Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 24STCP00492, Date: 2025-03-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP00492 Hearing Date: March 25, 2025 Dept: 85
Supporters Alliance for Environmental
Responsibility v. City of San Gabriel et al.,
Tentative decision on petition for writ of mandate: granted in part
24STCP00492
Petitioner Supporters Alliance for Environmental
Responsibility (“SAFER”) seeks a writ of mandate directing Respondents City of San
Gabriel (“City”) and its City Council (collectively, “City”) to set aside the certification
of a Mitigated Negative Declaration (“MND”) and associated approvals for the
Rubio Village Mixed Use Project (“Project”).
The court has read and considered the moving papers, joint opposition,
and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of
the Case
Petitioner SAFER commenced this proceeding on February 15,
2024. The verified Petition states a single
mandamus cause of action[1] for
violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) and alleges in
pertinent part as follows.
Real Party-in-Interest Rubio Village, LLC (“Rubio Village”) is
the Project applicant. Pet., ¶11. The Project consists of the construction of
three two- to six-story buildings with 225 residential multi-family units and
approximately 13,499 square feet (“sq. ft.”) of commercial use and 438 parking
spaces. The Project site is located on
2.9 acres at 201-217 South San Gabriel Boulevard in the City. The Project site is vacant. It is bisected by the Rubio Wash on the
southwest portion of the Project site.
Pet., ¶3.
On August 24, 2023, the City released for public review and
comment a draft Initial Study and MND (collectively, the “MND”) for the Project. Pet., ¶30.
In September 2023, SAFER submitted written comments to the City’s
Planning Commission that constituted substantial evidence supporting a fair
argument that the Project would have significant, unmitigated environmental
impacts requiring the preparation of an Environment Impact Report (“EIR”). Pet., ¶31.
When the City first considered the Project in 2006, it
concluded that an EIR was required and certified a Final EIR on April 3,
2007. Pet., ¶44. The Project entitlements expired in
2011. Pet., ¶44. In a 2015 Addendum, the City found that most
of the Project’s impacts would be the same as presented in the 2007 EIR, but
with the additional necessity of implementing greenhouse gas-related mitigation
measures. Pet., ¶44. Because the prior iterations of the Project
required an EIR, the current Project iteration also does as it is a larger
project. Pet., ¶46.
SAFER’s September 2023 comments described multiple ways the
MND’s analysis and mitigation failed to comply with CEQA, supported by expert
analysis from a biologist, Dr. Shawn Smallwood Smallwood (“Smallwood”). Pet., ¶39.
Smallwood found the MND’s discussion of biological resources was
insufficient because it failed to identify Project impacts. Pet., ¶40.
Smallwood’s associate, biologist Noriko Smallwood (“Noriko”),[2]
visited the Project site on September 7, 2023, at which time she identified 18
species of vertebrate wildlife, including three species with special status:
Western Gull, Allen’s hummingbird, and American kestral. Pet., ¶40.
Smallwood concluded that the MND mischaracterized the environmental
setting, failed to account for habitat loss, failed to assess impacts on
wildlife movements, failed to assess impacts on wildlife from Project-related
bird-window collisions, and contained mitigation measures which inadequately
addressed the Project’s impacts on biological resources. Pet., ¶41.
Noriko visited the Project site a second time on December
23, 2023, identifying 22 vertebrate species including five special-status
species: Western Gull, California Gull, Allen’s hummingbird, American kestrel,
and Red-shouldered hawk. Pet., ¶42. The City did not substantively address any of
Smallwood’s concerns. Pet., ¶43.
SAFER’s September comments included expert written analysis
by geologist Matt Hageman (“Hageman”) and Dr. Paul E. Rosenfeld (“Rosenfeld”)
of Soil/Water/Air Protection Enterprise (“SWAPE”). Pet., ¶48.
SWAPE found the MND failed to adequately evaluate the Project’s
construction and operation emissions, particularly for Diesel Particulate
Matter (“DPM”). Pet., ¶49. The Project would produce DPM emissions over
a period of 25 months. Pet., ¶50. Yet, the MND did not contain a health risk
assessment to evaluate the Project’s impact on human health for nearby
sensitive receptors. Pet., ¶50.
The Office for Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
(“OEHHA”) recommends that all short-term projects lasting two months or more be
evaluated for cancer risks to nearby sensitive receptors. Pet., ¶51. OEHHA also recommends that projects lasting
six months or more be evaluated for the duration of the project. Pet., ¶51.
OEHHA recommends estimating with an exposure duration of 30 years. Pet., ¶51.
The MND also did not require the City to use clean
construction equipment. Pet., ¶52. The MND failed to respond to SAFER’s comments
or provide any mitigation for air quality impacts. Pet., ¶53.
SAFER’s September 2023 comments included expert written
analysis by certified industrial hygienist Francis Offermann
(“Offermann”). Pet., ¶54. Offermann found the Project’s surroundings
face a baseline cancer risk of 467 per million, which is above South Coast Air
Quality Management District’s (“SCAQMD”) threshold of 10 per million. Pet., ¶55. Offermann concluded that the formaldehyde
emissions from the Project would be approximately 120 per million, also well
above the SCAQMD threshold of 10 per million, further exacerbating cancer
risks. Pet., ¶56. Offermann recommended specific mitigation
measures, including installing outdoor mechanical air ventilation systems,
installing high efficiency air filters, and using materials that comply with
California Air Resourced Board (“CARB”) guidance. Pet., ¶57.
The City failed to adequately address Offermann’s comments,
instead asserting the MND addressed the issues by requiring compliance with
CARB rules and Title 24 of the California Building Standards. Pet., ¶58.
However, Offermann assumed CARB compliance in his analysis. Pet., ¶58.
On November 13, 2023, SAFER made oral comments to the
Planning Commission reiterating its concerns.
Pet., ¶32. The Planning
Commission nonetheless adopted a resolution recommending the City Council
approve the Project. Pet., ¶32.
The City provided written notice that the Project would be
heard by the City Council on December 19, 2023.
Pet., ¶34. SAFER submitted
additional written comments providing evidence that the Project might have
significant, unmitigated environmental impacts.
Pet., ¶34. SAFER also provided
rebuttal comments to City’s arguments from the Planning Commission hearing. Pet., ¶34. That same day, the City provided SAFER with the
2007 EIR and the 2015 Addendum referenced in the MND. Pet., ¶¶ 33-34.
On December 19, 2023, SAFER submitted supplemental written
comments explaining why the MND was improper.
Pet., ¶35. That evening, the City
Council heard the Project, and SAFER commented orally. Pet., ¶35.
The City Council voted to certify the MND. Pet., ¶35.
SAFER submitted further written comments, with additional
expert opinion, reiterating its position.
Pet., ¶36. SAFER also submitted
oral comments to be read during the City Council hearing. Pet., ¶36.
On January 16, 2024, the City Council approved the Project and
uphold the prior approval of the MND.
Pet., ¶37.
On January 17, 2024, the City filed a Notice of
Determination (“NOD”) with the County Clerk reflecting approval of the
MND. Pet., ¶38.
SAFER contends that the City abused its discretion by
failing to proceed in the manner required by law in certifying a MND that does
not comply with CEQA and by failing to prepare an EIR. SAFER presented a fair argument supported by
substantial evidence that the Project may have an adverse impact related to
biological resources, indoor air quality, and DPM air impacts. Pet., ¶¶ 72-75.
Petitioner SAFER prays for a peremptory writ of mandate
directing the City to (a) set aside the MND and any and all permits or
approvals issued for the Project, (b) fully comply with CEQA prior to Project
approval, and (c) prepare, circulate, and consider an EIR to address all CEQA
violations related to Project approval.
SAFER also prays for mandamus directing the City and Real Party Rubio
Village to suspend all activities in furtherance of the Project unless and
until the City brings its actions into compliance with CEQA. Prayer, ¶2.
SAFER further prays for a preliminary and permanent injunction staying
the City’s approval of the Project.
Prayer, ¶1. Finally, SAFER prays
for attorney fees, costs of suit, and other and further relief as the court
deems just and proper. Prayer, ¶¶ 4-6.
B. CEQA
The purpose of CEQA is to maintain a quality environment for
the people of California both now and in the future. Public Resources (“Pub. Res.”) Code
§21000(a). “[T]he overriding purpose of
CEQA is to ensure that agencies regulating activities that may affect the
quality of the environment give primary consideration to preventing
environmental damage.” Save Our
Peninsula Committee v. Monterrey County Board of Supervisors, (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 99, 117. CEQA must be
interpreted “so as to afford the fullest, broadest protection to the
environment within reasonable scope of the statutory language.” Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259. Public
agencies must regulate both public and private projects so that “major
consideration is given to preventing environmental damage, while providing a
decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian.” Pub. Res. Code §21000(g).
The Legislature chose to accomplish its environmental goals
through public environmental review processes designed to assist agencies in
identifying and disclosing both environmental effects and feasible alternatives
and mitigations. Pub. Res. Code
§21002. The EIR is the “heart” of CEQA,
providing agencies with in-depth review of projects with potentially
significant environmental effects. Laurel
Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California, (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1112, 1123. An EIR describes
the project and its environmental setting, identifies the potential
environmental impacts of the project, and identifies and analyzes mitigation
measures and alternatives that may reduce significant environmental
impacts. Id. The EIR serves to “demonstrate to an
apprehensive citizenry that the agency has in fact analyzed and considered the
ecological implications of its actions.”
No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68,
86. Using the EIR’s objective analysis,
agencies “shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment...
whenever it is feasible to do so.” Pub.
Res. Code §21002.1.[3]
CEQA
does not require any particular procedure for agency approval of a
project. See Apartment Assn.
of Greater Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
1162. The Guidelines establish a
three-tiered process to ensure that public agencies inform their project
decisions with environmental considerations.
Davidson Homes v. City of San Jose, (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106,
112. The first tier, which is
jurisdictional, requires an agency to conduct a preliminary review to determine
whether CEQA applies to, or exempts, a proposed activity. Guidelines §§15060, 15061.
If
the project falls within CEQA’s purview and is not exempt, the agency moves to
the second step of preparing an initial study to determine if the project may
have a significant effect on the environment.
Guidelines §15063; Banker’s Hill, Hillcrest v. City of San Diego,
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 249, 257-58. The initial
study helps the applicant to modify a project, mitigating adverse impacts
before an EIR is prepared, thereby enabling the project to qualify for a
negative declaration and eliminate unnecessary EIRs. Guidelines §15063(c)(2), (c)(6).
If
there is no substantial evidence of any significant environmental effect, the
agency may adopt a negative declaration.
Pub. Res. Code §21080(c); Guidelines §15070(b). Where the initial study shows no substantial
evidence of any net significant environmental effect in light of revisions in
the project that would mitigate any potentially significant effects, the agency
may adopt a mitigated negative declaration.
Citizens for Responsible and Open Government v. City of Grand Terrace,
(“Citizens”) (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1331. A mitigated negative declaration states that
(1) the proposed conditions avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a
point where clearly no significant environmental effect would occur and (2)
there is no substantial evidence in light of the whole record before the agency
that the project, as revised, may have a significant effect on the
environment. Pub. Res. Code §21064.5; Citizens,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 1331-32.
The third tier is an EIR.
Generally, an EIR is required for any project that may have a
significant impact on the environment. Pub.
Res. Code §21080(d), 21100(a), 21151(a); Pala Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 556, 570-71. In reviewing the agency’s decision to adopt a
mitigated negative declaration in lieu of an EIR, the court applies the fair
argument test. When there is substantial
evidence supporting a fair argument that a proposed project may have a significant
effect on the environment, an EIR is required.
