Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCP02790, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling

Tiffany Abraham v. City of Los Angeles, et al., 23STCP02790

Tentative decision on petition for declaratory relief and mandamus: granted in part

Petitioner Tiffany Abraham (“Abraham”) seeks mandamus and declaratory relief directing Respondents City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles World Airports (“LAWA”), and Justin Erbacci (“Erbacci”) (collectively, “City”) to comply with the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Abraham commenced this proceeding against Respondents City, LAWA, and Erbacci on August 2, 2023, alleging causes of action for violation of California Constitution, Art. I, section 3(b), traditional mandamus, and declaratory judgment, with the remedy of injunction. On December 12, 2024, Johnson filed the First Amended Petition (“FAP”), the operative pleading, alleging the same claims. The verified FAP alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On October 31, 2022, Cristofer Abraham was working in a utility room in or near Terminal 8 of the Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”). The fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression system (sometimes, “FSS”) used in the utility room released a deluge of toxic carbon dioxide gas without any warning, without the requisite pre-activation alarms, without the requisite delay, without the requisite lockouts and without other mandated safety mechanisms.

On November 11, 2022, Cristopher Abraham died of asphyxia related to the toxic carbon dioxide levels. FAP, ¶14. The discharge of the carbon dioxide system on October 31, 2022 resulted in the death of Cris Abraham, the emergency evacuation of Terminal 8, and affected airport operations. FAP, ¶14.

Petitioner Abraham, Cristopher Abraham’s widow and mother to their two minor children, is a member of the public. Through her counsel, Abraham continues to investigate the incident and any claims against those involved for the death of Cristopher Abraham. FAP, ¶9.

Respondent City is a local agency as defined in the CPRA with responsibility for ensuring that public documents are made available for inspection and copying in compliance with the CPRA. FAP, ¶10.

Respondent LAWA is a local agency as defined in the CPRA with responsibility for ensuring that public documents are made available for inspection and copying in compliance with the CPRA. LAWA owns and operates LAX and is a department of the City. FAP, ¶11.

Respondent Erbacci, in his capacity as the Chief Executive Office of LAWA, is ultimately responsible for the operations of the LAWA, including compliance with the CPRA. FAP, ¶12.

On April 30, 2022 (sic.), Abraham submitted CPRA Requests to LAWA for specific and identifiable records. The Requests seeks records related to certain fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems used at LAX, records related to the construction, modification, inspection, testing, repair and maintenance of these carbon dioxide fire suppression systems, records related any Request for Proposal as to these fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems, records related to the fire alarms utilized in Terminal 8 at LAX, and records related to the LAX’s records retention and CPRA policies. FAP, ¶15, Ex.1.

The records sought in the Requests are important to inform the family and loved ones of Cristopher Abraham of the facts surrounding his death, inform the community and public of the efficacy of the safety mechanisms utilized at LAX terminals with respect to the fixed carbon dioxide systems, and investigate whether the maintenance, inspection, and operation of the fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems and fire alarms are in compliance with regulatory standards. Furthermore, the community has the right to be informed of the facts and circumstances surrounding the October 31, 2022, incident, similar incidents, and prior warnings and notifications regarding the continued use of these systems at LAX. FAP, ¶16.

On April 30, 2023, the same day as the Requests, Petitioner’s counsel received confirmation from LAWA that the Requests had been assigned as request number #23-540. FAP, ¶17, Ex. 2.

On May 11, 2023, LAWA responded to the Requests via email seeking an additional 14 days to respond. FAP, ¶18, Ex 3..

“LAWA has disclosable records. Given the broad time range and breadth of the request resulting in a significant amount of records, LAWA is still in the process of conducting a search and review of potentially responsive records, which will be provided to you on a rolling basis beginning June 20, 2023. We will continue to communicate with you about your request. Should you wish to further define or tailor the request to specific inquiries, LAWA will assist you to do so.” FAP, ¶19, Ex. 4.

On June 3, 2023, Abraham’s counsel communicated with the City Attorney for LAWA seeking a proper response whether the requested records are disclosable. FAP, ¶20, Ex. 5.

No records were made available on June 20, 2023, the date LAWA had provided on June 2, 2023. On June 20, 2023, LAWA communicated the following:

“LAWA continues the process of conducting a search and review of potentially responsive records; these records will be provided to you on a rolling basis. LAWA will continue to release records as they become available for release and will continue to communicate throughout the process.”

“LAWA accordingly maintains its reservation of rights under the law that allow for nondisclosure of records in LAWA’s ongoing response that are exempt under either express provisions of the Public Records Act and/or pursuant to applicable federal or state law, including 49 CFR Section Part 1520, and/or other applicable legal privileges including, but not limited to, attorney work product and attorney client privileges. We will continue to communicate with you about your request. Should you wish to further define or tailor the request to specific inquiries, LAWA will assist you to do so.” FAP, ¶21, Ex. 6.

On June 23, 2023, Abraham’s counsel again communicated with the City Attorney for LAWA again seeking a code compliant response to the Requests, seeking an estimate when records would be provided, and inquiring why no documents were produced on June 20, 2023. FAP, ¶22, Ex. 7.

On June 29, 2023, LAWA communicated that its response was compliant. FAP, ¶23, Ex. 8.

On July 11, 2023, Abraham’s counsel communicated with the City Attorney detailing and confirming a telephone conference between them. FAP, ¶24.

On July 19, 2023, LAWA informed Abraham’s counsel that records would be available on July 28, 2023. LAWA did not provide the any records on the date LAWA set. FAP, ¶25.

Despite having more than three months to determine whether the records requested are disclosable and to provide an estimate when they will be produced, Respondents have failed and/or refused to provide the statutorily mandated response to the April 30, 2023 Requests and to produce the records promptly or within a reasonable time. FAP, ¶26.

Petitioner seeks (1) a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondents to make a statutorily-mandated determination of the requested documents and to make the records requested available for inspection within ten days and (2) a declaration pursuant to Government Code section 7923.110 that Respondents have violated Petitioner’s rights under California Constitution Art. I, section 3, and Government Code section 7923.000 et seq., by failing to provide a proper response and by failing to produce the requested documents. Petitioner also seeks costs and attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 7923.115 and such other relief as the court deems just and proper. FAP Prayer.

