to conduct full civil discovery, call their own
witnesses, and cross examine the witnesses of opposing parties. Govt.
Code §11513. He had the right to call
and cross-examine witnesses. §87679; Govt.
Code §11513(b). Given the availability
of discovery and witness cross-examination, it is difficult to imagine how Doe’s
due process rights were substantively injured. The ALJ expressly observed that, whatever the
validity of Doe’s arguments about Friedman’s investigation, he suffered no lasting
injury because he received due process at the hearing. AR
1855. Opp. at 16-17.
In reply, Doe argues that, while the
technical rules of evidence are loosened in an administrative forum, the
guarantees of the Education and Evidence Codes cannot be entirely disregarded
where the ALJ parroted the Report and relied on hearsay while entirely
disregarding Doe’s favorable witnesses. He
contends that the ALJ’s decision refers to the Report’s hearsay in paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 23, 35, 43,
44, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 67, and only nine paragraphs
cite to the hearing transcript -- ¶¶ ¶ 42, 77, 78, 96, 107, 113, 114, 121, and 123. This is true even though both parties cited
to the hearing transcript extensively in their closing briefs. AR 696-57, 772-803, 807-62. Often the ALJ’s findings paragraphs are a
mixture of hearsay from the Report (without citation) and references to
testimony (without citation), so it is impossible to verify whether the
conclusion is supported by the evidence.
Reply at 9-10.[11]
As
stated ante, the court agrees that the ALJ’s decision would have been
better if it identified witness testimony and separated it from witness
interviews and documentary evidence.
However, Doe cannot cure the defect of a generalized objection in his
opening brief by citing specific paragraphs in reply. New evidence/issues
raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly presented to a
trial court and may be disregarded. Regency
Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323,
1333. Nor does he adequately do so
anyway. His citation to purported
reliance on hearsay in the ALJ’s decision does not make such reliance wrong. Doe was obligated to show that the ALJ’s
finding(s) were improperly based solely on hearsay in violation of Govt. Code
§11513(d). He has not done so.
3.
The Morrison Factors
In Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d
at 229-30, the California Supreme Court articulated factors to consider in
whether a credentialed employee’s misconduct renders him unfit for service as a
teacher: (a) likelihood that the conduct at issue may have adversely affected
students/fellow teachers; (b) degree of such adversity anticipated; (c)
proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct; (d) type of teaching
certificate held by the party involved; (e) extenuating or aggravating
circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct; (f) likelihood of recurrence of
the questioned conduct; (g) praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of motives
resulting in the conduct; (h) extent to which disciplinary action may inflict
an adverse impact or chilling effect upon constitutional rights of the teacher
involved or other teachers. Not every Morrison
factor must be considered; a trier of fact may consider all of the factors that
are relevant to the respective case. Ibid.;
West Valley-Mission College v. Concepcion, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at
1777.
Doe argues that the only alleged conduct
within the four years under section 87680 concerns
I.N. Despite I.N.’s frustration with Doe,
he was evaluated by all students in the CAFYES Program in 2016 and 2017 and
received 100% positive evaluations in 2016 and 99% positive evaluations in
2017. AR 781. Pet. Op. Br. at 21; Reply at 11-12.
Doe’s
assertion about his positive student evaluations is insufficient to overcome
the ALJ’s Morrison evaluation. AR
1859-62. This evidence relates mostly to
Doe’s guilt and was considered by the ALJ.
See AR 1848. To the extent
that it bears on the Morrison factor of adverse effect on students or
co-workers, the lack of an adverse effect on students in 2016 and 2017 does not
affect the ALJ’s conclusion that Doe’s misconduct had a significant adverse
impact on the complaining students, other students in the CAFYES program,
student workers, and staff members. AR
1860.
Although
it also bears on guilt and not the Morrison analysis, Doe’s claim about section
87680 is not adequately shown. Section
87680 provides that no decision of dismissal or suspension shall be made based
on charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more than
four years prior to the filing of the notice.
The written notice delivered to the employee pursuant to section 87672
shall be deemed an accusation. §87679. The Statement of Charges was served on May
10, 2021. AR 917. Thus, any charges or evidence prior to May
10, 2017 were subject to exclusion at the hearing.
Doe
fails to demonstrate that he objected at the hearing to any evidence before May
10, 2017. The
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine includes issue exhaustion. The agency must be given the opportunity to
reach a reasoned and final conclusion on each and every issue upon which it has
jurisdiction to act before it is raised in a judicial forum. Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of
Los Angeles, (2021), 12 Cal.5th 458, 479 (citation omitted). The exact issue raised in the lawsuit
must have been presented to the administrative agency. Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County
of Placer, (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 577, 594. Doe’s failure to demonstrate exhaustion of
the section 87679 issue at the hearing is a waiver of that claim.
