Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCP02295, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling

Francisco Enriquez v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, 23STCP02295

Tentative decision on petition for writ of mandate: denied

Petitioner Francisco Enriquez (“Enriquez”) petitions the court for a writ of mandate compelling Respondent Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (“Commission”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“Department”) to set aside the decision to discharge him and reinstate him to his position of deputy sheriff.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Enriquez commenced this proceeding on June 30, 2023, alleging a cause of action for administrative mandamus under CCP section 1094.5. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On February 1, 1999, Enriquez was hired as a deputy sheriff. Pet., ¶5. Enriqeuz was a sworn police officer at all relevant times. Pet., ¶5.

On August 6, 2013, Enriquez was notified of the Department’s intention to discharge him from his position as Deputy Sheriff. Pet., ¶6. On August 16, 2013, the Department notified Enriquez that he was discharged, effective that same date. Pet., ¶7.

Enriquez was granted an evidentiary hearing in which to challenge the accusations and allegations contained in the letter of discharge. Pet., ¶8. The Commission appointed Angela D. Shaw as Hearing Officer. Pet., ¶8.

The Hearing Officer heard the matter for a total of 22 days, from July 2017 to June 2021. Pet., ¶9. On July 1, 2022, the Hearing Officer issued findings affirming Enriquez’s discharge. Pet., ¶10.

On September 20, 2022, Enriquez filed Objections to the Hearing Officer’s findings. Pet., ¶11. The Commission overruled Petitioner’s Objections. Pet., ¶12. On April 5, 2023, the Commission generated a Final Commission Action and Order noting that it had overruled Enriquez’’s Objections and sustained his discharge. Pet., ¶12.

Enriquez alleges that the Commission prejudicially abused its discretion in sustaining the discharge because its conclusions are not supported by evidence. Pet., ¶14.

On August 31, 2023, the Commission filed a Notice of No Beneficial Interest in the outcome of the proceedings.

CCP section 1094.5 is the administrative mandamus provision which structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendered by administrative agencies. Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (“Topanga”) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15.

CCP section 1094.5 does not in its face specify which cases are subject to independent review, leaving that issue to the courts. Fukuda v. City of Angels, (1999)20 Cal.4th 805, 811. In cases reviewing decisions which affect a vested, fundamental right the trial court exercises independent judgment on the evidence. Bixby v. Pierno, (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143. See CCP §1094.5(c). Revocation or suspension of a license warrants application of the independent judgment test. See Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392, 396.

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” Id. at 143. The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners, (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868. In short, the court substitutes its judgment for the agency’s regarding the basic facts of what happened, when, why, and the credibility of witnesses. Guymon v. Board of Accountancy, (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1013-16.

“In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 817. Unless it can be demonstrated by petitioner that the agency’s actions are not grounded upon any reasonable basis in law or any substantial basis in fact, the courts should not interfere with the agency’s discretion or substitute their wisdom for that of the agency. Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 150-151; Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Board, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 198, 208.

The agency’s decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 860, 862. The hearing officer is only required to issue findings that give enough explanation so that parties may determine whether, and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15. Implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order. Id. at 115.

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties (Ev. Code §664), and the petitioner therefore has the burden of proof. Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137. “[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party attacking the administrative decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings were unfair, in excess of jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of discretion. Afford v. Pierno, (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.

The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Lake v. Civil Service Commission, (“Lake”) (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 224, 228. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the court must examine the extent of the harm to the public service, the circumstances surrounding the misconduct, and the likelihood that such conduct will recur. Skelly v. State Personnel Board, (“Skelly”) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 217218. Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. Nightingale v. State Personnel Board, (“Nightingale”) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 507, 515. The policy consideration underlying such allocation of authority is the expertise of the administrative agency in determining penalty questions. Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners, (“Cadilla”) (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 961.

Petitioner Enriquez had been employed by the Department for 11 years when he was terminated from his deputy sheriff position. AR 2976. He was assigned to Century Station. In 2009, he was “on loan” to the Narcotics Strike Team (“NST”) -- i.e., he was taken away from his patrol duties in order to assist the NST with investigations. AR 2977-78.

On October 7, 2009, Detective Scott Kalassay (“Kalassay”) created an operations plan to conduct a wall stop of Miguel Amarillas (“Amarillas”), a suspected drug dealer. Kalassay’s attention had been brought to Amarillas by a confidential informant (“CI”), who told Kalassay that Amarillas was going to sell him an ounce of methamphetamine. AR 2655, 2658, 2661-63, 2981. The CI also told Kalsassay that Amarillas’ girlfriend, Tatiana Lopez (“Lopez”), could be carrying the drugs for Amarillas. AR 2671, 2693.

The officers assigned to the primary takedown of Amarillas were Century Station patrol deputies Javier Martinez (“Martinez”) and Ronald Slagle (“Slagle”). Enrizquez was the backup. AR 2985. When Slagle and Martinez were unable to get onto the correct street to stop Amarillas, Kalassay directed Enriquez to look for Amarillas’ vehicle. AR 2985-86.

Enriquez saw Amarillas travelling at a high rate of speed, not signaling, effecting a rolling stop, and not wearing a seatbelt, and pulled him over. AR 2986-87. Lopez was a passenger in the car. AR 2989. Amarillas was on active parole, and thus subject to a warrantless search. AR 2988. Enriquez believed Amarillas and Lopez to be under the influence of narcotics. AR 2679, 2988. He patted Amarillas down for weapons and placed him in his patrol car. AR 2989. Enriquez conducted a visual search of Lopez but did not pat her down because only a female deputy could search a female suspect. AR 2990. Enriquez put Lopez in the rear of Slagle’s patrol car, along with Lopez’ dog. AR 2990. Enriquez searched Amarillas’ car for narcotics. No narcotics were found. AR 2677.

The remaining facts concern the transport of Amarillas and Lopez to the Century Regional Detention Center (“CRDF”), the discovery of methamphetamine in Enriquez’s patrol vehicle, the booking of Amarillas and Lopez, and the parole search of Amarillas’ apartment. These facts were the subject of the Department’s charges against Enriquez and are in dispute.

Lopez and Amarillas filed a complaint against the Department and every individual involved with the NST, alleging that evidence was planted. AR 2748-49, 3031. They also filed a civil lawsuit. AR 2750.

As a result of the complaint, the Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) initiated an investigation into the conduct of Enriquez, Slagle, Martinez, and Kalassay. AR 2902-03, 2961-62. Subsequently, the Department’s Internal Criminal Investigation Bureau (“ICIB”) initiated a criminal investigation of all members of the NST. AR 3032-33.