The parties stipulated on December 11, 2023 that Petitioner would have leave to file the FAP and that Respondents would have 35 days after service of the court’s order to file an answer to the FAP. No answer is on file.

Trial setting conferences were held on November 9, 2023 and on January 11, March 21, June 20, July 25, September 24, and October 24, 2024.

The people have the constitutional right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny. Cal. Const. art. 1, §3(b)(1). A statute, court rule, or other authority shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. Cal. Const. art. 1, §3(b)(2). If a statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision of the constitution limits the right of access, it shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest. Cal. Const. art. 1, §3(b)(2).

The CPRA, located at Government Code[1] section 7920 et seq. (formerly 6250 et seq.)[2] was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public. San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-72. The CPRA’s purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving the public access to information in the possession of public agencies. CBS. Inc. v. Block, (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651. The CPRA was intended to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, and it makes public access to governmental records a fundamental right of citizenship. Wilson v. Superior Court, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141. This requires maximum disclosure of the conduct of government operations. California State University Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (“California State University”), (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 823.

The CPRA makes clear that “every person” has a right to inspect any public record. §7922.525(a). The term “public record” is broadly defined to include “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the people’s business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. §7920.530.

Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, the agency shall determine within ten days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure, though that deadline may be extended up to 14 days for “unusual circumstances.” §7922.535(a), (b). If the agency determines that the request for records is denied in whole or in part, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt or that the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. §§ 7922.540, 7922.000.

If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it shall make the records promptly available upon payment of fees for direct costs of duplication or a statutory fee, if applicable. §7911.530. There is no deadline expressed in number of days for producing the records. Rather, section 7911.530 says the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” Section 7922.500 provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

“Records requests . . . inevitably impose some burden on government agencies. An agency is obliged to comply so long as the record can be located with reasonable effort.” California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-66. “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. [Citation.] In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (“City of San Jose”) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must ‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request. [Citation.].” Ibid.

The right to inspect is subject to certain exemptions, which are narrowly construed. California State University, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 831. The burden of demonstrating that exemptions apply lies with the governmental entity. §7922.000. Aside from a defined exemption, the entity can demonstrate that on the facts of the particular cas the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record. Id.

Section 792,705 exempts “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited by federal or state law, including but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.”

A claim to compel compliance with a CPRA public records request may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief. §7923.000. Because the petitioner may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief, the trial court independently decides whether disclosure is required. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 (appellate court independently reviews trial court CPRA decision). No administrative record is required, and the parties must submit admissible evidence.

Mandamus is available to compel compliance with the CPRA. §§ 6258, 6259. A petition for mandamus under the CPRA is a “special statutory proceeding” similar to, but different from, mandamus and “falls within the definition of a “special proceeding of a civil nature.” City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, (2017) 9 Cal.App.5^th 272, 285. This statutory mandamus is not the equivalent of ordinary mandamus, and the remedy may not be denied because of other adequate remedy at law. Wilder v. Superior Court, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 82-83.

Section 7923.000 authorizes a mandamus writ only when “public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public”. The CPRA remedy is available only to a person who is seeking disclosure of public records and only where the public entity is allegedly improperly withholding those records. County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 126. If the court finds that the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure is not justified, the court shall order the public official to make the record public. §7923.110(a). The CPRA provides no judicial remedy for any other purpose or entity or a remedy that may be utilized for any purpose other than to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.” Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).

If the requestor prevails in such litigation, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, to be paid by the public agency at issue. §7923.115(a). If the case was clearly frivolous, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the public agency. §7923.115(b).

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for either a writ of administrative mandamus (CCP §1094.5) or of traditional mandamus. CCP §1085. A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....” CCP §1085. Traditional mandamus permits judicial review of ministerial duties as well as quasi-legislative and legislative acts. County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City, (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 972.

A traditional writ of mandate is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty required by statute. See Rodriguez v. Solis, (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 501-02. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance.” Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84 (internal citations omitted). Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.

No administrative record is required for traditional mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty.

Petitioner Abraham is Cris Abraham’s widow and the mother to their two minor children. She is a member of the public within the meaning of section 7920.515. FAP, ¶6.

LAWA is the City department that owns and operates LAX. It is governed by a seven-member Board of Airport Commissioners appointed by the Mayor and approved by the City Council. LAWA reports an operational budget of $1.076 billion for Fiscal Year 2023-24 with projected revenues of approximately $2.005 billion. LAWA employs nearly 4,000 individuals, more than any City department other than the police and fire departments. LAWA operates at no cost to taxpayers and is a self-supporting department. LAWA’s revenues are derived mostly from aircraft landing fees, lease fees from more than 350 tenants, concession fees, and parking fees. Both LAWA and COLA are public agencies under the CPRA. FAP, Exs. 8-10.

Petitioner’s April 30, 2023 Requests to LAWA seek specific and identifiable public records pursuant to the CPRA. Gutierrez Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. Generally, the Requests seek records of the fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems used in Terminals 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of LAX. Gutierrez Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. More specifically, the Requests seek records related to any inspection, testing, repairs, or changes to the fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems used in Terminals 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of LAX. Gutierrez Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. The Requests also seek reports such records as the reports, drawings, diagrams, plans, photographs, videos, inspection, testing, repairs, or proposed changes to the fixed carbon dioxide fire suppression systems used in Terminal 8. Gutierrez Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. The Requests further seek records regarding two construction projects at LAX: LAX Project Number T-LAX-13599 and LAX Project Number 7005891. Gutierrez Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1.

Petitioner’s counsel received an April 30, 2023 email from LAWA’s nextrequest portal confirming that the Requests were submitted successfully and assigned the following number: #23-540. Gutierrez Decl., ¶3, Ex. 2.

Petitioner’s counsel received an email from LAWA on May 11, 2023 (1) seeking a 14-day extension and citing former section 6253(c)(1) and (2) setting May 24, 2023 as the due date for LAWA’s response. Gutierrez Decl., ¶4, Ex. 3.

