Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCP04662, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Jerome Bennett Bey (“Bey”) seeks mandamus to enforce the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) (Govt. Code., §7920.005 et seq.) against the City of Los Angeles (“City”) and the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD” or “Department”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers,[1] opposition, and reply, and renders the following decision.

On December 28, 2023, Petitioner Bey filed his Petition against the City and LAPD alleging causes of action for traditional mandate and declaratory relief. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On November 12, 2022, Bey sustained injuries while working as a security guard for the Los Angeles Police Museum’s Fall Carnival (“Carnival”), after a vehicle drove through safety barriers in attempt to evade pursuing LAPD officers (the “Incident”).

Petitioner is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that LAPD approved a special event permit for the Carnival and was responsible in part for overseeing security and safety measures for the Carnival, including ensuring that the Carnival complied with Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) section 41.20(d), which requires that “adequate barricades, lights and warning devices . . . other traffic control measures…” be “provided and maintained during a street closure.”

On or around February 23, 2023, Petitioner submitted a CPRA request to multiple City agencies, including the City Administrative Officer, the Police Commission’s Investigation Division (“CID”), and LAPD. The February 23 CPRA request sought the following categories of records relating to the Carnival and Incident: (1) All contracts, permits, and applications for the Carnival; (2) All policies and procedures applicable to the Carnival; (3) All records relating to Carnival safety measures; (4) Records relating to any company approved to work at the Carnival or hire staff for the Carnival; (5) All insurance policies taken out for the Carnival or that provide coverage for Carnival claims; (6) All incident reports, witness statements, and records relating to the Incident at the Carnival; (7) All contracts for security at the Carnival; (8) Records that identify City employees, contractors, or staff responsible for managing the Carnival; (9) Records that identify City employees, contractors, or staff working at the Carnival; (10) All communications regarding the Incident; (11) All communications regarding security at the Carnival; (12) All communications regarding safety measures at the Carnival; (13) All communications relating to requests one through nine.

On March 3, 2023, LAPD sent Petitioner a message advising that it required a 14-day extension “due to the need to search for, collect, and review the requested records from other Department entities which are separate from the office processing the request.”

LAPD provided its response to Petitioner’s February 23 Request 25 days later, on March 20, 2023. On April 5, 2023, LAPD advised Petitioner that it identified witness statements responsive to the February 23 Request but could not disclose them unless Bey’s representative provided evidence that it represented him by April 11, 2023.

Petitioner could not respond to the requests by LAPD’s arbitrary deadline. On April 18, 2023, LAPD provided notice to Petitioner that it was closing the February 23 Request. LAPD did not produce any responsive records.

On September 27, 2023, Petitioner submitted a CPRA request to LAPD that requested the same records as the February 23 Request. On October 10, 2023, LAPD responded to Petitioner’s September 27 CPRA request, and advised that it was closing the request because it was a duplicate of the February 23 Request. LAPD advised: “Should you have inquiries on current or future requests, please do not re-submit the same request. Rather, please use the external message feature to inquire about status to communicate with us.”

That same day, Petitioner sent a message to LAPD requesting that it reopen the February 23 Request. Petitioner did not receive a response. On November 2, 2023, Petitioner sent another request that LAPD re-open the February 23 Request.

We have received your correspondence, dated October 10, 2023, and November 2, 2023, requesting to reopen this request. If you wish to proceed with items 10-13 of your request, we ask that you narrow the scope of your request by providing a date range and keywords so that a more focused search can be conducted. Please respond by November 10, 2023; we will reopen your request upon receipt of your response.

On November 9, 2023, Petitioner’s counsel sent LAPD a copy of Petitioner’s authorization form and responded to LAPD’s request that Petitioner narrow items 10-13 of the February 23 Request, by providing keywords for LAPD to search. LAPD did not respond.

On December 7, 2023, Petitioner sent LAPD an email requesting a status update. LAPD again failed to respond.

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for either a writ of administrative mandamus (CCP §1094.5) or of traditional mandamus. CCP §1085. A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....” CCP §1085.

A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty. Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted). Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.

No administrative record is required for traditional mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty.

The people have the constitutional right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(1). A statute, court rule, or other authority shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2). If a statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision of the constitution limits the right of access, it shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest. Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2).

The CPRA, located at Government Code (“Govt. Code”)[2] section 7920 et seq. (formerly 6250 et seq.)[3], was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public. San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-72. Section 7921 declares that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” The CPRA’s purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving the public access to information in the possession of public agencies. CBS. Inc. v. Block, (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651. The CPRA was intended to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, and it makes public access to governmental records a fundamental right of citizenship. Wilson v. Superior Court, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141. This requires maximum disclosure of the conduct of government operations. California State University Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (“California State University”), (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 823.

The CPRA makes clear that “every person” has a right to inspect any public record. §7922.525(a) (former §6253(a)). The term “public record” is broadly defined to include “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the people’s business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. §7920.530 (former §6252(e)).

The right to inspect is subject to certain exemptions, which are narrowly construed. California State University, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 831. The pertinent exemptions for this case are found in sections 7923.600, 7923.610, and 7923.615.

Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, the agency shall determine within ten days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure, though that deadline may be extended up to 14 days for “unusual circumstances.” §7922.535(a), (b). If the agency determines that the request for records is denied in whole or in part, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt or that the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. §§ 7922.540, 7922.000.[4]

If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it shall make the records promptly available upon payment of fees for direct costs of duplication or any applicable statutory fee. §7911.530. There is no deadline expressed in a number of days for producing the records. Rather, section 7911.530 says the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” Section 7922.500 provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

“Records requests . . . inevitably impose some burden on government agencies. An agency is obliged to comply so long as the record can be located with reasonable effort.” California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-66. “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. [Citation.] In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (“City of San Jose”) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must ‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request. [Citation.].” Ibid.

Section 7923.600(a) exempts from disclosure “[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by any state or local police agency….[and] investigatory…files complied by any…local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes….” This provision protects both records of investigation and investigatory files. Williams v. Superior Court, (“Williams”) (1993) 5 Cal.4^th 337, 341. The exemption protects witnesses, victims, and investigators, secures evidence and investigative techniques, encourages candor, recognizes the rawness and sensitivity of information in criminal investigations, and effectively makes such investigations possible. Dixon v. Superior Court, (2009) 170 Cal.App.4^th 1271, 1276 (coroner and autopsy reports in investigative file are exempt).[5]

The exemption for investigatory files serves an important purpose and is broad in nature. Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 349, 356. Even though a document does not on its face purport to be an investigatory record, it may have extraordinary significance to the investigation warranting exemption. Id. Instead of adopting the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) case-by-case approach with specific criteria to determine the exemption, the Legislature provided for the complete exemption of such files, with disclosure of information derived from the records. Id. at 350, 353 (criminal investigatory file of two deputy sheriffs).

Information in a file is investigatory material only when the prospect of enforcement proceedings becomes “concrete and definite”. Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 355 (citing Uribe v. Howie, (“Uribe”) (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 194). The investigatory file exemption does not terminate when the investigation ends; documents properly in the file remain exempt. Rackauckas v. Superior Court, (“Rackauckas”) (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 169, 174.

The California Supreme Court addressed the distinction between former section 6254(f)’s investigatory file and records of investigation exemptions in Haynie v. Superior Court, (“Haynie”) (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061. Plaintiff Haynie, a black male, was stopped by LASD, handcuffed, and questioned without charges filed based on a citizen complaint. Id. Haynie filed a tort claim and separately sought and writings concerning the incident. Id. LASD invoked section 6254(f) and refused to comply. Id.

The Hayne court noted that case law had held that section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files applies only when the prospect of enforcement is concrete and definite. Once this is shown, and that a record was created for the purpose of investigation, Haynie rejected any requirement that the agency show a valid need to withhold records, such as evidence that the disclosure would endanger a witness or the investigation itself. Id. at 1071. Haynie cautioned that this does not mean that everything law enforcement does is shielded from disclosure. Officers have citizen contacts for purposes of crime prevention and public safety that are unrelated to either civil or criminal investigations, and records are exempt under section 6254(f)’s protection of records of investigation only for investigations taken for purposes of whether a violation of law has or may occur. Id. at 1071.

Not every file is an investigatory file for purposes of section 7923.600(a). The law does not provide[] that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labeled “investigatory.” Uribe supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 212-13 (routine farmer reports of pesticide spraying were not investigatory files for licensing purposes). So, if a document in the investigatory file is publicly filed in a court, it is not exempt under section 7923.600(a). See Weaver v. Superior Court, (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 746, 751 ("Because they were publicly filed, the charging documents Weaver seeks are not investigatory files exempt from disclosure under the CPRA."). Furthermore, it is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure under the investigatory file exemption. See Comm'n on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court, (“POST”) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 278, 291 (analogizing personnel files to investigatory files and citing Williams, supra, 5 Ca1.4th at 355 for the proposition that 'the law does not provide... that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled "investigatory’”).

In sum, a file is investigatory only if the prospect of law enforcement is “definite and concrete” and the record properly belongs in the file because it relates to the investigation. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, (“Copley”) (2006) 39 Cal.4^th 1272, 1293.

In contrast to investigatory files, the Haynie court concluded that the concrete and definite prospect of enforcement standard only applies to section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files, and “records of investigation” are exempt on their face whether or not they are included in an investigatory file. Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356). Any interpretation that limited records of investigations only to those where the likelihood of enforcement has ripened would expose the public to “the very sensitive investigative stages of determining whether a crime has been committed or who has committed it.” Id. at 1070. Documents independently exempt -- Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 654 (records of complaints), American Civil Liberties Union v. Deukmejian, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 449 (intelligence information) – have been held not to be part of the concrete and definite investigatory file requirement, and no less is true for investigatory records. Id.

These records of investigation do not lose their exempt status based on the prospect of enforcement. Law enforcement officers may not know whether a crime has been committed when they undertake an investigation, and the results may be inconclusive. For example, a fire may be suspicious but found to be accidental after investigation. Id. at 1070. Even reports from routine investigations such as the traffic stop involving Haynie are protected. Id. at 1070-71.

The California Supreme Court subsequently emphasized that Haynie‘s statement that “records of investigation exempted under section 6254(f) encompass only those investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the violation and its agency.” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. Superior Court, (“ACLU”) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1040. The ACLU court then held that LAPD’s records from scanning license plates to look for stolen cars through automated license plate reader technology were not records of investigation because they were not part of targeted inquiry into particular crime. Id. at 1042.

Despite the exemptions for investigatory records and files, state and local law enforcement agencies are required to disclose to a victim, the victim’s authorized representative, and a covering insurance carrier information, inter alia, a description of the property, date, time and place of the incident, the names and addresses of involved persons and witnesses, diagrams, and witness statements, unless the disclosure would endanger a witness or involved person or any investigation. §7923.605(a).