The District Attorney filed criminal charges against Enriquez. AR 3034. He was tried twice and both times the outcome was a hung jury. AR 3034.

After serving a Letter of Intent on June 12, 2013, the Department served Enriquez with a Notice of Discharge on August 7, 2013, alleging the following:

1. That in violation of Manual of Policy and Procedures Sections 3-01/050.10, Performance to Standards; and/or 3-01/030.10, Obedience to Laws, Regulations, and Orders (as it pertains to Perjury, 118.1 P. C.); and/or 3-01/100.35, False Information in Records; and/or 3-01/040.70, False Statements; and/or 3-01/030.05, General Behavior; and/or 3-01/000.10, Professional Conduct; on or about October 7, 2009, you failed to conform to the work standards established for your position when you knowingly authored a probable cause declaration and incident report with inaccurate and/or false and/or improper police information and/or material matter for which you were subsequently criminally charged with perjury by declaration and filing a false police report; and/or you failed to adhere to the Core Values of the Department as you failed to apply wisdom and use common sense in your interactions during the arrest of Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez and/or your handling of this incident; and/or caused undue embarrassment to, and/or damaged the reputation of the Department; and/or brought discredit to yourself and/or the Department, as evidenced by, but not limited to:

a. being criminally charged on or about July 27, 2012, by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office for two felony counts of perjury (perjury by declaration and filing false police report), and/or;

b. stating you authored the arrest report, supplemental report and PCD’s for Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez and that all your reports were true and accurate depictions of your actions and the facts, and/or;

c. admitting but not documenting or telling anyone you placed Mr. Amarillas in your vehicle and Ms. Lopez in Deputy Slagle’s vehicle upon their initial detention, but switched them prior to transporting to CRDF because you wanted to “keep an eye on her” until she was searched at booking because Ms. Lopez had not been thoroughly searched in the field, and/or;

d. admitting to not being certain if you searched your vehicle after removing Mr. Amarillas and placing Ms. Lopez in the vehicle, and/or;

e. arresting Mr. Amarillas for being under the influence of a controlled substance, methamphetamine; however, on the booking medical questionnaire, you indicated Mr. Amarillas was not under the influence of a controlled substance, and/or;

f. the jailer’s portion of Mr. Amarillas’ booking medical questionnaire showed the “no” box was checked regarding the jailer’s observation of Mr. Amarillas being under the influence of a controlled substance, and/or;

g. writing in the incident report that Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez refused to provide a urine sample to prove or disprove the presence of a stimulant in their system. However, both Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez denied being asked or offered the opportunity to provide samples, and/or;

h. submitting completed Century Station Urine Test Waiver Forms indicating Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez refused to provide samples, and/or;

i. Sergeant Hannemann stating to IAB investigators that he did not sign the Century Station Urine Test Waiver Forms as indicated on the forms and was never told that Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez refused to provide samples, and/or;

j. writing in the incident report and PCD that you saw the clear bags of methamphetamine as you removed Ms. Lopez from the backseat of your vehicle, and/or;

k. telling Lt. Colton during the Service Comment Review that you discovered the narcotics wrapped in toilet paper and shoved under the driver’s seat contradicting the incident report and PCD, and/or;

l. stating you located the narcotics in your car while Ms. Lopez stood by the car, even though Ms. Lopez described a female taking her out of the vehicle and into CRDF booking front while leaving her dog in the back seat of the vehicle, and/or;

m. Deputy Kalassay stating he only saw you by the vehicle when Deputy Kalassay observed the narcotics in the vehicle;

2. That in violation of Manual of Policy and Procedures Sections 3-01/040.75, Failure to Make Statements and/or Making False Statements During Departmental Internal Investigations; and/or 3-01/040.70, False Statements, on or about June 12, 2012, you failed to make full and/or complete and/or truthful statements in a department internal investigation and your submitted reports and official documentation for your arrest, transportation and booking of Mr. Amarillas and Ms. Lopez on October 7, 2009, as evidenced by, but not limited to:

b. stating in your deposition to Attorney Tom Beck, that your name was on Ms. Lopez’ booking slip because you were the one who completed her booking process. Yet, during your Departmental internal investigation you stated you did not complete Ms. Lopez’ booking slip, and/or;

c. stating you did not complete the additional charge sheet for Ms. Lopez even though your name was on it, and/or;

d. Deputy Martinez telling IAB investigators that he completed Ms. Lopez’ booking slip, and/or;

e. Deputy Slagle stating he completed the medical questionnaire and assessment booking forms for Ms. Lopez, and/or;

f. stating in a Department internal interview that you found the small baggie of narcotics wrapped in Kleenex at the base of the floorboard and the vehicle guard, the bottom of your patrol vehicle, but writing in the incident report you observed a clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be several individual baggies containing methamphetamine. AR 651-54.

Enriquez had a 22-day evidentiary hearing before the Hearing Officer. AR 130. On July 1, 2022, the Hearing Officer issued proposed findings and recommendation upholding Enriquez’ discharge. AR 130-62. She essentially found that all the allegations were true in that Enriquez failed to follow policy by being criminally charged, in preparing the Incident Report, supplemental report, PCDs, and booking information, in his uncertainty in whether he searched his patrol vehicle after removing Amarillas and placing Lopez in the vehicle, in preparing the booking and other paperwork for the arrests, in stating that Lopez was standing by the patrol vehicle when he discovered the narcotics, and in failing to make true and complete statements in his civil suit deposition, the ICB/ICIB investigation, and in reports submitted for the Lopez and Amarillas arrests. AR 154-56.

On April 5, 2023, the Commission overruled Enriquez’ objections and approved the Hearing Officer’s findings upholding the discharge.

Petitioner Enriquez argues that the weight of the evidence does not support the findings of his misconduct and the penalty of termination is not warranted.

Charge 1, Allegations (a) and (b) were that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position when he was criminally charged on or about July 27, 2012, by the District Attorney with two felony counts of perjury (perjury by declaration and filing false police report) and stated that he authored the arrest report, supplemental report and PCDs for Amarillas and Lopez and that all his reports were true and accurate.

Enriquez admits that Charge 1, Allegations 1(a) and (b) are true. He was criminally charged on or about July 27, 2012 for two felony counts of perjury (perjury by declaration and filing false police report). But he was never convicted. He also stated that he authored the arrest report, supplemental report, and PCDs for Amarillas and Lopez and that the reports were true and accurate. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

The County argues that Enriquez falsely stated in the arrest report and PCD for Amarillas that he charged Amarillas with felony possession of narcotics for sale (H&S Code §11378) because he had discovered a single baggy of methamphetamine, along with Amarillas’ mail, in his dresser drawer during a parole roll back search of Amarillas’ and Lopez’s apartment. The evidence established that members of the NST, including Enriquez, did not leave Century Station for the parole search until 10:30 p.m. AR 1593. The NST returned to CRDF sometime between 11:15 p.m. and 11:25 p.m. Id.