On June 3, 2023, Petitioner’s counsel communicated with the City Attorney for LAWA seeking a proper response whether the requested records are disclosable. Gutierrez Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

On June 23, 2023, Petitioner’s counsel sent a letter to the City Attorney. Gutierrez Decl., ¶6, Ex. 5. This correspondence responded to LAWA’s communications received June 3 and June 20, 2023. Gutierrez Decl., ¶6, Ex. 5. In these communications, LAWA stated that it maintains a reservation of rights for exemptions. LAWA stated that it has disclosable records, that it continues to search for records, and that it is using reservation of rights as to exemptions. In addition, the communications address each party’s position with respect to what sort of response is required from a public entity under section 7922.535. Gutierrez Decl., ¶77, Ex. 5.

Petitioner’s counsel sent the City Attorney a letter dated July 11, 2023 confirming a one-hour telephone conversation between City Attorney Priscilla Tomescu (“Tomescu”) and Petitioner’s counsel. Gutierrez Decl., ¶8, Ex. 7. This letter confirmed (1) that LAWA would be producing a meaningful set of documents that day, (2) that LAWA agreed the Requests are clear, (3) how many of the requested categories overlap, (4) how and where the records are stored and that records dated before 2015 are less likely to be digitalized, (5) the parties’ respective viewpoints whether LAWA’s response to the Requests complies with the CPRA; and (6) whether breaking up the time frame or categories of the Requests or prioritizing them would help LAWA comply. Ex. 7.

Petitioner’s verified Petition was filed on August 2, 2023. Gutierrez Decl., ¶9, Ex. 8. Respondents responded to the Petition. Gutierrez Decl., ¶10, Ex. 9. Petitioner then filed the FAP. Gutierrez Decl., ¶11, Ex. 10.

Petitioner’s counsel sent a November 9, 2023 letter to City Attorney Tomescu requesting to meet and confer pursuant to the court’s order that day. Gutierrez Decl., ¶12, Ex. 11. The meet and confer did not occur until December 14, 2023 due to Tomescu’s unavailability. Gutierrez Decl., ¶12. Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu a December 15, 2023 letter detailing the meet and confer results. Gutierrez Decl., ¶13, Ex. 12.

Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu a January 10, 2024 letter confirming Tomescu’s representation that the production would be completed by the end of February. Gutierrez Decl., ¶14, Ex. 13.

Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu a January 12, 2024 letter and subsequent email communications seeking to follow-up on specific records consisting of photographs and plans for the room protected by carbon dioxide fire suppression systems. Gutierrez Decl., ¶15, Ex. 14.

Petitioner’s counsel subsequently sent Tomescu a letter dated March 20, 2024. Gutierrez Decl., ¶16, Ex. 15. In this letter, Petitioner’s counsel confirmed their conversation wherein Tomescu represented that LAWA would continue to work on the Requests and that any time estimate for production given to date were only estimates. Gutierrez Decl., ¶16, Ex. 15.

Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu a letter dated August 8 confirming their conversation regarding the 16,000 emails and 500 non-email documents identified by LAWA. Gutierrez Decl., ¶17, Ex. 16.

Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu an August 20, 2024 letter including proposed search terms the court asked Petitioner to provide. Gutierrez Decl., ¶18, Ex. 17.

Petitioner’s counsel sent Tomescu a September 11, 2024 letter confirming their conversation, including with LAWA’s outside counsel, that LAWA was in the process of reviewing 16,000 emails containing approximately one million pages. Gutierrez Decl., ¶19, Ex. 18. The letter again proposed search terms. Id. See also Gutierrez Decl., ¶20, Ex. 19.

Petitioner’s counsel obtained a declaration from Cal OSHA that was signed by and drafted by the City. Gutierrez Decl., ¶21, Ex. 20. The City has not produced this document, or any communications related to it. Gutierrez Decl., ¶21, Ex. 20.

The sequence of operation for the carbon dioxide fire suppression systems at LAX describes the location of the fire suppression systems. Gutierrez Decl., ¶22, Ex. 21. None of LAWA’s search terms seek documents related to the fire suppression systems in Terminals 4, 5 or 6. Gutierrez Decl., ¶22, Ex. 21.

The City produced a document during the deposition of Marcus Frank (“Frank”), the person designated by LAWA and the City as the person most qualified to testify as to certain topics, on June 2, 2024. It is Exhibit 8 to the deposition. Gutierrez Decl., ¶25, Ex. 24. Frank testified that this document contains all the terms used by LAWA to search for records requested in the Requests. Gutierrez Decl., ¶25, Ex. 24.

A series of emails dated February 5, 2018, were produced in response to the Requests. Gutierrez Decl., ¶26, Ex. 25. The email reference photographs, floor plans and spread sheets as attachments or as separate computer drives. Gutierrez Decl., ¶26, Ex. 25.

Fireworks is a software-based incident management platform that combines hardware, software, and networking to provide a life safety and mass notification solution for fire alarm systems. Gutierrez Decl., ¶27, Ex. 26. LAWA utilizes Fireworks and provided a single page representing the incident of October 31, 2022, whereas the software monitors Terminal 8 continuously. Gutierrez Decl., ¶27, Ex. 26. CPRA Request 26 seeks the Fireworks history for Terminal 8. Gutierrez Decl., ¶27, Ex. 26.

The redacted 2021 AIG Survey Report (“2021 AIG Report”) that was produced references gaseous fire suppression systems and references other reporting years where the gaseous systems are discussed. Gutierrez Decl., ¶28, Ex. 27. Counsel discussed the 2021 AIG Report in written correspondence and in meet and confer conferences. Gutierrez Decl., ¶28, Ex. 27. Respondents’ counsel promised to produce the unredacted 2021 AIG Report but only provided a redacted portion of the Report. Gutierrez Decl., ¶28, Ex. 27.

On March 21, 2024, the court allowed the deposition of the City’s and LAWA’s person(s) most qualified (“PMQ”) on the search efforts used to locate records. Ex 22 (minute orders). The PMQ deposition of Frank took place on June 26, 2024. Gutierrez Decl., ¶24, Ex. 23.