Citizens, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 1331.
The fair argument standard is a low threshold test. “[I]f a
lead agency is presented with a fair argument that a project may have a significant
effect on the environment, the lead agency shall prepare an EIR even though it
may also be presented with other substantial evidence that the project will not
have a significant effect.” Guidelines
§15064(f)(1); Arviv Enterprise v.
South Valley Area Planning Comm’n, (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1345-46. “[I]f there is a disagreement among experts over
the significance of an effect, the agency is to treat the effect as significant
and prepare an EIR.” Sierra Club v. Cty. of Sonoma,
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1317.
The petitioner bears the burden to present a fair argument
based on substantial evidence that an EIR is required. Ibid.
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “enough relevant information and
reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to
support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be
reached.” Guidelines §15384(a). The term
“substantial evidence” is evidence that is of a ponderable legal significance,
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. Stanislaus
Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus, (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 144.
Substantial evidence includes fact, a reasonable assumption predicated
upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact. Pub. Res. Code
§21080(e)(1). Argument, speculation, and
unsubstantiated opinion or narrative will not suffice. Guidelines §15384(a), (b).
Statements by attorneys regarding potential environmental
impacts do not constitute substantial evidence.
Pala Band of Mission Indians
v. County of San Diego, (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 556, 580. Nor is testimony from lay persons regarding
matters that require technical expertise.
Jensen v. City of Santa Rosa, (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 877,
894. For lay testimony to be substantial
evidence, the personal observations and experiences must directly relate to and
inform on the impact of the project under consideration. Newtown Preservation Society v. County of
El Dorado, (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 771, 791.
In the absence of a specific factual foundation in the record, dire
predictions by laypersons regarding the consequences of a project also do not
constitute substantial evidence. Porterville
Citizens for Responsible Hillside Development v. City of Porterville,
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 901. Substantial
evidence further cannot be imputed by a lack of evidence. Gentry
v. City of Murrieta, (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1382 (“lack of
study, standing alone, does not give rise to a fair argument that the [p]roject
will in fact have a significant cumulative effect”).
Whether substantial evidence exists is a question of
law. See California School
Employees Association v. DMV, (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 634, 644; Citizens,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 1331.
Review is de novo with a preference for resolving doubts in favor
of environmental review. Ibid. If substantial evidence exists supporting a
fair argument that an EIR was required, the court must set aside the agency ‘s
decision to adopt a mitigated negative declaration as an abuse of discretion
for failing to proceed in a manner required by law. Id. at 1332.
C. Standard of Review
A party may seek to set aside an agency decision for failure
to comply with CEQA by petitioning for either a writ of administrative mandamus
(Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §1094.5) or of traditional mandamus. CCP §1085.
A petition for administrative mandamus is appropriate when the party
seeks review of a “determination, finding, or decision of a public agency, made
as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given,
evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts
is vested in a public agency, on the grounds of noncompliance with
[CEQA].” Pub. Res. Code §21168. This is generally referred to as an
“adjudicatory” or “quasi-judicial” decision.
Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, (“Western
States”) (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 566-67.
A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all other actions
“to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a determination, finding, or
decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with [CEQA].” Where an agency is exercising a
quasi-legislative function, it is properly viewed as a petition for traditional
mandamus. Id. at 567; Pub. Res.
Code §21168.5.
At issue is SAFER’s CEQA challenge to a quasi-adjudicative
action taken by the City in certifying the Project’s MND and approving its
entitlements. This procedural setting,
where a hearing was required, is governed by administrative mandamus. In determining whether to grant a petition
for either administrative or traditional mandamus in a CEQA case, the court
decides whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Public entities abuse their discretion if
their actions or decisions do not substantially comply with the requirements of
CEQA. Sierra Club v. West Side
Irrigation District, (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 690, 698. Abuse of discretion is established if the
agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Western States, supra, 9
Cal.4th at 568; Pub. Res. Code §21168.5.
The court must adjust its scrutiny to the nature of the
alleged defect, depending on whether the claim is predominantly one of improper
procedure or a dispute over the facts. Vineyard
Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova,
(2007) 40 Ca1.4th 412, 435. Challenges
to an agency's failure to proceed in the manner required by CEQA, such as an
EIR’s failure to address a subject required to be covered or to disclose
information about a project's environmental effects, are subject to a less
deferential standard than challenges to an agency's substantive factual
conclusions. Id. at 435. In
reviewing these claims, the court must "determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures,
'scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA
requirements'." Id; Sierra
Club v. County of Fresno, (“Sierra Club”) (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502,
512. Whether issues are procedural or
factual “is not always clear”. Id. at
513. Clear-cut procedural issues—such as
whether “the agency provide[d] sufficient notice and opportunity to comment on
a draft EIR” and whether “the agency omit[ted] the required discussion of
alternatives”—are reviewed de novo and
“courts will invalidate an EIR that fails to meet them.” Id. at
512.
D. Statement of
Facts[4]
1. The Project
Description
Rubio Village is the
applicant for the Project. The Project consists of three buildings containing
225 residential units, approximately 13,449 sq. ft. of commercial uses, and 438
parking spaces. AR 634. Building A would be six stories tall and
contain 206 residential units, residential amenities, and retail and restaurant
spaces. AR 634-35. Building B would be two stories tall with three
townhouses. AR 635. Building C would be four stories tall with 16
residential units and a restaurant space. AR 635. The Project would provide 43,810 sq. ft. of
open space, with 27,048 sq. ft. on ground level and 16,762 sq. ft in a third-floor
courtyard. AR 638. The Project will require the removal of 16 of
the 44 existing trees at the Project site and the planting of 106 trees at
ground level, and another 25 trees in the third-floor courtyard. AR 638.
Construction would take an estimated 25 months. AR 639.
2. The Project Site
The Project site,
located at 201-207 South San Gabriel Boulevard, San Gabriel, California, is
undeveloped and fenced off. AR 630. Commercial uses border the Project site to
the north and east. AR 630. Commercial and high-density residential uses
border the Project site to the south. AR
630. Multi-family residential uses
border the Project site to the west. AR
630.
The Project site is
about 2.9 acres, with the Rubio Wash, a concrete-lined water course, running
through from the northwest to the southeast.
AR 630. The land is relatively
flat with low-lying shrubs, weeds, and non-native grasslands scattered
throughout, as well as 44 trees from 13 species. AR 630.
The Project site contains 12 Mature Class I Trees and five other mature
trees. AR 1043, 1053-54.
The Project site is
zoned as Planned Development Overlay, meaning any use that is permitted in
residential, commercial, or mixed-use zoning is permitted. AR 634.
The Project site was previously developed, but prior uses were
demolished. AR 660.
3. CEQA Review of
Prior Projects at the Project Site
On April 3, 2007,
the City Council approved and certified a Final EIR for a developer’s project
known as the San Gabriel Center Project located at the Project site. AR 627.
The San Gabriel Center Project was a mixed-used project consisting of
159 dwelling units, 14,190 sq. ft. of retail space, and 4630 sq. ft. of
restaurant uses. AR 627-28. The Final EIR for the San Gabriel Center
Project concluded that it would have no substantial environmental impacts. AR 531-39, 561-62.
In February 2015, a
different developer proposed, relying on an addendum to the San Gabriel Project
Final EIR, a substantially identical project known as the Rubio Village Project,
consisting of 159 dwelling units, 10,230 sq. ft. of retail space, and 6319 sq. ft.
of restaurant uses. AR 628. The Addendum for the 2015 project included
mitigation measures. AR 531. In May 2016, the same developer proposed a
modified version of the Rubio Village Project under a second addendum. AR 628.
In May 2022, Real
Party Rubio Village proposed a four-story mixed-use project, consisting of 179
residential units, 8038 sq. ft. of residential space, and 5956 sq. ft. of
restaurant use. The May 2022 project was
deemed exempt from additional CEQA review as it would have no additional
impacts associated with the revisions and the project was approved on May 10,
2022. AR 628.
4. The Initial
Study and the MND
On July 21, 2023,
the City received the Air Quality Technical Report for the Project analyzing
the air quality impacts of the Project.
AR 892-1011.[5] This report indicated that any air quality impacts
would be less than significant. AR
900-01.
In an undated Initial
Study Checklist, the City analyzed the potential environmental impact of the
Project. AR 3243-70.[6] The analysis found no impact to candidate,
sensitive, or special-status biological resource species. AR 3247, 3256. The analysis noted that the
Project site is predominately urbanized and built out and no species that are
candidate, sensitive, or special status species are known to exist in the local
vicinity. AR 3256. The Project would not result in any
significant adverse impacts to federal or state listed or other designated
species and further analysis on this topic is not required. AR 3256.
On August 24, 2023,
the City released the MND for the Project for public review and comment. AR 4208-09.
For air quality, the
MND concluded that both criteria pollutant levels and air quality would not
reach significant impact levels. AR
651-52. The MND noted sensitive
surrounding land uses primarily consisting of residential communities adjacent
to the Project site. AR 651. The MND
acknowledged that Project construction would generate DPM. AR 657.
The MND stated that DPM exposure health risks are primarily linked to
long-term exposure, and the DPM generated by Project construction only would be
temporary and episodic. AR 657-58. The DPM would dissipate quickly, and exposure
would be short. AR 658. The MND noted
that the OEHHA has not identified short-term health effects from
DPM. AR 658. Additionally, construction activities would
comply with California regulations limiting idling of heavy-duty construction
equipment to no more than five minutes, further reducing DPM emissions. AR 658.
For biological resources,
the MND relied on an Arborist Report and Arborist Addendum. AR 659.
The MND stated that no candidate, sensitive, or special-status species
are known to exist in the area around the Project site due to its location
within a built-out urbanized area. AR
660. Riparian habitats occur along
riverbanks and streams. No riparian
habitat or other sensitive natural communities are present at the Project site
or immediate vicinity because it is in an urbanized area, is surrounded by
urban uses, and was previously developed and demolished. AR 660.
No areas within the Project vicinity could serve as a wildlife corridor
or nursery site for native and migratory wildlife. AR
660. Further, the minimal onsite
vegetation (shrubs and non-native weeds) does not provide suitable nesting
habitat for migratory birds. AR 660.
There are five
mature trees on the Project site.
AR 660. Of these, four will be removed due to
encroachment and/or poor condition. The
Project must comply with the Migration Bird Treaty Act and the California Fish
and Game Code, which protect migratory birds as well as non-migratory birds,
resident game birds, and birds in the orders Falconiformes and Strigiformes
(birds of prey). AR 660-61. The removal of the four mature trees could
potentially impact nesting migratory birds.
AR 661.
To address any
impact on migratory birds, the Project will be subject to Mitigation Measure
(“MM”) BIO-1, which addresses construction activities during the nesting season. AR 661.
MM BIO-1 requires construction to occur outside of nesting season if
possible. AR 661. If not possible, MM BIO-1 requires completion
of a pre-construction nesting bird survey within three days prior to beginning
construction activities. AR 661. Then, a qualified biologist must prepare and
implement a nesting bird plan. AR 661. Compliance with the regulatory framework and MM
BIO-1 will reduce this potential impact to less than significant. AR 661.
5. SAFER’s First
Comment
The City received
three comment letters, including SAFER’s September 22, 2023 written
comment. AR 767-861. SAFER’s comment included a review of the
Project’s biological impacts by biologists Smallwood and Noriko. AR 778-809; see AR 4131-84.
