Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 23STCV28792, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Lawrence Worthen (“Tenant”) applies for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant Collin Hinds (“Landlord”) from collecting rent for his unit in 5622 Keniston Ave., Los Angeles, CA, 90043 (“Property”) during the pendency of the action.

The court has read and considered the moving papers and opposition (no reply was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 27, 2023. The operative pleading is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed December 26, 2023, alleging (1) collection of rent on a substandard dwelling, (2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3) private nuisance, and (4) a violation of unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq. The FAC alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Tenant has rented the Property pursuant to a rental agreement (“Lease”) with Landlord since December 15, 2022. The City of Los Angeles’ Housing Authority (“HA”) was a party to this Lease and agreed to pay a portion of the rent.

When he signed the Lease, Tenant did not know it was illegal for Landlord to charge rent in the Property’s substandard condition. For the past eight months the Property has been infested with mold and had electrical and structural defects along with a damaged roof.

Landlord knows about these problems due to numerous complaints from Tenant and from a Mold Inspection and Testing Report by Nations Laboratories and Indoor Restore Environmental Services. Landlord has still to address these issues.

Tenant seeks actual, general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages along with attorney’s fees and costs. Actual damages include rent due and paid during the tenancy. Tenant also seeks injunctive relief compelling Landlord to cease his current course of conduct and correct all existing code violations and uninhabitable conditions of the Property.

On December 18, 2023, Department 47 (Hon. Theresa Taber) denied Tenant’s handwritten application for a preliminary injunction enjoining Landlord from transferring possession of the Property and neighboring properties during the pendency of this action. Taber ordered Tenant to file a motion with supporting declarations if he sought this relief.

On December 5, 2023, Tenant personally served Landlord with the Complaint and Summons.

On January 16, 2024, this court granted Tenant’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause (“OSC”) re: preliminary injunction enjoining Landlord from collecting rent for the pendency of this action.

An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §525. An injunction may be more completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[2] It is an equitable remedy available generally in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623. The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Voorhies v. Greene (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court, (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.

A preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a noticed motion. The complaint normally must plead injunctive relief. CCP §526(a)(1)-(2).[3] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based on a verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate, facts. See CCP §527(a). For this reason, a pleading alone rarely suffices. Weil & Brown, California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. O’Connell v. Superior Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. CCP §526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of “inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v. Blue Cross of California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. Doe v. Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Carlson, (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.

A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. See CCP §529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.

Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any public park, square, street or highway, is a nuisance. Civil Code §3479.

A nuisance that is not a public nuisance is a private nuisance. Civil Code §3481. Civil action and abatement are among the proper remedies for nuisance. Civil Code §§ 3491, 3501. “Abatement” is the removal or destruction of the thing which constitutes the nuisance without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. Civil Code §§ 3495, 3501. A private person may abate either a public or private nuisance. Civil Code §§ 3495, 3502.

Where a civil action is filed against a private nuisance, the defendant property owner is presumed to know the business conducted at his or her property. People ex rel. Bradford v. Barbiere, (1917) 33 Cal.App. 770, 779. Owners of premises where nuisance acts occur may be liable even if they are not negligent in permitting the nuisance to occur. Lew v. Superior Court, (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 866, 871 (property was nuisance because used for sale of drugs; court did not decide whether liability could be imposed on owners whose property is a nuisance through no fault of their own). A plaintiff does not have a right of private eminent domain to compel a defendant landowner to install a nuisance remedy on the latter’s property. Aspen Grove Condominium Association v. CNL Income Northstar, LLC, (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 53, 62-63 (preliminary injunction against nuisance water retention basin which seeped water onto landowner’s property; landowner was not required to permit an interceptor trench to be built on its property as a remedy).

A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable if it is a residential unit described in Health & Safety Code (“H&S Code”) section 17920.3 or 17920.10. Civil Code §1941.1(a). H&S Code section 17920.3(a)-(c) defines a substandard building as any building or portion thereof in which there exists inadequate sanitation, structural hazards, or a nuisance to such an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants thereof. “Inadequate sanitation” includes but is not limited to (13) visible mold growth, except when minor and on surfaces that can accumulate moisture as part of their properly functioning and intended use; (14) general dilapidation or improper maintenance. H&S Code §17920.3(a). Structural hazards include but are not limited to (1) deteriorated or inadequate foundations and (2) defective or deteriorated flooring or floor supports. H&S Code §17920.3(b).