LAWA provides search terms to its IT department. Frank Depo., p. 54. They use names or a list of search terms to locate records, including emails. Frank Depo., p. 54. LAWA’s search terms are Exhibit 8 to the deposition. Frank Depo, p. 56. The 18 terms listed on the left column of Exhibit 8 were used to locate documents, records, and emails on personal computers and shared drives. Frank Depo., p. 56-57. The 41 terms listed on the right column were used to search for all emails. Frank Depo., pp. 57, 140, 142.

Neither list includes the term “Champion”. Frank Depo., pp. 59-60. Some of the Requests used the word Champion and Frank did not know why it was left off the search list. Frank Depo., pp. 59-60. The search is ongoing, but nothing has really been found in double-checking. Frank Depo, pp. 40-41. The primary search is complete and Frank is just verifying that it was thorough and comprehensive. Frank Depo., p. 41.

All the records located are maintained in a share drive. Frank Depo., p. 11. Approximately 13,000 responsive emails have been located. Frank Depo., pp. 15, 17, 21. Frank expects the process to review and to produce the 13,000 or so emails with 500 non-email records will take three to five months. Frank Depo., pp. 45-46, 49-50, 78--79.

Exhibit 7 is an email that references photos. Frank Depo., pp. 129-32. The server containing this email has been searched for the photos without success. Frank Depo., pp. 131-32. Exhibit 9 references some floor plans. Frank was unsure whether a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 133-34. Exhibit 10 references a spreadsheet prepared for costs. Frank assumed that a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 134-36.

The Requests are Petitioner’s second request for disclosure of public records concerning issues and information that relates to the pending civil wrongful death lawsuit filed by Petitioner against LAWA and a dozen other entities. Hunter Decl., ¶3, Ex. 1. Petitioner previously requested disclosure of records pursuant to which the City has produced all responsive documents amounting to tens of thousands of pages. Hunter Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.

The Requests consist of 70 requests. Hunter Decl, ¶3. After receiving the Requests, LAWA performed a review of the documents to confirm responsiveness and identify any potential exemptions such as statutory exemptions and security risks to the airport’s safety, security, and operation. Hunter Decl., ¶7. The searches performed by LAWA resulted in millions of pages of documents that were potentially responsive to the 70 requests. Hunter Decl., ¶7.

LAWA created a comprehensive list of search terms that were distributed to employees, internal departments at LAWA, and its IT Department for use in retrieving potentially responsive documents. Hunter Decl., Ex. 2. The search terms LAWA used were based upon the substantive nature of the 70 Requests, as well as internal considerations regarding LAWA’s storage processes and department organization. Hunter Decl., Exs. 2, 3. The search terms included the FSS, carbon dioxide, CO2, fire alarms, inspections, maintenance, Los Angeles Fire Department, activation, change, modify, replacement, fire panel, electrical panel, discharge, change, testing, visual alarm, and upgrade—among many other specific terms. Hunter Decl., Ex. 2.

Given the volume of documents, the City notified Petitioner that it would take numerous months to review the records, but that the City would produce responsive documents on a “rolling basis,” which it did. Hunter Decl., ¶8.

At the last status conference on October 24, 2024, the City had produced all responsive documents with the exception of potentially responsive emails and attachments (totaling approximately one million pages) that it was in the process of reviewing. Hunter Decl., ¶8, Ex. 4.

After subsequently completing its lengthy review, the City made a final production of responsive records on December 9, 2024. Hunter Decl., ¶9. The City has produced all documents responsive to Petitioner’s Requests other than those exempt from public disclosure as set forth in its Exemption Log served on Petitioner in September 2024. Hunter Decl., ¶10. In total, the City has produced hundreds of thousands of pages of records pursuant to the Requests. Hunter Decl., ¶10.

The City relies on portions of the Frank PMQ deposition. Hunter Decl., ¶6, Ex. 3 (Frank Depo.).

A search for Fireworks history as requested in Requests 26 was conducted. Frank Depo., p. 106. All emails of all employees were searched. Frank Depo., p. 142.

A search for drawings, as-built drawings, plans, and diagrams was conducted and records located. Frank Depo., p. 107. Exhibit 7 is an email that references photos. Frank Depo., pp. 129-32. The server containing this email has been searched for the photos without success. Frank Depo., pp. 131-32. Exhibit 9 references some floor plans. Frank was unsure whether a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 133-34. However, they should have come up in the search. Frank Depo, p. 133. Exhibit 10 references a spreadsheet prepared for costs. Frank assumed that a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 134-36.

Petitioner Abraham seeks a declaration that the City has failed to comply with its obligations under the CPRA because it failed to promptly provide non-exempt public records and wrongly withheld non-exempt records. Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandate directing the City to (a) provide a disclosability determination, (b) produce all non-privileged records that were located, including the 16,000 emails and attachments it has identified, (c) produce certain other specific records, (d) conduct a search of all databases using the search terms provided by Petitioner’s counsel on August 20, 2024, (e) produce all non-exempt records within 30 days of the hearing, and (f) produce a list of any records withheld based on a claim of exemption or privilege. Pet. Op. Br. at 3-4.[4]

An “agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor.” §7922.535(a), (b). If the agency determines that the request for records is denied in whole or in part, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt or that the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. §§ 7922.540, 7922.000. The written response shall set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial. §7922.540.

Abraham argues that LAWA failed to comply with section 7922.535. On May 11, 2023, LAWA sought additional time to make the requisite determination. “LAWA would like the ten-day period to be extended for an additional 14 days…. The new due date for this request will be May 24, 2023.” Gutierrez Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 3. On June 20, 2023, LAWA communicated that it “continues the process of conducting a search and review of potentially responsive records…LAWA accordingly maintains its reservation of rights under the law that allow for nondisclosure of records in LAWA’s ongoing response that are exempt….” Gutierrez Decl., ¶¶ 6-7, Exs. 5-6. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

Abraham argues that these provisions mandate a duty and a strict timetable for a public entity to provide a determination of disclosability and estimated date of production. The CPRA further mandates that nothing in this division shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records. See §7922.500. LAWA failed to communicate the necessary determination within the strict statutory period mandated. By asserting a vague reservation of rights, LAWA effectively avoided the requisite disclosability determination. As such, the court should declare that LAWA failed to timely provide the requisite disclosability disclosure and order it to do so. Pet. Op. Br. at 9-10.