Noriko visited the Project
site on September 7, 2023 for approximately two and a half hours. AR 778.
Noriko observed multiple species of bird, including: (a) Allen’s
Hummingbird, designated as a Bird of Conservation Concern[7]
by the Fish and Wildlife Service; (b) Western Gull, also a BCC; and (c)
American Kestrel, a bird of prey species.
AR 780, 782, 1969. In particular, Noriko observed three American
Kestrels socializing, hunting, and bathing in Rubio Wash. AR 780, 1969.
Smallwood reviewed
available wildlife databases and determined that approximately 118 special-status
species had been observed in the region (within 30 miles), 43 of which were
within 1.5 miles of the Project site. AR
790-93. Smallwood concluded that Noriko’s
survey and the modeling of her data show the Project site is valuable to
wildlife, including multiple species that are listed as rare by state and
federal resource agencies or protected by statute (birds of prey). AR 785.
Smallwood opined
that the MND inadequately evaluated habitat loss for special-status species,
interference with wildlife movement, and bird-window collisions. AR 793-801.
For wildlife habitat, he noted that the Project site is one of the last
remaining naturally covered open spaces in the region, and that its development
would further fragment wildlife habitats.
AR 793. He estimated a loss of
nesting capacity, based on known nest density in Rancho Cordova, of 42 nests,
which would be a significant impact and would likely result in a decrease of
139 birds per year. AR 793-94.
For wildlife
movement, Smallwood emphasized that the Rubio Wash is a key, neglected
feature. AR 794. He pointed out that volant wildlife would
have to fly farther between stopovers if the Project eliminated this open
space. AR 794. For window collisions, Smallwood predicted
that many birds would die each year from collision with the windows of the
Project buildings. AR 797. Smallwood finally predicted that vehicle
traffic from the Project, estimated at 11,130,450 miles per year, will result
in 610 wildlife fatalities per year.
AR 798-800.
Smallwood added that
MM BIO-1 does nothing to address impacts other than construction that disrupts
nesting and would be insufficient to adequately mitigate those impacts. AR 801-02.
He further opined that the MND
was based on an arborist’s report and an arborist is not qualified to analyze
effects on wildlife biology. AR 788.
SAFER’s comment also
included opinions from SWAPE’s Rosenfeld and geologist Hageman, and from certified
industrial hygienist Offermann. AR 811-21, 843-61. Offermann assessed the Project’s potential
indoor formaldehyde emissions, a known human carcinogen. AR
844, 846, 884. Indoor
formaldehyde emissions come primarily from composite wood products. AR 844-45.
Formaldehyde quantities are limited by California law. AR 845.
Offermann opined that even only using compliant construction materials,
the amount of formaldehyde present can harm humans without further
mitigation. AR 845. There are currently little to no current
formaldehyde emissions at the Project site, but emissions will begin at levels
that pose health risks once the Project is built. AR 846-47.
Offermann calculated that future residents would be exposed to an
increased cancer risk of 120 per one million due to inhalation of formaldehyde
off-gassing from composite wood products and this risk exceeds the CEQA
significant cancer risk of 10 per million.
AR 846. Offermann suggested
mitigation measures such as using different materials or the use of outdoor air
ventilation. AR 853.
SWAPE concluded that
the MND failed to adequately evaluate the Project’s air quality impacts, and
that the Project would result in significant human health impacts from
emissions of DPM. AR 818-20. SWAPE based its conclusion on review of the MND,
Rosenfeld’s expertise on health risk assessments, and guidance from OEHHA. AR 818-20.
SWAPE argued the City’s localized significance threshold (“LST”)
analysis is not applicable to DPM because LST analysis only applies to
“criteria air pollutants” while DPM is a “toxic air contaminant”. AR 819.
SWAPE pointed to OEHHA guidance on preparing health risk
assessments. AR 819.
6. The City’s Response to Comments
In October 2023, the
City issued its response to submitted comments.
AR 741-55,[8]
4194-4202.
In response to
Smallwood’s comments about habitat, the City asserted that the three species
observed by Noriko are not considered federally or state-listed, nor are they
listed as having critical habitat. AR
744. The potential for special-status
species at the Project site depends on suitable habitat, habitat connectivity,
and general disturbance in the area. AR
744. The Project site contains minimal
habitat value for the special-status wildlife species that Smallwood asserts
could inhabit it. AR 744. A species’ use of a site depends on a number
of factors, and detection of a species should not be based exclusively on the
length of observation. AR 745. Apart from observation, Smallwood’s modeling was
based on a Northern California location not similar to the Project site and therefore
his modeling projections are inapplicable.
AR 745.
As for wildlife
movement, the City asserted that compliance with the California Fish and Game
Code, the Migration Bird Treaty Act, and MM BIO-1 will bring potential impacts
to migratory birds below significant thresholds. AR 745, 4195.
The City reasserted that the Project site’s position surrounded by urban
uses and previous development and demolition left it not useful as a wildlife corridor
for native and migratory wildlife. AR
744-46, 4194-96. The Project would plant
106 trees on the ground floor which would allow wildlife to continue to use the
site as a stopover. AR 745, 4195. The City also specified that Rubio Wash would
remain as it is. AR 746, 4196. Both could be used as a stopover and Smallwood
did not present any evidence how the Project would cut wildlife off from
stopping over. AR 4196.
The City stated that
Smallwood’s prediction of 475 annual bird fatalities from bird-window
collisions is inapplicable because his data sources from multiple sources in
the United States are largely environmentally distinct from the Project’s
environment. AR 746. The City also disagreed with Smallwood’s
prediction for vehicle collision fatalities as based on unrepresentative data
from rural, undeveloped roadways, and therefore speculative and
misleading. AR 746.
For health risk
impacts, the City stated that neither SCAQMD nor other relevant agencies
require an evaluation of potential health risks from indoor formaldehyde
emissions. AR 4198. Offermann overstated the potential health
impacts from formaldehyde emissions by making false assumptions, including (1)
the Project’s construction materials would not be compliant with existing
regulation; (2) formaldehyde emissions from materials would be constant over 70
years; (3) residents would live in their units for 70 years; (4) residential
occupants and employees would inhale 20 cubic meters of air per day; and (5)
employees would work at the Project site for eight-hour days, five-day weeks,
and 50-week years. AR 751-52,
4201-02.
The City contended that
the correct assumptions are: (1) the materials will be compliant with
regulations; (2) formaldehyde emissions decrease with time; (3) lifetime risk
values for residents should be based on 350 days per year for only 30 years
according to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”); (4) the
average person inhales approximate 7.57 cubic meters of air per day according
to the American Lung Association; and (5) workers remain in a job a median of
only 4.1 years according to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. AR 752, 4202.
The City further responded
that future residents and employees are not considered CEQA impacts at all
because CEQA does not regulate environmental changes that do not affect the
public at large. AR 751, 4201. Jesse Fan (“Fan”), the CEQA project
manager and the City’s environmental consultant, concluded that Offermann’s
analysis was pure speculation, and the data, studies, and assumptions used were
not relevant or credible. AR 751-52,
4201-02. Finally, the City pointed out that Offermann’s own studies reflect
that California’s formaldehyde emissions regulations are successful at reducing
emissions to safe levels. AR 4199-4201.
7. The Planning
Commission Hearing
On November 13, 2023, the Planning Commission held a hearing
on the Project, at which SAFER reiterated its written comments. The Planning Commission voted to recommend
approval of the MND to the City Council.
AR 3895, 3927, 3958-60.
8. SAFER’s Second Comment
On December 14, 2023, SAFER submitted a second written
comment with further arguments from Smallwood and SWAPE, and SAFER submitted a
supplemental comment four days later. AR
4029-43, 4045-50, 4083-87. SAFER
maintained that there was a fair argument the Project might result in
significant environmental impact, requiring an EIR. AR 4083-87.
Smallwood argued the City improperly narrowed the definition of
special-status species to those that are threatened, endangered, or have a designated
critical habitat. AR 4029-30. Yet, Guidelines section 15380 also includes
“rare” in the term special-status species.
AR 4030. The City’s listed
factors used to conclude that the Project site has minimal value as a habitat –
namely, connectivity and general disturbance -- are not how wildlife habitat is
measured. In fact, special-species wildlife
often use disturbed environments. AR
4032. For wildlife movement, Smallwood
asserted that the City’s evidence, such as the previous usage of the Project site,
is largely irrelevant. AR 4039-41, 4109.
SWAPE asserted that state health risk policies, reflected in
agency guidance, require a health risk assessment because the Project’s
anticipated construction and operation duration exceed two-month and six-month
limits provided by agency guidance. AR
4027.
9. The City Council Hearing
On December 19, 2023, the City Council held a hearing on the
Project. AR 3897-08. SAFER reiterated its concerns orally. AR 3974-76.
City CEQA project manager Fan offered oral comments on the Project’s
biological resources impact. AR
3987-89. Fan asserted that the birds
mentioned by SAFER in its comments were Birds of Conservation Concern and birds
of prey that are the “common birds” that would generally use the urbanized
environment. AR 3988. They are commonly found in residential
backyards and urban features such as parks and ornamental architecture. AR. 3988-89.
The Project would provide more trees than currently exist onsite and
those birds are going to be thriving and come back to the Project site. AR 3989.
The City Council voted to adopt Resolution 23-73 approving
the MND and Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program, introduce Ordinance
No. 700, scheduled a second reading and adoption of the Ordinance at the next
regular City Council meeting on January 16, 2024, and excluded the public art
requirement for the Project. AR 3933.
10. SAFER’s Third Comment
SAFER submitted a third written comment on January 12,
2024. AR 4090-184. SAFER included details from a second survey
conducted by Noriko on December 23, 2023.
AR 4097-98. Noriko observed the
same special-status species she noted during the September 7, 2023 survey, plus
two additional special-status species: the California Gull and Red-Shouldered
Hawk. AR 4097-98, 4115. Combining the
two surveys, Noriko detected a total of 26 vertebrate wildlife species,
including five special-status species.
AR4114.
Smallwood argued that wildlife, even special-status species,
often make use of highly disturbed environments, and Noriko had observed
special-status species on the Project site.
AR 4032. Smallwood further argued
that “unsuitable habitat” is an impossible concept. AR
4031-32. He explained that the 106
new trees that will be planted could provide stopover opportunities for some
species of bird but may not be suitable for all types of birds, including birds
adapted to open ground environments. AR
4039. For window collisions, he reviewed
reports from over 200 buildings from a variety of structures and environments
to estimate a mean fatalities-per-square-meter-of-glass-per year. AR 4040.
11. The City Council’s Project Approval
The City Council held its regular meeting on January 16,
2024, for which SAFER again presented written comments. AR 4187-88.
The City Council voted to adopt Ordinance No. 700 by a vote of 5-0. AR 3943.
The City filed a NOD with the County Clerk the next
day. AR 1.
E. Analysis
Petitioner SAFER
seeks to set aside certification of the MND and Project approval, and to compel
the City to prepare an EIR under the fair argument standard.
1.
Standing
Standing
is a threshold issue necessary to maintain a cause of action, and the burden to
allege and establish standing lies with the plaintiff. Mendoza v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (“Mendoza”) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802,
810. As a general rule, a party must be
“beneficially interested” to seek a writ of mandate. Friends of Oceano Dunes, Inc. v. San Luis
Obispo County Air Pollution Control Dist., (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 957,
962 (citing CCP §1086). Likewise, to
seek declaratory relief, a party must be an “interested person.” CCP §1060.