No duty to repair a dilapidation shall arise for the landlord if the tenant is in substantial violation of one of a predefined set of affirmative obligations, if the violation substantially contributed to the existence of the dilapidation or interferes with the landlord’s obligation to effect necessary repairs. Civil Code §1941.2(a). One such duty is the duty to properly use and operate all electrical, gas and plumbing fixtures and keep them as clean and sanitary as their condition permits. Civil Code §1941.2(a)(3).

Substandard housing conditions may constitute a public or private nuisance. On a finding that the building violates the state housing law, the tenant or a tenant association may seek an order appointing a receiver for the substandard building pursuant to H&S Code section 1790.7(c). Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC, (“Erlach”) (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1293-94. If a receiver is appointed, the owner of the substandard building will be enjoined from collecting rents from the tenants. Id. at 1294.

Civil Code section 1942.4 provides a tenant with a statutory cause of action where the premises are untenantable. Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1293-98 (building inspector’s “red tag” of building and order for tenant to vacate due to unsafe conditions did not terminate the tenancy for purposes of damages). A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit if all of the following apply: (1) the dwelling, inter alia, is substandard per H&S Code section 17920.3; (2) a public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions; (3) the conditions have existed and not been abated for 35 days beyond the date of service of said notice; and (4) the conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant that violates Civil Code sections 1929 or 1941.2. Civil Code §1942.4(a).

In addition, the implied warranty of habitability provides the tenant with a remedy. The tenant may either defend an unlawful detainer action or bring suit against the landlord for damages from the breach. Id .at 1297. The implied warranty does not require a landlord to ensure that leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but “bare living requirements” must be maintained. Green v. Superior Court, (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637. Where the landlord breaches the implied warranty, the tenant is not excused from paying rent; he or she remains liable for the reasonable rental value during the period that the defective condition existed. See Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 1298.

As of March 14, 2022, Tenant met the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) definition of a Person with Disabilities. Worthen Decl., ¶7, Ex. G. He is legally blind, has recently suffered a stroke, and has both a bad vertebrae in his spine and a newly operated knee. Worthen Decl., ¶7.

On December 14, 2022, Tenant signed a one-year lease for the Property effective the next day. Worthen Decl., Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A. Tenant agreed to pay $2,045 per month in rent and acknowledged the condition of the premises as described in an attached Statement of Condition. Worthen Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A. Tenant also acknowledged receipt of an attached booklet title “Information on Dampness and Mold for Renters in California.” Worthen Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A.

Tenant agreed to use and safeguard all fixtures and to immediately notify Landlord of any problem, malfunction, or damage with any item. Worthen Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A, §11.A. Tenant would be financially responsible for any repairs or replacements he caused, including damage that results from a failure to timely report a problem. Worthen Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A, §11.A.

Landlord has been in continuous violation of the Lease since December 15, 2022. Worthen Decl., ¶2(b). On September 11, 2023, Indoor Restore Environmental Services (“Indoor”) confirmed the presence of mold at the Property via a test by Nation Laboratories. Worthen Decl., ¶3(a), Ex. B. On September 15, the Department of Environmental Health (“DEH”) filed a complaint, Case No. COO386573 (“DEH Complaint”), for failure to address mold at the Property. Worthen Decl., ¶3(b).

The Property failed a September 21, 2023 HUD inspection based on a cracked wall and damage to the ceiling of a closet in the front room. Worthen Decl., ¶12, Ex. L. The ventilation needed weatherization, and the water heater made a knocking noise. Worthen Decl., ¶12, Ex. L. To date, repairs on these issues are not complete. Worthen Decl., ¶12.

Landlord issued Notices to Enter Dwelling for September 28, November 28-30, and various days in December 2023. Worthen Decl., ¶4(a), Ex. D.[4] Several of these notices cite mold, Section 8 inspections, and the need to make necessary, agreed, or mold remediation repairs. Worthen Decl., ¶4(a), Ex. D. The December 6 notice also cited the need to install “toilet and floor.” Worthen Decl., ¶4(a), Ex. D.

