Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCP03391, Date: 2024-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Vincent J. Huang (“Huang”) seeks a writ of mandate directing the City of West Hollywood (“City”) to set aside its denial of, and to approve, his requested Notice of Termination of Tenancy for Owner Occupancy (“Notice of Termination”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Huang commenced this proceeding on September 14, 2023. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Petitioner’s mother, Elizabeth Huang (Ms. Huang”) suffered a sudden decline in health within the year before the Complaint was filed such that she needed to change her housing accommodations. Pet. ¶7. The City’s Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“RSO”) section 17.52.010 provides that a tenancy may be terminated if a landlord’s qualifying parent plans to live in a unit upon the submission of certain documentation and City approval. Pet. ¶8.

On May 24, 2023, Huang filed an application for a Notice of Termination at 1119 Poinsettia Drive (the “Property”), Unit 9, as authorized under RSO section 17.52.010. Petitioner’s application met all City requirements for a termination of tenancy and included a letter from Ms. Huang’s doctor explaining her medical condition and setting forth his recommendations regarding a suitable potential living space. Pursuant to the doctor’s assessment, Ms. Huang’s medical condition necessitated housing which included a walk-in shower, no door between bedroom and kitchen, and a unit facing the street on the second floor. Pet. ¶9.

On June 6, 2023, City staff attorney Brandon Lawrence, Esq. (“Lawrence”) sent Huang a letter requesting additional/clarifying information for the request to terminate a tenancy on the second floor notwithstanding Ms. Huang’s limited mobility. Pet. ¶10. On June 14, 2023, Huang responded in detail why Ms. Huang’s medical condition required her to occupy Unit 9 at the Property. He explained that no units on the first floor of the building had walk-in showers and no intervening walls between the kitchen and bedroom, and that a determination had been made that the potential dangers/risks associated with full-tub showers on the first floor surpassed those presented by using the stairs to the second floor, especially given that Ms. Huang would not often leave the unit. Pet. ¶11.

On June 30, 2023, the City denied the requested Notice of Termination. The City’s denial letter generally cited several RSO sections -- such as RSO sections 17.52.010.12(f) and (g) -- but failed to support their applicability. Pet. ¶12. The June 30, 2023 denial letter also found that Ms. Huang must be deemed “disabled,” as that term is defined in the West Hollywood Municipal Code (“WHMC”), to qualify for relative occupancy. No such requirement is found in RSO section 17.52.010.12. Pet. ¶13.

On July 17, 2023, Huang timely filed an appeal from the denial to the Director of Human Services and Rent Stabilization (“Director”). Huang’s appeal explained why the submitted Notice of Termination application met the RSO’s requirements and should be granted. Pet. ¶15.

On or about July 28, 2023, Real Party-in-Interest Blake Roberts (“Roberts”), the tenant in Unit 9, submitted opposition. Robert’s submission set forth false information not based on any evidence. Pet. ¶16.

On August 10, 2023, the Director denied Petitioner’s appeal without further explanation. The Director’s determination constitutes a final action by the City and Huang has exhausted all available administrative remedies. Pet. ¶¶ 17-18.

Petitioner Huang alleges that the City abused its discretion and has failed to act in a manner in accordance with law by failing to approve his Notice of Termination because the request met all the legal requirements of the RSO and RSO Regulations. Pet. ¶24. The City’s actions in denying the requested Notice of Termination also were an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Pet. ¶25.

“A tenancy shall not be terminated, nor shall its renewal be refused, except for one or more of the following reasons:…

12. Owner or Relative Occupancy. The landlord, or his or her spouse, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, child or grandchild (by blood or adoption) plans to live in the unit, subject to the following conditions and requirements as well as regulations promulgated by the Commission…

(b) Sixty-Day Notice Period. The landlord has given at least sixty days’ written notice that he or she intends to terminate the tenancy. The tenant may not waive the required sixty days’ notice. The sixty-day period does not begin until the landlord has paid relocation fees to the tenant, and notice has been filed with and approved by the city. Within ten business days, the City shall approve the notice if:

(i) it is on a form approved by the City, signed under penalty of perjury declaring that all information provided on the form is true; and

(ii) it specifies the names and current addresses of the unit’s proposed occupants, the rent paid by the tenant when the landlord served the termination notice, and the qualifying relationship between the landlord and the proposed occupants; and

(iii) If the owner or qualifying relative seeks to occupy a particular unit due to his or her medical condition, it includes accurate and true evidence showing that the landlord's or qualifying relative’s physical needs require him or her to occupy that particular unit; and

(iv) it states that within thirty days of receiving the notice to vacate, the tenant may notify the landlord in writing that he or she would be interested in re-renting the unit if it is re-offered for rent in the future; and

(vi) it advises the tenant to file a copy of any notice of interest in re-renting the unit with the City of West Hollywood Rent Stabilization and Housing Department.

Other than the grounds stated in subdivision (g) of this section, the sole bases on which the landlord may choose to owner/relative occupy one unit rather than another are the number of bedrooms and the medical necessity of the person intending to occupy the unit. If the landlord or qualifying relative requires a particular unit for medical reasons, the landlord must include as part of the notice a letter from the qualifying person’s physician stating the medical basis for the need for a particular unit.

The City may revoke its approval of the notice if it determines that the approval was granted based on false or misleading information. The appeal of any decision to rescind the notice approval shall be governed by Chapter 7 of the Rent Stabilization Regulations (Appeals of Administrative Determinations of the Rent Stabilization and Housing Department).” RSO §17.52.010(12)(b)(emphasis added); RJN Ex. 2.

RSO section 17.52.010(12)(f) prohibits recovery of possession if a comparable unit in the building is already vacant and available:

“(f) No Just Cause if Comparable Unit is Vacant. A landlord may not recover possession under this subsection if a comparable unit in the building is already vacant and available, or if such a unit becomes vacant and available during the period of the notice terminating tenancy. If a comparable unit does become vacant and available during said notice period, the landlord shall rescind the notice to vacate. ‘Comparable unit,’ as used in this section, means a rental unit that is approximately the same size, has the same number of bedrooms, and can accommodate the owner or qualified relative's medical condition, if any.”