An “interested person” means the same thing as a “beneficially
interested” person in mandamus cases.
Asimow, et al., Administrative Law (2018), Ch. 14, §14:6. The term
“beneficially interested” has been generally interpreted to mean that one may
obtain the writ only if the person has some special interest to be served or
some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the
interest held in common with the public at large. SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San
Jose, (“SJJC”) (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1053. The beneficial interest must be direct and
substantial. Ibid. A petition has no beneficial interest if he
or she will gain no direct benefit from the writ’s issuance and suffer no
direct detriment if it is denied. Ibid.
Respondents contend
that SAFER lacks standing to pursue the CEQA claim. SAFER has no existence independent of the laborers’ union. Since its creation in 2019 by SCDCL,[9] SAFER has received virtually all of its funding from the
laborers’ union, has been housed (rent free) in SCDCL’s offices, shares the
same telephone number [(626)350-6900] as SCDCL, and has had no employees of its
own. Opp. at 21-22.
Based on its tax
returns, SAFER received a total of $5,940,000 from the laborers’ union from
2019 through 2023, more than 95% of its total revenue over that period. In response to the IRS’s question whether
SAFER is “directly or indirectly affiliated with, or related to, one or more
tax-exempt organizations”, SAFER has always responded “Yes” and identified its
affiliate as the SCDCL. Opp. at 22-23.
SCDCL exercises total
control over SAFER. SAFER’s Bylaws
dictate that SCDCL’s “Business Manager [Jon P. Preciado] shall serve as a
Director and President of [SAFER], as Chairperson of the Board of Directors, by
virtue of his/her position or office.” RJN Ex. 10, p. 8. The Bylaws mandate that the other members of
SAFER’s Board and all of SAFER’s corporate officers shall be officers of the
laborers’ union council. Ibid.
That always has been the case, as
reflected in the lists of directors and officers on SAFER’s tax returns. The Bylaws state that there shall be “no
voting members” and the Board shall decide whether to admit any members at all.
RJN Ex. 10, p. 11. Hence, SAFER is nothing more than the
litigation arm of the laborers’ union.
Opp. at 23.
SCDCL’s express
mission is “to unite the local unions within its jurisdiction in order
to advance the economic and other interests of the membership and seek
continued improvements in the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreements.”
RJN Ex. 1. This is an economic objective, not one
directed to preserving the environment for the benefit of the general public,
and it is attributable to SAFER as well.
Opp. at 23.
An association has standing when it has a
beneficial interest in the litigation. Respect
Life South San Francisco v. City of South San Francisco, (“Respect Life”)
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 449, 454. The participation of incorporated and
unincorporated associations has become common in public interest-oriented
litigation. McKeon v. Hastings
College, (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 877, 892-93.
A petitioner in a CEQA case has a beneficial interest if the petitioner
will be adversely affected by the environmental impacts of the challenged project.
Bozung v. LAFCO, (1975) 13 Cal.3d
263, 272. An association suffering no
harm from the challenged agency action still has standing to sue as the
representative of its members (a) if at least one member of the association
could have met the private interest standard if the member sued individually,
(b) the interests the association seeks to protect are relevant to its purpose,
and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the individual
members’ participation in the lawsuit. San
Francisco Apartment Association v. City & County of San Francisco,
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 463, 472-74.
The Petition alleges that SAFER “has direct
and beneficial interests in Respondents’ compliance with laws bearing upon
approval of the Project...[and these] interests will be directly and adversely
affected by the Project, which…would cause substantial harm to the natural
environment and the quality of life in the surrounding community.” Pet., ¶17. SAFER has members who “live, work, and/or
recreate near the Project site and in the City.
They have been and will continue to be harmed by Respondents’ failure to
comply with the San Gabriel Municipal Code and to provide environmental
documents that accurately and fully inform interested persons of the Project’s
true impacts, and mitigate those impacts.” Pet., ¶28.[10]
SAFER argues that the City wrongly focuses on
SCDCL’s interests instead of SAFER’s interests as stated in the Petition. Even if SAFER were a labor union (which it is
not), labor unions can have standing to sue under CEQA. CEQA litigants often have competing economic
interests and, so long as an association’s member has standing in his or her
own right, this suffices to satisfy CEQA’s liberal standing requirements. Bakersfield Citizens v. City of
Bakersfield, (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1198. Union members breathe air and enjoy a healthy
environment as much as anyone else.
Indeed, construction workers are exposed to higher levels of emissions
from construction equipment, such as DPM, than the general public. Reply at 17-18.
While
SAFER should have presented evidence that one or more members live near the
Project site or will be performing construction on the Project, Respondents have
not fully rebutted the allegations of the Petition, even if the court were to consider
RJN Exs. 2-9. The unrebutted allegations of a petition can
suffice to support standing. Respect
Life, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at 454. SAFER has standing to pursue its claims.[11]
2. The Environmental Setting
Respondents note (Opp. at 6-7) that “[a]gencies
enjoy the discretion to decide, in the first instance how to realistically
measure the existing physical conditions without the proposed project, and the
selection of a baseline will be upheld when supported by substantial evidence.”
Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma, (2002) 86
Cal.App.5th 222-23 (citations omitted).
The Guidelines contemplate that the physical conditions existing when a
Notice of Preparation is published “will normally constitute the baseline
physical conditions” used to describe the environmental setting and to
determine the significant effects of a proposed project. Id. at
217; Guidelines §15125(a). Knowledge
of the baseline conditions is “critical to the assessment of environmental
impacts”, and special emphasis is “placed on environmental resources that are
rare or unique to that region and would be affected by the project.” Guidelines §15125(c).
Respondents contend that SAFER improperly
characterizes the Project’s environmental setting by suggesting that the
Project site is laden with mature trees and bisected by a watercourse, the
Rubio Wash. See Pet. Op. Br. at
6. This description omits important
characteristics of the Project site and fails to provide any evidence of rarity
or uniqueness of the environmental resources at the Project site, or how they
would be affected by the Project. In
fact, the Project site is more or less flat, fenced off on all sides, and the
topography is low-lying shrubs, weeds,
and non-native grasslands scattered throughout, as well as 44 trees from 13
species. AR 630. The site contains 12 Mature Class I Trees and
five other mature trees. AR 1043,
1053-54. Additionally, commercial
land uses are located to the north and east of the Project site; commercial
uses and high-density residential uses are located to the south of the Project site;
and multi-family residential uses are located west of the Project site. AR 630. The concrete-lined Rubio Wash drainage
channel traverses the Project site from the northwest to southeast. AR 630, 634.
Opp. at 7.
Thus, the Project site is a previously
developed, now vacant, flat lot with low bushes, weeds, and minimal
vegetation. This must be taken into
account when determining whether the City’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence. Opp. at 7.
SAFER argues that
the MND makes numerous assertions about the Project’s impact on biological
resources without substantial evidence. The record contains no evidence that
any surveys of the Project site were conducted by qualified biologists to
support the MND’s finding of the species that exist there. The City relied primarily on arborists’
reports from 2018 to assess impacts on biological resources (“Arborist
Report”). AR 659. However, “[a]n arborist is not a wildlife
biologist, and would be unqualified to survey the site as a wildlife
biologist.” AR 788. Under CEQA,
“opinions rendered by nonexperts” or experts without the proper credentials, do
not amount to substantial evidence. Jensen
v City of Santa Rosa, (2018) 23 Cal.App. 5th 877, 894. As such, the City’s conclusions regarding the
Project’s impacts on biological resources are not supported by substantial
evidence. Pet. Op. Br. at 14.
SAFER also argues
that the MND concludes, without citing any sources, that “[n]o species that are
identified as candidate, sensitive, or special status species are known to
exist in the local vicinity due to urbanized conditions. No impact [will] occur in this regard.” AR 660.
This is false. Noriko conducted surveys of the Project site on September
7 and December 23, 2023. She observed
wildlife, including special-status species, using the Project site to bathe,
hunt, and forage. AR 780, 4098. She saw
and photographed multiples species that the City implied should not be there.
Additionally, Smallwood’s analysis of databases revealed that numerous other
special-status species have been identified near the Project site. Given Smallwood’s analysis and Noriko’s
expert observations, it is clear that the Project site is habitat for
special-status species. Pet. Op. Br. at
14-15.
Nor is the City’s
attempt to reclassify special status species as “common birds” persuasive. At the December 19, 2023 City Council
meeting, the City’s representative insinuated that the special-status species
identified by Noriko are the “kind of common birds that would utilize the site
and just kind of the general site in the urbanized environment.” AR 3988.
This is misleading. The birds
identified on or around the Project site are not merely common birds, and the
fact that they can rarely or sometimes be found in backyards does not qualify
them as common. AR 4109. Such comments by the City do not rise to
substantial evidence because they are not substantiated by facts in the
record. Pet. Op. Br. at 15.
SAFER argues that the
City further asserted that the Project site contains minimal habitat value for
special-status species because such analysis “depends on suitable habitat types
and variability, habitat connectivity, and general disturbance in the area” and
implied the absence of habitat value because the site is a “vacant dirt lot
with low-lying shrubs weeds, and non-native grasslands scattered throughout the
Project site.” AR 744-45. This is incorrect.
Noriko’s surveys clearly demonstrate that the Project site provides
substantial habitat value as evidenced by the observed hunting, foraging, and
bathing on the Project site. AR 780,
4098. Additionally, the City
misconstrued the legal standard by minimizing the Project site’s value as
habitat. Smallwood explained that, while
the City’s response relies on habitat connectivity and general disturbance in
the area as contributing factors to a determination of whether the site
provides value to wildlife, it cites no evidence in support of these
factors. In fact, special status species
often make use of disturbed environments.
AR 4032.
SAFER argues that
CEQA compels the City to determine whether the Project will result in impacts
to special status species. Noriko
positively identified special-status species onsite, clearly utilizing the site
as habitat. As such, the City’s conclusion that the Project site does not have
either special-status species or habitat value is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Pet. Op. Br. at 15.
Respondents respond that an initial study
supporting a negative declaration should provide the basis for concluding that
the project will not have a significant effect on the environment. Gentry v. City of Murrieta, supra, 36
Cal.App.4th at 1378 (citation omitted). The initial study must disclose the
data or evidence upon which the person conducting the study relied. Ibid.
However, the initial study is not required to disclose sufficient
evidence to support each of its findings.
Ibid. “There is ‘no authority…that
an initial study is inadequate unless it amounts to a full-blown EIR based on
expert studies of all potential environmental impacts. If this were true, the
Legislature would not have provided in CEQA for negative declarations.” “The ultimate issue is not the validity of
the initial study, but rather the validity of the lead agency’s adoption of a
negative declaration.” Id. at
1379. Even if the initial study fails to
cite evidentiary support for its findings, it remains the petitioner’s burden
to demonstrate substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of significant
environmental impact. Id. “An absence of evidence in the record on a
particular issue does not automatically invalidate a negative declaration. Id. ‘The lack of study is hardly evidence that
there will be a significant impact.’” Id. Opp.
at 11.
A specialized expert is not always necessary
to support an initial study. “Sometimes,
however, expert planning personnel may be entitled to conclude without
additional evidence or consultation that a project will not have a particular
environmental impact.” Gentry v. City
of Murrieta, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1380. Opp. at 11-12. This is not such a case. The MND discloses only an evaluation of
potential biological resource impacts in an Arborist Report and Arborist
Addendum. AR 659. The court agrees with SAFER that the City
cannot rely on the Arborist’s Report to evaluate special-status species,
wildlife movement, and habitat loss. Nor
can the City rely on planning personnel to analyze these impacts.