Additionally, state and local law enforcement shall disclose, except to the extent that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, the full name and occupation of every person arrested by the agency, the person’s physical description, the time and date of arrest and booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail, the time and manner of release or the location where the arrestee is being held, and all charges on which he or she is being held. §7923.610.

Finally, subject to the same limitation that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, and subject to the restrictions of Penal Code section 841.5,[6] a state or local law enforcement shall disclose the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency and the time and nature of the response thereto including, to the extent the information regarding the crimes or incident investigated is recorded, the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. §7923.615; Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072.

Former section 6254(k) provided in relevant part: “[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are any of the following:...(k) [r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law....” This exemption “is not an independent exemption. It merely incorporates other prohibitions established by law. CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 656. “In 1998, the Legislature added an article to the PRA specifically ‘list[ing] and describ[ing]’ over 500 statutes that provide disclosure exemptions through Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k)….” Copley, supra, 39 Cal.4^th at 1283.

The CPRA now provides a non-exhaustive list of all laws that may restrict disclosure. §§ 7930.000-7930.215.

A CPRA claim to compliance with a public records request may proceed through mandamus or declaratory relief. §7923.000. A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” CCP §1085. Because the petitioner may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief, the trial court independently decides whether disclosure is required. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 (appellate court independently reviews trial court CPRA decision). No administrative record is required, and the parties must submit admissible evidence.

On November 12, 2022, Petitioner was working as a security guard for the Police Museum’s Fall Carnival. Petitioner sustained injuries when third party Steven Lamar Weems, II (“Weems”) drove his SUV through safety barriers in attempt to evade LAPD officers (the “Incident”). Gleizer Decl., ¶1.

Between January and February 2023, Petitioner’s counsel submitted identical CPRA requests to multiple City Departments -- LAPD, Los Angeles Fire Department, Board of Building and Safety Commissioners, Planning Commission, Bureau of Street Services, and City Planning -- seeking records related to the Carnival and the Incident.

Petitioner’s February 23, 2023 Request to LAPD sought the following records related to the Carnival and the Incident:

(4) Records relating to any company approved to work at the Carnival or hire staff for the Carnival;

(5) All insurance policies taken out for the Carnival or that provide coverage for Carnival claims;

(6) All incident reports, witness statements, and records relating to the Incident at the Carnival;

(8) Records that identify City employees, contractors, or staff responsible for managing the Carnival;

(9) Records that identify City employees, contractors, or staff working at the Carnival;

(13) All communications relating to requests one through nine. Gleizer Decl., ¶1, Ex. A.

Broadly speaking, the Request sought three categories of records: (1) LAPD’s investigatory records and files relating to the Incident; (2) records relating to the Carnival event, which was organized by a private non-profit organization, the Los Angeles Police Museum (“Police Museum”); and (3) all communications regarding the Incident or the Carnival event. Orocio Decl., ¶3.

On February 24, 2023, LAPD’s Legal Affairs Division in charge of CPRA responses (“Discovery Section”) sent a message to Petitioner that his February 23 Request had been received and would be assigned to a CPRA Analyst. Orocio Decl., Ex. B, p. 187.

On March 2, 2023, an analyst created a task for LAPD’s Information Technology Bureau (“ITB”) to search for emails with the keyword “Carnival” dated between November 12, 2022, to February 23, 2023. Orocio Decl., Ex. B, p. 186.

On March 3, 2023, Petitioner sent a message to “clarify that [his] request includes incident reports, CAD notes, bodycam and vehicle footage.” Orocio Decl., Ex. B, p. 186. That day, LAPD notified Petitioner that it required a 14-day extension pursuant to section 7922.535 because “unusual circumstances” exist with respect to the request due to the need to search for, collect, and review the requested records from other Department entities which are separate from the office processing the request.” Orocio Decl., Ex. B, p. 186.

Four Discovery Section analysts at one time or another were responsible for the Department’s search for records responsive to the CPRA Request: Diego Rocha, Aminah Williams, Katherine Reyes Moore, and Leticia Barnes. Orocio Decl., ¶4. A total of 19 custodians were contacted for the search. Orocio Decl., ¶4, Ex. A.

On or about March 3, 2023, Mr. Rocha submitted an email search request to ITB for any emails to or from an LAPD email address that hit on the search term “Carnival” dated between November 12, 2022 (the date of the Incident) to February 23, 2023 (the date of the Request). Orocio Delc., ¶42, Ex. B, p. 185. That search returned 15,133 hits, or over 30 gigabytes of data. Id. ITB’s eDiscovery system, which relies on Microsoft Purview, has a size limitation of ten gigabytes for the maximize size of a file that is exportable. Ex. G. The search was not limited to the relevant custodians, who had not been identified by that point. Given the large number of results returned, the search for the general term “Carnival” was insufficiently tailored and thus likely to contain numerous irrelevant emails. Orocio Decl., ¶42.

The Carnival event was organized by a private non-profit organization, the Police Museum. As a private non-profit, the Police Museum is run independently from LAPD. LAPD did not plan the Carnival, employ workers for the event, provide security, or negotiate vendor contracts on behalf of the Police Museum. Thus, LAPD did not have officers assigned to assist with security at the Carnival since it was a private event. Orocio Decl., ¶13, Ex. C. The Discovery Section determined that Items 1–5 and 7 of the CPRA Request seek records that are not in the possession of LAPD. Orocio Decl., ¶13. For similar reasons, LAPD did not have documents responsive to Items 8 and 9. Orocio Decl., ¶38.

CID is the custodian for event permits and applications. CID “is the regulatory arm of the Board of Police Commissioners” and includes a Permit Processing Section that is responsible for processing and issuing permits for businesses requiring regulation, including those that provide services at “carnivals.” Orocio Decl., ¶14. Ex. D. The Discovery Section determined that CID might have records responsive to the CPRA Request, such as records relating to permits and applications for the Carnival. The Discovery Section affirmatively reached out to CID and confirmed that such records had been provided by CID to Petitioner in February 2023. Orocio Decl., ¶15. On or about March 20, 2023, LAPD responded to Petitioner that CID “has already provided records responsive to your request.” Orocio Decl., ¶16, Ex. B, p. 174.

LAPD responded to Petitioner’s February 23 Request on March 20, 2023. Gleizer Decl., ¶3, Ex. C. LAPD advised that records responsive to Items 1-5, & 7 were previously produced by CID in response to a separate request. Gleizer Decl., ¶3, Ex. C. LAPD asserted that it did not possess responsive records for Items 8 and 9. Ex. C. LAPD asserted that any records identified for Item 6 were investigatory and denied Petitioner’s request on that basis. Ex. C. LAPD further advised that it was continuing to search for witness statements and would produce responsive nonexempt records. Ex. C.

LAPD’s response also informed Petitioner that the “requested records may be available in response to a subpoena or court order” and provided the service address for LAPD’s Risk Management and Legal Affairs Division. Id. It is the Discovery Section’s practice to so inform requesters who seek investigatory records because, even though investigatory records are exempt from disclosure vis-à-vis the general public in response to a CPRA request pursuant to section 7923.600, such records might otherwise be available through discovery requests or a court order in a civil action or criminal proceeding. Orocio Decl., ¶20. LAPD added: “Should any records be located, to the extent the information is recorded, a summary including the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the call, the name and age of the victim, and a brief statement of the circumstances can be made available to you upon request.” Ex. C. In so stating, LAPD was informing Petitioner that, if responsive records were located, the Department would provide him with disclosable information from those records as specified in section 7923.615. Orocio Decl., ¶20.

With respect to Items 10–13, the Discovery Section noted that ITB had “conducted an email query for your request,” which yielded more than 15,000 Department-wide email hits for the search term “Carnival,” but that the scope of the search would need to be narrowed and more focused given ITB’s search export system limitations. Ex. C. Thus, the Discovery Section asked Petitioner to respond by March 26, 2023 to “narrow the scope of [the] request so that a more focused search can be conducted” as to Items 10 through 13 of the February 23 Request. Ex. C. Petitioner did not respond. Orocio Decl., ¶23.

On April 5, 2023, the Discovery Section contacted Petitioner to notify him that witness statements had been located and were in review and requested a “signed representation agreement or affidavit acknowledging that you represent the victim as an authorized representative or an insurance carrier so that we may proceed with your request pursuant to Government [Code] Section 7923.605[(a)]. In order to ensure an accurate and timely response to your request, please respond by April 11, 2023.” Orocio Decl., ¶22, Ex. B, p. 171.

Petitioner failed to respond to the Discovery Section’s April 5, 2023, email. Orocio Decl., ¶24. Nor did he provide a signed representation agreement or affidavit of his counsel’s relationship to him as requested to release witness statements. Orocio Decl., ¶23. Thus, on April 18, 2023, the LAPD closed Petitioner’s February 23 Request. Gleizer Decl., ¶4, Ex. D; Orocio Decl., ¶23, Ex. B, pp. 169-70. The Discovery Section emphasized: “Should you wish to provide us with the required information, please respond to this email and we will reopen your request.” Id.

Petitioner made no additional contact with the Discovery Section for approximately six months. Orocio Decl., ¶24.

On September 27, 2023, Petitioner submitted a new Request that duplicated the original February 23 Request. Orocio Decl., ¶25, Ex. E. As is its practice whenever it receives a duplicative CPRA request, the Discovery Section informed Petitioner that it had closed the September 27 Request but invited him to reopen his original February 23 Request. Orocio Decl., ¶26.

On October 10 and November 2, 2023, Petitioner sent the Discovery Section emails requesting that LAPD reopen the February 23 Request. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 5-8, Exs. E-H. The Discovery Section responded on November 3, 2023, and advised that, in order to proceed with the Request, Petitioner needed to narrow the scope of Items 10-13 by providing a date range and keywords. Gleizer Decl., ¶9, Ex. I.

On November 9, 2023, Petitioner submitted proof of representation to LAPD and addressed its request to narrow the scope of Items 10-13. Gleizer Decl., ¶10, Ex. J; Orocio Decl., ¶28, Ex. B, p. 163. Petitioner’s counsel stated he was “not willing” to narrow Items 10 through 12. Orocio Decl., ¶45, Ex. B, p. 163. For Item 13, he proposed 22 search terms and phrases: “(1) barricades; (2) vehicle / vehicular access; (3) barriers; (4) sand bags; (5) safety; (6) security; (7) witness; (8) street access; (9) risk(s); (10) pedestrians; (11) cement; (12) rail(s); (13) concrete; (14) safety inspection; (15) safety check; (16) incident report; (17) Weems; (18) hit-and-run; (19) crash; (20) Porsche; (21) injured/injuring/injury; and (22) arrest.” Ex. B, p. 163.

Terms such as “safety,” “witness,” and “vehicle” are used with very high frequency within a law enforcement agency. Orocio Decl., ¶45. Petitioner did not provide a date range or the names of custodians he proposed to search. Orocio Decl., ¶45.

Petitioner sent a follow up email on December 7, 2023 and did not receive a response. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 11-12, Exs. I, K. Petitioner filed the Petition on December 28, 2023. Gleizer Decl., ¶12, Ex. L.