The Rent Stabilization Department’s determination may be appealed to the Director of the Rent Stabilization Department by an affected party. RSO Regulations §70001. The determination may be appealed on the grounds that the material submitted to the Department was false and misleading, and therefore the decision was erroneous as based on false information. RSO Regulations §70002. An appeal will not be accepted for filing if, inter alia, it does not set forth proper grounds under RSO Regulations section 70002. RSO Regulations §70006(A)(4). The Director shall make a decision on a properly filed appeal within 14 days oof submission of written statements and the decision shall be final. RSO Regulations §70008.

CCP section 1094.5(a) governs a case which seeks review of a proceeding that required a hearing, the taking of evidence, and discretionary administrative determination of facts. CCP section 1094.5 applies whether or not a hearing was actually held. Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board, (2004) 121 Cal.App.4^th 29, 37. Conversely, if an evidentiary hearing was held, but the hearing was not required by law, the decision is reviewed under traditional mandamus. Scott B. v. Board of Trustees of Orange County High School of the Arts, (“Scott B.”), (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 117, 123 (applying CCP section 1085 where a student was dismissed following a hearing that was held, but not required by law); see also Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of Alameda, (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 311 (applying CCP section 1085 where an agency’s procedures expressly stated “No public hearing is required[.]” (emphasis in original).

Administrative hearings are often informal and may be based on written evidence only. Purely documentary proceedings can satisfy the hearing requirement of CCP section 1094.5 so long as the organization is required by law to accept and consider evidence from both sides. “[C]ourts and commentators have found that purely documentary proceedings can satisfy the hearing requirement of…section 1094.5, so long as the agency is required by law to accept and consider evidence from interested parties before making its decision.” Friends of the Old Trees v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391. However, where an organization makes a decision based upon one party’s unilateral submission of information without considering evidence from opposing parties, no hearing occurs within the meaning of section 1094.5. 300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing and Community Development, (“300 DeHaro”) (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1250. There still must be something in the nature of a hearing – “an adversarial process in which the agency resolves disputed facts after affording interested parties an opportunity to present evidence.” Id. at 1251.

Petitioner Huang argues that at the outset of the case there was an element of ambiguity regarding what standard of review applies. An administrative record was prepared at Petitioner Huang’s request. However, the decision did not result from a proceeding in which by law a hearing was required to be given and therefore traditional mandate under CCP section 1085 applies. San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 349, 362-363. Therefore, the evidence to be considered before this court is not limited to the administrative record. Pet. Op. Br. at 4, n. 1. The City implicitly agrees that this case is governed by CCP section 1085. Opp. at 12.

The parties appear to be correct. Although the Director held a “paper hearing”, and both Huang and eventually Roberts presented evidence, a hearing was not required by law. The Department’s administrative determination may be appealed to the Director by an affected party (RSO Regulations §70001), but the only grounds for appeal are that the material submitted to the Department was false and misleading, and therefore the decision was erroneous. RSO Regulations §70002. An appeal will not be accepted for filing that does not set forth such grounds. RSO Regulations §70006(A)(4). In this case, Huang’s appeal did not allege that the material submitted to the Department was false and misleading. Rather, he alleged that the Department erred in not approving his Notice of Termination. Therefore, the Director was not required to make a decision on the appeal and only did so voluntarily, which means that this matter is governed by traditional mandamus. See Scott B., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 123.

“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” CCP §1085(a).

A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty. Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted). Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.

A ministerial act is one that is performed by a public officer “without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of such act.” Ellena v. Department of Insurance, (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205. It is “essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective measures have been met.” Sustainability of Parks, Recycling & Wildlife Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dept. of Resource Mgmt., (“Sustainability oof Parks”) (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359. By contrast, a discretionary act involves the exercise of judgment by a public officer. County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 653-54.

Where a duty is not ministerial and the agency has discretion, mandamus relief is unavailable unless the petitioner can demonstrate an abuse of that discretion. Mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of a public agency’s discretion in a particular manner. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 261. It is available to compel an agency to exercise discretion where it has not done so (Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 1, 8), and to correct an abuse of discretion actually exercised (Manjares v. Newton, (1966) 64 Cal.2d 365, 370-71). In making this determination, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, whose decision must be upheld if reasonable minds may disagree as to its wisdom. Id. at 371. An agency decision is an abuse of discretion only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.” Kahn v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 98, 106. A writ will lie where the agency’s discretion can be exercised only in one way. Hurtado v. Superior Court, (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579.

Questions posed with respect to the proper interpretation of law are issues of law over which a court exercises its independent judgment. Rea v. Blue Shield of California, (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1237-38. The weight accorded to an agency’s statutory interpretation is fundamentally situational and turns on a legally informed, commonsense assessment of its contextual merit. Id. at 1237. Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an agency’s interpretation is just one among several tools available to the court; depending on context, it may be helpful, enlightening, even convincing, or it may sometimes be of little worth. Id. at 1237-38.

No administrative record is required for traditional mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty or as an abuse of discretion. Despite this fact, the parties have prepared an administrative record as well as presenting additional evidence by declaration and judicial notice.

Petitioner Huang has submitted his declaration contending that “[t]he accusations set forth by Mr. Roberts [in the Administrative Record] are speculative and unsubstantiated.” Huang Decl., ¶6. Huang also tries to bolster the issue of medical necessity, again without identifying any specific medical condition and instead stating that “[m]y mother has been dealing with a chronic medical condition since 2015. In 2022, she suffered a sudden decline in health, causing an urgent need for a change to her existing housing accommodations.” Huang Decl., ¶5.

The City objects to this extra-record evidence as improper, citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, (“Western States”) (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 559, 574 (“It is well settled that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in . . . traditional mandamus actions challenging quasi-legislative decisions.”) Opp. at 12.