Yet, Enriquez had already charged Amarillas with felony possession of narcotics for sale at least an hour before the NST left Century Station for the parole search. Records in the CLETS database established that Enriquez requested approval from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to place a parole hold on Amarillas because he had been charged with possession of narcotics for sale, a felony. AR 2398-404. At 9:29 p.m., the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation notified CRDF the parole hold was approved. AR 1709. The booking slip for Amarillas states that he was booked for felony possession of narcotics for sale at 8:45 p.m. The booking slip was time stamped by professional staff at 10:23 p.m., which was before the NST left for the parole search. AR 1502. Opp. at 13.

Enriquez rebuts the County’s argument. Enriquez testified that he charged both Lopez and Amarillas with possession for sale because they were pointing fingers at the other about the narcotics found in Enriquez’s patrol vehicle. AR 2708-09. Sgt. Michael Hannemann testified that this was appropriate. If a deputy finds drugs in a situation like this and does not know to whom they belong, it is acceptable to charge both individuals with possession and the District Attorney will determine which suspect is to be held accountable. AR 2433-34.

Enriquez added in his testimony that “our whole mindset was that they were both not denying it which led us to believe that they were both aware that there was methamphetamine being transported….[T]he whole time they were being arrested for possession for sales, but since it was an ongoing investigation, they would continue this until the end -- until we did a rollback search. AR 3114. When asked if they decided to charge Amarillas for possession with intent to sell before they left for the parole search, Enriquez answered: “Well, we would have had to, because we wouldn’t have gotten a parole hold.” AR 3114. Enriquez wrote the PCD for Amarillas at 11:45 p.m., after the parole search. AR 1498. He wrote the Incident Report and narrative the day after the arrest. AR 1474, 1479. Both were written after the parole search. When asked why he wrote in the Incident Report that he charged Amarillas with possession after discovering the baggie in the apartment, Enriquez explained:

“Well, the paragraph does not make sequential sense. I should have added specifics, and I should have clarified that he was already being charged with sales, and the additional bag just solidified our case…..But I was not trying to be untruthful. I should have written it a little bit more clearer as to why they were both charged.” AR 3110.

“Just like the incident report, I should have been more specific to clarify for somebody besides myself and anybody with law enforcement experience to read better, but there’s no way we could have returned and done a rollback at the time we did if they were not arrested for possession for sales. So we couldn’t have returned to his house.” AR 3112.

Enriquez is guilty of Charge 1, Allegation (a) because he failed to adhere to the work standards for his position when he was criminally charged on or about July 27, 2012, by the District Attorney with two felony counts of perjury (perjury by declaration and filing false police report) However, he was never found guilty in the criminal case. Moreover, the court does not find that Enriquez planted a baggie of methamphetamine in the vehicle. There is insufficient evidence to support that conclusion or that he planted the same type of baggies at Amarillas’ apartment. Therefore, he did not make false statements in the Incident Report and PCD about Amarillas’ possession of narcotics for sale.

Charge 1, Allegation (c) was that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position because he admitted but did not document or tell anyone that he placed Amarillas in his vehicle and Lopez in Deputy Slagle’s vehicle upon their initial detention, but switched them prior to transporting to CRDF because he (Enriquez) wanted to “keep an eye on her” until Lopez was searched at booking because she had not been thoroughly searched in the field.

Charge 2, Allegation (a) was that Enriquez falsely stated in his reports and documentation that he transported Lopez to CRDF.

Kalsassy agreed. He testified that male deputies could not physically touch Lopez to search her. AR 2680. A request was made for a female deputy to come to the scene, but one did not respond. AR 2680-81. There had been a determination to arrest Lopez and Amarillas for being under the influence. AR 2681. It is best to separate suspects and they had two patrol cars. AR 2681. As lead detective, he determined who should transport which suspect. AR 2683. He decided that Enriquez would transport Lopez because he was assigned to the NTF and Deputy Slagle or Martinez would transport Amarillas. AR 2683.

Based on this testimony, Enriquez argues that he simply forgot to document the switch of suspects between vehicles. He did not write the Incident Report immediately after the arrest, and did so only after the officers went to Amarillas’s apartment for the parole search. AR 3137-38. Moreover, an incident report is a summary that does not list every single event that occurred. Ibid. Pet. Op. Br. at 9-10, 13-14.

As the County shows (Opp. at 5-7), the evidence demonstrates that Enriquez falsely stated in the Incident Report and the PCDs that he transported Lopez from the Arco station, the location of the Wall Stop, to CRDF. Lopez told Department investigators that she was transported to CRDF by Deputy Slagle, whose patrol car had an uncomfortable broken rear seat. AR 753-54, 773, 775. The vehicle repair records corroborated her assertion. The back seat of Deputy Slagle’s patrol vehicle was replaced after October 7, 2009. AR 1542. There is no evidence that the back seat of Enriquez’s patrol vehicle was repaired.

The radio traffic supports the conclusion that Deputy Slagle transported Lopez from the Wall Stop to CRDF. Department policy is to call in the beginning and ending mileage when transporting a female. AR 1277. This policy protects both male deputies and the Department from spurious claims of sexual misconduct by female suspects. AR 1277-79. NST Sergeant Michael Hannemann (“Sgt. Hannemann”) testified that the mileage proves the travel route and the timestamp on the radio broadcast also provides the time to show that there were no delays, stops, or diversions in the transport. AR 2349. At 8:30 p.m., Slagle broadcast his beginning mileage for the transportation of a female suspect, and at 8:43 p.m., Slagle broadcast his ending mileage from CRDF. AR 1277-79, 1781. The radio broadcasts reflect that he was transporting a female to the station. AR 1278. The mileage Slagle broadcast was consistent with the patrol car he was assigned. AR 1561-62.

After listening to the radio traffic, Enriquez admitted at his deposition that he did not broadcast either the beginning or ending mileage for the transportation of a female suspect. AR 1792. He testified that it slipped his mind to do so. AR 1792. He did not know why Slagle would make that broadcast. AR 1792. He did not recall if he asked Slagle to report that he (Enriquez) was transporting Lopez. AR 1792. He assumed that Slagle transported Amarillas because he (Slagle) was the only other person there. AR 1793. (Martinez drove Amarillas’ car.)