LAPD had not produced any records in response to the Request when it filed its Answer to the Petition on February 1, 2024. Gleizer Decl., ¶13, Ex. M.

On March 27 and 29, 2024, the parties’ counsel met and conferred via phone and email regarding the February 23 Request. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 14-17, Exs. N-O. LAPD confirmed that it did not possess records responsive to Items 1-5 and 7 beyond the records previously produced by CID. Gleizer Decl., ¶14, Ex. N. LAPD confirmed that its search identified records responsive to Item 6, which it would produce, subject to redactions. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 15.

Petitioner’s counsel argued that it would not be an undue burden for LAPD to review and identify responsive records from the 15,000 emails. Gleizer Decl., ¶16. However, if it was, counsel provided a list of search terms for LAPD to use. Gleizer Decl., ¶16. Counsel proposed using a date range of November 11, 2021, to November 2, 2023, for all searches with the exception of the terms “Weems,” “Bennett,” “Bey,” and “November 12 Incident/accident” which Petitioner proposed limiting to a range of November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023. Gleizer Decl., ¶16; Gleizer Decl., Ex. N.

LAPD rejected both the search terms and date ranges proposed by Petitioner, asserting that the search proposed would require “approximately 30 separate searches” and was “infeasible.” Gleizer Decl., ¶17, Ex. O. On March 29, 2024, Petitioner objected to LAPD’s attempt to limit the scope of search. Gleizer Decl., ¶18, Ex. P.

Despite the lack of agreement, LAPD informed Petitioner on April 19, 2024 that it planned to disclose a batch of records the following week. Gleizer Decl., ¶21, Ex. Ex. S. After Petitioner raised concerns about the scope of the search in light of the failed agreement, LAPD advised that if, after the production, Petitioner believed “there may be further responsive records in the LAPD's possession, we can have that discussion at our meet and confer.” Gleizer Decl., ¶21, Ex. S.

In April 2024, the Discovery Section requested that ITB run an email search for the keywords “Carnival” or “security” or “Police Museum” between October 1, 2022 to November 12, 2022, sent to or from two Police Museum contacts, Erica Arias and Cynthia Jimenez. Orocio Decl., ¶46. This search returned 49 emails plus their attachments.

On approximately April 12, 2024, the Discovery Section requested that ITB run two separate email searches across the 17 relevant custodians who had been identified. The first search was for the keyword “LA Police Museum” within 20 words of any of the following keywords: “incident report” or “Weems” or “hit-and-run” or “crash” or “Porsche Cayenne” or injur* or “Bennett” or “Bey”, for the date range from November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023. Orocio Decl., ¶48, Ex. B, pp. 152-53. A second search was requested for the keyword “Carnival” within 20 words of any of the following keywords “incident report” or “Weems” or “hit-and-run” or “crash” or “Porsche Cayenne” or injur* or “Bennett” or “Bey”, for the date range from November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023. Orocio Decl., ¶48, pp. 149-50.

On April 25, 2024, LAPD made its first production of 11 documents in response to Petitioner’s February 23 Request. Gleizer Decl., ¶22, Ex. T. The documents produced were emails and attachments and the majority included some redactions. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 22-23, Ex. T. LAPD advised that records responsive to Items 1 through 5 and 7 already had been produced by CID. Gleizer Decl., ¶23; see Ex. U.

On May 1, 2024, Petitioner met and conferred with LAPD regarding the April 25 Production. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 24-25. During the meeting, LAPD advised it conducted several email searches “and all responsive, nonprivileged records from those searches have been produced.” Gleizer Decl., ¶24. LAPD advised that its search used the terms originally proposed by LAPD in its March 27, 2024 email and that the search was limited to emails of LAPD custodians involved in investigating the Incident. Gleizer Decl., ¶24. Petitioner raised concerns regarding the failure to include custodians who were involved in planning and security for the Carnival and the failure to search for non-email records. Gleizer Decl., ¶25.

Following the May 1, 2024 meeting, LAPD informed Petitioner that it would expand its search based on the terms proposed in Petitioner’s March 27 email and would add custodians related to planning and security for the Carnival. Gleizer Decl., ¶26, Ex. V. The email also stated that LAPD “agreed to do some digging into whether there are any responsive non-email records in the Department’s possession.” Gleizer Decl., ¶26, Ex. V. Petitioner took issue with LAPD’s resistance to searching for non-email records. Gleizer Decl., ¶27, Ex. W.

On approximately May 9, 2024, the Discovery Section requested two more email searches across 19 custodians, consisting of the 17 custodians who had previously been searched plus two custodians identified by Petitioner. The first search was for emails in the date range from November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023 and hitting on the keyword “Carnival” and any of the following keywords: “barricades” or “vehicle” or “vehicular access” or “barriers” or “sand bags” or “safety” or “security” or “witness” or “street access” or “risk” or “pedestrians” or “cement” or “rail” or “concrete” or “safety inspection” or “safety check” or “incident report” or “Weems” or “hit-and-run” or “crash” or “Porsche” or “injured” or “injury” or “arrest” or “MLK” or “Trinity” or “South Central”, for the date range from November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023. Orocio Decl., Ex. B, pp. 147-48. The second search was for emails hitting on the keywords “Police Museum” and any of the following keywords: “barricades” or “vehicle” or “vehicular access” or “barriers” or “sand bags” or “safety” or “security” or “witness” or “street access” or “risk” or “pedestrians” or “cement” or “rail” or “concrete” or “safety inspection” or “safety check” or “incident report” or “Weems” or “hit-and-run” or “crash” or “Porsche” or “injured” or “injury” or “arrest” or “MLK” or “Trinity” or “South Central”. Ex. B, pp. 145-46.

The first search returned approximately ten email hits, although only one was determined to be responsive and it had been previously produced. The second search returned approximately 104 email hits, of which two were determined to be responsive and were queued for production. Orocio Decl., ¶51.

On approximately May 22, 2024, the Discovery Section requested an email search across 19 custodians for the date range from October 1 to November 12, 2022 and the keyword “Carnival” and any of the following keywords: “barricades” or “vehicle” or “vehicular access” or “barriers” or “sand bags” or “safety” or “security” or “witness” or “street access” or “risk” or “pedestrians” or “cement” or “rail” or “concrete” or “safety inspection” or “safety check” or “incident report” or “Weems” or “hit-and-run” or “crash” or “Porsche” or “injured” or “injury” or “arrest” or “MLK” or “Trinity” or “South Central”. Orocio Decl., ¶53, Ex. B, pp. 135-37.

In early June 2024, ITB completed this request. This search returned approximately nine emails, of which five were responsive. Most of the responsive emails had been previously produced, but the remaining were queued for production. Orocio Decl., ¶55.

It is not true that the Discovery Section failed to include all key terms proposed by Petitioner, failed to include terms such as “LA Police Museum”, and only conducted two searches for email records. The Discovery Section conducted three searches containing the search terms “Police Museum” or “LA Police Museum”, and conducted a total of six email searches. Orocio Decl., ¶57.

It also is not true that the search was almost exclusively limited to emails. The Discovery Section searched for, reviewed, and made redactions to investigatory records and files, searched for witness statements, staff lists, and permits for the Carnival, and asked all relevant custodians whether they had sent or received any texts related to the Incident on their personal or any Department-issued cell phone, and whether they had any handwritten notes or drawings concerning the Incident. None of the relevant custodians reported having texts, handwritten notes, or drawings concerning the Incident. Orocio Decl., ¶58.

On June 10, 2024, Petitioner received LAPD’s second record production, which totaled 121 pages and was heavily redacted. Gleizer Decl., ¶28, Ex. X. LAPD’s document production included (i) a small number of email records between LAPD and the Police Museum regarding the Carnival, and (ii) certain investigatory records that were redacted in a manner to disclose just the items of information to which Petitioner was entitled under sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615. Orocio Decl., ¶¶ 56, 59. The June 10 production included redacted copies of the arrest and Traffic Crash Reports for the Incident. Gleizer Decl., ¶28, Ex. Y. The June 10 production cited to exemptions which appeared on the slip sheets for records withheld in their entirety. Gleizer Decl., ¶30. No additional context was provided. Gleizer Decl., ¶30.

Petitioner asked LAPD to provide the specific grounds for its redactions and also asked LAPD to confirm that pages withheld in their entirety did not contain relevant, non-exempt material that could be reasonably segregated. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 30-32, Ex. Z. LAPD responded that the exemptions were identified on the slip sheets of the June 10 production. Gleizer Decl., ¶33, Ex. AA. LAPD advised that signatures and initials were redacted as a precaution against forgery and were exempt under sections 7927.700 and 7922.000 on the basis that “disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and/or would not serve the public interest.” Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 30-33. LAPD also advised that “[p]ersonal information such as cell phone numbers and personal email addresses were also redacted per 7927.700 and 7922.000.” Gleizer Decl., ¶33. Petitioner requested a privilege log, which LAPD denied. Gleizer Decl., ¶33, Ex. AA.

On July 1, 2024, Petitioner and LAPD met and conferred on the adequacy of the search. Petitioner noted that photographs and videos were referenced in the police reports produced on June 10 that were never produced. Gleizer Decl., ¶35. LAPD responded that it had not obtained those records, but they were privileged and not subject to disclosure. Gleizer Decl., ¶35. Petitioner further noted that the June 10 production referred to additional communications between the Police Museum and LAPD, an ICS Form, and personnel accounting that had not been produced. Gleizer Decl., ¶35, Ex. AB.

The parties also discussed the unredacted copy of the Traffic Crash Report that Petitioner obtained from a LAPD detective in or around December of 2022. Bennett Decl., ¶¶ 2-5, Ex C; Gleizer Decl., ¶36. The unredacted report called into question LAPD’s redactions to the police and arrest report. LAPD represented that its version of the police report was different from the unredacted report and that its objections were valid. Gleizer Decl., ¶35.

On June 24, 2024, Orocio was deposed as LAPD’s PMQ. Orocio Decl., ¶11. Gordon Decl., Ex. G. Other than the registrar of actions for the PMQ deposition, no further records were produced by LAPD. Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.

The Discovery Section reached out to the appropriate LAPD personnel to ascertain whether ICS form 2.14 or personnel accounting form exist. Neither was created because the Carnival was an in-house event. Orocio Decl., ¶60.

The Discovery Section does not access evidentiary records uploaded to evidence.com in connection with CPRA requests. Evidence.com is LAPD’s platform that houses evidence for criminal investigations. Evidence collected at crime scenes and stored at evidence.com by the Department is, by definition, investigatory in nature and is never disclosed in response to CPRA requests. Orocio Decl., ¶61.

As for the redaction of personal emails, phone numbers, and other personal information, the Discovery Section's policy and practice is to redact the contact information of private individuals or businesses (while disclosing the identities of such individuals or businesses) because the invasion of an individual's privacy must be counterbalanced against the public's need for the information. The Discovery Section does not believe there is a public interest in the contact information of a private individual or business, as the disclosure of such contact information does not reveal anything about the public agency's conduct of its duties. Orocio Decl., ¶62.