The rule in Western States does not apply because this case does not concern a quasi-legislative decision. It concerns the City’s quasi-adjudicative determination that Huang’s Notice of Termination does not qualify under RSO section 17.52.010(12). There is no limitation on the nature of evidence that may be presented so long as it was before the decision-maker. See post.

The City anticipated that Huang would present additional evidence and submits Huang’s deposition and Lawrence’s declaration. In doing so, the City cautions that it is not suggesting that either party’s extra-record evidence is necessary for resolution of the issues. The City maintains that the matter can be decided on the administrative record alone. Its additional evidence is intended to (1) rebut Huang’s claims, (2) provide additional evidence supporting the City’s decision, and (3) provide evidence related to the City’s affirmative defense of unclean hands. Opp. at 12-13.

The court will consider each party’s extra-record evidence, but limited to evidence that would have been before the decision-maker. Evidence that is presented after-the-fact will be considered only on the issue whether the matter should be remanded to the City for the evaluation of that additional evidence.

Elizabeth Betty Shun-Shin Huang is Huang’s mother. AR 4-5. The Property has a 17-unit multi-family apartment building subject to the RSO. AR 2, 4.

Real Party Roberts has been the tenant occupying Unit 9 since June 2003. AR 2, 5. Roberts is 63 years old and pays approximately $475.21 per month in rent. AR 5.

In 2022, Ms. Huang, who had been dealing with a chronic medical condition since 2015, suffered a sudden decline in health, necessitating a change to her existing housing accommodations. See AR 7.

On April 1, 2023, Huang sent Roberts a letter stating that his tenancy would terminate in 60 days because the owner/relative intended to move into the unit. AR 36. The letter stated:

“This letter serves as formal notice that your tenancy at 1119 Poinsettia Drive # 9 will terminate in 60 days from the date of this notice. Therefore, your tenancy will end on May 31, 2023, and you must vacate the premises by no later than that date….We will be moving into the unit and therefore, it is necessary for you to vacate the premises….[W]e hope that you will comply with this notice and that this matter can be resolved without legal action.” AR 36.

Roberts retained an attorney to respond. AR 38. The attorney’s cease and desist letter explained that Huang failed to satisfy at least two RSO requirements for owner/family member occupancy: (1) the owner is required to terminate the tenancy of the most recent tenant to move into the property, and (2) the owner must be a real person and possess legal title to at least 50% of the property. AR 38-39; RSO section 17.52.010(12)(i).

On May 6, 2023, the Property’s ownership was transferred from 1119 Poinsettia LLC to Huang (50%), Elizabeth Betty Shun-Shin Huang (25%), and Jong Teh Huang, Trustee of The Jong Teh Huang Trust. RJN, Ex. 1 (grant deed).

On May 24, 2023, Huang filed and served the Notice of Termination, giving notice to Roberts in Unit 9 that his tenancy would terminate in 60 days from service for the purpose of owner/relative occupancy in accordance with RSO section 1.52.010(12). AR 4-8. Accompanying the Notice of Termination was a $11,588 relocation check. AR 6.

The filed documents included a letter from Ms. Huang’s doctor, Dr. Jong T. Huang (“Dr. Huang”) explaining that she had been dealing with a chronic medical condition since 2015. AR 7. Recently, her condition had worsened, necessitating new accommodations that were crucial to her health and well-being. AR 7. Her chronic medical condition required immediate access to medication and caregivers in the event of emergency. AR 7.

Dr. Huang’s letter strongly recommended that Ms. Huang receive an apartment unit that fulfills the following criteria: (a) a walk-in shower because of her limited mobility, (b) no door between the bedroom and kitchen for her quick and unimpeded access to the kitchen where medication and supplies may be stored, and (c) a unit facing the street on the second floor to facilitate the timely reception of prescription deliveries. This was particularly important because she is not proficient in using technology or phones. AR 7.

On June 6, 2023, City staff attorney Lawrence sent Huang a letter requesting clarifying information. RSO section 17.52.010(12)(e) provides that an owner or qualifying relative seeking to occupy a unit due to medical condition must present accurate and true evidence that the qualifying relative’s physical needs require occupancy of that particular unit. AR 9. Lawrence questioned Dr. Huang’s note that Ms. Huang required a unit on the second floor despite her limited mobility, noting that there is no elevator to aid her access to the second floor. AR 9. Lawrence also noted that the City may disapprove any notice under RSO section 17.52.010.12.(b) if based on false or misleading information. He asked for “clarifying information or evidence as to why Ms. Huang can only occupy this particular unit and not a unit on the first floor.” AR 9.

On June 14, 2023, Huang responded. AR 12-15. He stated that he had two options: (a) a first-floor unit with full tub showers and walls between the kitchen and bedroom or (b) a second-floor unit accessible by stairs but without full tub showers and walls between the kitchen and bedroom. AR 12. No units on the first floor met the specified requirements and the risks associated with first-floor units were greater than those of the second-floor unit, especially given that it was not anticipated that his mother would often leave the unit. AR 12-14. The carpeted stairs with railings provide a more stable surface than wet and slippery bathroom floors, Ms. Huang needs to use the bathroom and kitchen far more than the stairs, and she needs a unit facing the street to monitor deliveries of medication and groceries. AR 12-14. There are four units with street-facing windows and only Unit 9 provides an unobstructed street view. AR 15.

On June 30, 2023, Lawrence denied the Notice of Termination, citing RSO section 17.52.010(12)(e), (f), and (g). AR 18-19. The denial stated:

“The information that you provided as to Ms. Huang’s need for the second floor of the unit is not adequate enough to approve this eviction notice. Nothing in your response indicates a physical or mental impairment other than the description in Dr. Huang’s letter that indicates Ms. Huang ‘is not proficient in using technology or telephones.’” AR 19.