Enriquez’s argument he simply forgot to announce he was transporting a female suspect and Slagle made the announcement for him is not credible. Enriquez did not know if a broadcast was made or know why Slagle would announce he (Slagle) was transporting Lopez. AR 1792. Policy requires the deputy who is transporting a female suspect to announce the beginning and ending mileage for the transportation. AR 1792-93. Enriquez had no explanation why Slagle would broadcast the ending mileage when he arrived at CRDF if he (Slagle) had transported Amarillas. AR 1794.

The Mobile Digital Terminal (“MDT”) communications from Enriquez’s and Slagle/Martinez’s patrol cars corroborate the fact that Slagle transported Lopez and Enriquez transported Amarillas. Slagle’s and Martinez’s Deputy Daily Worksheet documented one male and one female arrest. AR 1561. Lopez’s name was run for warrants from the MDT in Slagle/Martinez’s car. AR 1562. Lopez’s booking number was requested from the MDT in Slagle/Martinez’s car. AR 1562. Martinez told IAB that he completed Lopez’s booking slip at CRDF booking. AR 1153-64. Slagle completed the medical questionnaire and intoxication assessment booking forms for Lopez. AR 1509-11.

In contrast, Amarillas’ name was run for warrants from the MDT in Enriquez’s car (AR 1564), a booking number for Amarillas was requested from the MDT in Enriquez’s car (AR 1564), and an Incident Report Number (URN) using Amarillas’ name was requested from the MDT in Enriquez’s car’s MDT (AR 1564). Enriquez completed Amarillas’ booking slip (AR 1502), medical questionnaire (AR 1504), and intoxication assessment booking form (AR 1506). Opp. at 6.

The circumstantial evidence is compelling. Enriquez provides no explanation why Slagle would broadcast his beginning mileage and ending mileage for the transportation of a female suspect if he was not transporting Lopez. Nor is there any explanation why Slagle would run Lopez for warrants and prepare her booking forms, and why Enriquez would run Amarillas for warrants and prepare his booking forms if they did not transport the respective arrestees.

Additionally, Enriquez submitted a supplemental report, approximately five weeks after the arrest, affirming the information in the Incident Report that he had thoroughly searched his patrol car before he began his shift. He did not mention anything about switching the suspects in his patrol car. AR 1489.

Enriquez’s argument that he switched Amarillas and Lopez because Detective Kalassay wanted him to keep an eye on Lopez because she had not been searched is not credible. Enriquez did not explain why he needed to keep an eye on Lopez since she was detained in Slagle/Martinez’s car, or why he could not have assigned Slagle or Martinez to keep an eye on Lopez. Enriquez also did not document in the Incident Report or PCDs that he took Amarillas out of his car and put Lopez in because Kalassay wanted him to keep an eye on her. Sgt. Hannemann could not recall ever switching suspects in his career. AR 2348.

The testimony of Enriquez and Kalassay that Enriquez was instructed to transport Lopez because Slagle’s vehicle was over its scheduled time and needed to leave also does not ring true. Both Amarillas and Lopez were taken to CRDF and there is no evidence that one arrived significantly before the other. At 8:43 p.m., Slagle broadcast his ending mileage at CRDF. AR 1277-79, 1781. Enriquez was preparing Amarillas’ Medical Screening form at 8:45 p.m. AR 1504. If anything, Enriquez returned to the station before Slagle.

Contrary to his testimony at the hearing, Kalassay told IAB that Enriquez never told him he had first placed Amarillas in his patrol car and Lopez in Slagle’s car, or that he switched the suspects before transportation. AR 1942-44. Enriquez only told him about the switch after-the-fact when the issue arose with the District Attorney. AR 1943. Kalassay acknowledged to IAB that he did not observe any portion of the Wall Stop, he only had a vague recollection of his telephone conversations with Enriquez while Enriquez was at the stop, and he was told after the fact that the suspects had been arrested for being under the influence. AR 1070-76.[1] Opp. at 7.

The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Enriquez transported Amarillas and that Slagle transported Lopez. Enriquez therefore is guilty of Charge 1, Allegation (c) and more importantly, Charge 2, Allegation (a).

Charge 1, Allegation (d) was that Enriquez that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position because he admitted to not being certain if he searched his vehicle after removing Amarillas and placing Lopez in the vehicle. In other words, the narcotics found in the vehicle could have come from Amarillas, not Lopez.

Enriquez argues that this was nothing more than a mistake. Sgt. Hannemann testified that if a deputy finds drugs and does not know to whom they belong, it is acceptable to charge both individuals with possession, as the NST did. AR 2433-34. Pet. Op. Br. at 10.

The County notes that Enriquez admitted to IAB that he was not certain if he searched his patrol car after he allegedly removed Amarillas and before he placed Lopez in his car. Enriquez’s admission is material, as he acknowledged to IAB that he could not rule out that Amarillas, not Lopez, left the narcotics Enriquez allegedly discovered in his patrol car. AR 995-98. In other words, Enriquez admitted that he might have wrongly charged Lopez for the drugs he allegedly discovered in his patrol car. Sgt. Hannemann testified that deputies are trained to search their patrol car each time they remove a suspect. AR 2347. Enriquez knew that he needed to discount the possibility another suspect left the drugs in his car as he articulated in the Arrest Report and in his November 17, 2009 supplemental report that he had thoroughly searched his patrol vehicle prior to the beginning of his shift. AR 1478, 1489. Opp. at 7-8.

If Enriquez had switched Lopez and Amarillas, he was guilty of not searching his vehicle after removing Amarillas and placing Lopez in the vehicle pursuant to Charge 1, Allegation (d). However, the court has found that the weight of the evidence shows no switch of arrestees. Therefore, this issue is moot.

Charge 1, Allegations (e) and (f) were that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position because he arrested Amarillas for being under the influence of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. However, Enriquez indicated on the booking medical questionnaire that Amarillas was not under the influence of a controlled substance. The jailer’s portion of Amarillas’ booking medical questionnaire also showed the “no” box was checked, meaning the jailer had not observed Amarillas as being under the influence of a controlled substance.

Enriquez notes that he testified that he filled out the Medical Screening Form for Amarillas (AR 1504) incorrectly: “[A]s you can tell by my mark, I just went down the line and did ‘No’s’ on all of them.” AR 3010-11. He continued: “I was rushing through it and honestly, I do not make a lot of under the influence arrests. I am used to drug and gun arrests and so I just got into the routine and that I just did it quickly as if it was an arrestee or something else.” AR 3011. Item No. 3 on the Form asks whether the arrestee appears to be under the influence, and “[i]f yes, complete ‘Arresting Deputy’s Assessment’ portion of Intoxication Assessment Sheet.” AR 1504. Enriquez checked no, but he completed the Intoxication Assessment indicating Amarillas was indeed under the influence. AR 1506, 3011-12. The jailer did not testify, and while he also checked “no” for whether Amarillas was under the influence in his Jailer’s Assessment (AR 1505), Enriquez argues that he could have checked the boxes quickly without taking the time to make an actual assessment. Additionally, the Jailer’s Assessment cannot be accepted as proof that Amarillas was not under the influence because the jailer did not testify. Pet. Op. Br. at 10-11.