The Incident involved a violation of the law that led to a police investigation and a pending criminal trial against the suspect. The Discovery Section does not produce investigatory records in response to CPRA requests because such records are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Thus, LAPD’s investigation records regarding the Incident, including police reports, photographs, videos, and other evidence, are categorically exempt, in their entirety, pursuant to the investigatory records exemption of section 7923.600. Orocio Decl., ¶7.

Petitioner is not entitled to the investigatory records themselves, but rather to certain items of information from the records, as specified in sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and/or 7923.615. Orocio Decl., ¶8. The Discovery Section provided Petitioner a one-page sheet containing the information that is required to be disclosed pursuant to section 7923.610. Orocio Decl., ¶32, Ex. F. LAPD also provided certain items of information pursuant to section 7923.605(a), which provides for limited disclosure of specified information only “to the victims of an incident, or an authorized representative thereof”. Orocio Decl., ¶33. Finally, LAPD provided redacted investigatory records containing information pursuant to section 7923.615. Orocio Decl., ¶34.

During his deposition, PMQ Orocio testified that he did not know if the City searched for text messages, photographs, videos, or personal cell phones. Gordon Decl., Ex. G (Orocio Depo), pp. 70 (texts and handwritten notes), 90–91 (texts or cell phones), 115–16 (handwritten notes, photographs, videos, faxes, personal cell phones). The following exchange took place during Orocio’s deposition:

“Q: Okay.…. And your testimony is anything outside of emails, you do not know, correct?

On August 15, 2024, LAPD served a set of Special Interrogatories on Petitioner seeking information about CPRA requests Petitioner sent to other City agencies regarding the Incident. As part of Petitioner’s search for responsive information, Petitioner identified emails exchanged directly between Petitioner and LAPD detectives in December of 2022 which LAPD failed to identify and produce as part of its record search. Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶2. Petitioner produced the emails along with his discovery responses in a September 22, 2024 email to LAPD’s counsel. Id., ¶3.

“I can only speculate that they were not identified previously because they did not hit on the search terms that you or I proposed, notably ‘Carnival’ or ‘Police Museum.’ As you should know, now is well past the time to be bringing up new search terms. The proper time to do so was months ago, when we were meeting and conferring about the Request, search terms, custodians, etc. If you had at any point informed us, during discovery, of Mr. Bennett's email address or the fact that he had apparently communicated with someone at the LAPD, on his own accord, we could have included his email address in our searches, but it seems you were just made aware of those communications by your client as well.” Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶5, Ex. AG.

Petitioner’s counsel responded that same day that LAPD did not run the search terms Petitioner had proposed, which included the term “Bennett.” Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶6, Ex. AH.

Petitioner filed a civil lawsuit for his injuries stemming from the Incident (LASC Case No. 23STCV22661), which named, among others, the City and the Police Museum as defendants. On July 2, 2024, Petitioner sent the Police Museum a request for production of documents in that case. Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶8, Ex. AI. Petitioner received the Police Museum’s response on September 5, 2024, which produced a number of documents submitted to the City as part of the Carnival’s planning and permitting process. Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶9, Ex. AJ.

The production included an Indemnification and Hold Harmless Agreement in favor of the City, a Petition signed by local property owners in the area affected by the Carnival street closure, and the final invoice from the City issued to the Police Museum, a LAFD Division 5 permit application, and a different version of the Carnival Event Agreement than CID produced. Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶10, Ex. AJ.

The production also included various records from the City’s Special Events Portal for the Carnival. Ex. AJ. LAPD also produced records reflecting the Special Events Portal as part of its April 25, 2024 production. Gleizer Decl., Ex. T, p. 9. However, the variations produced by the Police Museum include messages exchanged between the Police Museum and the City regarding street closure requirements and barricades, identified various documents submitted by the Police Museum to the City, and discussed status of the permit process. Supp. Gleizer Decl., ¶12.

Petitioner seeks mandamus to compel the City to conduct a reasonable search and produce additional unredacted records.[8]

Petitioner seeks unredacted copies of a “Police and Arrest Report”. Pet. Op. Br. at 10. Item 6 of the Request expressly sought law enforcement records of the LAPD’s investigation into the Hit and Run Incident, including “incident reports, witness statements, and records relating to the Incident[.]” Orocio Decl., ¶¶ 18-19. The Incident involved a violation of the law that led to a police investigation and a pending criminal trial against the suspect. Orocio Decl., ¶7. The redacted investigatory records and/or information produced by LAPD include (1) a Follow-Up Investigation Report for a Felony Hit and Run (Ex. B, p. 81); (2) an Arrest Report for a Felony Hit and Run (Ex. B, pp. 82-102); (3) a Traffic Collision and Arrest Status Report (Ex. B, pp. 103-04); (4) a Traffic Crash Report (Ex. B, pp. 105-19); (5) a Vehicle Report for an impounded vehicle (“Impound Report”) (Ex. B, p. 120-21), and (6) a one-page sheet containing the information disclosed pursuant to section 7923.610 (requiring disclosure of arrest information to the public) (Ex. B, p. 66).

Petitioner first notes that LAPD asserted that pages withheld from the Police and Arrest Report are exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections 7922.000 (catch-all balancing),[9] 7923.600 (law enforcement investigatory records and files), 7927.700 (personnel and medical files based on invasion of privacy), and 7927.705 (exemption based on federal or state law privilege). Gleizer Decl., ¶¶ 29-30, Ex. Y, pp. 81-121. Yet, LAPD failed to provide any justification supporting its redactions to the police reports beyond its references to the CPRA statute. “Conclusory or boilerplate assertions that merely recite the statutory standards are not sufficient.” Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court of San Diego County, (“Golden Door”) (2020) 53 Cal.App.5^th 733, 790. Pet. Op. Br. at 7.

This is an issue of timing. Although Petitioner complains that LAPD did not explain why an exemption applies (e.g., Pet. Op. Br. at 8), it is not obligated to do so until trial. Only then does LAPD have the burden of proving its exemptions. During the pre-litigation process, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt. §§ 7922.540, 7922.000. Where an agency withholds responsive records on the basis of a statutory exemption, “the agency . . . must disclose that fact.” Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072 (citing section 7922.000). This task may be performed by citing the exemptions relied upon for each request in the agency’s written response. At trial, the agency bears the burden of proving exemption. §7922.000.

The City relies on the investigatory record exemption, not the investigatory file exemption, in section 7923.600(a). It is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure. See POST, supra, 42 Cal. 4th 291. “Records of investigation” are exempt on their face whether or not they are located in an investigatory file. Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356). Records of investigation also do not lose their exempt status based on the prospect of enforcement. Id. at 1070. Even reports from routine investigations such as the traffic stop involving Haynie are protected. Id. at 1070-71. Records of investigation encompass only investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the violation. ACLU, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 1040.

The City contends that LAPD does not need to do more to prove that the records of investigation exemption applies because it is undisputed that the sought-after records are law enforcement records of a felony criminal investigation. See Bennett Decl., ¶6; Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 353-55; Castanares v. Superior Court, (“Castanares”) (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 295, 305-06; Haynie, supra 26 Cal.4th at 1068.

Petitioner criticize LAPD’s lumping together the five different reports as investigatory records without attempting to distinguish them. Reply at 3. LAPD makes an unsubstantiated claim that it is “undisputed that the sought-after records are law enforcement records of a felony criminal investigation.” But this issue is disputed. The fact that the incident involved a crime does not mean each of the police reports is an investigatory record exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. See Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court, (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 289 (“The mere fact that the Report contains privileged information does not bestow protected status on the entire document”); Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 357 (“[a] public agency may not shield a document from disclosure with the bare assertion that it relates to an investigation). Reply at 3-4.

While the City could have done a better job of evaluating the police reports, most are exempt investigatory records on their face. The Incident involved a violation of the law that led to a police investigation and a pending criminal trial against the suspect. Orocio Decl., ¶7. The redacted investigatory records produced by LAPD include (1) a Follow-Up Investigation Report for a Felony Hit and Run (Ex. B, p. 81); (2) an Arrest Report for a Felony Hit and Run (Ex. B, pp. 82-102); (3) a Traffic Collision and Arrest Status Report (Ex. B, pp. 103-04); (4) a Traffic Crash Report (Ex. B, pp. 105-19); and (5) a vehicle Impound Report (Ex. B, p. 120-21). The first three directly relate to a criminal investigation and the Traffic Crash Report also is investigatory, albeit administrative in nature. However, the Impound Report appears to be clerical only and is not an investigation undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. As such, it is not a protected record of investigation and must be produced.

b. Required Disclosure of Information Pursuant to Sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615

Despite the exemptions for investigatory records and files in section 7923.600, state and local law enforcement agencies are required to disclose to a victim, the victim’s authorized representative, and a covering insurance carrier information, inter alia, a description of the property, date, time and place of the incident, the names and addresses of involved persons and witnesses, diagrams, and witness statements, unless the disclosure would endanger a witness or involved person or any investigation. §7923.605(a).

Finally, subject to the same limitation that disclosure would endanger the safety of a person involved in the investigation or a successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, and subject to the restrictions of Penal Code section 841.5,[10] a state or local law enforcement shall disclose the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency and the time and nature of the response thereto including, to the extent the information regarding the crimes or incident investigated is recorded, the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. §7923.615; Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072.

Petitioner argues that he is a victim and the police reports contain facts and other related information expressly disclosable under sections 7923.605, 7923.610, 7923.615. Reply at 3-4.

The City responds that the CPRA’s investigatory records exemption is a “broad exemption from disclosure” that “requires law enforcement agencies to provide certain information derived from the records about the incidents under investigation….” Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 349 (italics added). The CPRA only requires that the agency disclose the specified information from the investigatory records, not the records themselves. Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072. Opp. at 11. The City has disclosed a one-page sheet containing the information required by section 7923.610 concerning the arrestee (Ex. B, p. 66) and also has provided the information required by section 7923.605 and 7923.615. Opp. at 12.

Assuming the redactions are appropriate, LAPD has complied with its obligations under sections 7923.605, 7923.610, 7923.615. See post.

All required accident reports, and supplemental reports, shall be without prejudice to the person reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the DMV and CHP, except that the law enforcement agency to which an accident was reported shall disclose the entire contents of the reports to any person who may have a proper interest, including the drivers involved or any person injured, and any attorney who declares under penalty of perjury that he represents any of these persons. §20012.

All required accident reports and supplemental reports made to the CHP by any peace officer shall immediately be made available for the confidential use of any division in the DMV, the confidential use of the Department of Transportation, and, for accidents on highways other than state highways, for the confidential use of the local authority having jurisdiction over that highway. §20014.