The denial cited WHMC section 17.08.010(10) defining a “disabled person.” AR 19. Huang’s rationale that Ms. Huang needed a second-floor unit to have an unobstructed view of the street is not sufficient to show that her need to see deliveries will substantially limit one or more major life activities. In fact, Huang stated that her necessities will be delivered to her doorstep. AR 19.

The denial letter added that Dr. Huang’s letter indicates that Ms. Huang needs a unit without intervening walls between the bedroom and kitchen and the proposed unit offers and open concept layout, but as a landlord, Huang could comply with local, state, and federal guidelines to reasonably accommodate Ms. Huang’s disability and engage in an interactive process with her to create any reasonable accommodations or modifications for another comparable unit. AR 19.

The denial letter informed Huang of his right to appeal pursuant to Chapter 7 of the RSO Regulations. AR 19.

On July 17, 2023, Huang appealed to the Director. AR 20-25. Huang explained the medical necessity for Ms. Huang to occupy Unit 9 and the lack of comparable units in the building. AR 20-26.

On or about July 28, 2023, Roberts submitted an opposition, alleging harassment and fraud by Huang. AR, 27-34. Roberts has recently been the subject of Huang’s repeated unsubstantiated attempts at eviction. AR 29, 31-32. He contended that Huang’s eviction attempts began during the COVID-19 Pandemic, involved legal threats, and escalated to the point where Roberts was forced to retain private counsel to protect his tenancy. AR 30-31.

On August 10, 2023, the Director denied Huang’s appeal, noting that RSO Regulations 7008 requires the Director to make a decision on an appeal within 14 days, which decision shall be final. The Director affirmed the Department’s determination not to approve Huang’s Notice of Termination. AR 52.

Huang is part-owner of the Property. Huang Decl., ¶2; RJN Ex. 1 (grant deed). Ms. Huang, trustee of the Elizabeth Betty Shun-Shin Huang Trust, is Huang’s mother and also part-owner of the Property. Huang Decl., ¶3; RJN Ex. 1.

The Property is improved with a 17 rental unit multi-family apartment building. Huang Decl., ¶4. Real Party Roberts has been the tenant occupying Unit 9 of the apartment building since June 2003. Huang Decl., ¶4.

Ms. Huang has been dealing with a chronic medical condition since 2015. Huang Decl., ¶5. In 2022, she suffered a sudden decline in health, causing an urgent need for a change to her existing housing accommodations. Id.

Huang has reviewed the July 23, 2023 document submitted by Roberts in opposition to my requested Notice of Termination (AR 27-34). Huang Decl., ¶6. Roberts’ accusations are speculative and unsubstantiated. Id. There is no agenda to remove him from Unit 9. Id. The Notice of Termination was submitted for Unit 9 due to Ms. Huang’s particular medical condition Id.

The City deposed Huang on April 18, 2024. Huang testified in pertinent part as follows. Roberts pays approximately $475.21 per month in rent. Huang Depo, pp. 27-29. One other unit pays approximately the same amount: $700-800. Id, p. 28. The remaining units pay between $1000 and $2000. Id. p. 29.

Huang sent a 60-day notice to Roberts on April 1, 2023, with his tenancy to end on May 31, 2023. Huang Depo., p. 49 (see AR 36). “The reason for this notice is that the owner/relative of this property intends to occupy the unit”. Huang Depo. pp. 47-49.

Huang did not know who owned or controlled the LLC that previously owned the Property. Huang Depo., p. 15. He subsequently admitted that he and Ms. Huang owned it. Huang Depo., p. 22.

Ms. Huang can use a telephone and she uses landlines. Her difficulty with a cellular phone is due to the fact that she is elderly and “technology inept”. Huang Depo., pp. 71-72.

Huang asked his father for the medical letter: “Q: So you requested the letter from your father. You approached your father and said we need a letter? A. Yes.” Huang Depo., p. 43. He did not instruct Dr. Huang on what to write. Huang Depo., p. 38.

Dr. Huang was told not to provide specific details of Ms. Huang’s medical condition. Huang Depo. p. 39. On the other hand, Huang did not tell him to specify and put his license on the line by violating HIPPA. Huang Depo., p. 43. He is a doctor and is not supposed to provide details about a person’s medical condition that goes to a public record. Huang Depo., p. 41. Huang interpreted the City’s form not to disclose patient confidentiality stuff that would be in the public domain. Huang Depo., p. 41. Huang asked the City if the doctor could be an interested party – i.e., his father – and they said “it’s fine.” Huang Depo., p. 42.

Lawrence is an attorney in the City’s Rent Stabilization Department. Lawrence Decl., ¶1. Among other tasks, he is assigned to review notices to terminate tenancy. Lawrence Decl., ¶2. He was assigned and worked on the Notice of Termination issued by Huang. Id.

Lawrence understands that Huang testified at deposition that he was provided certain information and guidance from representatives of the City regarding his Notice of Termination, including that City representatives (1) instructed or requested that he transfer property from an LLC into his name for the purposes of his Notice of Termination, (2) instructed him regarding the contents of a supporting doctor’s note, and (3) advised that it would be acceptable if the doctor submitting the note was Huang’s father and a party with an ownership interest in the property. Lawrence Decl., ¶3.

Lawrence communicated with Huang while working on the matter. The communications were in the form of correspondence that is part of the administrative record and Lawrence did not at any point (1) instruct or request that Huang transfer property from an LLC into his name for the purposes of his Notice of Termination, (2) instruct him about the contents of a doctor’s note. or (3) advise him that it would be acceptable if the doctor submitting the note was his father and a party with an ownership interest in the property. Lawrence Decl., ¶4.

The Department’s policy is not to provide legal advice to landlords or tenants. Staff working in the Department are informed of this policy and follow it in the regular course of business. If a landlord or tenant contacts the Department requesting specific instruction regarding how to comply with the RSO, the Department provides information regarding procedures, ordinances, and regulations but does not provide legal advice. Lawrence Decl., ¶5.