The County responds that Enriquez testified at his deposition that he stated in the Incident Report and PCD that he had probable cause to arrest Amarillas for being under the influence of narcotics because he observed objective symptoms. AR 1807-08. Enriquez did not document any standardized Field Sobriety Tests (“FSTs”) for Amarillas, nor did he arrest him for driving under the influence. However, Enriquez indicated on the medical questionnaire that Amarillas was not under the influence of a controlled substance and the jailer checked “no” for the same observation. While Enriquez argues that he and the jailer coincidentally made the same mistake, the alleged mistakes were never corrected. Opp. at 11.

Enriquez replies that he made a mistake, not an act of dishonesty. He testified at the hearing that the entire operation was “a rush job.” AR 3009. They were close to Amarillas’s residence, and they wanted to get out of the location quickly. AR 3009. During the booking, the thought process was “let’s get out of booking so we can do this rollback [search of Amarillas’s apartment] before anybody gets there before we do to discard of any evidence.” AR 3010. When he was filling out the medical questionnaire for Amarillas, he “was rushing through it and honestly I do not make a lot of under the influence arrests. I am used to drug and gun arrests and so I just got into the routine and that I just did it quickly as if it was an arrestee or something else.” AR 3011. Enriquez provided the same explanation regarding filling out Amarillas’s medical questionnaire during his highly antagonistic civil deposition by Attorney Beck. AR 1808-09. Certainly, if Enriquez intended to provide false statements regarding the arrests of the suspects, he would not have checked a box that Amarillas was not under the influence. The fact that he did so lends credence to the fact that it was a mistake. Reply at 2-3.

The court agrees. Enriquez is guilty of failed to adhere to the work standards for his position by stating on the booking medical questionnaire that Amarillas was not under the influence of a controlled substance, but this error favored no one except Amarillas and was a mistake, not an intentionally false statement. Enriquez is not responsible for the jailer’s entry, and it does not prove that Amarillas was not under the influence.

Charge 1, Allegations (g), (h), and (i) were that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position because he wrote in the Incident Report that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide a urine sample to prove or disprove the presence of a stimulant in their system. Both Amarillas and Lopez denied being asked or offered the opportunity to provide samples. Enriquez submitted completed Century Station urine test waiver forms indicating that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide samples. Sgt. Hannemann told IAB investigators that he did not sign the urine test waiver forms, the forms wrongly indicate that he did so, and he was never told that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide samples.

Enriquez notes that neither Amarillas nor Lopez testified at the administrative hearing. Accordingly, their statements denying refusal to sign the forms are hearsay unsupported by any corroborating evidence and cannot be accepted as true. Kalassay testified that this case was “100 percent” his. AR 2728. Kalassay inquired of Amarillas and Lopez if they would provide samples, and he heard their refusals. AR 2731-33 (Kalassay), 3027-28 (Enriquez). While the waiver forms have Enriquez’s name as the witnessing officer (AR 396-97), Kalassay wrote Enriquez’s name. AR 2731. Kalassay also wrote Sgt. Hannemann’s name on the waiver forms. AR 2732. Pet. Op. Br. at 11.

The County responds that Enriquez wrote in the Incident Report that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide urine samples. Enriquez submitted Century Station urine test waiver forms documenting Amarillas’ and Lopez’s refused to provide samples. AR 1675-76. Both Amarillas and Lopez denied being asked or offered the opportunity to provide samples.[2] Enriquez told Attorney Beck that he offered urine tests to Lopez and Amarillas inside the booking area at Century Station and that someone else may have filled out the form (AR 1837-38), but he later told IAB that he did not recall offering tests to Lopez or Amarillas.[3] Opp. at 12-13.

The County responds to Detective Kalassay’s testimony that he asked Lopez and Amarillas to take urine tests, but they refused, by pointing out that Sgt. Hannemann’s name was written on the sergeant’s signature line on both urine test waiver forms. Yet, Sgt. Hannemann testified that it is not his handwriting on the signature line, he did not witness Lopez or Amarillas refusing to provide urine samples, and he did not recall authorizing the use of his name of the forms. AR 1675-76, 2388-89. Falsely writing in the name of Sgt. Hannemann on the urine test waiver forms is not a mistake, it is intentional misconduct. Opp. at 13.

Perhaps so, but it was the misconduct of Detective Kalassay, not Enriquez. The weight of the evidence shows that Enriquez was not guilty of Charge 1, Allegations (g), (h), and (i). Enriquez wrote in the Incident Report that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide a urine sample to prove or disprove the presence of a stimulant in their system, but he was entitled to rely on Detective Kalassay in doing so.

Charge 1, Allegations (j), (k), (l), and (m) were that Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position because he wrote in in the Incident Report and PCD that he saw the clear bags of methamphetamine as he removed Lopez from the backseat of his vehicle. He told Lt. Colton during the Service Comment Review that he discovered the narcotics wrapped in toilet paper and shoved under the driver’s seat contradicting the incident report and PCD. He stated that he located the narcotics in his car while Lopez stood by the car. Yet, Lopez described a female taking her out of the vehicle and into CRDF booking while leaving her dog in the back seat of the vehicle. Detective Kalassay stated that he only saw Enriquez by the vehicle when he observed the narcotics in the vehicle.

Charge 2, Allegation (f) was that Enriquez stated in his IAB interview that he found the small baggie of narcotics wrapped in Kleenex at the base of the floorboard and the vehicle guard, the bottom of his patrol vehicle, but he wrote in the Incident Report that he observed a clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be several individual baggies containing methamphetamine. AR 651-54.

Enriquez argues that these allegations are evidence of the Department reaching for purported policy violations. He explained during his interview that he saw a Kleenex covering a plastic baggie containing several smaller, clear bags of methamphetamine as soon as Lopez stepped out of the vehicle at CRDF. AR 987, 989-90. That he may not have noted in his Incident Report that there was a Kleenex covering the bags is insignificant; the important fact is that he noted that he found several small baggies of narcotics.[4] Pet. Op. Br. at 11-12.