As discussed post, SAFER fails to
present substantial evidence to support a fair argument of significant adverse
impacts to special-status species, wildlife movement, or habitat loss. Smallwood’s report focused on species
hunting, foraging, and bathing in the Rubio Wash (which will remain on the
Project site) and he presented no evidence that identifies that nests of these
species were observed on the Project site.
He further fails to show that any species observed were special-status
species. At the December 19, 2023 City
Council meeting, the City’s CEQA project manager Fan clarified that the birds
identified by Noriko are commonly found in residential backyards, parks and on
ornamental landscaping. AR 3988. Of the
44 trees onsite, 16 would be removed and 17 would be protected in place. A total of 106 trees would be planted on the
ground floor, and 25 trees would be planted on the third-floor courtyard,
providing more trees than are currently located on the site. AR 638, 3989. Opp. at 12.
These facts would constitute
substantial evidence that the Project will have no substantial adverse impacts
to special-status species, wildlife movement, and habitat loss if an expert
wildlife biologist so opined.[12] The
City had no such expert. The MND therefore is not supported by substantial
evidence that the Project will not have significant adverse impacts on
biological resources.
4. The MND Lacks Substantial Evidence
That MM BIO-1 Will Mitigate the Project’s Significant Adverse Impacts on Birds to
Less Than Significant
The Initial Study emphasized that the
Project would be required to comply with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”)
and California Fish and Game Code, which would protect migratory birds. The Initial Study noted that impacts would
potentially be significant with respect to the removal of, and encroachment on,
trees that provide a nesting habitat for migratory birds, and therefore the
Project would be subject to compliance with MM BIO-1, which addresses
construction activities during the nesting season. AR 661.
MM BIO-1 provides that during construction,
grubbing, brushing or tree removal shall be conducted outside of the State
identified nesting season for migratory birds -- i.e., typically March
15-September 1, if possible. If the
construction activities cannot be conducted outside the nesting season, a
pre-construction nesting bird survey within and adjacent to the Project site
shall be conducted by a qualified biologist within three days prior to
initiating construction activities. AR 661.
MM BIO-1 also requires the preparation and implementation of a nesting
bird plan by a qualified biologist if active nests are found during the
pre-construction nesting bird survey. AR
661.
SAFER argues that MM BIO-1 is not the
cure-all for potentially significant impacts on biological resources. MM BIO-1 was designed to “address potential
impacts to migratory birds,” thereby restraining the adequacy of this measure
to a specific wildlife population. MM
BIO-1 was not formulated to account for the numerous non-migratory wildlife
species observed on or around the Project site.
Pet. Op. Br. at 16.
Even if MM BIO-1 could address impacts to
non-migratory wildlife, requiring preconstruction surveys without first
completing a detection survey reduces the adequacy of the measure. Based
on his expertise in conducting nest surveys and knowledge of survey protocols
established by both state and federal wildlife departments, Smallwood found
that the proposed mitigation measure of conducting preconstruction surveys
would be insufficient to adequately mitigate significant impacts to nesting
birds, “[r]egardless of whether construction timing avoids the nesting season.”
AR 801-02. Smallwood explained:
“Preconstruction surveys are only intended as last-minute, one-time salvage and
rescue operations targeting readily detectable nests or individuals before they
are crushed under heavy construction machinery. Because most special status
species are rare and cryptic, and because most bird species are expert at
hiding their nests lest they get predated, most of their nests will not be
detected by preconstruction surveys without prior support of detection surveys…
Locating all of the nests on site would require more effort than is committed
during preconstruction surveys.” AR
801-02. Pet. Op. Br. at 16; Reply at 12-13.
SAFER adds that MM BIO-1 cannot reduce the
other adverse effects on biological resources.
Issues related to habitat fragmentation, impediments to wildlife
movement, and the Project site’s decreased productive capacity will not be reduced
to levels below significance because MM BIO-1 does not address them. AR 802.
Even with implementation of MM BIO-1, unaddressed impacts to biological
resources will remain significant and unmitigated. Pet. Op. Br. at 16.
Respondents responds that SAFER wrongly
concludes that MM BIO-1’s mitigation measures are focused on migratory
birds. The Initial Study emphasized that
the Project would be required to comply with the MBTA and Fish and Game Code,
which would protect migratory birds. AR
661. Additionally, the Initial Study noted that the Fish and Game Code extends
protection to non-migratory birds identified as resident game birds (Fish and
Game Code §3500) and to any birds in the orders Falconiformes or Strigiformes
(birds of prey) (Fish and Game Code §3503).
AR 661. Further, City staff’s
October 18, 2023 response noted that the Project site was previously developed
and prior uses were demolished, and no areas within the Project vicinity could
function as a wildlife corridor or nursery site for native wildlife. AR 4196.
The Rubio Wash would remain in place, and 106 trees would be planted on
the ground floor, all of which would serve as an opportunity for birds to
utilize the Project site as a stopover site. AR 4195-96. Staff further added that there was no evidence
the Project would cut wildlife off from a stopover. Id.
Accordingly, the mitigation measures proposed by the City adequately
reduce potential significant impacts to wildlife movement. Opp. at 13.
The City’s evidence might suffice to mitigate impacts on both migratory and
non-migratory birds if (a) it was supported by a wildlife biologist and (b) the
City answered Smallwood’s point about the inadequacy of preconstruction
surveys. It has not done so, and the MND
lacks substantial evidence that MM BIO-1 is sufficient to mitigate the
Project’s significant adverse impacts on birds to less than significant.
5. SAFER Has Not Presented Substantial Evidence Supporting a Fair
Argument that the Project May Have Significant Adverse Impacts on Biological Resources
Although the MND is not supported by substantial evidence that the Project will not
have significant adverse impacts on biological resources, or that MM BIO-1 will
mitigate the Projects significant adverse impacts on birds to less than
significant, this does not mean that an EIR is required. SAFER must show substantial evidence
supporting a fair argument that the Project may have significant adverse
impacts. A lack of study alone
does not give rise to a fair argument that a project will have significant
impacts. But it does “‘enlarge the scope’
of the fair argument which may be made ‘based on the limited facts in the
record.’” Gentry v. City of Murrieta,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1382 (citation omitted).
SAFER contends that it has presented
substantial evidence establishing a fair argument that the Project may have significant adverse impacts
on biological resources. SAFER submitted comments from an expert wildlife biologist,
Smallwood, who found that the Project may result in significant impacts to
special-status species, wildlife habitat, and wildlife movement based on
observations of the Project site, experience, and relevant scientific
studies. These expert opinions and
findings sufficiently qualify as substantial evidence. SAFER adds that the City made no
effort to survey the Project site for wildlife in response to Smallwood’s
comments. Pet. Op. Br. at 10, 14; Reply at 7.
a. There Is Not Substantial Evidence
Supporting a Fair Argument That the Project May Have Significant Adverse
Impacts on Special-Status Species
SAFER notes that courts have
repeatedly held that expert opinions qualify as substantial evidence. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of
Supervisors, (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 229, 249. “[A] lead agency or court may weigh evidence
on the whole record in determining the preliminary issues of whether evidence
is ‘substantial’ and thus deserving of consideration”. Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento,
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903, 935.
This “limited weighing of evidence to determine admissibility in an
environmental debate must not be confused with a weighing of some substantial
evidence against other substantial evidence.” Id. “[F]or example, if an expert purporting to a
hold a Ph.D. testifies as to the environmental effect of a project, a lead
agency or court may properly consider and ‘weigh’ evidence in the record
showing that the expert never attended college and his Ph.D. is phony.” Id.
SAFER argues that Smallwood
holds a Ph.D. in ecology and has authored numerous articles on “animal density
and distribution, habitat selection, wildlife interactions with the
anthrosphere, and conservation of rare and endangered species.” AR 778. Respondents do not take issue with
Smallwood’s qualifications as an expert, only the substantial nature of the
evidence he provided. Reply at 7-8.
During
her two site surveys, Noriko observed 26 species of vertebrate wildlife,
including five special-status species.
AR 4114. The special-status
species included (1) the Red-shouldered hawk and American kestrel, both of
which are protected by Fish and Game Code section 3503.5, (2) the California
gull, which is listed as a Bird of Conservation Concern by USFWS and is listed
on the Watch List of DFW and (3) Allen’s hummingbird, another Bird of
Conservation Concern. AR 780, 3505,
4115. Additionally, Smallwood’s review
of other publicly available wildlife occurrence databases found that 118
special status species have been identified in the region of the Project, with
43 observed within 1.5 miles of the site. AR 790-93. Noriko’s eyewitness observations refute the
City’s assertion that no special-status species are known to exist at or around
the Project site because of its urbanized condition. AR 660.
Pet. Op. Br. at 11.
The
City’s responses claimed that the species identified by Noriko are not
federally- or state-listed, nor are they listed as having critical habitat at
the Project site. AR 744. SAFER contends this is both incorrect and
misconstrues the legal standard. CEQA’s consideration of potentially significant
impacts on wildlife is not limited to state- or federally-listed wildlife
species or whether the Project site is identified as a critical habitat. Rather, CEQA requires an analysis of a
project’s impact on “any species identified as a candidate, sensitive, or
special status species…by” DFW or USFWS.
Guidelines App. G §(IV)(a) (emphasis added). Smallwood explained that the Allen’s
hummingbird, Western gull, and California gull are all listed by USFWS as Birds
of Conservation Concern. AR 780. USFWS lists such species pursuant to its
directive to “identify species, subspecies, and populations of all migratory
nongame birds that, without additional conservation action are likely to
become candidates for listing under the Endangered Species Act”. 16 U.S.C. §2912(a)(3); see 86 Fed.
Reg. 32056-01 (June 16, 2021). In
addition, the American kestrel and Red-shouldered hawk are classified as birds
of prey, a valuable resource protected under state law. See Fish and Game Code §§ 3503,
3503.5, 3505, 3513; see also 14 CCR §§ 251.1, 652, 783-786.6. The City’s representative agreed that the
identified species were respectively Birds of Conservation Concern and birds of
prey at the December 19, 2023 City Council meeting. AR 3988 (stating that these species are
common birds). Pet. Op. Br. at 11.
In
his November 28, 2023 letter, Smallwood argued that the City’s response
ultimately “pigeon-hole[d] the meaning of special status species to those
species listed by the state or federal governments as Threatened or Endangered
or as those with designated critical habitat. However, special status species
include more species than claimed in the response”; it includes rare species. A “rare species” is defined as a species not
presently threatened with extinction but is small in numbers that it may become
endangered if its environment worsens or is likely to become endangered in the
foreseeable future throughout a significant portion of its range and may be
considered threatened. Guidelines
§15380. AR 4029-30. Smallwood considers birds of prey protected
by Fish and Game Code section 3503.5 necessarily to be rare. Pet. Op. Br. at 11.
Respondents
argue that SAFER ignores previous environmental analyses of the Project site
that did not find any impact as to special-status species. For example, the
Draft EIR prepared in June 2006 by the City’s environmental consultant
indicates that the project would not have a substantial adverse effect on any
species identified as a candidate, sensitive, or special status species. AR 263, 483-84. The Final EIR in 2007 indicated there would
be no impacts to special status species, habitats, or wildlife movement, also
noting that the Project site does not have an adopted habitat conservation
plan, natural community conservation plan or other habitat conservation
plan. AR531-39, 561-62. Moreover, the mitigation measures adopted in
connection with the approval of the San Gabriel Center Project were included in
the Addendum conducted in 2015. AR
531. Other environmental analysis
conducted by the City found no impacts to candidate, sensitive or special-status
species. AR 3247, 3256. Opp. at 8.