Petitioner argues that section 20012 obligates law enforcement agencies to disclose the entire contents of “[a]ll required accident reports, and supplemental reports” to any injured person named in the report or their representative. See State of California ex rel. Dept of Transportation v. Superior Court, (“Hall”) (1985) 37 Cal.3d 847, 853 (section 20012 requires disclosure of an entire report to all persons involved in the reported accident). Courts have further held that investigative reports prepared by law enforcement officials are subject to disclosure under section 20014. State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court of Ventura County, (“Paniagua”) (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 998, 1003-04 (traffic accident reports disclosable to proper person of interest). Based on sections 20012 and 20014, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to an unredacted copy of the police reports as a matter of law. Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

The City responds that section 20012 does not specify what “required accident reports” must be disclosed, much less require the disclosure of the different law enforcement investigatory records at issue here, including arrest records. Similarly, section 20014 is wholly inapposite, as it pertains to the disclosure of accident reports and related reports to other government entities identified in the statute, not to members of the public or even to injured persons. Opp. at 12.

The City contends that Petitioner’s argument should thus be rejected because LAPD properly disclosed, inter alia, the names and addresses of all parties or witnesses to the Incident as specified under section 7923.605(a). See Williams, supra at 353 (law enforcement agencies must “disclose . . . the names and addresses of witnesses and persons involved in the incidents under investigation”, while remaining free to “preserv[e] the exemption for the records themselves”); Haynie, supra 26 Cal.4th at 1072 (same); 65 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 563, at *4 (1982) (“We are aware of no statute which provides special access to complaint and arrest records by the victim. . . providing information to the agency contained in such report. An informant’s right of access to complaint and arrest records is the same as that of any other member of the public.”). Opp. at 13.

The City argues that Petitioner’s two cited cases arose in entirely different contexts from this proceeding and neither case involved the CPRA’s investigatory records exemption. Hall concerned a criminal defendant’s subpoena duces tecum to an agency for records. 37 Cal.3d at 850. The court held that a “person charged with a crime arising from an automobile accident may establish a ‘proper interest’” under section 20012 in discovering accident records that could lead to relevant and admissible evidence in the defendant’s defense. Id. at 855. Unlike Petitioner, the defendant requested reports “with names, addresses, or other [identifying] information deleted”. See id. at 852. Paniagua involved a motion to compel discovery responses to interrogatories that requested the names, addresses, and phone numbers for parties or witnesses to certain traffic accidents, in a civil litigation proceeding. 77 Cal.App.5th at 1003-04. Opp. at 12-13.

Petitioner contends that the City’s argument that section 20014 is limited to government entities ignores Paniagua, which ordered the disclosure of unredacted accident reports to plaintiff after determining they had a proper interest in the reports. 77 Cal.App.5th at 1004–05. Paniagua explained that reports subject to disclosure under section 20014, including investigative reports, are disclosable “‘on the same showing which requires disclosure of section 20012 reports.” 77 Cal.App.5th at 1003–04 (quoting Hall, supra, 37 Cal.3d at 857–58). Reply at 5.

Petitioner adds that LAPD’s argument that “section 20012 does not specify what ‘required accident reports’ must be disclosed” is not well taken. LAPD’s own website provides, “Traffic Collision Reports may be released to authorized persons such as victims . . . as provided in Section 20012 of the Vehicle Code.” See Pet. RJN Ex. A. LAPD’s website further states Traffic Crash Reports involving an arrest can be ordered by mail. Ibid. Thus, according to LAPD, “required accident reports” include, at a minimum, Traffic Crash Reports, including those involving an arrest. Additionally, required accident reports under sections 20012 and 20014 include reports that must be filed by persons involved in an incident that results in injuries or death (§§ 20008, 20009), along with accident and investigative reports prepared by law enforcement. Accordingly, the express provisions of the Vehicle Code and supporting case law demonstrate that LAPD is required to provide Petitioner unredacted copies of each of the police reports. Reply at 5-6.

Both sides are wrong. As stated, the police reports include (1) a Follow-Up Investigation Report for a Felony Hit and Run, (2) an Arrest Report for a Felony Hit and Run, (3) a Traffic Collision and Arrest Status Report, (4) a Traffic Crash Report, and (5) an Impound Report. The first three directly relate to a criminal investigation. They are not accident reports or supplemental accident reports governed by section 20012 and 20014, and they remain exempt under section 7923.600(a).

The Impound Report is clerical and not an investigation undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred. As such, it is not a protected record of investigation, and the court already has ordered its production.

The Traffic Crash Report also is investigatory. Its purpose is to investigate the traffic crash for administrative and civil liability purposes, but not criminal purposes. As a record of investigation undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law has occurred, it is a protected record of investigation under section 7923.600(a). However, that exemption is overcome by section 20012, which clearly requires its production to Petitioner as a person injured, and to any attorney who declares under penalty of perjury that he represents Petitioner. As required by section 20012, the entire unredacted Traffic Crash Report must be produced to Petitioner.

Petitioner notes that the police reports include a copy of the Traffic Crash Report for the Incident. LAPD was informed Petitioner had an unredacted copy of the Traffic Crash Report after the LAPD disclosed the redacted police reports in its June 10 production. LAPD continued to maintain its objections were valid and asserted that its unredacted Traffic Crash Report differs from the version produced. Gleizer Decl., ¶ 36. Assuming the two copies of the Traffic Crash Report are the same, Petitioner contends that the prior disclosure of the report constitutes a waiver of LAPD’s exemption. §7921.505. Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

The City replies that, prior to submitting the CPRA Request, Petitioner apparently obtained an unredacted copy of a Traffic Crash Report from an LAPD employee in December 2022. Bennett Decl., ¶5. As Petitioner acknowledges, the record he obtained was different than the redacted record produced by LAPD because they are documents of different length. Any waiver of the report disclosed in December 2022 should be narrowly construed and not deemed as a waiver the other record. §7921.505(b). Opp. at 13.

This issue is mooted by the fact that Petitioner is entitled to the unredacted Traffic Crash Report. As the City must produce this unredacted report, Petitioner’s request for an in-camera review is denied. See Pet. Op. Br. at 10; Reply at 4.

When an agency refuses to disclose a public record, it must justify its decision by demonstrating that the record is exempt under specific provisions of the CPRA or that withholding the record serves a greater public interest than disclosure. Copley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 1282. The agency’s justification “must be specific enough to give the requester a meaningful opportunity to contest the withholding of the documents and the court to determine whether the exemption applies.” Golden Door, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 790.) Reply at 6.

Petitioner argues that many of LAPD’s redactions are simply based on LAPD’s internal policies. During his PMQ deposition, Orocio indicated that LAPD would continue to follow its internal policies even if a record was not exempt or lost exemption process. Gordon Decl., Ex. G (Orocio Depo), pp. 93, 159. LAPD’s internal policies do not trump the CPRA and do not justify the LAPD’s record redactions. Reply at 6. The court agrees.

Petitioner argues that LAPD’s redactions to the police reports are improper under the CPRA. LAPD asserts that the withheld portions of the police reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections 7922.000 (catch-all), 7923.600 (records of investigation/investigatory files), 7927.700 (personal privacy in medical/personnel and other files), and 7927.705 (exempt by federal or state privilege). Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

With regard to the catch-all exemption, at no point did LAPD describe, explain, or justify the grounds for its exemptions, despite Petitioner explicitly requesting additional context. LAPD simply referenced the CPRA’s catch-all provision. §7922.000. Conclusory or boilerplate assertions that merely recite the statutory standards are not sufficient.” Golden Door, supra. 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 790. LAPD fails to meet its burden justifying application of the catch-all exemption to the police reports. Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

LAPD also asserts the redacted portions of the police report are exempt under the investigatory exemption and personal privacy exemption. §§ 7923.600, 7927.700. Although portions of the police reports may be deemed investigatory – the court has found that they are -- the investigatory exemption does not provide a blanket exclusion for entire documents. Instead, it is designed to protect specific aspects of investigatory files that, if disclosed, would jeopardize effective law enforcement or individual privacy. §§ 7923.600-7923.630. Pet. Op. Br. at 8-9.

The unredacted Traffic Crash Report provides evidence that the redactions applied by the LAPD are improper. Bennett Decl., Ex. C. Under section 7923.605, law enforcement agencies are obligated to disclose to a victim of an incident or their authorized representative “the names and addresses of persons involved in, or witnesses . . . all diagrams, statements of the parties involved in the incident, the statements of all witnesses, other than confidential informants.” Similarly, section 7923.610 obligates law enforcement agencies to make specific information regarding an arrestee public, including their name, physical description, facts surrounding their arrest, and the charges brought against them. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

The redacted police reports produced by LAPD redact information that is subject to disclosure under both sections 7923.605 and 7923.610. This includes Weems physical description (Geizler Decl., ¶¶ 29-30, Ex. Y, p. 105, but see p. 82 (physical description left unredacted), the SUV’s VIN and registered owner (Ex. Y, p. 106), the collision summary (Ex. Y, p. 116), witness statements (Ex. Y, p. 116), and facts surrounding Weems’ arrest and charges brought against him (Ex. Y, pp. 81, 116-18, 121). Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

With regard to LAPD’s claim that the records are exempt under the privacy exemption, courts have held that the exemption applies only to “sensitive personal information which individuals must submit to government.” Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, (1984) 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 902. The police reports contain information concerning persons involved in the Incident either as a victim, witness, involved party/arrestee, or police officer. The personal nature of the information provided is limited. Moreover, witnesses had the option to remain anonymous as demonstrated by witness “W3” in the unredacted Traffic Crash Report. Bennett Decl., Ex. C, p. 12. The public has a substantial interest in the Incident that far exceeds privacy concerns in light of the serious nature of the offense and injuries and the fact that it took place at a community Carnival open to the public. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

Petitioner misunderstands section 7923.600(a), which exempts records of investigation from disclosure on their face. Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356). The three criminal investigation police reports are exempt under section 7923.600(a) and LAPD need not provide those reports at all. LAPD does have an obligation to provide information to Petitioner pursuant to sections 7923.605, 7923.610, 7923.615 and it has chosen to do so by disclosing a one-page sheet containing the information required by section 7923.610 concerning the arrestee (Ex. B, p. 66) and by providing the information required by section 7923.605 and 7923.615 through the redacted police reports. Opp. at 12. LAPD need not provide the same information more than once. So long as the information required by sections 7923.605, 7923.610, 7923.615 is provided somewhere, that is all that is required.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the redactions are appropriate – LAPD could have withheld the criminal police reports in their entirety – but rather whether the redacted reports provide the information required by sections 7923.605 and 7923.615. Petitioner argues that LAPD’s disclosure improperly redacted the suspect’s (Weems) physical description, collision summary (Ex. Y, p. 116), witness statements (Ex. Y, p. 116), and facts surrounding Weems’ arrest and charges brought against him (Ex. Y, pp. 81, 116-18, 121), which are required by sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

The City responds that all this information was disclosed by the Department. The one-page sheet contains a physical description of the arrestee as required under section 7923.610. Orocio Decl., ¶32. The redacted police reports include witness statements and facts surrounding the arrest as specified under sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615. LAPD did not redact witness statements. Rather, the analysis and conclusions of the investigating officer, which are not disclosable, were redacted from the “COLLISION SUMMARY” and the “UPON ARRIVAL (AT SCENE INVESTIGATIONS)” sections of the Traffic Crash Report. §7923.605(b) (expressly exempting the disclosure of the “analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer”). Opp. at 14.