The County contends that Enriquez offered two different descriptions of the narcotics packaging he allegedly discovered in the rear floorboard of his car. Enriquez first said the narcotics were in plain view when he stated in the Arrest Report that he saw clear bags of methamphetamine after removing Lopez from the backseat of his patrol vehicle. AR 1471-82, 2396-98, 2481. Enriquez later told Lt. Colton, who was conducting a Service Comment Review, that he discovered nine baggies of narcotics wrapped in toilet paper that had been shoved under the driver’s seat. AR 1324. Enriquez also later told IAB that, when he searched his car after Lopez stepped out, he saw a package wrapped in white Kleenex under the front seat, and he could not really see narcotics because the Kleenex covered most of it. AR 990. Opp. at 8.

The County argues that this was not an inconsequential mistake. Properly documenting observations about the discovery of narcotics is one of the fundamental duties of a deputy sheriff. This was a pattern of false statements that Enriquez made when he documented the arrest, transportation, searching, and booking of Amarillas and Lopez in the Incident Report and PCDs. Opp. at 8.

The court agrees, and Enriquez does not dispute, that his failure did not meet Department standards in documenting the discovery of narcotics.

The County argues that Enriquez also falsely stated in the Incident Report and PCD that he located the narcotics in his patrol car while Lopez stood by the car. Lopez denied to Department investigators she ever possessed narcotics and stated that a female employee took her out of the vehicle and into Century’s booking, leaving her dog in the back seat. AR 753-54. Opp. at 8.

Enriquez argues that his statement does not contradict Lopez’ statement. Enriquez stated during his interview, as did Lopez, that another deputy took Lopez from his vehicle to booking. AR 991. Lopez could well have still been by the car when Enriquez observed the narcotics. Enriquez further testified that Lopez left her dog in the back of the car when she exited. AR 2998. Even if they are contradictory, Lopez did not testify and any statements she made is hearsay and cannot be considered for their truth. Pet. Op. Br at 11-12; Reply at 4.[5]

According to the County, Kalassay contradicted Enriquez’ statement in the Incident Report and PCD that he discovered the narcotics while Lopez was standing by his patrol car. Kalassay told IAB that he only saw Enriquez standing by the patrol vehicle when he (Kalassay) observed the narcotics in the vehicle.[6] Opp. at 9.

Enriquez responds that the allegation pertaining to Kalassay is that he only saw Enriquez standing by the vehicle when he (Kalassay) observed the narcotics in the vehicle. Enriquez explained during his IAB interview that Kalassay came out to look at the narcotics he had found in the car. AR 992. This does not contradict Enriquez’s statement that Lopez had not yet been taken into the station when he (Enriquez) noticed the drugs. Pet. Op. Br. at 12. The court agrees that Kalassay’s statement does not contradict Enriquez; it is a question of timing and Kalassay could have come out to see the narcotics after Lopez was taken in for booking.

Finally, the County argues that Enriquez and Kalassay made contradictory statements as to who maintained custody of the narcotics, who booked the narcotics, and when they were booked. Enriquez told Attorney Beck that he booked the narcotics before the NST left for the roll back parole search. AR 1798. In contrast, Kalassay told IAB that he took possession of the drugs, walked back into the station and confronted Lopez in an interview room. AR 1090-91. He then gave them to Enriquez or someone else to book. AR 1092. When Attorney Beck confronted Enriquez with the evidence labels for the booking of the narcotics showing that Kalassay booked the narcotics at 11:25 p.m. and 11:26 p.m. (AR 1853-54), Enriquez stated that Kalassay may have helped with the booking. AR 1802. Enriquez and Kalassay admitted they did not document the chain of custody of the seized narcotics, as required by policy.[7] Opp. at 9.

The court does not find the statements of Kalassay and Enriquez to be inconsistent. Kalassay had possession of the drugs and had someone else book them. This person may have been Enriquez. Further, Kalassay also made contradictory statements about the narcotics. During his June 7, 2012 interview, Kalassay stated that he saw a partially unwrapped package on the floor of Enriquez’s vehicle but was unable to discern its contents: “It just looks like toilet paper wrapped around the hand…” AR 1083-84. He continued: “I surmised that it was dope, but I couldn’t confirm it until we opened it up and took a look[.]” AR 1084. During his September 25, 2013 interview, Kalassay stated that the package was “already unwrapped and the Kleenex and dope were still sitting on the floorboard….” AR 1934. Pet. Op. Br. at 12-13; Reply at 3-4.

Nonetheless, Enriquez’ argument is dependent on the truth of his position that he transported Lopez in his patrol vehicle. If she was not in his vehicle, she could not have been standing by it when Enriquez observed narcotics behind the front seat. Enriquez testified in his civil deposition consistently with his Incident Report and PCDs that he discovered the narcotics in his patrol car while Lopez stood by his car, after he arrived at CRDF at 8:43 p.m. Enriquez told Attorney Beck he took custody of the narcotics, walked with Lopez into the booking front at CRDF, and booked the narcotics himself. AR 1798-99, 1809-10. Lopez’s booking slip states she was booked for possession of narcotics for sale at 8:50 p.m. AR 1507. Opp. at 9. Since the court concludes that Lopez was not in Enriquez’ vehicle when she arrived at CRDF, it follows that she was not standing by the vehicle when he discovered the narcotics. Enriquez also did not meet Department standards in documenting the discovery of narcotics.

The weight of the evidence supports Enriquez’s guilt on Charge 1, Allegation (l) and Charge 2, Allegation (f). He failed to meet work standards in documenting the discovery of narcotics in his patrol vehicle and also falsely stated that he located the narcotics in his car while Lopez stood by the car.

Charge 2, Allegation (b) was that Enriquez made false statements in the Department’s internal investigation and his submitted reports because he stated in his deposition to Attorney Beck that his name was on Lopez’ booking slip because he completed her booking process. Yet, during his IAB interview, he stated that he did not complete Lopez’ booking slip.

The booking slips for Amarillas (AR 1502) and Lopez (AR 1507) both state that Enriquez was the arresting, transporting, and booking deputy.

Sgt. Hannemann testified that booking slips should include the names of each deputy who participated in the booking process, but more often than not the person filling it out makes a “line across,” indicating that one person performed all the functions even if they did not. AR 2361-62. Consistent with this testimony, Deputy Martinez stated during his IAB interview that he filled out Lopez’s booking slip on behalf of Enriquez. AR 1156. Martinez explained that he was trained to fill in the arresting officer’s name, and then draw a line across the remaining boxes -- i.e., booking, searching, and transporting employee. AR 1154-55. Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

Enriquez testified during the hearing that when Attorney Beck showed him Lopez’s booking slip, he saw that his name was on the line for “arresting deputy,” “booking deputy,” “transporting deputy,” and “searching deputy.” AR 3099. Attorney Beck had asked Enriquez in the deposition if he recognized his handwriting on the booking slip, and Enriquez responded that it “looks like it.” AR 3099-100.