The City responds that Abraham seems to think that section 7922.535 requires an agency to determine whether a responsive document is subject to disclosure (i.e., responsive and not exempt or privileged) before the document is even located or reviewed. As such, Abraham complains that LAWA took the common step of reserving its rights to assert that a document might be exempt or privileged while it was searching for documents. That is absurd. No agency can be expected to determine whether a document is subject to an exemption or privilege until it reviews the document. This step is particularly appropriate here, where most of Abraham’s 70 Requests were extremely broad, not seeking specific identifiable documents but rather documents concerning or relating to general categories of documents. Opp. at 7-8.

Abraham replies that the City cites no authority is that it is appropriate to reserve exemptions and leave the determination for a later date. The statutory language of section 7922.535(a) requires the public entity to provide a response containing specific information, including a determination and the reasons therefor. Reply at 5.

Most public agencies comply with section 7922.535(a) by stating whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records and citing the statutory exemptions on which it will rely. The parties do not cite, and the court is unaware, of case law on this issue, and for good reason. By the time a CPRA case gets to court, the public agency’s initial determination of whether records are disclosable and the exemptions on which it will rely is no longer an issue. “The CPRA provides no judicial remedy for any other purpose or entity or a remedy that may be utilized for any purpose other than to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.” County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at 127 (emphasis in original).

The same is true here. Whether LAWA timely complied with section 7922.535(a) is not an issue subject to a judicial remedy. It also is moot because it is undisputed that the City has agreed to produce all responsive records that are not listed in its Exemption Log. See Hunter Decl., ¶¶ 8-10, Ex.4.

To determine if a search was adequate under the CPRA, California courts apply the standard used in Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") cases, which provides that a search "need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents" given the circumstances. ACLU v. Superior Court, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 85 (citing Meerepol v. Meese, (“Meerepol”) (D.C. Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 942, 951-56. "[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate" in light of the relevant circumstances. Meerepol, supra, 790 F.2d at 951. An agency's search must be "reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents." Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National City, ("CYAC"), (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1420 (citation omitted).

The scope of the search is dictated by the scope of the request. Id. "An agency is... obliged to search for records based on criteria set forth in the search request." California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, ("CFAC"), (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. Based on the language of the request, an agency must "determine whether it has such writings under its control and the applicability of any exemption." Id. at 166. The agency's search "should be broad enough to account for the problem that the requester may not know what documents or information of interest an agency possesses." CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1425 (citation omitted).

An agency must be "sufficiently proactive [and] diligent in making a reasonable effort to identify and locate" the requested records. Id. The California Attorney General counsels that, "[a]t a minimum, [reasonable] efforts should include: consulting record indexes [,] consulting knowledgeable people [, and] looking in logical places." Office of the California Attorney General, Public Records Act Training at 31 (available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/pra.pdf).

An agency need only search files reasonably likely to contain responsive records. Jenkins v. United States, DOJ (D.D.C. July 12, 2017) 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 107363, *7.) It "is not required to expend its limited resources on searches for which it is clear at the outset that no search will produce the records sought." Reyes v. EPA, (“Reyes”) (D.D.C. 2014) 991 F.Supp.2d 20, 27; Earle v. United States, (“Earle”) DOJ (D.D.C. 2016) 217 F.Supp.3d 117, 123. Moreover, if an agency shows it never had or no longer possesses the records requested, "the reasonable search required... may be no search at all." Reyes, supra, 991 F.Supp.2d at 27; Earle, supra, 217 F.Supp.3d at 124 (search would be futile where agency declaration showed records in question did not exist); Amnesty Int'l v. CIA, (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) 2008 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 47822, at *34 (agency not required to search at all where it would be futile).

A clearly framed request which requires an agency to search an enormous volume of data for a ‘needle in a haystack” or a request which compels the production of a large volume of material may be objectionable as unduly burdensome. CFAC, supra, 67 Cal.App.4^th at 166. However, records requests impose some burden on agencies, and the agency is required to comply so long as the record can be recovered with reasonable effort. Id.

Under FOIA, it is the agency's burden to prove the adequacy of its search by proffering evidence showing its search was reasonably calculated to locate all responsive records. Baltranena v. Clinton, (D.D.C. 2011) 770 F.Supp.2d 175, 182. An agency can show its search was adequate with affidavits showing where and how it searched for the records. Citizens Comm. on Human Rights v. FDA, ((9^th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 1325, 1328. In evaluating the agency's evidence on this issue, courts should consider "such relevant factors as the amount of time and staff devoted to the request and whether the agency attempted to limit its search to one or more places when other sources likely would have contained [the] information requested." Landmark Legal Foundation v. E.P.A., (D.D.C. 2003) 272 F.Supp.2d 59, 62.

Abraham argues that LAWA failed to conduct a reasonable search. As testified by LAWA’s PMQ, LAWA use a limited list of search terms to locate records, including emails. LAWA’s search terms include two lists. The 18 terms listed on the left column were used to located documents. The 41 terms listed on the right column were used to search for emails. Ex. 24. Pet. Op. Br. at 10; Reply at 6.

LAWA’s search terms are inadequate and unlikely to locate all the records requested because they do not cover specific terms sought in the Requests. For example, the term “permit” is not included as a search term in Exhibit 24 even though both construction and hot work permits are sought in Request 17-23, 29, 35 and 52-54. Similarly, the search terms do not include the term “Champion” notwithstanding that Champion is requested in Request 4; Ex. 23 (Frank Depo.), pp. 59-60. Champion has contracted with LAWA since 2005 to conduct inspections on various fire systems at LAX, including the fixed carbon dioxide systems. Finally, the email search terms do not include Room 202, which is the location where the tanks of the subject fire suppression system are located and which is requested in Requests13, 15, 21, 31, 51 and 57. Pet. Op. Br. at 11.