Lawrence did not approve Huang’s Notice of Termination pursuant to RSO section 17.52.010 for the reasons stated in the administrative record. Lawrence Decl., ¶6. There are additional reasons not to approve the Notice of Termination. Lawrence Decl., ¶7. The doctor’s note was authored by Dr. Huang. Id. Lawrence conducted a property search (AR 77-86) and learned that Huang owned properties with a Jong T. Huang (AR 79) and that the Jong Teh Huang Trust is a part-owner of the Property. AR 77; id. Lawrence was not certain, however, that Dr. Huang is related to Huang simply because they share a relatively common last name. Id.

Since then, Huang has testified that Dr. Huang is his father and an owner of the property. Lawrence Decl., ¶9. Huang did not disclose this to Lawrence. Id. Lawrence finds it highly material that Dr. Huang is related to Huang and an owner of the Property as it calls to question the authenticity and truth of the statements presented. Id. Had he been aware of these facts, it would have been another basis not to approve the Notice of Termination. Id.

The City provides landlords with units subject to the RSO with technical guidance and assistance through Rent Stabilization Information Coordinators. An appointment for such guidance and assistance can be made through the City’s website. Reply Huang Decl., ¶2.

Using this portal, Huang met with Rent Stabilization Information Coordinator Anwar Zraikat (“Zraikat”) on or about March 27, 2023 regarding the requirements for terminating a tenancy for his mother due to her medical condition. They discussed that Huang should attempt resolve the tenancy directly with the tenant, before going through the formal process with the City. Reply Huang Decl., ¶3. The March 31, 2023 letter to Roberts was sent for this purpose. At that time, Huang was not aware of all the formal processes the City requires. Reply Huang Decl., ¶3.

On or about April 27 2023, Huang met again with Zraikat regarding the process and forms. Zraikat advised that Huang would need to change the ownership of the property. Reply Huang Decl., ¶4. Zraikat also advised that the fees for filing with the City were going up and that Huang should submit his application as soon as possible. Id.

On May 15 2023, Huang asked Zraikat whether there would be any reason he could not submit a doctor’s note from his father, who was his mother’s treating physician and could provide a note the fastest. Reply Huang Decl., ¶5. Zraikat advised that there was no reason to not move forward with such note. Id.

On May 24 2023, Huang had a follow-up meeting with Zraikat, who confirmed that Huang’s application met all of the City’s requirements. Reply Huang Decl., ¶6.

Petitioner Huang seeks to compel the City[3] to set aside its denial and approve the Notice of Termination in accordance with RSO section 17.52.010(12).

Petitioner Huang argues that his Notice of Termination fully complied with the RSO. It was on a form provided by the City (AR 5), it specified the name and address of the proposed occupant, the rent paid by Roberts, and the qualifying relationship between Huang and Ms. Huang, it included accurate and true evidence showing Ms. Huang’s physical needs requiring her to occupy Unit 9, and it provided the language required by the RSO. AR 5, 7; RSO §17.52.010(12)(b)(i)-(vi). The requested Notice of Termination included a letter from Ms. Huang’s physician stating the medical basis for the need to occupy Unit 9. AR 7. Huang argues that, upon his submittal of the fully RSO-compliant Notice of Termination, the City had mandatory duty to approve it within ten business days. RSO §17.52.010.12(b) ([w]ithin ten business days the City shall approve the notice...); see Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 (the word “may” is ordinarily construed as permissive and the word “shall” is construed as mandatory, particularly when a single statute uses both terms). Pet. Op. Br. at 7.

Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation.¿ AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.¿ See MacDonald v. State of California, (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 319, 330.

A ministerial act is one made without regard to the judgment or opinion of the person performing the act. Ellena v. Department of Insurance, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 205. It is “essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective measures have been met.” Sustainability of Parks, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1359. In contrast, a discretionary act involves the exercise of judgment by a public officer. County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 653-54.

For example, after a project has been approved as meeting all zoning requirements, issuance of a “run-of-the mill” building permit is ministerial. See, e.g., Friends of Westwood. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 259, 270, 277 (permit is ministerial if the ordinance limits public official to determining whether zoning permits the structure, the structure meets Building Code strength requirements, and applicant had paid his fee). On the other hand, the issuance of building permits is a discretionary function, and a building official has no mandatory duty to issue any building permit at all, where zoning compliance has not been approved. See Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 49, 57-58 (city had no discretion to withhold a certificate of occupancy after discretionary building permit had been approved). A public entity has a ministerial duty to comply with its own rules and regulations where they are valid and unambiguous.” CV Amalgamated LLC v. City of Chula Vista, (2022) 82 Cal. App. 5th 265, 279.

The court agrees with the City that the issue does not involve a purely ministerial duty and instead involves the exercise of some discretion. The gravamen of Petitioner’s argument is that the City had a mandatory duty to approve the Notice of Termination, but the language of the RSO affords the City some discretion in determining whether a Notice of Termination is adequate, and thus whether it must be approved. The City is required, within ten days, to approve the Notice of Termination if (a) “it includes accurate and true evidence showing that the landlord’s or qualifying relative’s physical needs require him or her to occupy that particular unit”. RSO §17.52.010(12)(b)(iii). The City may revoke its approval of the notice if it determines that the approval was granted based on false or misleading information. RSO §17.52.010 (final paragraph).

Huang’s argument that the City has a mandatory duty rests on the word “shall,” but ignores the text that follows. The duty is only triggered if certain conditions are met, and those conditions involve the exercise of discretion. Specifically, the City first must determine that the evidence provided to support a qualifying physical condition is “accurate and true”, which necessarily involves some judgment and decision-making. Further, the RSO contemplates that the City can determine whether information is false or misleading, again suggesting some amount of evaluation and decision-making. To hold otherwise would prohibit the City from even questioning the evidence provided in support of the Notice of Termination.