Doe’s
argument that only I.N.’s complaint fell within the four-year period also is
incorrect. The six student complaints
were made in April, late May, and November 2017, and in January, July, and
August 2018. AR 1824. Student I.N.’s complaint alleged misconduct
between September 28, 2017 and November 8, 2017. AR 1831.
A.B.’s informal complaint was made on May 25, 2017, and formally on June
1, 2017. AR 1829. S.M. alleged misconduct between November 2016
and July 2018. AR 1832. L.M. complained of misconduct between Doe’s
hire date and July 2018. AR 1832. B.C. alleged misconduct between November 2016
and November 2017. AR 1830-31. Some of each complainant’s allegations were
within the four-year period.
Additionally,
Garcia observed misconduct on unstated dates and alleged personal
discrimination and retaliation by Doe between February through November 2017. AR 1833.
President Gallagher observed Doe’s flirtatious conduct in the Spring
2018. AR 1826. Elias worked with Doe until June 2017 and
observed his misconduct. AR 1837. Doe further misappropriated student
information during his administrative leave in 2018. See AR 1848. Some or all of this evidence was within the
four-year period.[12]
To
the extent that some of the charges and/or evidence fell outside the four-year
period, Doe had the obligation to raise it before the ALJ and to show the same
to the court. He fails to do so.
F.
Conclusion
The Petition is
denied. The District’s counsel is
ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it on Doe’s counsel for approval
as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if
there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a
declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for October 10,
2024 at 9:30 a.m.
[1]
Petitioner Doe has been permitted to proceed anonymously. This was an error. A public employee challenging his dismissal
should always do so in open court. As
the case has proceeded thus far anonymously without objection, the court will continue
to refer to him as Doe.
[2]
Los Angeles Community College District (“District”) states that it is the
proper Respondent, but an administrative law judge from OAH was appointed as
the final decision-maker under Education Code section 87678.
[3]
The court will use the term CAFYES in this decision.
[4]
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise
stated.
[6]
Del Campo testified that CAFYES had a budget for gift cards and other
incentives to encourage attendance at mandatory workshops and events. AR 2146-147. Doe distributed the gift cards as he saw fit,
because that was part of the job LACC hired him to do. AR 793.
EOPS accountant Lee kept records of the gift cards and the CAFYES
students had to sign for the cards they received. AR 793.
[7]
Doe notes that the District’s opposition fails to cite any witness testimony
and argues that it is a rubber-stamp of the ALJ’s 53-page decision. Unlike Doe, the District does not bear the
burden of proof.
[8] The District notes that Doe fails to address the charge concerning
his unlawful acquisition and retention of student information while he was on
administrative leave. On June 16, 2023,
the Hearing Officer granted the District’s motion to amend its statement of
charges to include this charge. AR 565-71. The District proved this misconduct
through the testimony of Novoa. Doe admitted
under cross-examination that he instructed Navoa to print these files and
deliver them to him while he loitered on the sidewalk just off campus. AR
3530-32. He admitted to improperly
taking documents he was not authorized to possess while on administrative
leave, indicating that he needed the documents for his defense. AR 3532,
3535. The ALJ included this issue in
deciding Doe’s evident unfitness (AR
1866), dishonesty (AR 1868), and willful
refusal to obey the laws (AR 1871). Doe’s omission of this issue underscores the
incomplete and slanted nature of his factual exposition. Opp. at 15.
[9]
Doe notes that Investigator Friedman listed six complainants but spoke to only
three. See AR 990-93.
She spoke to 13 of 16 witnesses but interviewed only one of 13 witnesses
identified by Doe. AR 187.
Reply at 10.
[10]
The observations of Friedman in the Report were admissible as a public employee
record under Evid. Code section 1280. Hildebrand v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1570-72.
[11]
Doe adds that there are disconnects where the ALJ does mention testimony. For instance, the ALJ refers to President
Gallagher’s testimony recounting the EOPS graduation ceremony in which she
thought Doe was being flirtatious with her.
She also saw Doe whispering in a female student’s ear and placing his
hand on the back of female student who was wearing a blue dress. AR 1826, 1838. However, on cross-examination Gallagher was
unable to identify anyone in the group photograph taken at the event. AR 2334.
Gallagher could not even identify Doe.
Nor did anyone match the description that Gallagher gave of the female student
Doe supposedly touched. AR 1816, 3417-19. Reply at 10-11. This cross-examination may undermine
Gallagher’s recollection, but it does not show she was wrong.
[12]
In reply, Doe argues that the ALJ’s analysis of Morrison factors consists
of generalized conclusory statements that are unsupported by the witnesses and
evidence. Reply at 11. The ALJ’s Morrison analysis is
supported by the rest of her findings and Doe has not shown those findings are
unsupported by the weight of the evidence.