Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCP04436, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Marlon Bellini v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 23STCP04436

Tentative decision on administrative mandamus: denied

Petitioner Marlon Bellini (“Bellini”) seeks a writ of administrative mandamus directing Respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“CUIAB”) to set aside its decision that he is ineligible for family leave unemployment compensation benefits.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

Bellini filed the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate on December 8, 2023. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Bellini was employed by Miller Milling Company at 5471 Ferguson Drive, Commerce, CA 90640. His leave benefits for the birth of his son were denied.

Bellini filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits, which were denied by the California Employment Development Department (“EDD”).

Bellini appealed the determination, and an administrative law judge affirmed the EDD’s denial, reasoning that Bellini had not submitted sufficient documentation to establish evidence of a qualifying relationship to a child to satisfy the requirements necessary for payment of benefits under code section 2708(c) of Title 22 California Code of Regulations (“CCR”) section 2708(c).

Bellini appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to Respondent CUIAB, which found no material errors and adopted the issue statement, the finding of fact, and the reasons for the decision. CUIAB also declined to admit Bellini’s additional evidence as it could not be authenticated and, even if authenticated, it would still not satisfy the requirement of 22 CCR section 2708(c). Ex. 3.

CCP section 1094.5 is the administrative mandamus provision which structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendered by administrative agencies. Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (“Topanga”) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 51415.

CCP section 1094.5 does not on its face specify which cases are subject to independent review, leaving that issue to the courts. Fukuda v. City of Angels, (“Fukuda”) (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811. In cases reviewing decisions which affect a fundamental vested right the trial court exercises independent judgment on the evidence. Bixby v. Pierno, (“Bixby”) (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143. See CCP §1094.5(c). The court reviews an agency’s determination of an application for welfare benefits under the independent judgment standard. Fink v. Prod, (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166 178-79.

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 143. The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners, (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868. In short, the court substitutes its judgment for the agency’s regarding the basic facts of what happened, when, why, and the credibility of witnesses. Guymon v. Board of Accountancy, (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 101316.

“In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 817. Unless it can be demonstrated by petitioner that the agency’s actions are not grounded upon any reasonable basis in law or any substantial basis in fact, the courts should not interfere with the agency’s discretion or substitute their wisdom for that of the agency. Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 15051; Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Board, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 198, 208.

The agency’s decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 860, 862. The hearing officer is only required to issue findings that give enough explanation so that parties may determine whether, and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, 51415. Implicit in CCP section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order. Id. at 515.

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties (Evid. Code §664), and the petitioner therefore has the burden of proof. Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137. “[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party attacking the administrative decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings were unfair, in excess of jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of discretion. Alford v. Pierno, (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.

California has established family temporary disability insurance benefits that provide wage replacement to workers who take time off to care for their family members. Unemployment Insurance Code (“UIC”) §3300 et seq. “Family temporary disability insurance shall provide up to eight weeks of wage replacement benefits to workers who take time off work . . . to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth.” UIC §3301(a)(1).) “Claims for disability benefits shall be made in accordance with authorized regulations of the Director of Employment Development.” UIC §2706.

When filing a claim to bond with a new child after birth, the claimant shall include a supporting document that provides sufficient information to establish the relationship between the claimant and the new child. §2708(c)-1(a). “The department may, at its discretion, accept a supporting document that does not contain all of the information prescribed under this section provided that the department can readily obtain the information through reasonable means or ascertain that there is no intent to defraud.” Id.

The supporting document shall include the child’s name, date of birth, gender, social security number, if available, but the absence of such number shall not be disqualifying. §2708(c)-1(1). If applicable, a supporting document shall also include: (a) the date(s) of placement, (b) the names of the parent(s), custodial parent(s), and/or registered domestic partner, and (c) a dated signature of the social worker, director or authorized designate. §2708(c)-1(2).

To verify the birth of a child for a bonding claim, supporting documents shall be provided as follows: (1) a certified birth certificate, (2) documents from the hospital or birthing center attesting to the birth of the child listing the claimant as parent, or (3) a letter from the birthing center or hospital’s Director of Medical Records containing the child’s name, date of birth, gender assigned at birth, social security number if available, the names of the parents, and “a dated signature of the social worker, director, or authorized designate.” §2708(c)-1(b)(1)(A)-(C).