Petitioner replies that the City’s argument that LAPD generally disclosed this information is unsupported by citation to the evidence. LAPD’s redaction of information subject to disclosure violates its duties and obligations under the CPRA. See §7922.525. Reply at 6-7.

The court does not agree. Petitioner has a burden which has not been met. His burden was not to point out what information was redacted but rather what information is missing that is required by sections 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615. Particularly since the unredacted Traffic Crash Report must be produced, Petitioner has not shown that any required disclosure is missing.[12]

No further review of the redacted police reports is required (although, as stated, the unredacted Traffic Crash Report and Impound Report must be produced for other reasons).

LAPD’s record production includes redacted signature blocks on several records. LAPD asserted that “signatures and initials signatures and initials are redacted as a precaution against forgery and because…[sections] 7927.700 and 7922.000 exempt records the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and/or would not serve the public interest.” Pet. Op. Br. at 10.

LAPD redacted LAFD’s signed approval of the Police Museum’s plot plan. Ex. Y, pp. 10, 77 [duplicate copy). LAPD also redacted multiple signatures on the police reports. Ex. Y, pp. 81, 82, 88, 90, 120. As an initial matter, CID previously produced an unredacted copy of the signed plot plan which waives LAPD’s asserted privileges. Compare Geizler Decl., ¶23, Ex. U (CID production) and Ex. Y, pp. 10, 77 (LAPD June 10 production).[13] Pet. Op. Br. at 11.

Notwithstanding this waiver, the signatures do not constitute “personnel, or similar files.” §7927.700. The redacted records do not concern the signatories job performance or any grievance; they are ordinary business records concerning the affairs of the City. Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist., (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 530, 539; Labor Code §1198.5. Pet. Op. Br. at 11.

Even if the records constitute personnel files, LAPD does not explain how disclosure of a public agency employee’s signature on an official government form constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Nor does it address the public interest in nondisclosure. The only support offered by LAPD is its assertion that signatures are exempt as a precaution against forgery. Geizler Decl., ¶33. LAPD’s forgery argument is sheer speculation, and LAPD provides nothing to substantiate its forgery concern. See CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Superior Court, (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 (burden of proof is on the proponent of nondisclosure). This speculative concern is greatly outweighed by the strong public interest in the conduct of law enforcement and other public employees engaged in government business. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4^th 97, 104-05. The signatures appear on official government forms and confirm that the necessary government approval was approval from a public employee with proper authority was obtained. See Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach, (2014) 59 Cal.4^th 59, 71-72 (officer’s name is part of factual information that must be disclosed). Pet. Op. Br. at 11.

The City responds that LAPD applies such redactions as a precaution against forgery. §§ 7927.700 (unwarranted invasion of personal privacy), 7922.000 (public interest in not disclosing outweighs the public interest in disclosing).) Petitioner offers no argument or case law to support the disclosure of signatures or initials, as opposed to the names of employees, which the Department did not redact. Opp. at 14.

As Petitioner argues (Reply at 7), LAPD redacted signatures based on Department policy, not evidence. The City makes no attempt to substantiate LAPD’s forgery claim and its concern is speculative. LAPD carries the burden to justify its redactions and has failed to do so. See California State University v. Superior Court, (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 887 (“The unsupported statements constitute nothing more than speculative, self-serving opinions designed to preclude the dissemination of information”). Reply at 7. The signatures must be produced.

c. Redactions to Email Addresses and Phone Numbers of LAPD Employees and Third Parties

LAPD redacted the email and telephone number of a third-party Carnival contractor, Ron Waldman, who was involved in planning the Carnival, the phone number of Police Museum employees communicating with LAPD, and the work phone number of LAPD employees. LAPD asserted this information was exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections 7927.700 and 7922.000. Pet. Op. Br. at 11-12.

Petitioner argues that LAPD did not provide justification for withholding this contact information under the catch-all exemption in section 7922.000. See Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court, (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 1065, 1071 (“burden on proponent of nondisclosure to prove a clear overbalance”). The phone numbers and email addresses are used for business purposes and are listed on forms submitted to the City. Gleizer Decl., Ex Y, pp. 1-7, 11 (emails), 68 (Carnival event details in City’s special events portal). See San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 775, 780-81 (information about those who voluntarily contract with the government is disclosable under the CPRA). Pet. Op. Br. at 12.

For the contact information of Waldman and the Police Museum employees, there is a strong public interest in third parties engaging in business with or on behalf of the City. Contact information can also provide useful information for purposes of searching and identifying relevant documents. For the telephone numbers of LAPD employees, the phone numbers appear in the employee’s LAPD email signature line, which also includes the department and unit the employee works in. Ex Y, pp. 73-76. The phone number is being used for business purposes and is thereby subject to disclosure. See §7928.300 (employee personal phone numbers are not public records and generally not subject to disclosure). Pet. Op. Br. at 12.

Petitioner correctly responds that LAPD failed to substantiate any public interest or personal privacy concerns in the redacted business emails and phone numbers of third parties responsible for planning and organizing the Carnival. See California State University v. Superior Court, (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 834 (individuals who bought suites in public facility entered into public sphere and “[b]y doing so, they voluntarily diminished their own privacy interests”). Reply at 7-8.

The business contact information of third parties must be disclosed but not the business phone numbers of LAPD employees.

Petitioner contends that the redacted police reports produced by LAPD redact the SUV’s VIN and registered owner (Ex. Y, p. 106), information that is subject to disclosure under both sections 7923.605 and 7923.610. Pet. Op. Br. at 9.

The City merely responds that such redactions are proper because that information is not disclosable. See generally §§ 7923.605, 7923.610, and 7923.615. Opp. at 13-14.

As Petitioner replies (Reply at 6), this argument fails to satisfy LAPD’s burden, and this information must be disclosed.

To determine if a search was adequate under the CPRA, California courts apply the standard used in FOIA cases, which provides that a search "need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents" given the circumstances. ACLU v. Superior Court, (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 85 (citing Meerepol v. Meese, (“Meerepol”) (D.C. Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 942, 951-56. "[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate" in light of the relevant circumstances. Meerepol, supra, 790 F.2d at 951. An agency's search must be "reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents." Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National City, ("CYAC"), (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1420 (citation omitted).

The scope of the search is dictated by the scope of the request. Id. "An agency is... obliged to search for records based on criteria set forth in the search request." California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, ("CFAC"), (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. Based on the language of the request, an agency must "determine whether it has such writings under its control and the applicability of any exemption." Id. at 166. The agency's search "should be broad enough to account for the problem that the requester may not know what documents or information of interest an agency possesses." CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1425 (citation omitted).

An agency need only search files reasonably likely to contain responsive records. Jenkins v. United States, (D.D.C. July 12, 2017) 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 107363 at *7. It "is not required to expend its limited resources on searches for which it is clear at the outset that no search will produce the records sought." Reyes v. EPA, (“Reyes”) (D.D.C. 2014) 991 F.Supp.2d 20, 27; Earle v. United States, (“Earle”) (D.D.C. 2016) 217 F.Supp.3d 117, 123. Moreover, if an agency shows it never had or no longer possesses the records requested, "the reasonable search required... may be no search at all." Reyes, supra, 991 F.Supp.2d at 27; Earle, supra, 217 F.Supp.3d at 124 (search would be futile where agency declaration showed records in question did not exist); Amnesty Int'l v. CIA, (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) 2008 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 47822 at *34 (agency not required to search at all where it would be futile).

A clearly framed request which requires an agency to search an enormous volume of data for a ‘needle in a haystack” or a request which compels the production of a large volume of material may be objectionable as unduly burdensome. CFAC, supra, 67 Cal.App.4^th at 166. However, records requests impose some burden on agencies, and the agency is required to comply so long as the record can be recovered with reasonable effort. Id.

An agency can show its search was adequate with affidavits showing where and how it searched for the records. Citizens Comm. on Human Rights v. FDA, ((9^th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 1325, 1328. In evaluating the agency's evidence on this issue, courts should consider "such relevant factors as the amount of time and staff devoted to the request and whether the agency attempted to limit its search to one or more places when other sources likely would have contained [the] information requested." Landmark Legal Foundation v. E.P.A., (D.D.C. 2003) 272 F.Supp.2d 59, 62.

Even significant expense to the agency will not excuse an agency from conducting a thorough search for responsive records unless it constitutes an undue burden. See, e.g., CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Superior Ct., (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 892, 909 ($43,000 cost to agency to compile responsive public records was not valid reason to deny CPRA request). “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627 (citation omitted). The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents and agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches. Some general principles have emerged, however. Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must “‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request...” Ibid. (citation omitted).

Petitioner argues that LAPD failed to conduct an adequate search for records responsive to the CPRA Request, resulting in a delayed and grossly deficient production of records. Section 7922.600 mandates that a public agency assist the requestor to overcome “any practical basis for denying access to the records or information sought.” A public agency satisfies this duty by making a reasonable effort to elicit additional clarifying information from the requester that will help identify the record or records.” Id. LAPD has impeded and refused to make any real effort to work with Petitioner for purposes of identifying records responsive to the CPRA Request. LAPD’s conduct should be deemed by the court as an outright denial of Petitioner’s Request. See CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1425 (“the effect of the [agency’s] inability or unwillingness to locate the records had the same effect as withholding requested information from the public”). Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

As the City correctly argues (Opp. at 19, n.3), this allegation is baseless. Petitioner made the Request in February 2023. LAPD assigned a CPRA analyst and asked ITB to look for emails using the word “Carnival”. The Discovery Section also determined that CID had already produced Items 1—5 and 7 to Petitioner. LAPD responded to the Request on March 20, 2023, noting that Items 10-13 had to be narrowed because there were more than 15,000 email hits. On April 5, 2023, the Discovery Section contacted Petitioner to inform him that witness statements would be provided upon receipt of a signed authorization. Petitioner failed to respond until he submitted a new Request almost six months later, on September 27, 2023.

By November 9, 2023, Petitioner asked that the initial Request be re-opened as required, provided the required authorization, and addressed the Discovery Section’s request to narrow Items 11-13 by narrowing Item 13 only. He sent a follow-up email and peremptorily filed the Petition on December 28, 2023. Thereafter, the parties met and conferred several times, sometimes at the court’s prompting, resulting in the April 25 and June 10 productions. These facts show that the City attempted to work with Petitioner and endeavored to search for records within the parameters it deemed feasible. Petitioner bears almost all the fault for delay.

This leads to the scope of LAPD’s search, which must be "reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents." CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1420.