Respondents
notes that a species is “rare” under Guidelines section 15380(b)(2) when either
(a) although not presently threatened with extinction, the species is existing
in such small numbers throughout all or a significant portion of its range that
it may become endangered if its environment worsens, or (b) the species is
likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range and may be considered ‘threatened’ as that
term is used in the Federal Endangered Species Act. Nassiri v. City of Lafayette, (“Nassiri”)
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 910, 925. Opp. at
9.
Of
the 18 species Noriko observed on September 7, 2023, only three were noted to
have been onsite: Anna’s Hummingbird (no status stated); Allen’s Hummingbird
(Bird of Conservation Concern); and American Kestrel (bird of prey). AR 780.
No notes were made that the Western Gull was seen onsite. See id. As in Nassiri, Smallwood never discussed the
Guidelines definition of rare and never asserted that the species observed at
the Project site are rare under Guidelines section 15380(b)(2). Id.
Further, SAFER presented no evidence that the Project site is a critical
habitat for any of these three species or how the environmental setting is
unique or rare. Rather, Smallwood leapt
to the conclusion that “…the project would contribute further to habitat
fragmentation in an environmental setting in which wildlife would be devastated
by the loss of one of the region’s last patches of naturally covered open
space.” AR 793. Opp. at 9.
SAFER
replies that special-status
species are those which “may be protected as threatened or endangered under
state or federal law or are otherwise being tracked by the California
Department of Fish and Wildlife (or the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service) or a private organization such as the
California Native Plant Society because the species are declining at a rate
that could lead to their being listed or are otherwise sufficiently rare or
threatened enough to warrant monitoring.”
Practice Under the California Environmental Quality Act, (2d. ed.
Cal. CEB 2024 § 20.53 (emphasis added). The
Guidelines require agencies to consider whether a project may “[h]ave a
substantial adverse effect . . . on any species identified as . . . special
status [] in local or regional plans, policies, or regulations, or by the
California Department of Fish and Wildlife or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.” Guidelines App. G, §(IV)(a)
(emphasis added). This is broader than
the requirement to analyze potential impacts to rare species (App. G,
§(XXI)(a)), which carries a definition distinct from “special status species.”
Guidelines §15380(b)(2). Reply at 8-9.
According to SAFER, Respondents mistakenly
conflate the meaning of “special status” and “rare” in arguing that SAFER
failed to demonstrate that the Project may have a significant impact on special-status
species because Smallwood “never asserted that the species observed on the
Project site are rare.” SAFER is not
required to demonstrate that the species Noriko observed are rare. It is sufficient that they have been
identified as special status. The
Allen’s hummingbird, Western gull, and California gull have been identified by
USFWS as Birds of Conservation Concern. AR
780. Birds of Conservation Concern are
those birds “that without additional conservation action are likely to become
candidates for listing under the Endangered Species Act.” AR 770. As such, the three species qualify as
special-status species as USFWS continues to monitor these birds for
conservation attention. Id. Other birds observed by Noriko, including the
American kestrel and Red-shouldered hawk, similarly qualify as special-status
species because they are protected by state law under the Fish and Game Code.
AR 780, 4115; Fish and Game Code §§ 3503, 3503.5, 3505, 3513; see also
14 CCR §§ 251.1, 652, 783-86.6. Based on
Noriko’s observations of the five special-status birds during her surveys,
Smallwood concluded that the Project would result in significant adverse
impacts on these species despite the City’s proposed mitigation measure. AR 794, 797.
Reply at 9.
SAFER contends that Respondents’ reliance on Nassiri,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at 910, demonstrates not only that they misunderstand
the difference between rare and special-status species, but also the standard for
challenging an MND. In Nassiri,
the petitioner was required to provide substantial evidence that rare species habitat
existed on the project site to show that the project did not qualify for CEQA’s
Class 32 Infill Exemption. Id.
at 924-25. Thus, the petitioner was
required to first demonstrate that the species observed on the project site
were rare under Guidelines section 15380(b)(2).
Id. The Legislature
created a statutory scheme that categorically exempts infill projects from CEQA
(Pub. Res. Code § 21084(a)), which comes with limited exceptions that
disqualify a project from proceeding under an exemption, including the
existence of habitat value for rare species on the project site. Guidelines §15332(c). That standard does not apply to challenges to
an MND where the bar for preparing an EIR is much lower. See Meija v.
City of Los Angeles, (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 322, 332. As an infill project is not at issue in this
case, SAFER is not required to demonstrate that the species observed at the
Project site are rare as that term is defined in Guidelines section 15380. Reply at 9-10.
The court agrees that the fair argument standard
for an EIR is much lower than the evidence required in Nassiri and that
a species need not be rare to be special status. However, SAFER’s evidence of special status
is suspect. The Guidelines requires
agencies to consider whether a project may “[h]ave a substantial adverse effect
. . . on any species identified as a candidate…or special status” by
DFW or USFWS. Guidelines App. G,
§(IV)(a) (emphasis added). This may be
broader than the requirement to analyze potential impacts to rare
species (Guidelines App. G, §(XXI)(a); Guidelines §15380(b)(2)), but SAFER does
not show that any of Allen’s hummingbird, Western gull, and the California gull
is identified by either DFW or USFWS as special status.
This leaves whether DFW or USFWS has
identified any these species as a “candidate”.
USFWS has identified these three species as “Birds of Conservation
Concern.” AR 780. SAFER argues that USFWS
lists Birds of Conservation Concern pursuant to its directive to “identify
species…of all migratory nongame birds that, without additional conservation
action are likely to become candidates for listing under the Endangered
Species Act”. 16 U.S.C.
§2912(a)(3). See AR 770. But “likely to become candidates” is not the
same as “candidates”. The species must
be a candidate under Guidelines App. G, §((V)(a).
According to Smallwood, “special status
species” is a term used in the scientific community for species that are
sufficiently rare that they require special consideration and should be, or
have been, listed as rare, threatened, or endangered by the federal or state
government. AR 770. Perhaps, but the failure of DFW or USFWS to
identify a Bird of Conservation Concern as special status or as a candidate is
dispositive of the special status issue under Guidelines section 15380. SAFER also does not show that any of the
identified species is endangered, rare, or threatened under Guidelines section
15380. Smallwood’s
conclusion that Birds of Conservation Concern are necessarily rare did not mean
they meet the definition of “rare” in Guidelines section 15380(b)(2). See Nassiri, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at 924 (species likely to become a candidate for listing
is not necessarily a species that currently meets the definition of rare in
Guidelines section 15380(b)(2)).[13]
Not
only are the species observed by Noriko not federally or state-listed, the City’s
responses pointed out that the Project site does not have the potential to
provide habitat for special species. AR
4194. The Initial Study noted that the
Project site was previously developed and prior uses demolished. It also found that no areas within the Project
vicinity could function as a wildlife corridor or nursery site for native and
migratory wildlife. The minimal onsite
vegetation (i.e., low shrubs and non-native weeds) does not provide a
suitable nesting habitat for migratory birds.
AR 660.
The
Project site is surrounded on all sides by urban uses and contains minimal
habitat value for the special-status wildlife species that Smallwood asserted
could inhabit it. AR 4195. A species use of a site depends on multiple
factors – e.g., suitable habitat types and variability, habitat
connectivity, and general disturbance in the area. AR 4195. The detection of a species should not be
based exclusively on the length of the survey.
AR 4195. Additionally,
Smallwood’s modeling and projections do not disclose the actual presence of
candidate, sensitive, or special-status species. His modeling also is based on an analysis of
annual grasslands in the Altamont Pass of northern California, which is not at
all similar to the Project site. AR
4195. Opp. at 10.[14]
Smallwood’s
comments are not substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the
Project may have a potentially substantial adverse effect on special
species.
b. There
Is Not Substantial Evidence Supporting a Fair Argument that the Project May
Have Significant Adverse Impacts on Wildlife Habitat
SAFER
argues that Smallwood identified several potential impacts to wildlife habitat
that will result from the Project. AR
793-94. Habitat fragmentation and loss
have been recognized as the most likely leading cause of a documented 29%
decline in overall bird abundance across North America in the last 48
years. AR 793. The Project area has undergone severe habitat
fragmentation, and the Project would further contribute to that fragmentation
by the loss of one of the region’s last patches of naturally covered open
space. AR 793. Habitat loss results in the numerical decline
in existing wildlife, and also the “permanent loss of productive capacity”. Id.
Smallwood
noted that the two means of estimating loss of productive capacity are surveys
to count the number of nests and chicks and an estimate based on known total
nest density elsewhere. AR 793. Smallwood chose the latter. He relied on two
studies of grassland/wetland/woodland sites in other states and surveyed a site
in Rancho Cordova for conditions closer to California. AR 793.
He arrived at an estimate of 42 bird nests at the Project site and
inferred an annual loss of productivity at the Project site of 139 birds. AR 794.
SAFER notes that the City contended that impacts to wildlife habitat
will fall below significance thresholds through the implementation of MM BIO-1. AR 745.
However, MM BIO-1 focuses primarily on migratory bird species, not the
species with habitats at the Project site.
Pet. Op. Br. at 11-12.
This is not substantial evidence. As stated ante, the Project site
contains minimal habitat value. AR
4195. The Initial Study noted that the
Project site was previously developed, and prior uses were demolished. It also found that no areas within the
Project vicinity could function as a wildlife corridor or nursery site for
native and migratory wildlife. The
minimal onsite vegetation (i.e., low shrubs and non-native weeds) does
not provide a suitable nesting habitat for birds. AR 660.
This is true for all birds, not just
migratory birds. Of the 18 species
Noriko observed on September 7, 2023, she only noted three on the Project site:
Anna’s Hummingbird (no status stated); Allen’s Hummingbird (Bird of
Conservation Concern); and American Kestrel (bird of prey). AR 780.
The City’s responses noted that Smallwood’s reliance on other studies to
calculate the loss of 42 nest sites is based on an analysis of annual
grasslands of the Altamont Pass, which is in northern California and is not similar
to the Project site. AR 4195. This is not substantial evidence.
Finally, MM BIO-1 requires the Project to try
to avoid the nesting season for construction.
If it could not, a bird survey would be performed and a nesting bird plan
of buffering, monitoring, and reporting would be developed for active
nests. AR 4195. Contrary to SAFER’s argument, this mitigation
measure would apply to all bird nests, not just migratory birds. It would not impact long-term loss of habitat
but would mitigate habitat loss during construction.
SAFER
replies that Respondents, citing no authority, claims that SAFER “presented no
evidence as to what would constitute a critical habitat for each of these
species or how this environmental setting is unique or rare”. There was no need for Smallwood to opine on
whether the environmental setting of the Project site constitutes critical
habitat, or that it is unique or rare.
Smallwood found that the Project site currently represents “one of the
region’s last patches of naturally-covered open space.” AR 793. He also noted
that “Noriko’s survey proves that the site is valuable to wildlife . . . [and t]he
animals she saw at the site would not be there if the site was of no
value.” AR 785. As a result, he predicted the loss of 42 nest
sites and 139 birds per year, significantly impacting wildlife habitat. AR 794.
The City disagreed, claiming that the Project site contains minimal
habitat value for special-status wildlife species. AR 4195.