Rapid Response Mold Testing performed a mold inspection based on samples from December 15, 2023. Worthen Decl., ¶4(b), Ex. E. The Mold Inspection Report revealed fungal growth on the storage wall. Worthen Decl., ¶4(b), Ex. E.

On December 27, 2023, REHS Chief Environmental Health Specialist Yvette Boston (“Boston”) conducted the fourth mold test on the Property. Worthen Decl., ¶3(c), Ex. K. Because the Property failed the test, the test confirmed the Property still had ongoing mold issues. Worthen Decl., ¶3(c)[5].

The DEH Complaint remains open, and an inspector has confirmed ongoing mold presence. Worthen Decl., ¶7.[6] Boston’s inspection also confirmed the Property suffers from several building safety code violations, including a buckled subflooring due to improper flooring installation. Worthen Decl., ¶10.[7]

On October 4, 2023, Tenant visited his doctor based on shortness of breath, wheezing, chest pain, an enlarged aorta, and a multinodular goiter. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. Cedars Sinai prescribed Advair for a month and told him to use albuterol only if needed for shortness of breath. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. It also advised him to “consider environmental change” to see if he felt better “without particular environmental factor.” Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F.

A Mosaic Diagnostics Report based on a November 16, 2023 sample found above-normal levels of the mycotoxin Citrinin in Tenant’s bloodstream. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F.

Tenant’s utility bill increased by $420 from November 28 to December 15, 2023 due to the conditions at the Property. Worthen Decl., ¶6.

Property damage from the mold includes $2,000 in clothes, $1,320 in shoes, $450 in kitchen items, $800 in the dining room, $1,900 in the living room, $2,100 in Tenant’s bedroom, $300 in curtains, and $400 in pictures for a total of $9,270. Worthen Decl., ¶9, Ex. I.

Tenant has incurred various other expenses because of the mold. Worthen Decl., ¶10, Ex. J.

On September 1, 2023, Tenant told Landlord and management company 401k Realty that he has left the washing machine on and returned to witness flooding on at least three different occasions. Hinds Decl., ¶4. This flooding occurred between December 17, 2022 and February 28, 2023, months before Tenant told Landlord. Hinds Decl., ¶4. This caused mold and other damage to the apartment floor. Hinds Decl., ¶4. Tenant’s failure to report the floods before this damage occurred constituted a violation of the Lease. Hinds Decl., ¶4.

Based on the mold, Tenant filed a complaint with the Los Angeles County Dept, of Public Health (“DPH”), Case No. CO0389837 (“DPH Complaint”). Hinds Decl., ¶4. This led to inspections on November 9 and December 27, 2023, and January 11, 2024. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B. The DPH inspection report from January 11, 2024 confirmed that Landlord had removed the mold on the closet wall. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B. As for the soft flooring foundation in the kitchen and wash area, DPH referred the matter to the Building and Safety Southwest District. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B. DPH would therefore close the DPH Complaint. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B.

Landlord and 401k Realty incurred $11,000 in costs related to mold testing, mold abatement and flooring repair. Hinds Decl., ¶5, Ex. C. These costs may not reflect all costs that resulted from Tenant’s failure to timely communicate multiple floodings. Hinds Decl., ¶5.

Based on a monthly rent of $2,047, the rent for the days Landlord had to access the Property to repair the damage totaled $1,023.60. Hinds Decl., ¶6, Ex. D. Landlord has reimbursed Worthen for those days via a $400 check on November 28, 2023, and $623.60 check on January 5, 2024. Hinds Decl., ¶6, Ex. D.

On December 18, 2023, the Los Angeles County Development Authority sent Landlord notice that Tenant had issued a lease termination notice for the Property, effective December 31, 2023. Hinds Decl., Ex. J. The Development Authority would not provide housing assistance payments for any month after Tenant vacates the premises. Hinds Decl., Ex. J. Despite this notice, Tenant has not moved out of the Property. Hinds Decl., ¶15. He refuses to sign documentation allowing Section 8 to pay a portion of the rent. Hinds Decl., ¶15. Enjoining Landlord from collecting rent from Tenant will impact Hind’s income as a single father of two sons. Hinds Decl., ¶15.