Huang replies that this interpretation is misplaced. A ministerial duty is an act that a public officer is obligated to perform in a prescribed manner required by law when a given state of facts exists. Schmid v. City and County of San Franciso, (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 495; Court House Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto, (“Court House Plaza”) (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 871, 883 (municipal code stated that “a use permit shall be issued without a public hearing if the proposed structure or structures comply with the development plan and conditions thereof” and that fact that the zoning administrator may impose conditions on the permit did not change the ministerial character of the zoning administrator's function). In this case, the City does not even have the ability to impose conditions as in Court House Plaza. The City only has the option of approving or denying the Notice of Termination under the set standards set forth in the RSO. Its functions are ministerial, and without discretion. Reply at 6.

Not so. There is no standard in RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b) to approve the Notice of Termination. The Notice of Termination must have accurate and true evidence showing that the landlord’s or qualifying relative’s physical needs require him or her to occupy that particular unit. RSO §17.52.010(12)(b)(iii). There is nothing essentially automatic based on fixed standards and objective measures in making this evaluation. See Sustainability of Parks, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1359. The City necessarily exercises judgment in deciding whether the Notice of Termination shows that a qualifying relative’s medical needs require her to occupy a particular unit.[4]

Thus, the City does not have a mandatory ministerial duty to approve the Notice of Termination simply because it contains the necessary information required. The City is incorrect, however, in arguing that this means traditional mandamus cannot lie. Traditional mandamus can lie for a discretionary duty to compel an agency to exercise discretion where it has not done so (Los Angeles County Employees Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at 8), and to correct an abuse of discretion actually exercised (Manjares v. Newton, supra, 64 Cal.2d at 370-71). An agency decision is an abuse of discretion only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.” Kahn v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at 106. A writ will lie where the agency’s discretion can be exercised only in one way. Hurtado v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 579.

The question is whether the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary support in failing to approve Huang’s Notice of Termination. In making this decision, Lawrence was entitled by the RSO to evaluate whether Huang’s medical was accurate and true evidence showing that Ms. Huang’s physical needs require her to occupy Unit 9. See RSO §17.52.010(b)(iii).

Dr. Huang’s letter did not identify Ms. Huang’s condition, stating only that she had been dealing with a chronic medical condition since 2015 and that recently her condition had worsened. AR 7. Dr. Huang opined that her chronic medical condition required immediate access to medication and caregivers in the event of emergency and strongly recommended that she receive an apartment unit that has (a) a walk-in shower only because of her limited mobility, (b) no door between the bedroom and kitchen for her quick and unimpeded access to the kitchen where medication and supplies may be stored, and (c) a unit facing the street on the second floor to facilitate the timely reception of prescription deliveries. This was particularly important because she is not proficient in using technology or phones. AR 7.

There is little doubt that Dr. Huang’s letter was vague about Ms. Huang’s medical condition. While Huang relied on Ms. Huang’s privacy and HIPPA, those concepts have little bearing on the issue. If Ms. Huang and her son wanted her to have a particular unit, they were obligated to explain the seriousness of her medical condition and why it required accommodation. A general reference to a chronic medication condition did not suffice. Additionally, Huang was required to make a connection between Ms. Huang’s medical condition and why no other unit would suffice.

For these reasons, Lawrence wrote Huang on June 6, 2023 requesting clarification. Lawrence questioned Dr. Huang’s note that Ms. Huang required a unit on the second floor despite her limited mobility, noting that there is no elevator to aid her access to the second floor. AR 9. He asked for “clarifying information or evidence as to why Ms. Huang can only occupy this particular unit and not a unit on the first floor.” AR 9.

Huang’s response did not come from Dr. Huang as required by RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b), but it was admittedly detailed. AR 12-15. Huang stated that he had two options: (a) a first-floor unit with full tub showers and walls between the kitchen and bedroom or (b) a second-floor unit accessible by stairs but without full tub showers and walls between the kitchen and bedroom. AR 12. No units on the first floor met the specified requirements and the risks associated with first-floor units were greater than those of the second-floor unit, especially given that it was not anticipated that his mother would often leave the unit. AR 12-14. The carpeted stairs with railings provide a more stable surface than wet and slippery bathroom floors, Elizabeth needs to use the bathroom and kitchen far more than the stairs, and she needs a unit facing the street to monitor deliveries of medication and groceries. AR 12-14. There are four units with street-facing windows and only Unit 9 provides an unobstructed street view. AR 15.

Despite its detail, Huang’s response did not explain anything more about the seriousness of her medical condition and why it required accommodation. As the City argues for Dr. Huang’s letter (Opp. at 14), the response “does not make the required connection between a specific medical condition and how that condition results in medical needs that can only be accommodated by Ms. Huang moving into Unit 9.” Lawrence was not required to accept Huang’s explanation why Ms. Huang can climb stairs to the second floor and not use a first-floor unit. A walk-in shower makes sense for a person with limited mobility, but neither of the other two requirements does. The requirements that there be no door between the bedroom and kitchen for quick and unimpeded access to the kitchen for medication and supplies and that the unit face the street on the second floor to facilitate the timely reception of prescription deliveries are not medical issues; they are issues of convenience that easily can be addressed by other means such as leaving the door open and receiving medication at the unit door.

Thus, Lawrence’s June 30, 2023 decision to deny the Notice of Termination was not arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidence. As Lawrence stated:

Huang attacks Lawrence’s denial letter because it generally cites RSO sections 17.52.010.12(e), 17.52.010.12(f), 17.52.010.12(g), and 17.08.010(10). AR 18-19. Pet. Op. Br. at 7.

Huang correctly notes that RSO section 17.52.010.12(e) references an inapplicable situation in which an owner/relative for whom a tenant was evicted does not move into the unit within 90 days and occupy the unit for a minimum period of a year. RJN Ex. 2. Pet. Op. Br. at 7.