Smallwood replied that there is no “such thing as ‘unsuitable habitat’”
because “habitat is defined at that part of the environment that is used by
members of a species” and Noriko saw three special-status species on the
Project site, thereby refuting the City’s speculation that no such species would
occur there. AR 4032.
SAFER
concludes that the dispute between Smallwood and the City demonstrates that, at
the very least, there are doubts regarding the potential for the Project to
result in significant habitat loss and this “disagreement among experts” must
be resolved in an EIR. Sierra Club v. Cnty. of Sonoma, (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1307, 1317 (“if there is a disagreement among experts over the
significance of an effect, the agency is to treat the effect as significant and
prepare an EIR”). Reply at 10-11.
Not
so because Smallwood’s opinion is not substantial evidence. For the reasons stated ante, his
calculation of 42 nesting sites and 139 birds per year lost lacks an adequate
foundation. The fact that Noriko saw three (and later five) bird species
on the Project site does not mean they nest there. See AR 792-93.
Smallwood’s comments are not substantial
evidence supporting a fair argument that the Project may have significant
adverse impacts on wildlife habitat.
(i). Stopover
SAFER notes that Smallwood addressed the
Project’s potential impacts on wildlife movement throughout the Project
site. Smallwood noted that the MND
relied on the assumption that Project site’s surrounding urbanized environment,
absence of designated wildlife corridors and nursery sites, and previous
development to conclude that the Project will not affect wildlife movement. AR
745-46. Smallwood explained that the MND
relied on a false standard. AR 794,
4039. Evidence of previous development
or an urbanized surrounding is not dispositive of whether the Project site can
be a corridor for wildlife movement.
“Previous development does not magically prevent wildlife from
incorporating the site into their movement patterns.” What is relevant is the existing
environmental setting at the time of the Notice of Preparation. AR 4039.
Pet. Op. Br. at 12-13.
Smallwood opined that “a site such as the
proposed project site is critically important for wildlife movement because it
composes an increasingly diminishing area of open space within a growing
expanse of anthropogenic uses, forcing more species of volant wildlife to use
the site for stopover and staging during migration, dispersal, and home range
patrol . . ..” AR 794 (citing three scientific studies). “The [P]roject would cut wildlife off from
stopover and staging opportunities, forcing volant wildlife to travel even
farther between remaining stopover sites.” Id. Smallwood underscored the significance of the
Rubio Wash, a water channel that bisects the Project site and is a feature that
wildlife would likely follow in moving through the region. Id.
This is supported by Noriko’s observations of wildlife using the Rubio
Wash. AR 780. Pet. Op. Br. at 12.
Smallwood’s conclusion is not supported by
substantial evidence for the simple reason that SAFER fails to establish how
the Project would prevent birds from a stopover. The City’s responses reiterated that the
Project site was previously developed, prior uses were demolished, the Project
site is surrounded on all sides by existing urban uses, and no areas within the
Project vicinity could function as a wildlife corridor or nursery site for
migratory wildlife. AR 4195. Noriko
observed birds using the Rubio Wash, but the Project will not affect the Rubio
Wash or the birds which stopover there.
Moreover, 106 trees would be planted on the ground floor, all of which
could still serve as an opportunity for birds to use as a stopover site. Id.
Opp. at 10-11.
SAFER
replies that Smallwood’s comments do establish how the Project would cut
wildlife off from a stopover. The
untouched Rubio Wash and the addition of 106 trees on the Project site would
provide opportunities for migratory birds to use the Project site for stopover,
but this did not change Smallwood’s opinion.
AR 4039. He explained: “[t]he
planting of 106 trees could provide stopover opportunities for some species of
bird, but not all, and not all of the native birds that are adapted to
open-ground environments . . . even with the planting of trees on the property
not covered by buildings, development projects such as the proposed Project
cause substantial declines in wildlife species richness and abundance.” Id.
Reply at 11.
Smallwood’s
generalized replies do not amount to substantial evidence. Developments may cause substantial decline in
wildlife species and abundance, but Smallwood fails to present evidence that
the Project will do so. He ignores the
continued existence of the Rubio Wash and fails to identify any open ground
birds that are also migratory, or other birds that would require a
stopover. The City correctly found that
Smallwood did not provide evidence how the Project would prevent stopover. AR 4039.
(ii). Bird-Window Collisions
SAFER notes that Smallwood additionally
employed his expertise on impacts to avian movement from window
collisions. “Window collisions are often
characterized as either the second or third largest source o[f] human-caused
bird mortality.” AR 795. The Project would add three buildings, one of
which will be six stories, and many glass windows. AR 794.
Smallwood acknowledged that glass facades differ in their hazardousness
for birds based on spacing, contiguity, orientation, and other factors. AR 795.
He relied on scientific literature for bird collisions from 213
buildings. AR 796-97. HE noted that the MND does not disclose the
nature and extent of windows for the Project and relied on the average square
meter ratio of window to floor space for 34 other California residential and
mixed-used projects in his data base. AR
797. HE took the mean fatality rate from
other studies and applied it to his estimate of Project glass to predict the
Project’s buildings would result in about 475 annual bird deaths. AR 797.
SAFER notes that the City’s responses
attempted to rebut Smallwood’s expert findings because they allegedly do not
“tak[e] into account the lack of avian observations, and the preexisting
urbanized landscape…” AR 746. SAFER
argues that this cannot be further from the truth. Smallwood stated: “In responding to my
comment, the City is obviously not examining the underlying data – the evidence
that birds will collide with the windows of the buildings that would be
constructed.” AR 4040. Given the
numerous data points, studies, and scientific review used to reach his
decision, as well as the documented observations of bird species flying
directly over or adjacent to the Project site, Smallwood’s conclusions clearly
constitute an “expert opinion supported by facts.” Guidelines §15384(b). Pet. Op. Br. at 13.
Smallwood’s conclusions regarding the bird
collisions do not amount to substantial evidence. The studies he relies on were made at various
locations and for structures that are not shown to be similar to the Project,
including New York City, several universities, a four-story glass walkway, and
unidentified sites. AR 796-97. As Respondents argues, in Save the Plastic
Bag, the California Supreme Court held that the court of appeal erred in
concluding there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that
Manhattan Beach’s ban on plastic bags might significantly affect the
environment. 52 Cal.4th at 175. The court cautioned against overreliance on
generic studies and emphasized that when the scale of the project is such that
the use is plainly insignificant, proper perspective must be maintained and
should not be allowed to distort the evaluation of the actual impacts
attributable to the project at hand. Id. Opp. at 11.
SAFER
replies that substantial evidence may be based on reasonable inferences. Guidelines §15384(a). Smallwood defended his conclusions on the
basis that he drew a “scientific inference drawn from many thousands of actual
bird-window collisions across the USA” in concluding that the Project would
result in significant bird mortality from window collisions:
“My review included reports of avian fatality
monitoring at 213 buildings and facades in a wide variety of environmental
settings, types of structures, and types of glass on structural facades. The
variety of settings, types of structures and types of glass included in the
studies lent the mean number of fatalities/m2 of glass a
sufficiently wide 95% confidence interval for capturing the level of collision
mortality that would result from the Project.
In other words, I sought out the wide variation of settings, structures,
and types of glass that served the basis of my estimated mean mortality.” AR 4040.
Reply at 11-12.
SAFER
adds that the reference to Save the Plastic Bag is irrelevant. Smallwood explained that the purpose of using
bird collisions from 213 buildings was to obtain a mean number of bird
fatalities that could be applied to the Project. AR 4040. Smallwood made clear that his use of this data
was to infer impacts well within the Project’s geographical boundaries. Reply at 12.
Smallwood’s
review may have included reports of bird collisions at a large number (213) of
buildings, but that does not make them applicable to the Project. Substantial evidence from an expert opinion
on bird collisions would be based on settings, structures, and types of glass
similar to the Project. Smallwood made
no such comparison and his opinion that 475 birds would die annually
from collisions with the windows of three residential buildings that are six stories, two stories, and four stories
tall is lacking an adequate foundation.
Expert analysis based upon unrealistic and improbable assumptions
may be disregarded. See Nassiri,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at 930.[15]
(iii). Vehicle-Related Deaths
SAFER argues that Smallwood linked the
Project’s potential wildlife impacts to the role played by vehicle trips in
mortality rates of wildlife. AR
798-800. Citing the scientific consensus
of the impacts of wildlife road kills in California and the United States and
studies in Contra Costa County quantifying wildlife fatalities from vehicle
collisions, Smallwood assumed similar collision fatality rates and estimated
the potential wildlife mortality that would result from the Project’s estimated
11,130,450 vehicle miles travelled per year.
AR 799-800. He concluded that the
Project’s vehicle trips would cause about 610 annual wildlife fatalities. Id.
Pet. Op. Br. at 13.
The City attempted to discredit Smallwood’s
opinion by explaining that the predicted impacts are misleading and
speculative. AR 746. As emphasized in
Smallwood’s rebuttal, the City’s response “conflates scientific inference with
speculation, which are the same ways of making predictions.…The evidence does
not support the City’s insinuation that Project-generated traffic would kill no
wildlife. Every study of traffic impacts to wildlife has found that traffic
causes substantial wildlife mortality.”
AR 4041. Pet. Op. Br. at 13.
Smallwood may believe that the extrapolation
of mortality from a study site to the Project “is how prediction science works”
(AR 4041) but his predictions must be supported by an adequate foundation to
constitute substantial evidence. They are
not. It is certainly true that traffic
causes substantial wildlife mortality, but whether the Project will do so is a
different issue. As the City pointed
out, Smallwood relies on studies of a rural, undeveloped stretch of roadway in
Contra Costa County whereas the Project is an urban infill development that
will not create new roadways. AR
746. The two are apples and oranges and
Smallwood’s attempted extrapolation is unsupported speculation.
6. SAFER Has Not Presented Substantial Evidence Supporting a Fair
Argument that the Project May Have Significant Adverse Impacts on Air Quality, But the MND Lacks Substantial
Evidence That the Project Will Not Cause a Significant Health Impact from DPM
Exposure
a.
Health Risks Due to Indoor Emissions of Formaldehyde
(i). CEQA
Does Not Require Evaluation of Health Impacts from the Project Itself
SAFER notes
that Certified Industrial Hygienist Offermann assessed the Project’s potential
indoor emissions of the toxic air contaminant formaldehyde within the proposed
residences and commercial units and the resulting increased cancer risk to the
Project’s future residents and employees.
AR 846. Formaldehyde is a toxic
air contaminant and a known human carcinogen. AR 844. “The primary source of formaldehyde indoors
is composite wood products manufactured with urea-formaldehyde resins, such as
plywood, medium density fiberboard, and particleboard. These materials are
commonly used in building construction for flooring, cabinetry, baseboards,
window shades, interior doors, and window and door trims.” AR 844-45. CARB has adopted a regulation that limits the
levels of formaldehyde in composite wood products sold in California. AR 845.
While this regulation reduces emissions from compliant composite wood
products products, it does not preclude the formaldehyde still present in those
products from exposing residents to cancer health risks. AR 845.
Pet. Op. Br. at 16-17.