On August 20, 2024, pursuant the court’s suggestion, Abraham’s counsel provided a list of search terms aimed at capturing the records, including emails, sought by the Requests. Gutierrez Decl., ¶18, Ex. 17. To date, the City has not agreed to search using Abraham’s proposed terms. Because the search terms used are inadequate and unlikely to locate the records requested, LAWA failed to use reasonable efforts. LAWA should be ordered to search for records utilizing the search terms proposed by Abraham’s counsel. Pet. Op. Br. at 11-12.

In reply, Abraham adds that, under FOIA, the agency has the burden of showing the reasonableness of its search “beyond material doubt.” Transgender Law Center v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, (2022) 46 F.4th 771, 780. The same should be true under the CPRA. Reply at 7-8. "[A]ffidavits describing agency search procedures are sufficient for purposes of summary judgment only if they are relatively detailed in their description of the files searched and the search procedures, and if they are nonconclusory and not impugned by evidence of bad faith." (quotation omitted). Citizens Commission on Human Rights v. Food and Drug Administration, (1995) 45 F3d 1325. Reply at 7.

Abraham does not challenge the scope of LAWA’s search, the employees identified for the search, the locations of records, or the level of effort. She only challenges LAWA’s failure to use search terms “permit”, “Champion”, and “Room 202”. Pet. Op. Br. at 11. As the City argues (Opp. at 4), the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 627. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches and it need not use the precise language of the request. Ibid. The City also is entitled to the presumption that its search was reasonable and in good faith. American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 85.

If the City relied solely on the Hunter declaration, the court would agree that it failed to meet its burden. Hunter’s declaration states that the Requests consist of 70 requests. Hunter Decl, ¶3. LAWA created a comprehensive list of search terms that were distributed to employees, internal departments at LAWA, and its IT Department for use in retrieving potentially responsive documents. Hunter Decl., Ex. 2. The search terms LAWA used were based upon the substantive nature of the 70 requests, as well as internal considerations regarding LAWA’s storage processes and department organization. Hunter Decl., Exs. 2, 3. The search terms included the FSS, carbon dioxide, CO2, fire alarms, inspections, maintenance, Los Angeles Fire Department, activation, change, modify, replacement, fire panel, electrical panel, discharge, change, testing, visual alarm, and upgrade—among many other specific terms. Hunter Decl., Ex. 2. Hunter’s declaration lacks a foundation of personal knowledge of the search and fails to include a detained description of files searched and search procedures.

However, the necessary evidence is provided by Frank in his PMQ deposition. Frank testified that LAWA provides search terms to its IT department. Frank Depo., p. 54. They use names or a list of search terms to locate records, including emails. Frank Depo., p. 54. LAWA’s search terms are in Exhibit 8. Frank Depo, p. 56. The 18 terms listed on the left column of Exhibit 8 were used to locate documents, records, and emails on personal computers and shared drives. Frank Depo., p. 56-57 The 41 terms listed on the right column were used to search for all emails. Frank Depo., pp. 57, 140, 142.

LAWA distributed the search terms to all departments and individual employees, who conducted separate searches of their respective records for potentially responsive documents. Frank Depo., p. 88, 91. Located records were uploaded or shared to a software program created for use in collecting documents for review and production. Frank Depo., pp. 104-05. All emails of all employees were searched. Frank Depo., p. 142. The search is ongoing but nothing has really been found in double-checking. Frank Depo, pp. 40-41. The primary search is complete and Frank is just verifying that it was thorough and comprehensive. Frank Depo., p. 41.

Frank also testified as to specific search issues. A search for Fireworks history as requested in Requests 26 was conducted. Frank Depo., p. 106. A search for drawings, as-built drawings, plans, and diagrams was conducted. Frank Depo., p. 107. Exhibit 7 is an email that references photos. Frank Depo., pp. 129-32. The server containing this email has been searched for the photos without success. Frank Depo., pp. 131-32. Exhibit 9 references some floor plans. Frank was unsure whether a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 133-34. Exhibit 10 references a spreadsheet prepared for costs. Frank assumed that a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 134-36.

Frank also testified about the Requests term “Champion”. Frank Depo., pp. 59-60. Some of the Requests used the word Champion and Frank did not know why it was left off. Frank Depo., pp. 59-60.

This evidence shows that the search was thorough and comprehensive. Frank’s lack of knowledge about the term Champion does not undermine its reasonableness. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the 70 requests were broad in nature. LAWA identified over 40 search terms that broadly dealt with all matters identified in Abraham’s requests. Hunter Decl., Ex. 2. The search of emails resulted in the retrieval of over one million pages of emails and attachments. Hunter Decl., ¶8.

The City argues without evidence that the search terms did not include “permit” or “Champion” because, based upon LAWA’s understanding of its internal processes and policies, it would be redundant to rely upon those terms and potentially lead to the exclusion of records that could be considered responsive. The search terms contemplated inclusion of records generated by a search using “permit” and “Champion” based on LAWA’s systems for storing documents and emails, as well as the scope of Champion’s work, which is limited to inspection and maintenance of FSS. By including the terms such as “inspection,” “maintenance,” “modification,” “testing,” “fire protection,” “Reg 4,” “carbon dioxide,” “CO2,” “fire alarm,” “fire panel,” “fire suppression system,” “FSS,” and “visual alarm,” the searches would retrieve potentially responsive documents. Opp. at 6.

The City adds, again without evidence, that records generated by a search using the term “permit” likewise would be included through search terms that identified specific project names and numbers, the identity of parties such as Brymax and CTS, and other terms such as “upgrade,” “modification,” “replacement,” “inspection,” “maintenance,” “change,” and “alter.” These terms are broader than the word “permit,” and LAWA determined that identifying these other search terms would be most reasonably calculated to lead to retrieval of responsive documents to Petitioner’s requests. Opp. at 6.

While unsupported by evidence, these arguments explain why Abraham’s contention that additional search terms were required is unpersuasive. The court agrees with the City that it is speculative to conclude that these terms would have generated additional responsive records.