As a threshold matter, Petitioner challenges the adequacy of LAPD’s search because he believes that “[c]ommon sense dictates that LAPD’s involvement would coincide with a substantial paper trail.” He also speculates that LAPD has “intimate” ties to the Carnival, but it was a private event. LAPD did not plan the Carnival, employ workers for the event, or provide event security. Orocio Decl., ¶13.

Petitioner contends that LAPD’s search parameters were overly narrow and the LAPD repeatedly rejected Petitioner’s request to expand the search terms and date ranges. LAPD agreed to expand its search to include the terms proposed in Petitioner’s March 27, 2023 email. However, the register of actions reveals that LAPD failed to include all key terms proposed by Petitioner. Glazier Decl., ¶¶ 25-27, Exs. V-W. Pet. Op. Br. at 13-14.

The City responds that Petitioner proposed that LAPD search terms including, among other things, “vehicle,” “safety,” “security,” and “arrest”, that are facially unreasonable and overbroad. Orocio Decl., ¶45. LAPD’s search parameters -- set forth in detail in Orocio’s declaration (Orocio Decl. ¶¶ 46–56), were reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents. Opp. at 15.

One key difference between LAPD’s search parameters versus those proposed by Petitioner is that most of LAPD’s email searches included a limiter for the term “Police Museum” or “Carnival.” Zhang Decl., ¶16. Thus, for example, an email that included the keyword “vehicle” would also need to include “Police Museum” or “Carnival” somewhere in the email chain to be included in the search results. Id. Running Petitioner’s proposed terms would have dramatically broadened the scope of the Request. They also were not targeted to the Request, which concerned a single Incident at a Carnival organized by the Police Museum. Opp. at 15.

Petitioner replies that the City’s argument is disingenuous. In response to meet-and-confer efforts ordered by the court, Petitioner proposed (1) terms to search independently and (2) terms to run in pairs. Gleizer Decl., ¶16, Ex. N. The terms Petitioner proposed to run independently were: “Weems, “LA Police Museum”, “Bennett”, “Bey”, “Street Carnival”, “November 12 Carnival”, “November 12 Incident/accident”, “Fall Carnival” “LAPD Carnival”, “Street Festival”, and “Porsche Cayenne.” The independent terms were specifically tailored to the Incident. Petitioner proposed limiting the date range for its search of the terms “Weems,” “Bennett,” “Bey,” and “November 12 Incident/accident” to November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023, and the remaining terms to November 11, 2021 to November 2, 2023. Gleizer Decl., Ex. N. LAPD cannot support its argument that the proposed terms were facially unreasonable and overbroad. Reply at 8.

The search terms used by LAPD were reasonable. The issue is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate" in light of the relevant circumstances. Meerepol, supra, 790 F.2d at 951. It was.

Petitioner alleges that LAPD limited the date range of almost all of its searches to November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023, which stifles the ability to identify and produce planning and permitting records. Despite Petitioner’s request to expand the date range, LAPD continued to use its limited date range and applied an alternative date range of October 1 to November 11, 2022, to only two searches. Glazier Decl., ¶¶ 25-27, Exs. V-W. Pet. Op. Br. at 13-14.

The City argues that the date ranges used by the LAPD’s email searches were reasonable. Four of the email searches used a date range of November 11, 2022 to November 2, 2023, in order to target email records from just before the date of the Incident until approximately one year later. Orocio Decl., ¶¶ 47–52. The other email searches used a date range of October 1 to November 12, 2022, and were targeted to email communications between LAPD and the Police Museum regarding the Carnival. Orocio Decl., ¶54. LAPD believes the date ranges used were reasonable and adequate to locate email communications related to the Incident and the Carnival, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 54.) Opp. at 16.

The Incident occurred on November 12, 2022. The court agrees with Petitioner that limiting the earliest range to October 1, 2022 stifled the ability to identify and produce planning and permitting records. LAPD refused to expand its search for a date range beginning November 11, 2021, which Petitioner proposed, and did not explain why the expanded date range would be overly burdensome. Reply at 8. The search must be expanded to include planning and permitting documents by using a range starting on November 11, 2021.

Petitioner raised concerns regarding LAPD’s custodian list, which the LAPD confirmed was limited to officers involved in the Incident. Glazier Decl., ¶¶ 24-27. Petitioner requested that the LAPD expand its search beyond custodians involved in investigating the Incident to include custodians involved in the planning and security for the Carnival. LAPD agreed, but the register of actions reveals that LAPD failed to expand the list and made no effort to identify additional custodians. Glazier Decl., Ex. AC. Pet. Op. Br. at 13.

The City responds that LAPD’s search for email and non-email records included 19 officers who communicated with the Police Museum or were involved in the investigation of the Incident. Petitioner’s assertion that LAPD failed to include custodians involved in planning and security for the Incident” is untrue. LAPD produced email records that hit on the terms “Carnival” or “security” or “Police Museum” that were sent to or from a Police Museum contact for the Carnival. Orocio Decl., ¶46. Opp. at 16.

Petitioner bases his assertions about planning and security custodians on attorney correspondence that occurred before LAPD finished its search for records. See Gleizer Decl., Ex. V. Following this meet-and-confer, LAPD agreed to add two custodians to its search parameters. Zhang Decl., ¶¶ 15-16. It is unclear which custodians Petitioner is claiming should have been included in LAPD’s search, because LAPD did not deny any request to include custodians. Zhang Decl., ¶16. Opp. at 16-17.

Petitioner does not reply to this argument. LAPD reasonably identified and used 19 custodians for the search.

Petitioner argues that LAPD’s search for records was almost exclusively limited to emails, both before and after the Petition was filed. See Gleizer Decl., Ex. AC (register of actions). The only attempt by LAPD to obtain non-email records took place on March 6, 2024, when the CPRA analyst requested witness statements, staff list, and obtained a permit for the Carnival. There is no evidence that any other efforts to search for additional non-email records was undertaken. Despite Petitioner’s request for cell phone records, records were not requested from custodians. See City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal. 5th at 627-28. Pet. Op. Br. at 13.

Petitioner repeatedly raised concerns regarding LAPD’s failure to search for non-email records. Glazier Decl., ¶¶ 25-27, Exs. V-W. LAPD’s counsel advised that it would look into the issue but never followed up with Petitioner. Id. There is no evidence that LAPD expanded its search following Petitioner’s request. The PMQ confirmed in his June 24, 2024 deposition that LAPD ran email searches but represented that he was not aware of searches for any other record types. Gordon Decl., Ex. G, pp. 71, 101-102, 115-17.

The City responds that it is untrue that LAPD’s search was limited almost exclusively to emails. The Discovery Section searched for, reviewed, and made redactions to non-email investigatory records and files that could contain information subject to disclosure to a crime victim or his authorized representative pursuant to section 7923.605. Orocio Decl., ¶57. The Discovery Section also asked the relevant custodians whether they had sent or received any text messages related to the Incident on their personal cell phone, or any Department-issued cell phone, and whether they had any handwritten notes or drawings concerning the Incident. Orocio Decl., ¶58. None reported having texts, handwritten notes, or drawings concerning the Incident. Id. Opp. at 16.[14]

Petitioner correctly replies (Reply at 9) that LAPD has materially changed its position regarding its search for non-email records. Orocio testified that he did not know if LAPD searched for text messages, photographs, videos, personal cell phones, etc. Gordon Decl., Ex. G (Orocio Depo), pp. 70 (texts and handwritten notes), 90–91 (texts or cell phones), 115–16 (handwritten notes, photographs, videos, faxes, personal cell phones). The City is bound by this testimony. See Ex. G, pp. 100–01.

Yet, Orocio now declares that LAPD searched for non-email records, including personal and Department-issued cell phones, for texts, handwritten notes, and drawings concerning the Incident. Orocio Decl., ¶58. No explanation has been made how Ocorico learned this information between June 24 and his declaration. Orocio’s contradictory declaration is disregarded on this point.

LAPD must search the custodians’ personal and Department-issued cell phones for texts, handwritten notes, and drawings concerning the Incident.

The unredacted Traffic Crash Report reveals that an officer “used a city cell phone to take and upload photos to evidnce.com [sic.]”, and that the interviews of Weems and two witnesses were captured on body cam video. Bennet Decl., Ex. C, p. 13. During the parties’ meet-and-confer, LAPD confirmed that it had not requested or obtained copies of these records, asserting they were privileged. Gleizer Decl., ¶35, Ex. AB.) Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

Petitioner argues that LAPD’s blanket privilege claim is improper. It is improper to assert objections to requests for production of documents that do not exist or are not in their possession, custody, or control. See Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 991. The Traffic Crash Report does not identify the content of the uploaded photographs, and LAPD has provided no factual basis to confirm they solely concern the investigation of the Incident. Castanares, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at 309 (rejecting blanket privilege for drone footage in favor of content-based analysis). LAPD’s wrongly failed to obtain and evaluate the photographs and video footage. Further, to the extent the body cam footage is limited to statements by Weems and the witnesses, such footage constitutes party and witness statements subject to disclosure under section 7923.605. The court should order the LAPD to obtain the records and assess them for purposes of disclosure under the CPRA. Pet. Op. Br. at 14.

The City responds that Petitioner’s argument is frivolous. Any photograph or video recording made by an officer at a crime scene is, by definition, a record of a criminal investigation which is exempt from disclosure under section 7923.600. Orocio Decl., ¶61. Because the disclosure of such evidence could jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution, or threaten the safety of a party or witness, it is categorically exempt from disclosure under the investigatory records exemption. As a result, the Discovery Section does not disclose evidence from evidence.com in response to CPRA requests. Orocio Decl., ¶61. Opp. at 17.

The City argues that Castanares, relied on by Petitioner, supports the Department’s position. That case held that drone video footage from calls for service that resulted in a law enforcement investigation (i.e., a case number was assigned) was exempt from public disclosure under section 7923.600(a)). 98 Cal.App.5^th at 305. The court need not review investigatory records that are exempt on their face. Id. The City adds that LAPD already provided witness statements, which were left unredacted from the records provided. Opp. at 17.

Petitioner misses the point on his first argument. It is not just the fact that a record was uploaded to evidnce.com that creates an exemption. It is the fact that the records are crime scene photos and video that makes them exempt. LAPD need not search such records uploaded to evidnce.com before deeming them to be exempt.

On his second argument, Petitioner is wrong that the City fails to address the witness statement issue. The City’s opposition expressly states that LAPD provided unredacted witness statements. Opp. at 17. Nonetheless, section 7923.605 states that a victim shall be provided “all diagrams, statements of the parties involved in the incident, the statements of all witnesses”. This language appears to state that all witness statements must be provided. At a minimum, it requires that all statements of the parties must be provided, including Weems.

The City must provide the interviews of Weems and two witnesses that were captured on body cam video and uploaded to evidence.com.