On December 18, 2023, Department 47 issued a minute order compelling Tenant to serve Landlord with the Complaint, Summons, and any motion for a preliminary injunction. Hinds Decl., ¶7; RJN Ex. A. Tenant never served Landlord with this minute order. Hinds Decl., ¶7.[8]

On December 26, 2023, Louis Francis (“Francis”) filed a notice declaration for an ex parte application for a TRO/OSC. RJN Ex. C. He asserted that he called Landlord’s number, 310-863-4032, at 8:00 a.m. that day to give notice of the application. RJN Ex. C. Landlord’s call log does not show he received a call from Francis at that time or any time that day. Hinds Decl., ¶8, Ex. E.

Later that day, Alexandra Melgoza alleged via signed proof of service that she personally served the FAC and ex parte application for a TRO/OSC. Hinds Decl., ¶9; RJN Ex. D. In reality, Tenant only served an unsigned copy of the ex parte application by taping a copy to Landlord’s door. Hinds Decl., ¶9; RJN Ex. B. Landlord did not see this copy until December 28, 2023, the day after the hearing on the application. Hinds Decl., ¶9.

On December 27, 2023, Department 1 continued the hearing on the ex parte application to January 2, 2024, and ordered Tenant to give notice. RJN Ex. E. Instead of personally serving this minute order by personal delivery to Landlord, who lives above the Property, Tenant mailed it by certified mail. Hinds Decl., ¶10, Ex. F. Landlord did not receive the certified mailing until January 11, 2024. Hinds Decl., ¶10.

On January 3, 2024, Tenant filed a new, unsigned ex parte application but failed to personally serve it. Hinds Decl., ¶11; RJN Ex. G. The application included a declaration from Francis alleging that he called Landlord the day before at 9:57 a.m., and a proof of service asserting that Francis served the application via mail. Hinds Decl., ¶11; RJN Ex. G. Neither is true. Hinds Decl., ¶11. Tenant withdrew this application. RJN Ex. H.

On January 8, 2024, Octavio Lopez (“Lopez”) left Landlord a voicemail stating that Tenant would appear ex parte on January 10, 2024 seeking a TRO/OSC. Hinds Decl., ¶12. That hearing never went forward. Hinds Decl., ¶12.

On January 10, 2024, Lopez asserted via declaration he gave Landlord notice of an ex parte application for January 11 via phone at 8:50 a.m. Hinds Decl., ¶13; RJN Ex. I. This declaration’s signature was dated January 8, two days before the purported notice. Hinds Decl., ¶13; RJN Ex. I. In any case, Landlord’s call logs do not show any such call. Hinds Decl., ¶13, Ex. G.

On January 11, 2024, Tenant filed three versions of a proposed order with January 11 as the hearing date, along with a fourth with January 12 as the hearing date. Hinds Decl., ¶14; RJN Ex. J. Tenant did not serve Landlord with any of the proposed orders. Hinds Decl., ¶14.

Tenant seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining Landlord from collecting rent during the pendency of this action.

When the court granted Tenant’s ex parte application for a TRO/OSC, it ordered Tenant to personally serve Landlord with the Complaint, Summons, and moving papers by January 17, 2024. Landlord asserts that despite proofs of service on file, Tenant failed to personally serve Landlord with anything but the TRO/OSC. Opp. at 3.

The court need not discuss this issue in detail. It ordered that Landlord file his opposition by January 28, 2024. Because this was a Sunday, the deadline automatically moved to the next court day, January 29, 2024. See CRC 1.10. Landlord filed and personally served Tenant with his opposition that day. Because Landlord has generally appeared and the timely opposition addresses the merits of this application, no prejudice has been sustained and Tenant’s service defects are waived.

Tenant asserts that he has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the four causes of action in the FAC, which include collection of rent on a substandard dwelling, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, private nuisance, and a violation of unfair section 17200. App. at 4. The sole matter at issue is whether there is mold in Tenant’s unit rendering it uninhabitable.

Tenant presents evidence that mold remains in his unit. On September 11, 2023, Indoor confirmed the presence of mold at the Property. Worthen Decl., ¶3(a), Ex. B. Landlord issued several Notices to Enter Dwelling from September to December 2023, often for mold remediation repairs. Worthen Decl., ¶4(a), Ex. D. Despite this, tests confirmed the continued presence of mold as of December 15 and 27, 2023. Worthen Decl., ¶¶ 3(c), 4(b), Ex. E.