Section 7922.530(a) provides that the agency “shall make the records promptly available”, and section 7922.500 provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

Abraham argues that the standard for production is reasonable promptness considering the magnitude of the effort required. More than 18 months have lapsed, and the City has not produced the records it concedes are responsive. From Frank’s testimony, it is unclear whether the search is even complete. Frank testified that the search continues and is nearly complete. Ex 23 (Frank Depo.), pp. 40-41. The search is ongoing but nothing has really been found in double-checking. Frank Depo, pp. 40-41. The primary search is complete, and Frank is just verifying that it was thorough and comprehensive. Frank Depo., p. 41. Pet. Op. Br. at 12.

Frank also testified that 10,000 to 13,000 responsive emails have been located. Frank Depo., pp. 15, 17, 21. More recently, City Attorney Tomescu represented that the number of emails is closer to 16,000 emails, with nearly 1 million pages of attachments. Gutierrez Decl., ¶11, Ex. 18. All the records located are maintained in a share drive. Frank Depo., p. 11. Frank testified that he expected the process to review and produce the 13,000 or so emails with 500 non-email records would take three to five months. Frank Depo., pp. 45-46, 49-50, 78-79. Five months have nearly lapsed as of the date of Abraham’s moving papers. Pet. Op. Br. at 12-13.

The City told the court that the production of records would be complete by the end of February of 2024, some nine months ago. Ex.22. At the numerous trial setting conferences, the City represented that complete production was forthcoming. More than 18 months have passed since the Requests were made. Despite these repeated representations, LAWA has not produced all non-privileged records located, including the 16,000 emails and attachments, identified. Pet. Op. Br. at 13.

The City responds that there is no deadline for the production of records. See §7922.535. While records often are disclosed at the same time the agency responds to a request, in some cases—such as the current case—that time frame for disclosure is not feasible because of the volume of records encompassed by the request. The standard contemplates reasonable promptness considering the magnitude of the effort required and scope of the requests made. See Crews v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1376-77 (trial court found no violation of the CPRA where production of documents was delayed). Opp. at 8.

LAWA did not unreasonably delay production of records for the Requests because it retrieved over one million pages and the review required substantial time. After reviewing the 70 Requests and identifying millions of pages of potentially responsive documents, LAWA advised Abraham’s counsel that it would be unable to immediately produce responsive records but would produce records on a “rolling basis” as those documents were identified and reviewed. LAWA did as it represented, making various productions of documents that were identified as responsive and non-exempt. As of October 24, 2024, the only remaining production, as identified to the court, was the production of a remaining number of emails with attachments, consisting of more than one million pages. Consistent with its representations, LAWA produced the responsive non-exempt documents on December 9, 2024. Opp. at 8-9.

The City concludes that LAWA has consistently responded that it would comply with the Requests to the extent it could without violating any exemptions or privileges. LAWA diligently worked to complete review of the voluminous records and produce the responsive documents. Due to the sheer volume of records requested, there is no basis to find that LAWA delayed unreasonably. Opp. at 9.

Abraham replies that, contrary to the City’s assertion, LAWA did not produce any records on December 9, 2024. At of the December 26, 2024 date of the reply, Abraham has not received or had an opportunity to review the final production of records. While LAWA sent a link, the City’s counsel was aware that the link did not function or provide accessible files and that Petitioner had not received the production. Reply Gutierrez Decl., ¶3, Ex. 29. The City’s failure to disclose this to the court is at a minimum misleading. Since December 9, 2024, Abraham has made repeated efforts to obtain the promised records. As of December 26, 2024, the City was suggesting that the production was forthcoming. Reply Gutierrez Decl., ¶3, Ex. 29. Reply at 1, n. 1.

Abraham adds that the City’s opposition fails to address the approximately 880,000 documents it is not producing. While the City argues that the search terms were tailored to locate the records sought, no explanation is provided why these pages are not being produced or how these documents may be exempt. As noted in American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 86: “[W]here an agency seeks to withhold portions of an otherwise disclosed document solely on grounds of nonresponsiveness, there may be a particular reason for concern. The need for redaction in such circumstances seems highly questionable, as the information is not claimed to be exempt and therefore does not pose the risks addressed by the statutory exemptions from the rule of disclosure.” LAWA is attempting to do the same with respect to the approximately 880,000 or so pages. If the ‘tailored’ search terms turned up the documents, then those documents are responsive. LAWA should be ordered to immediately produce all non-privileged records located, including the 16,000 emails and attachments identified. Reply at 2, 9.

LAWA agreed to produce all responsive, non-exempt records located. Contrary to Abraham’s’ argument, LAWA is not required to explain why documents located in the search are not responsive. Nor is it required to produce responsive records that were identified in its September 2024 Exemption Log, which Abraham has not challenged. LAWA is required to produce, however, the remaining 16,000 emails and attachments and 500 other documents. There is a controversy – which may be cleared up at the hearing – whether LAWA has done so. If not resolved by the hearing, LAWA is ordered to submit and serve a declaration explaining that it has produced all responsive, non-exempt documents to Abraham and the manner of doing so.

Abraham notes that Fireworks is a software-based incident management platform that combines hardware, software, and networking to provide a life safety and mass notification solution for fire alarm systems. Request 26 seeks the Fireworks history for Terminal 8 from October 31, 2002 to the present. Gutierrez Decl., ¶ 27, Ex 26. Despite this request, LAWA failed to produce the Fireworks history for the period requested. LAWA provided Abraham with a single page representing the incident of October 31, 2022. Pet. Op. Br. at 13-14.

The City responds that LAWA has repeatedly represented that it has no Fireworks records other than the record regarding the subject incident produced in response to Abraham’s first CPRA requests. Fireworks records identify alarm activations or set-offs within the airport, including the date, time, and location. The City has explained to Abraham that the one-page record previously produced was independently saved, presumably in response to the nature of the October 31, 2022 incident. LAWA conducted a reasonable and thorough search for any other Fireworks records and has been unable to locate any. Abraham’s refusal to accept these representations and her speculation that such records should exist does not mean that they do, or that LAWA failed to conduct a reasonable search for them. There is no duty to create a record that is requested but does not exist. Sander v. State Bar of Calif., (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 665-66. Opp. at 9-10.

Abraham replies that the City fails to provide evidence that the records do not exist. The Fireworks systems provides a continuous monitoring of alarms and a suggestion that the system has no other responsive records defies logic. Reply at 9.