The City argues that Petitioner’s assertion that this litigation prompted LAPD to turn over “records responsive to Items 1-4, and 8” is inaccurate. See Pet. Op. Br. at 15. LAPD does not have in its possession records responsive to Items 1-4, and 8 and never produced such records. Orocio Decl. ¶¶ 12–17, 37–39. The only documents responsive to Items 1–5 and 7 were provided to Petitioner by CID in February 2023. Orocio Decl., ¶17. Opp. at 17.

Petitioner responds that LAPD cannot make this argument because it did not search for records responsive to Items 1–5 and never obtained copies of the CID’s records prior to receiving them from Petitioner. Gordon Decl., Ex. G (Orocio Depo), pp. 167–68; CYAC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 1425 (“[agency’s] inability or unwillingness to locate the records had the same effect as withholding requested information from the public”). Reply at 8-9.

On March 20, 2023, LAPD advised Petitioner that records responsive to Items 1-5, & 7 were previously produced by CID in response to a separate request. Gleizer Decl., ¶3, Ex. C. On March 27, 2024, LAPD’s counsel confirmed that it did not possess records responsive to Items 1-5 and 7 beyond the records previously produced by CID. Gleizer Decl., ¶14, Ex. N. On April 25, 2024, LAPD made its first production of documents in response to Petitioner’s February 23 Request. Gleizer Decl., ¶22, Ex. T. LAPD advised that records responsive to Items 1 through 5 and 7 already had been produced by CID. Gleizer Decl., ¶23; see Ex. U.

It appears that LAPD never separately searched for these records and relied solely on CID’s production. Petitioner is entitled to a separate search.

The City argues that the court should decline to opine on the prevailing party issue because it is premature. Opp. at 18. The court disagrees. The appellate court has indicated that entitlement to attorney fees should be decided before judgment where feasible. In any event, there is no judgment in a CPRA case and it is appropriate for the court to determine the entitlement issue.

A petitioner who prevails in a CPRA case is entitled to court costs and attorney fees. §7923.115(a). An award is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails. Filarsky v. Superior Court, (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 427. A plaintiff prevails in litigation under the CPRA if the litigation motivated the defendant to release the requested documents or was the catalyst for the release. Motorola Commun. & Electronics v. Dep’t of General Servs., (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1344.

Petitioner initially argues that LAPD delayed production. It failed to provide a single responsive record until four months after the Petition was filed. PMQ Orocio testified that CPRA analysts assign deadlines in their system which dictate tasks regarding a request, including whether a response will be submitted. Orocio confirmed that, following Petitioner’s November 9, 2023, there was no deadline set in the system for the Requests email until March 6, 2024. Gordon Decl., Ex. G (Orocio Depo.), pp. 130, 135-37. Orocio testified that there was no evidence of the LAPD conducting any search for emails before the Petition was filed. Ex. G, pp. 147-40, 142. Orocio also confirms that LAPD used search terms provided by Petitioner, leading to the identification and production of records. Orocio Decl., ¶¶ 57–59. Reply at 10. Petitioner concludes that the Petition prompted LAPD to search for and disclose records. Pet. Op. Br. at 15.

The City responds that the Petition did not play a sufficient role in facilitating LAPD’s production of documents. Petitioner created his own problem by serving an unreasonably broad CPRA Request and refusing to limit that Request until long after the litigation commenced. Despite Petitioner’s continued insistence on overbroad search terms, the City made the eventual decision to limit the Request by using its own reasonable search terms that resulted in LAPD’s completion of the document production. Opp. at 18-19.

As discussed ante, Petitioner’s delay argument is unsupported. Any delay in production is mostly attributable to Petitioner. He also filed the Petition peremptorily without exhausting further discussion. The delay between his November 9, 2023 communication of Petitioner’s authorization form and response to LAPD’s request to narrow Items 10-13, his December 7, 2023 status update request, and the filing of his December 28, 2023 Petition is immaterial. LAPD had demonstrated its willingness to produce documents and the failure to continue the dialogue is Petitioner’s alone.

Petitioner next argues that the Petition compelled LAPD to produce responsive records. Pet. Op. Br. at 15.

After the Petition was filed, LAPD identified relevant custodians for the Request, promptly added the two additional custodians that Petitioner requested, formulated and ran several email searches, made redactions to exempt investigatory records while producing responsive, non-exempt information. See generally Orocio Decl; Zhang Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16. This effort was responsive and adequate. Because of Petitioner’s delay and peremptory filing of the Petition, the court will not award Petitioner any attorney fees for the records produced during the meet-and-confer process after the Petition was filed, including the release of records in the June 10, 2024 production. LAPD was always willing to search for and produce these records and Petitioner was not a catalyst for their production.

However, Petitioner is the prevailing party and entitled to his costs, as well as his attorney fees solely for the instant briefing that resulted in compelling LAPD to produce unredacted documents and conduct an additional search. This includes production of the Impound Report and the unredacted Traffic Crash Report, and the interviews of Weems and two witnesses captured on body cam video and uploaded to evidence.com. It also includes the removal of redactions on the signature blocks, the business contact information of third parties, and the SUV’s VIN and registered owner for produced records. Finally, it includes an additional search for records responsive to Items 1 through 5 and 7, expansion of the email search to include planning and permitting documents by using a range starting on November 11, 2021, and a search the custodians’ personal and Department-issued cell phones for texts, handwritten notes, and drawings concerning the Incident.

Petitioner is entitled to attorney fees only for this briefing effort and the portion of any attorney communications directing addressing these issues. The parties are ordered to meet and confer to reach agreement on the reasonable fees for this briefing effort. If they fail to agree, Petitioner may file a motion for that determination.

The Petition is granted in part. The City is ordered (a) to produce the Vehicle Report for an impounded vehicle and the unredacted Traffic Crash Report, and the interviews of Weems and two witnesses that were captured on body cam video and uploaded to evidence.com, (b) remove the redactions on the signature blocks for produced records, the business contact information of third parties, and the SUV’s VIN and registered owner, and (c) conduct an additional search for records responsive to Items 1 through 5 and 7, expand the email search to include planning and permitting documents by using a range starting on November 11, 2021, and search the custodians’ personal and Department-issued cell phones for texts, handwritten notes, and drawings concerning the Incident. Petitioner is entitled to his costs and attorney fees for his briefing and portion of any communications directing addressing these issues.

[1] The City notes that Petitioner untimely filed and served his brief on August 19, 2024 in violation of the court’s order that it be filed and served by August 16, 2024. Opp. at 10. Petitioner fails to reply. As the City suffered no prejudice, the court has elected to consider Petitioner’s brief.

[2] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.

[3] The Legislature confirmed that the 2023 changes in recodifying the CPRA were not intended to substantively change the law relating to inspection of public records. §7920.100.

[4] Section 7922.000 is the CPRA’s catch-all provision and “contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.” Michaelis v. Superior Court, (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1066, 1071. The court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests, evaluating the weight of the public interest by the gravity of the public tasks sought to be illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will illuminate those tasks. See Humane Society of the United States v. Superior Court, (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 12133, 1267-68.

[5] Section 7923.600(a) does not involve a public interest balancing test. The courts have consistently refused to apply additional criteria to CPRA exemptions that are not explicitly provided in the statute. See Williams, supra, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 354 (“The Legislature has carefully limited the exemption for law enforcement investigatory records … It is not our task to rewrite the statute.”).

[6] Except as otherwise required by Penal Code section 1054 et seq. or the U.S. or California Constitution, no law enforcement officer or employee of a law enforcement agency shall disclose to any arrested person, or to any person who may be a defendant in a criminal action, the address or telephone number of any person who is a victim or witness in the alleged offense. Penal Code §841.5(a).

[7] The City asks the court to judicially notice (1) CID’s webpage (Resp. RJN Ex. A) and (2) a September 8, 2024 Department 82 order denying attorney fees in Three Group, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 23STCP0988 (Resp. RJN Ex. B). Petitioner objects to judicial notice of Exhibit B, which cannot be cited under CRC 8.1115. Exhibit A is judicially noticed. Evid. Code §452(c). Exhibit B is irrelevant to this case and the request is denied.

In support of his reply, Petitioner asks the court to judicially notice LAPD’s website (Pet. RJN Ex. A). The request is granted. Evid. Code §452(c).

The City’s evidence refers to a Declaration of Grace Zhang, but none is in the court file or the evidence binders. As both parties refer to the Zhang declaration, the court has included cites to it without verifying the citations.

The court also has ruled on the parties’ evidentiary objections. The City’s evidentiary objections are overruled, including its objection that Petitioner improperly filed the redacted investigatory records with his opening brief. Opp. at 10, n.2. Once a document is produced in a CPRA response, it is in the public domain. Petitioner’s written evidentiary objections have almost all been overruled, although the court will not consider evidence in direct conflict with the PMQ deposition. The clerk is ordered to scan and electronically file the court’s rulings.

[8] In reply, Petitioner presents evidence that he identified emails between himself and LAPD detectives when responding to LAPD’s interrogatories that LAPD did not produce for his records request, and the Police Museum recently provided records in discovery in the related civil suit that were not produced by LAPD. Each of the latter records was responsive to Items 1-5 of the CPRA Request and were not produced. Opp. at 2-3. This evidence and argument is not properly presented in reply and has not been considered. See Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333 (new evidence/issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly presented to a trial court and may be disregarded).

[9] Section 7922.000 is the CPRA’s catch-all provision and “contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.” Michaelis v. Superior Court, (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1066, 1071. The court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests, evaluating the weight of the public interest by the gravity of the public tasks sought to be illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will illuminate those tasks. See Humane Society of the United States v. Superior Court, (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 12133, 1267-68.

[10] Except as otherwise required by Penal Code section 1054 et seq. or the U.S. or California Constitution, no law enforcement officer or employee of a law enforcement agency shall disclose to any arrested person, or to any person who may be a defendant in a criminal action, the address or telephone number of any person who is a victim or witness in the alleged offense. Penal Code §841.5(a).

[11] All statutory references in this section are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise stated.

[12] For this reason, Petitioner’s request for in camera review of the redacted police reports is not well taken. See Pet. Op. Br. at 10.

[13] The City argues that it is unclear what Petitioner means by “CID’s previous production waives LAPD’s asserted privileges,” since Exhibit Y does not include the bates number Petitioner cites. Opp. at 14. Petitioner clarifies its position that the unredacted plot plan produced by CID (Gleizer Decl., Ex. U, p. 17), waives LAPD’s claimed privileges for redactions it made to copies of the same record. Gleizer Decl., Ex. T, p. 10, Ex. Y, p. 77. Reply at 7.

[14] Petitioner provided evidence that the June 10 production referred to additional communications between the Police Museum and LAPD, an ICS Form, and personnel accounting that had not been produced. Gleizer Decl., ¶35, Ex. AB. However, the Discovery Section reached out to the appropriate LAPD personnel to ascertain whether such records were created and was told that they were not. Orocio Decl., ¶60. Opp. at 16. Petitioner does not address this point, and it is waived.