In contrast, Enriquez testified at his administrative hearing that his handwriting was not on the booking slip except for the portion on which the charge was written. AR 3119. Enriquez testified that the entire NST helped with the booking process. AR 3005. Enriquez explained that his statements during his IAB interview about the booking slip—which tracked his testimony at the hearing—were more accurate than his deposition testimony. AR 3144. Prior to the deposition, he only had reviewed his arrest report and was unfamiliar with the other documents. AR 3145. Attorney Beck’s deposition questioning also was incredibly antagonistic. AR 1830, 2097. Enriquez argues that it is understandable that he might not have been able to think clearly at his deposition. Pet. Op. Br. at 14-15; Reply at 5.

The County argues that, as a deputy sheriff, Enriquez was required to accurately represent his actions during the arrest, transportation, and booking of Lopez and Amarillas. Enriquez acknowledged to Attorney Beck that booking slips are meant to be factually correct. AR 1813. Detective Kalassay acknowledged in his IAB interview that it is important to ensure details are correct when submitting cases. AR 1927. At his deposition, Enriquez affirmed to Attorney Beck that he was the deputy who arrested and transported Lopez and completed her booking process. AR 1812. Yet, when Enriquez was interviewed by IAB, he denied that his writing was on Lopez’s booking slip, and he did not know who filled it out.[8] Sloppiness or a bad habit is not a legal excuse for submitting false and misleading booking documentation. If Enriquez was uncertain who completed the booking slip, even after reviewing it, he cannot reasonably expect that anyone reviewing Lopez’s booking slip to know who filed it out. See AR 2368-69. Opp. at 9-10.

The County adds that Enriquez and Detective Kalassay both testified that the errors in the booking paperwork were caused because the NST members were working hastily. Enriquez, however, had more than enough time to accurately complete the booking paperwork. That task was the only task he performed after he arrived at CDRF at 8:43 p.m. until he left for the parole search of Amarillas’ and Lopez’s apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. Amarillas’ booking slip was completed at 8:45 p.m. and Lopez’s booking slip was completed at 8:50 p.m. Enriquez clearly had enough time to ensure the booking paperwork was accurate. Opp. at 11.

Finally, Kalassay also testified that any errors could be corrected through testimony at a criminal hearing or trial. However, Department policy requires that all reports and official documentation be accurate. Neither Enriquez nor Kalassay corrected the Arrest Report, PCDs, or booking documentation before the criminal case against Lopez was dismissed. Opp. at 11.

Enriquez notes (Pet. Op Br. at 14) that it is obvious that the booking information is not accurate because Enriquez could not have transported both Amarillas and Lopez and he could did have searched Lopez under Department policy. AR 2990. Enriquez argues that, although he submitted both booking slips, he was not representing that “he was the arresting, transporting, and booking deputy for both suspects.” Reply at 4-5.

Whether or not Enriquez was not representing that he performed all stated tasks, the sloppiness or bad habit in preparing the booking form is attributable to the practice testified to by Sgt. Hannemann and as fulfilled by Deputy Martinez. The booking slips were a group effort and were inaccurately filled out, but they were not a false statement by Enriquez.

Charge 2, Allegation (c) was that Enriquez made false statements in the Department’s internal investigation and his submitted reports because he did not complete the additional charge sheet for Lopez even though his name was on it.

The County argues that Enriquez told Attorney Beck at his deposition that it “looked like” his handwriting was on the booking slip for Lopez. AR 1812. He subsequently told IAB that he did not complete the additional charge sheet for Lopez, even though his name was on it. AR 962. Again, the County argues that the deputies assigned to Century station had a bad habit of not accurately completing booking slips and that sloppiness or a bad habit is not a legal excuse for submitting false and misleading booking documentation. Nor would any reader of the booking paperwork know that it was a collaborative effort of the NST. Opp. at 10.

Enriquez points out that there is no evidence that the additional charge sheet contains a false statement, and the Hearing Officer made no finding on this charge. Enriquez stated during his administrative interview that it was not his handwriting on the additional charge slip and he did not know who filled out the form. AR 1034. It is likely that his name was on the charge sheet for the same reason his name was on Lopez’s booking slip; he was the arresting officer. See AR 1154-55. Pet. Op. Br. at 15-16.

The court agrees. Enriquez did not make a false statement on the additional charge sheet.

Charge 2, Allegation (d) was that Enriquez made false statements in the Department’s internal investigation and his submitted reports because Deputy Martinez told IAB investigators that he completed Lopez’ booking slip.

The County argues that Deputy Martinez told IAB investigators that he completed Lopez’s booking slip and wrote Enriquez’s name on it because Enriquez was the handling deputy. AR 1163-64. Because Deputy Martinez’s name does not appear on Lopez’s booking slip, no one reviewing Lopez’s booking paperwork would know he completed it. Opp. at 10.

This is true, but that fact does not make a false statement by Enriquez. As discussed supra, Enriquez testified in his civil deposition that the handwriting “looked like” his, but that was not his testimony at hearing. He told IAB investigators and testified at the administrative hearing that he did not fill out Lopez’s booking slip. AR 3119. See AR 3144. Pet. Op. Br. at 16.

There is nothing false about Enriquez’ testimony concerning Deputy Martinez’ completion of the booking slip.

Charge 2, Allegation (e) was that Enriquez made false statements in the Department’s internal investigation and his submitted reports because Deputy Slagle stated that he completed the medical questionnaire and assessment booking forms for Lopez.

The County argues that, even though Enriquez claimed he booked Lopez, Deputy Slagle’s name is listed on Lopez’s medical questionnaire and medical assessment forms. AR 1509, 1511. Deputy Slagle told IAB that he completed the forms. AR 1273-74. Opp. at 10.

This charge does not allege any false statement by Enriquez. There was no testimony that the arresting deputy must also fill out the medical questionnaire and assessment forms and Enriquez never claimed that he filled out Lopez’s medical forms. It was noted during Enriquez’s IAB interview that Deputy Slagle’s name was on the medical questionnaire and Enriquez said it was not his handwriting. AR 1034-35. The County cites no evidence that he made false statements regarding Lopez’s medical questionnaire in the Department’s internal investigation or in submitted reports. Pet. Op. Br. at 16; Reply at 5.