An individual who is deemed ineligible for state disability insurance benefits may appeal the Department’s initial determination to an administrative law judge. UIC §2707.2(a). The administrative law judge is empowered to “affirm, reverse, modify, or set aside any determination” of eligibility for benefits. UIC §2707.8. The beneficiary may appeal the decision of the administrative law judge to CUIAB’s appeals board. Ibid; see also UIC §1336.

On August 26, 2022, Bellini submitted a claim for paid family leave benefits beginning August 21, 2022 to bond with his son born on August 13, 2022. AR 43-45. Bellini submitted the following documents in support of his claim: (1) a “Record of Live Birth” that listed his son’s name, height, weight, and birth date (AR 50); a “Proof of Live Infant Birth” from Growing Healthy Together pediatric clinic dated August 16, 2022 that lists the child’s name, height, weight, and male sex (AR 53); a “New Family Member Proclamation” published in the Downey Patriot in September 2022 (AR 54); a “California Jurat” apparently notarizing and referencing an August 13, 2022 birth certificate (AR 55); and a “New family member sacred trust Proclamation” apparently referencing his son’s birth (AR 56).

EDD denied Bellini’s claim because he did not provide the necessary documentary evidence of his qualifying relationship to the child. AR 2. In its denial letter, EDD stated that Bellini could be found eligible if he provided: (1) the child’s birth certificate; (2) the child’s hospital discharge record; (3) a Declaration of Paternity; (4) the child’s passport showing INS Stamp I-551;1 or (5) another document listed in section 2708(c)-1. Id.

Bellini appealed on September 28, 2022. AR 3-4. He submitted the same documents that he provided with his initial claim. AR 3-4.

The appeal hearing was held on February 8, 2023, before administrative law judge Faith I. Mitchell (the “ALJ”). Bellini appeared on his own behalf. EDD submitted a declaration from Appeals Representative Lilibeth Anadeo-Latimer (“Anadeo”) in lieu of an appearance. AR 35-37.

Bellini testified that his wife delivered the baby at home, he assisted with the birth, and no doctor or midwife was present. AR 24. Bellini did not have a copy of his son’s birth certificate “for religious reasons” and he was not planning on getting one. AR 19-20, 25-26. Bellini had not filled out any documents to register his son’s birth with the County. AR 22. At the time of the hearing, Bellini’s son did not have a passport, although he had an appointment to get one. AR 24-25.

Anadeo’s declaration stated that none of the documents Bellini submitted were acceptable as proof of his relationship to the child for the purposes of paid family leave benefits. AR 35. Anadeo noted that Bellini’s documents did not qualify as a birth certificate or other record listed in section 2708(c)-1(b)(1)(A). Ibid. EDD declined to exercise its discretion to accept petitioner’s supporting documents pursuant to section 2708(c)-1(a). Ibid. Without supporting documentation, EDD was unable to verify the qualifying relationship with the child with whom Bellini was attempting to bond. Ibid.

On February 17, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision affirming EDD’s denial of benefits. AR 77-79. The ALJ agreed with EDD that Bellini’s supporting documents were insufficient to establish a qualifying relationship with the child under section 2708(c)-1. AR 79.

On February 24, 2023, Bellini submitted an appeal to CUIAB from the ALJ’s decision. AR 81. With his appeal, Bellini submitted a letter from Growing Healthy Together Pediatric Clinic stating that Bellini had brought his son in for an examination on August 16, 2022, and that the child had been born on August 13, 2022 to parents Marlon and Gabriela Bellini. AR 82.

On June 7, 2023, CUIAB affirmed the ALJ’s denial decision, also determining that the letter Bellini had submitted could not be authenticated and did not satisfy the requirements of section 2708(c)-1 anyway. AR 88. CUIAB advised Bellini to contact EDD’s Paid Family Leave Unit to inquire about what documents will be sufficient to establish eligibility. AR 88.

Petitioner Bellini seeks a writ of administrative mandamus directing CUIAB to set aside its decision that he is ineligible for family leave unemployment compensation benefits.

CUAIB points out that Bellini did not adhere to the court-ordered briefing schedule. At the June 4, 2024 trial setting conference, the court ordered Bellini’s opening brief to be filed and served no later than July 2, 2024, CUIAB’s opposition to be filed and served no later than August 8, 2024, and any reply brief to be filed and served no later than September 3, 2024.