Huang correctly notes that RSO section 17.52.010.12(f) provides that a landlord may not recover possession if a comparable unit in the building is already vacant and available. RJN Ex. 2. There is no evidence that a comparable unit in the building was vacant and available. Lawrence implicitly admitted that there are no comparable units by suggesting that Huang create “another comparable unit.” AR 19. The suggestion that Huang should remodel one of the other units in the apartment building for Ms. Huang is unreasonable and not a requirement of the RSO. Pet. Op. Br. at 9. The court agrees.

Huang correctly notes that RSO section 17.52.010.12(g) states that any tenant evicted must be the most recent tenant to occupy a unit with the number of bedrooms needed by the relative. RJN Ex. 2. This subsection is inapplicable because there is no evidence that Ms. Huang needed a particular number of bedrooms. Pet. Op. Br. at 10.

Huang correctly notes that there is nothing in RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b) which requires that Ms. Huang meets the definition of a “disabled tenant” in WHMC section 17.08.010(10). RJN Exs. 2, 4. The disabled tenant requirement is for the following: (a) determining violations of tenancy obligations (RSO §17.52.010(2)(g)(i)); (b) calculating allowable time to move out of a unit during a withdrawal of the structure from the rental market (RSO §17.52.010(15)(b)(4)); (c) calculating relocation fees (RSO §17.52.020(a)(1)(B); (d) calculating tenant harassment damages (RSO §17.52.090(f)); (e) calculating relocation benefits for temporary repossession (RSO §17.52.110(d); and (f) removal of parking space limitations (RSO §17.52.120(g)). RJN Ex. 2. None of these apply to termination for owner/relative occupancy under RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b). Pet. Op. Br. at 8-9.

While this latter point is true, the denial letter’s reference to the definition of a disabled tenant in WHMC section 17.08.010(10) appears to be simply an explanation why an unobstructed view of the street is unnecessary for Ms. Huang. AR 19. Lawrence seemed to be suggesting that even a disabled tenant would not need such an accommodation. Perhaps he would have been better off not referring to the definition of a disabled person, but it does not undermine his decision.

In sum, the denial letter’s general or other references to RSO sections 17.52.010(12)(e), 17.52.010(12)(f), 17.52.010(12)(g), and 17.08.010(10) do not undermine Lawrence’s point that Huang failed to provide sufficient information that Ms. Huang’s need for a second floor of the unit, specifically Unit 9.[5]

Finally, Huang argues that, while RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b)(iii) requires the inclusion of accurate and true evidence, Lawrence did not question the truth or accuracy of the evidence submitted. Huang met his burden to establish a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” as defined by RSO section 17.08.010(12). He did so both by submitting a medical professional’s assessment and explaining in detail that Unit 9 is necessary for Ms. Huang’s physical needs. AR, 12-14. Huang and Dr. Huang explained that the need to face the street from the second floor was necessary to provide Ms. Huang the physical ability to visually monitor deliveries of medication and groceries, which she recognizes via automobile, and ensure their timely access. AR, 14-15. Huang explained that of the four units in the building with windows that face the street, only Unit 9 provides an unobstructed view of the street. AR, 15. Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

Huang’s argument that he presented sufficient evidence to meet RSO section 17.08.010(12)(iii) does not establish that Lawrence’s decision to the contrary was arbitrary, capricious, or totally lacking evidentiary support. The record demonstrates that it was reasonable for Lawrence to conclude that Dr. Huang’s note failed to meet the accuracy requirements of the RSO. Dr. Huang did not provide a medical diagnosis or identify any specific medical condition, did not explain why the medical condition required that only Unit 9 could accommodate Ms. Huang, and did not explain how her needs were the product of a medical condition. Huang did not provide supporting information from a doctor as required by the RSO, and there is sufficient evidence that his attempts to explain the deficiencies were inadequate.[6]

The City makes other arguments that it contends support affirmance. First, the City Roberts claims that Huang has a long history of attempts to evict him. AR 30-31. Huang claimed that Roberts needed to vacate the unit because Huang himself intended to occupy Unit 9. AR 10. Huang threatened Roberts with legal action. AR 30-31. These prior attempts, coupled with the recent transfer of the Property from the LLC into Huang’s name, caution that the Notice of Termination based on medical necessity is not authentic. Opp. at 16.

Huang replies that the City’s reliance on Roberts’ story is unreasonable as it is not supported by documentary evidence and is contradicted by Huang and the City’s own files. For example, Roberts’ claim that he has been a tenant at the Property since 1995 (AR 29), is inconsistent with the City’s own records which show otherwise (AR 2, 3). Roberts’ claim that Huang has tried to evict him in the past is unsupported by written notices to terminate tenancy, notices to move out, 30-day notices to quit, or emails/complaints to the Housing Department. To the contrary, the only document provided is a late March 2023 letter evidencing Huang’s attempt to get Unit 9 for this mother prior to filing formal documents with the City. AR 36. Reply Huang Decl., ¶ 3. Reply at 5.

Second, the City argues that the record suggests that Dr. Huang is an owner of the Property and Petitioner’s relative. Lawrence conducted searches indicating these connections. AR 41-49, 77-86. This was not a stated basis for his denial as he was hesitant to make assumptions about the relatively common name of “Huang”. Lawrence Decl., ¶8. However, the fact that Dr. Huang is an owner of the Property, and also the husband of Ms. Huang, casts doubt on the impartiality and authenticity of his doctor’s note. Since the reasons supporting a decision need not be stated, and a decision that is supported by evidence must be upheld, these are additional reasons that the Notice of Termination was properly denied. Opp. at 16.

Huang replies that the City’s claim of materiality regarding the familial relationship between Huang and his father, and Dr. Huang’s ownership of the Property, is misplaced. Nothing in the RSO prohibits a letter from a related doctor who is also a treating physician or provides that there may not be ownership interest in the property. The City also cannot claim that Dr. Huang’s relationship to Huang is new information. Roberts’ submission specifically suggested that Dr. Huang and Huang’s father were the same person. AR 30. If Lawrence had doubts regarding the relationship between Huang and Dr. Huang, he could have asked for clarification. Reply at 5-6.