Enriquez acknowledges that he made some mistakes in his documentary reports concerning the arrests and bookings of Amarillas and Lopez, as well as in his deposition for Lopez’s civil lawsuit. He contends that these errors do not support the discipline of termination. In his performance evaluation from April 2008 through April 2009, Enriquez received a rating of “Very Good.” AR 602, 604. He also earned a “Very good” rating in his evaluation from April 2009 through April 2010, the period which encompasses the incident at issue. AR 596, 599. Subsequently, Enriquez was rated “Outstanding” in his performance evaluation for April 2010 through April 2011. AR 591. Pet. Op. Br. at 11-18.

Enriquez’s performance evaluations and his minimal prior discipline show that it would be out of character for him to engage in the alleged misconduct. The Department presented no motive why Enriquez, who was not the investigating officer, would plant narcotics in his vehicle or make false statements regarding the arrests and bookings of Amarillas and Lopez. Any discrepancies between Enriquez’s reports and his statements during his interview or deposition, both of which took place approximately three years after the incident, did not rise to the level of dishonesty. See County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd., (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 1606, 1616. Pet. Op. Br. at 18; Reply at 9.

Those allegations that were proved -- Enriquez was criminally charged with perjury, he switched Amarillas and Lopez from his vehicle without documenting it, and permitted others to complete the booking information -- should not lead to Enriquez’s termination. These are issues for which a lesser discipline is appropriate, if at all, especially since Enriquez had only sustained one three-day suspension in his 14 years with the Department. Enriquez has no history of dishonesty, he has not “repeatedly engaged in dishonest conduct” as the Department claims, and he will likely not engage in dishonest conduct in the future because he did not do so here. Nor did Enriquez harm the public trust, as he did not make intentionally false statements. The Department did not prove the most damning allegations against Enriquez, and those that are true should not lead to his termination. Reply at 9-10.

The County relies on the testimony of Acting Chief April Tardy (“Tardy”) testimony that discharge is the appropriate decision. Tardy agreed with Chief Kevin Goran, who signed the Notice of Discharge, that Enriquez should be discharged. Tardy testified that Enriquez’s conflicting reports and statements, as well as his arrest for perjury, demonstrated his lack of truthfulness during the arrest, transportation, booking and documentation for Amarillas and Lopez. Tardy testified that discharge was within the range of recommended discipline in the Department’s Guidelines. AR 716-7. Certain acts of misconduct, including dishonesty, are appropriate for discharge without progressive discipline. Opp. at 14.

“A deputy sheriff’s job is a position of trust and the public has a right to the highest standard of behavior from those they invest with the power and authority of a law enforcement officer. Honesty, credibility and temperament are crucial to the proper performance of an officer’s duties. Dishonesty is incompatible with the public trust.” Talmo v. Civil Service Com., (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 231. Enriquez’s dishonesty renders him unsuitable for employment as a peace officer. His dishonesty forfeited the trust of the Department and the public. The public is not well served by dishonest peace officers. Because Enriquez repeatedly entered false documentation in official Department records it is highly likely his misconduct would recur if he were returned to his position. He harmed the public service provided by the Department when he submitted a false Incident Report and false PCDs for Lopez and Amarillas, and then made numerous false statements in his IAB interview. Discharge is the appropriate discipline. Opp. at 14-15.

Some allegations in the Notice of Discharge simply were not proved. The sloppiness in preparing the booking forms is attributable to the practice testified to by Sgt. Hannemann and as fulfilled by Deputy Martinez. The booking slips were a group effort and were inaccurately filled out, but they were not a false statement by Enriquez. Enriquez also did not make a false statement on the additional charge sheet, he made no false statement about Lopez’ medical questionnaire, and there is nothing false about Enriquez’ testimony concerning Deputy Martinez’ completion of the booking slip. Finally, Enriquez wrote in the Incident Report that Amarillas and Lopez refused to provide a urine sample, but he was entitled to rely on Detective Kalassay in doing so.

Other allegations in the Notice of Discharge were proved but would not by themselves support discharge. Enriquez failed to adhere to the work standards for his position when he was criminally charged with two felony counts of perjury. However, he was never found guilty in the criminal case. The court does not find that Enriquez planted a baggie of methamphetamine in the vehicle and therefore did not make false statements in the Incident Report and PCD about Amarillas’ possession of narcotics for sale. Enriquez is guilty of failed to adhere to the work standards for his position by stating on the booking medical questionnaire that Amarillas was not under the influence of a controlled substance, but this error favored no one except Amarillas and was not an intentionally false statement.

However, the weight of the evidence shows that Enriquez did not transport Lopez and that he lied about doing so. He further failed to meet work standards in documenting the discovery of narcotics in his patrol vehicle, and he falsely stated that he located the narcotics in his patrol car while Lopez stood by the vehicle. The court accepts that a baggie of methamphetamine was found in the vehicle, and the result is that a criminal case was filed against Lopez that should not have been filed. Enriquez’s dishonesty harmed both Lopez and the Department.

Enriquez’s motivation for lying about Lopez is unclear. Once he stated in his Incident Report that he transported Lopez and found the baggies of methamphetamine after she got out of his vehicle (AR 370), however, he apparently was stuck. The rest flowed from there. In any event, the court is not required to find evidence of motive where the allegation is established by the weight of the evidence.

Despite the fact that a number of allegations were not proved or are by themselves insufficient, the dishonesty that was shown clearly supports the Commission’s decision to uphold Enriquez’s discharge. There is no reason to remand because there is no basis for the court to conclude that the Commission would reach any different result.

The Petition is denied. The County’s’ counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it on Enriquez’s counsel for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for August 1, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.

[1] The County notes that some of Kalassay’s and other witness testimony is not in the Administrative Record. Opp. at 7, n. 1.

[2] The County’s citation for this fact is incorrect. See AR 799, 839-40.

[3] The County’s citation for this fact is incorrect. See AR 1804.

[4] Enriquez notes that the Hearing Officer found that Enriquez stated in the Incident Report that the narcotics were “in the backseat of the patrol vehicle” but told Lt. Colton that they were “shoved under the driver’s seat.” AR 155-56. This is not true. Enriquez wrote in his Incident Report that he observed the bag of narcotics after Lopez stepped out of the rear of the vehicle. At no point did he state it was “in the backseat.” AR 370. Pet. Op. Br. at 12, n. 3.

[5] Lopez also said a female deputy took her out of the patrol vehicle and into the station for booking. IAB searched for this deputy and was unable to identify her. AR 734. Reply at 4, n. 1.

[6] The County’s citation for this fact is incorrect. See AR 1798-99; 1809-10.

[7] The County’s citation for this fact is incorrect. See AR 1093, 1800.

[8] The County’s citation for this fact is incorrect. See AR 1797.