Tenant also presents evidence of harm caused by the mold. Tenant visited a doctor in October 2023 for shortness of breath, wheezing, chest pain, an enlarged aorta, and a multinodular goiter. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. Treatment advice included an environmental change to avoid particular environmental factors. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. A November 2023 test found above-normal levels of a mycotoxin Citrinin in his bloodstream. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. Because the mold endangered Tenant’s life, limb, health and safety, it rendered the Property a substandard building.

Because Tenant has only a private inspection from Rapid Response Mold Testing that there is mold at his unit as of December 15, 2023 (Worthen Decl., ¶4(b), Ex. E), he cannot meet the elements of Civil Code section 1942.4(a) excusing him from paying rent. A landlord of a dwelling may not collect rent if all of the following apply: (1) the dwelling, inter alia, is substandard per H&S Code section 17920.3; (2) a public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions; (3) the conditions have existed and not been abated for 35 days beyond the date of service of said notice; and (4) the conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant that violates Civil Code sections 1929 or 1941.2. Civil Code §1942.4(a).

Additionally, Landlord presents evidence that Tenant caused of the mold. Landlord asserts that Tenant admitted to leaving his washing machine unattended multiple times, only to find it caused flooding in his absence. Hinds Decl., ¶4. This flooding occurred between December 17, 2022 and February 28, 2023, but Tenant only told Landlord and 401k Realty months later, in September 2023. Hinds Decl., ¶4. Landlord asserts that this flooding and the inability to address it when it occurred caused the mold and structural damage. Hinds Decl., ¶4. Worden has not contested these allegations. The Lease requires Tenant to use and safeguard all fixtures and to immediately notify Landlord of any problem, malfunction or damage with any item. Worthen Decl., ¶2(a), Ex. A, §11.A. Tenant violated this provision when he used a washing machine that flooded his floor three separate times. Tenant violated the Lease again by not telling Landlord about each incident for nine to six months.

Assuming arguendo that Tenant did not cause the mold, Landlord presents evidence that he has addressed the issue. On January 11, 2024, DPH issued an inspection report concluding Landlord had removed the mold on the Property. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B. It therefore dismissed the DPH Complaint initiated by Tenant. Hinds Decl., ¶4, Ex. B. If Landlord ever lost the right to collect rent, he has regained it.

The second factor which a trial court examines is the interim harm that plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach, (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177. This factor involves consideration of the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. Id.

Tenant’s medical reports demonstrate the mold on the Property affected his health. Worthen Decl., ¶5(a), Ex. F. With the mold removed, Tenant will no longer sustain these injuries in the absence of a preliminary injunction.

As Landlord notes, granting the preliminary injunction would deprive him of a source of income. Hinds Decl., ¶15. He asserts that such income is important as a single father of two sons. Hinds Decl., ¶15.

[1] Landlord seeks judicial notice of various documents on file in this case (RJN Exs. A-O) and disputes the accuracy of some of these documents. Opp. at 5. The court need not judicially notice the filings because it is always free to review prior filings in the current action.

[2] The courts look to the substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.

[3] However, a court may issue an injunction to maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).

[4] Tenant miscategorizes them as eviction notices. Worthen Decl., ¶4(a).

[5] Tenant cites Exhibit C of his declaration in support of this point. Worthen Decl., ¶3(c), Ex. C. This exhibit consists of one page with the words “Health environmental Dept” and “Last test Dec 27,” and two blank pages. Worthen Decl., ¶3(c), Ex. C.

[6] Tenant cites Exhibit H for this assertion. Worthen Decl., ¶7, Ex. H. There is nothing between the cover pages for Exhibits H and I. Worthen Decl., ¶7, Ex. H.

[7] Although Tenant cites to Exhibit K, it merely confirms that Boston is a DEH Chief Environmental Health Specialist. Worthen Decl., Ex. K.

[8] Landlord misreads the minute order to require Tenant to serve Landlord with the minute order itself. Hinds Decl., ¶7.