The court need not address these two issues because Huang correctly replies that Lawrence did not rely on Roberts’ information -- the majority of information was submitted to the City on July 25, 2023 (AR 29) after Lawrence denied the requested Notice of Termination on June 30, 2023 (AR 18-19). Lawrence admits that he denied the Notice of Termination for the reasons stated in the record. Lawrence Decl., ¶6. To the extent that he claims “there are additional reasons for not approving the Notice” (Lawrence Decl., ¶7), there is no authority to use new evidence as a post-hoc rationalization. Reply at 4. As stated ante, the new evidence is relevant only to whether the case should be remanded for additional hearing. As the City’s decision is not arbitrary or capricious, there is no need to do so.

Third and finally, the City argues that Huang is guilty of unclean hands. For years, he has attempted to evict Roberts through a pattern of harassment and intimidation, including during the COVID-19 Pandemic. His behavior violates good conscience, good faith, and the same RSO provisions that he is attempting to enforce. Prior to transferring the Property from the LLC into his own name, approaching his father to prepare a doctor’s note, and serving the Notice of Termination, Huang attempted to evict Roberts “under the radar” by sending him a letter stating, in no uncertain terms, that his tenancy would end and he must vacate the premises or face legal action. AR 36. Huang plainly misrepresented to Roberts that he was required to vacate the Property, and he did so without any proper factual or legal basis. Opp. at 16-17.

These facts do not support unclean hands. Huang points out that the City’s unclean hands relies on Roberts for a “pattern of harassment and intimidation”. Reply at 8-9. More important, it is not a violation of good conscience for a landlord to tell a tenant that he must vacate the premises, even if the law does not support that conclusion. The defense of unclean hands does not apply in every instance where the plaintiff has committed some misconduct in the matter in controversy, but only where it would be inequitable to grant any relief. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 447. Huang is not guilty of unclean hands.[7]

The City’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the evidence and the Petition is denied. The City’s counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it on Huang’s counsel for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for July 18, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.

[1] Petitioners request judicial notice of a (a) grant deed recorded as Instrument No. 20230316345 by the Los Angeles County Recorders’ Office (Ex. 1), (b) the City’s RSO, Chapter 17.52 (Ex. 2), (c) Chapter 7 of the City’s RSO Regulations (Ex. 3), the City’s’ RSO section 17.08.010 (highlighted) (Ex. 4). The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(b), (c).

In reply, Petitioners’ make a supplemental request for judicial notice of a City webpage regarding Rent Stabilization (Ex. 1) and a City webpage/portal to make Rent Stabilization appointments (Ex. 2). The City objects to these requests as improper. The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(c).

[2] The City objects to the reply evidence concerning Huang’s communications with Zraikat as improper. These statements concern issues raised in the opening brief and also are hearsay.

The court agrees that this evidence should have been presented with Huang’s opening brief. New evidence/issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly presented to a trial court and may be disregarded. Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333. While Lawrence’s declaration submitted in opposition denies any oral communication with Huang, that did not open the door for evidence of communication with another City employee. The objections are sustained, and the court lists the reply evidence for informational purposes only.

[3] For convenience, the court will refer to Lawrence’s denial rather than to the Director’s decision upholding the denial.

[4] The City also argues that the court should afford the City’s “interpretation of its own regulation great weight and deference…” Manderson-Saleh v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., (2021) 60 Cal. App. 5th 674, 697, (Ct. App. 2021) (citations omitted). The administrative record shows that the City interprets the RSO to require an exercise of discretion. In the course of evaluating the Notice of Termination, the City corresponded with Huang to seek clarifying information, and explicitly reminded him of its authority to “revoke approval of a notice if based on false or misleading information.” These actions are inconsistent with an interpretation that the City lacked discretion. Lawrence confirms that the City’s review of a Notice of Termination involves a determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and whether it is true and accurate. Lawrence Decl., ¶6. Opp. at 13-14.

Huang does not respond to this argument, but the City cannot bootstrap deference to its interpretation based on the very exercise of discretion at issue.

[5] Huang notes that the Citiy’s opposition cites a portion of RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b) which states: “[t]he City may revoke its approval of the notice if it determines that the approval was granted based on false or misleading information.” Huang argues that, by its plain terms, this section is only applicable to revocations of approved notices of termination. There has been no approval here, and nothing to revoke. Reply at 6. The court need not decide whether Huang is correct because RSO section 17.52.010(12)(b)(iii) specifically requires that the information be accurate.

[6] Unlike CCP section 1094.5, the agency in traditional mandamus is not required to make findings of fact or support its decision by bridging the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order pursuant to Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. City of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15. Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek, (1987)) 193 Cal.App.3d 249, 261.

[7] Huang separately argues that he proceeded with the Notice of Termination under the guidance of the Department. He presents evidence in reply that he met with Rent Stabilization Information Coordinator Zraikat on or about March 27, 2023 regarding the requirements for terminating a tenancy for his mother due to her medical condition. At that time, Huang was not aware of all the formal processes the City requires. Reply Huang Decl., ¶3. On or about April 27 2023, Huang met again with Zraikat, who advised that Huang would need to change the ownership of the Property. Reply Huang Decl., ¶4. On May 15 2023, Huang asked Zraikat whether there would be any reason he could not submit a doctor’s note from his father, who also was his mother’s treating physician, as that was the doctor who could provide a note the fastest. Reply Huang Decl., ¶5. Zraikat advised that there was no reason he could not move forward with such a note. Id. On May 24 2023, Huang had a follow-up meeting with Zraikat, who confirmed that Huang’s application met all of the City’s requirements. Reply Huang Decl., ¶6.

The court sustained the City’s objection to this evidence presented for the first time in reply and it has not been considered. In any event, the evidence does not undermine the conclusion that Lawrence’s decision was not arbitrary or lacking evidentiary support.