Bellini did not file his opening brief until July 9, 2024, and only after CUAIB filed and served a Notice of Non-Filing of Petitioner’s Opening Brief. CUIAB notes that Bellini’s opening brief does not explain why he failed to adhere to the July 2 filing deadline. The court can therefore refuse to consider the late-filed opening brief and deny the Petition in its entirety. Opp. at 9.

“[A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers,” particularly when a party “made no attempt to seek leave to file their [papers] late, and made no attempt to demonstrate good cause for having failed to adhere to the applicable deadline.” Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker, (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262. The fact that the party is proceeding in propria persona is not sufficient to establish good cause for failing to adhere to the court’s deadlines. Ibid.

While CUIAB is correct, it has suffered no prejudice from Bellini’s untimely opening brief. Therefore, the court declines to deny the Petition on this ground.

However, Bellini’s opening brief suffers from another defect. As required by LASC 3.231(i)(2), and as Bellini was informed by the court at the trial setting, his opening brief was required to present a full and fair statement of facts supported by citations to the Administrative Record. See also CRC 3.1113(k). Absent such support, the court must disregard the facts as unsupported. Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior Court, (1997) 60 Cal.App.4^th 573, 578. Additionally, a petitioner is obligated to lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. The "[f]ailure to do so is fatal" to any substantial evidence challenge and "is deemed a concession that the evidence supports the findings." Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine, (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266. The reviewing court should "not independently review the record to make up for appellant's failure to carry his burden." Ibid.

Bellini has presented no statement of facts supported by citations and merely states that he has submitted all valid legal documents. Pet. Op. Br. at 3. This is inadequate and the Petition shall be denied for this procedural defect.

Bellini repeatedly argues that there are “triable issues of fact”, summary [judgment] can only be granted when there are no triable issues of fact, and therefore CUIAB has not met its burden. Pet. Op. Br. at 3-5.

Bellini misunderstands the law. He cites the test for summary judgment under CCP section 437c. This mandamus case is before the court for trial, not summary judgment. Bellini, not CUIAB, has the burden of proof to show that CUAIB abused its discretion in upholding the denial of bonding disability insurance benefits. Alford v. Pierno, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at 691.[1]

Bellini has not met his burden. To verify the birth of a child for a bonding claim, supporting documents shall be provided as follows: (1) a certified birth certificate, (2) documents from the hospital or birthing center attesting to the birth of the child listing the claimant as parent, or (3) a letter from the birthing center or hospital’s Director of Medical Records containing the child’s name, date of birth, gender assigned at birth, social security number if available, the names of the parents, and “a dated signature of the social worker, director, or authorized designate.” §2708(c)-1(b)(1)(A)-(C).

The documents Bellini submitted do not satisfy the requirements of section 2708(c)-1. His son was born at home without the assistance of a midwife or a doctor. AR 24. Although he could record his son’s birth with Los Angeles County, Bellini made no effort to do so. AR 19-20, 25-26. He therefore has not received a certified birth certificate for his son, and he stated that he has no plan to obtain one in the future. Ibid.

As the ALJ pointed out to Bellini at his hearing, no document he submitted contains all the necessary information that would allow EDD to accept it as proof of his son’s birth and of Bellini’s paternity. AR 27-29. Even if the documents did contain the necessary information, EDD had discretion to reject them as not enabling it to readily obtain the information through reasonable means or ascertain that there is no intent to defraud. §2708(c)-1(a).

Other than asserting that the documents he presented to CUIAB were legitimate and acceptable, Bellini does not explain how CUIAB’s denial was an abuse of discretion. Bellini’s opening brief attaches as Exhibit A an image of a U.S. passport that was not included in the Administrative Record. As CUIAB argues (Opp. at 10), he cannot rely on this image because it is not part of the Record.

The Petition is denied. CUIAB’s counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it on Bellini for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for October 24, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.

[1] Bellini also errs in referring to Civil Code sections 2708(C) and 2010. Pet. Op. Br. at 3. There are no such statutes. Presumably, Bellini is referring to 22 CCR section 2708(c)-1, and the court will construe the reference as such.

[2] The court has no opinion whether Bellini may renew his claim to EDD using the passport, paternity test, and other new information.