The court agrees. The City has not provided evidence that Fireworks records refer to information identifying alarm activations or set-offs within LAX, including the date, time, and location, that it has no Fireworks records other than the Fireworks record regarding the subject incident, and that the one-page record previously produced was independently saved, presumably in response to the nature of the October 31, 2022 incident. The City must provide this information or search for these records.

Abraham argues that, after a numerous meet and confer efforts and promises to produce it in un-redacted form, the City produced only a redacted portion of the 2021 AIG Report. Gutierrez Decl., ¶28, Ex 27. The redacted portions appear to discuss the gaseous fire suppression systems and the City failed to provide the basis for redaction. In addition, the 2021 AIG Report shows that LAWA received other reports annually between 2015-2023, and that those reports also address the gaseous fire suppression systems. These reports are directly responsive to Requests 1-3 and 5-9. Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

The City responds that Abraham’s claim that AIG Survey Reports are directly responsive to Requests Nos. 1-3 and 5-9 is unsubstantiated. Her further contention that LAWA may not produce the 2021 AIG Report in redacted form is unsupported by law. An agency is only required to provide copies of “disclosable public records.” §7922.535. LAWA is permitted to claim exemptions from disclosure for a variety of reasons. See §§ 7921.000, 7930.000. It is therefore appropriate for an agency to redact exempt material from a record and produce the balance. Id. Opp. at 10.

As has been previously explained to Abraham, the redacted portions of the 2021 AIG Report are an insurability report that for areas of LAX not within the direct scope of the subject areas identified in the Requests. For example, the 2021 AIG Report indicates that the redacted information relates to “airfield improvements,” which is substantively different than fixtures contained within a terminal such as Terminal 8. Gutierrez Decl., ¶28, Ex 27, p. LAWA_NR23540_06262. Opp. at 10.

Even if the redacted information were responsive, LAWA is entitled to redact exempt material and produce only the disclosable portions of the records. The redactions to the AIG Report are essential for LAWA security purposes and are “Sensitive Security Information” pursuant to 42 CFR 1520. If disclosed, this information would comprise the security of the area and jeopardize airport safety and operations. Because redaction of this limited information is necessary to protect airport safety and operations, it cannot be disclosed. Opp. at 10-11.

Abraham replies that the redacted portions of the 2021 AIG Report are the very portions that discuss the gaseous fire suppression systems. LAWA failed to provide the basis on which it relies in redacting the Report. In addition, LAWA received other reports in annually between 2015-2023 and that those reports also address the gaseous fire suppression systems. These reports are directly responsive to Requests 1-3 and 5-9. Reply at 9.

The redaction of the 2021 AIG Report for exemption is not supported by evidence, but redaction for lack of responsiveness is. Abraham fails to show how information relating to “airfield improvements” bears on her Requests. She also fails to show the redacted portions of the 2021 AIG Report discuss gaseous fire suppression systems. For the other AIG Survey Reports, the court agrees with the City that Abraham has not shown how they are directly responsive to Requests Nos. 1-3 and 5-9. No further AIG Report records need be produced.

Abraham argues that LAWA failed to produce documents attached to February 2018 emails that was produced, including photographs, floor plans, and cost spreadsheets. Gutierrez Decl., Ex. 25. The emails reference a specific computer drive that has photos of the CO2 fire suppression systems. See Ex 25 (S:\Engineering\Airports\LAX\Photos\Terminal\T3,T4 &T8 CO2). Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

The City argues that it has advised Abraham on multiple occasions that a search into the pathway access to S:Engineering\Airports\LAX\Photos\Terminal\T3,T4, &T8CO2 failed to locate said pathway and, accordingly, any documents contained within that link or drive. That Abraham insists such documents exist notwithstanding these representations does not constitute evidence that LAWA has failed to conduct a reasonable search for them, much less that they exist. Opp. at 11.

Abraham replies that the City fails to provide evidence that the records do not exist. Reply at 9.

Not so. Frank testified that Exhibit 7 is one of the emails in question. Gutierrez Decl., Ex. 23 (Frank Depo.), pp. 129-32. The server containing this email has been searched for the photos without success. Frank Depo., pp. 131-32. Exhibit 9 references some floor plans attached to another email. Frank was unsure whether a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 133-34. Exhibit 10 references a spreadsheet prepared for costs for another email. Frank assumed that a search was conducted for them. Frank Depo., pp. 134-36.

While Frank expressed uncertainty about floor plans, and made an assumption about a spreadsheet, his certainty with respect to a search for photos for a February 2018 email is dispositive. It would be unreasonable for LAWA to search for some February 2018 email attachments and not others. No further search for February 2018 email attachments is required.

The Petition is granted in part. LAWA agreed to produce all responsive, non-exempt records located. LAWA is required to produce the referenced 16,000 emails and attachments and 500 other documents. There is a controversy – which may be cleared up at the hearing – whether LAWA has done so. If not resolved by the hearing, LAWA is ordered to submit and serve a declaration explaining that it has produced all responsive, non-exempt documents to Abraham and the manner of doing so.

The City also has not provided evidence that Fireworks records refer to information identifying alarm activations or set-offs within the airport, including the date, time, and location, that it has no Fireworks records other than the Fireworks record regarding the subject incident, and that the one-page record previously produced was independently saved, presumably in response to the nature of the October 31, 2022 incident. The City must provide a declaration concerning this information or conduct an additional search for these records.

[1] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.

[2] The Legislature has confirmed that the 2023 changes recodifying the CPRA were not intended to substantively change the law relating to inspection of public records. §7920.100.

[3] The court has ruled on Petitioner’s written objections to the City’s evidence by placing “O” for “overruled” and “S” for “sustained” next to the objection. The clerk is directed to scan and electronically file the court’s rulings.

[4] The City asserts that it is perplexing why Abraham continues to request documents under the CPRA when she has propounded similar discovery in her wrongful death lawsuit. Opp. at 2, n.1. Abraham correctly responds that the CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” §7921.300. The reason a person requests a public record is irrelevant to their right to obtain it. Marylander v. Sup.Ct. (Office of Statewide Health Planning & Develop., (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125. Reply at 3-4.