SAFER notes that the
MND did not address this potential indoor air pollution health risk. Nor did the City provide any substantive
response to Offermann’s comments regarding the Project’s formaldehyde
emissions. Instead, the City attempted to
discredit those comments and asserted that the Project’s potentially
significant impacts on future residents and employees are “not considered to be
an impact under CEQA.” AR 4201. That is
incorrect. It is the City’s duty to investigate potential environmental
impacts associated with the Project. See
County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern, (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1544, 1597. The only
substantial evidence in the record regarding the significance of these air
quality impacts is SAFER’s. “If the local
agency has failed to study an area of possible environmental impact, a fair
argument may be based on the limited facts in the record.” Gentry v. City of Murrieta,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1379. “Deficiencies in the
record may actually enlarge the scope of fair argument by lending a logical
plausibility to a wider range of inferences.”
Id. Pet. Op. Br. at 17; Reply at 13.
SAFER argues that CEQA
requires lead agencies to disclose and analyze “impacts on a project’s users or
residents that arise from the project’s effects on the environment.” California Building Industry Ass’n v. Bay
Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., (“CBIA”) (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369,
387. In CBIA, the California
Supreme Court held that a project’s impacts on future residents must be
considered under CEQA. Id. at
377. The court distinguished “the
environment’s effects on a project” from “the project’s impacts on the existing
environment.” Id. at 388. Although the existing environment’s effects
on a project need not be addressed, the court held that CEQA requires an
analysis of “impacts on a project’s users or residents that arise from the
project’s effects on the environment.” Id.
at 387; see also Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 518
(CEQA requires analysis of project’s impacts to human health).
As applied here, SAFER
concludes that the impact from emissions of formaldehyde is a direct result of
construction and operation of the Project and not an existing environmental
condition. The City improperly dismissed
this significant impact and, as such, the City’s determination that the Project
would not result in any significant air quality impacts is not supported by
substantial evidence. Rather,
substantial evidence in the record supports a fair argument that the Project
may have significant health risk effects from the Project’s formaldehyde
emissions. Pet. Op. Br. at 17-18;
Reply at 15.
Respondents correctly argue that the indoor
exposure to formaldehyde emissions released from composite wood products used
to construct the Project is not a CEQA environmental impact. This exposure is an impact of the existing
environment – namely, building materials -- on the Project and its future
inhabitants, not an impact of the Project on the environment.
This point is supported by CBIA,
which SAFER misreads and which is dispositive.
At issue in CBIA were air pollutant thresholds of significance
adopted by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (“District”). Id. at 378-79. After CBIA challenged the thresholds, the
trial court found them to be a project under CEQA and the District was required
to evaluate their impact on the environment.
Id. at 380. Because the
District failed to conduct such a review, judgment was entered in CBIA’s
favor. Id. The court of appeal reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted review of the issue whether CEQA requires an analysis of how
existing environmental conditions impact a project’s future residents or users. Id. at 381.
The CBIA court noted that CEQA
addresses human health and safety, and public health is of great importance in
the CEQA statutory scheme. Id at
386. However, the District went too far
in concluding that when existing environmental conditions on or near the
project site pose hazards to humans brought to the site by the project,
the project may have potentially significant environmental effects requiring
evaluation. Id. at 386, 387. CEQA does not provide enough basis to suggest
that “environmental effects” encompass broader considerations associated with
the health and safety of a project’s future residents or users. Id. at 387. The phrase is best limited to those impacts
on a project’s users or residents that arise from the project’s effects on the
environment. Id. Any other reading would elide the word
“environmental”. Id. Therefore, only the project’s effects on the
environment need be considered. Id.
at 388.
As Respondents argue (Opp. at 15), SAFER has
presented formaldehyde exposure solely as an effect on the future residents and
inhabitants of the Project. Formaldehyde
emissions from composite wood products used to construct the buildings is an
impact on the future residents of the Project rather than an effect of the
Project on the environment. An initial
study shall only consider the effects of the project on the environment. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21100(a), 21151(a). “Environment” is defined as the physical
conditions within the area which will be affected by a project. Pub. Res. Code §21060.5. The effects of the project on the environment
are “limited to… adverse changes in physical conditions which exist within the
area as defined in Section 21060.5.” Pub. Res. Code §§ 21100(d), 21151(b). CBIA made clear that CEQA only
requires an agency to consider the effects of the environment on a project or
its users where the project will itself have an effect on the environment that
will exacerbate the environmental conditions or issues. 62 Cal.4th at 388. Opp. at 14-15.
The short answer is that CBIA
forecloses SAFER from relying on human health impacts from the Project itself
and not impacts on the outside environment.
(ii). The City’s Lack of Regulatory
Authority Does Not Preclude Environmental Analysis
Respondents argue that the City has no legal
authority to regulate building materials, as CARB has occupied the field with
regard to such regulations and the California Building Standards Code (“Building
Code”) has occupied the field of building construction. The City has no discretion to modify the
regulations related to building materials.
Opp. at 15.
Respondents rely on McCorkle Eastside
Neighborhood Group v. City of St. Helena, (“McCorkle”) (2018)
31 Cal.App.5th 80, 94-95, in which petitioner challenged the city’s approval of
demolition and design review permits for an eight-unit residential
building. Id. at 85. The city council approved the project
pursuant to a CEQA exemption and ruled that its review was limited to design
issues since no use permit was required for the project, which was by
right. Id. at 91-92. The court held that the design ordinance’s
limitation of the city council’s discretion solely to design review did not
implicate environmental effects or CEQA because the zoning permitted the
multi-family housing project by-right. Id.
at 92. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that because the city had
discretion over some aspects of the project, the decision was necessarily a
discretionary decision subject to CEQA. Id.
at 94. Opp. at 15.
Respondents admit that McCorkle is
not on point because the issue was whether the project approval was a
discretionary decision subject to CEQA, and that is not at issue in this
action. They argue that the relevance of
McCorkle is the court’s explanation that an agency only must address
those effects over which the agency has discretion to regulate in complying
with CEQA. Id. at 94. The state
alone regulates residential building materials through the Building Code and
local agencies have no authority to regulate them. Building Industry Assn. v. City of
Livermore, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 725-26. Because the City has no authority to regulate
the use of building materials in construction projects, it does not have the
authority to condition the Project regarding the formaldehyde content of the composite
wood products used to construct the Project.
Consequently, exposure to formaldehyde emissions in building materials
is not an environmental impact under CEQA.
Opp. at 15-17.
SAFER correctly responds that any obligation the City has to
analyze the Project’s formaldehyde emissions does not require it to regulate
building products. Indeed, Offermann suggested
mitigation measures that would not require the use of different building
products, including outdoor air ventilation that would provide for a
“mechanical supply of outdoor air ventilation to allow for a habitable interior
environment [even] with closed windows and doors.” AR 852-53. Such mitigation measures are fully within the
City’s authority since it may use the full extent of its police powers in
exercising its duties under CEQA. See
Tiburon Open Space Comm. v. Cnty. of Marin, (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
700, 730. Furthermore, a lead agency
cannot avoid CEQA review simply because a project may comply with the rules
issued by another agency. Kings Co.
Farm Bur. v. Hanford, (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 712-18 (agency
erred by “wrongly assuming that, simply because the smokestack emissions would
comply with applicable regulations from other agencies regulating air quality,
the overall project would not cause significant effects to air quality.”). Reply at 16.
(iii). Offermann’s Opinion Is Not
Substantial Evidence
Respondents correctly argue that SAFER’s
claims regarding formaldehyde exposure are speculative because Offermann’s
opinions are based on unrealistic assumptions and involve projects dissimilar
to the Project. Opp. at 14.
Offermann’s analysis of the potential
formaldehyde emissions from composite wood products used to construct the
Project was based primarily on two studies he participated in preparing, one in
2004-05 and one in 2019. AR 845-53,
4200. The City’s environmental consultant
reviewed Offermann’s analysis and concluded that his assumptions were not
credible in the context of this Project:
“In addition, Mr. Offermann substantially
overstates health impacts as his analysis is based on a series of inaccurate
assumptions, including that: (1) the Project’s construction materials would not
be compliant with the applicable regulations to reduce formaldehyde exposure;
(2) formaldehyde daily emissions from construction materials would be constant
for over 70 years for residents; (3) residents would live in their units for 70
years; 4) residential occupants and employees would inhale 20 cubic meters of
air per day; and 5) employees would work at the Project site for 8 hours/day, 5
days/week, 50 weeks/year for 45 years.”
“In fact: (1) construction materials would
comply with all applicable regulations; (2) the amount of formaldehyde off
gassing from construction materials decreases over time; (3) per the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.EPA), lifetime risk values for
residents should be based on an exposure duration of 350 days per year for 30
years, not 70, and residents would not live in their units for more than a few
years; (4) according to the American Lung Association, the average person
inhales approximately 2,000 gallons of air per day, or roughly 7.57 cubic
meters per day; and (5) based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
median number of years workers remain in a job is 4.1 years, not 45.13.
Therefore, Mr. Offermann’s analysis is not credible.” AR 4201-02.
Opp. at 17-18.
According to CARB, the Composite Wood
Products (“CWP”) Regulation’s emission standards are set at low levels to
protect public health. AR 4199. The CWP Regulation, adopted in 2007,
established two phases of emissions standards: an initial Phase 1, and later, a
more stringent Phase 2 that requires all finished goods, such as flooring and
other building materials, for sale or use in California to be made using
complying composite wood products. AR
4199. As of January 2014, only Phase 2
products have been legal for sale in California. Thus, all wood products
installed in the Project would comply with the more stringent Phase 2
requirements and impacts with respect to formaldehyde would be less than
significant. AR 4199-4200.[16]
Because Offermann’s expert analysis is based
upon unrealistic and improbable assumptions, it may be disregarded. See Nassiri, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at 930. Furthermore, the
City’s environmental consultant noted there are no requirements or guidance
from SCAQMD or relevant agencies to evaluate such risk. The Project does not represent a unique or
special development for which impacts from building materials need to be
addressed under CEQA. Therefore, no
special analysis or mitigation is required. The Project will comply with the
existing codes and regulations in California, which adequately address
potential emissions and risks from formaldehyde in building materials to ensure
safe practices and healthy indoor air.
These include Title 24 Energy Standards, the CALGreen Code, and CARB’s
CWP Regulations. Opp. at 18.
SAFER replies that
Offermann based his findings on information in the Initial Study, relevant
scientific studies, and his extensive knowledge of formaldehyde-emitting
building products to determine that the Project may have a significant cancer
risk due to indoor formaldehyde emissions. AR774-76, 844-48. His evidence is not based on
speculation but rather facts and reasonable inferences based on facts. Even if the Project’s composite wood products
will comply with CARB’s regulations, Offermann calculated that future residents
would be exposed to an increased cancer risk of 120 in one million due to
inhalation of formaldehyde off-gassing from composite wood products. AR
846. This impact exceeds SCAQMD’s CEQA
significance threshold of 10 in one million, demonstrating that there is at
least a fair argument of a significant impact.
Id. Reply at 14-15.
SAFER
ignores the criticisms that Offermann’s assumptions are inaccurate and
unwarranted because: the amount of formaldehyde off gassing from construction
materials decreases over time; lifetime risk values for residents should be
based on an exposure duration of 350 days per year for 30 years, not 70 years;
residents would not live in their units for more than a few years; the average person inhales approximately
2,000 gallons of air per day, or roughly 7.57 cubic meters per day; and the
median number of years workers remain in a job is 4.1 years, not 45. These unwarranted assumptions make
Offermann’s opinion less than substantial evidence.
In
sum, SAFER has not presented substantial evidence supporting a fair argument
that the Project may have a significant adverse impact on air quality due to
indoor emissions of formaldehyde.
b.
DPM Emissions
The MND provides the following factual
support for its determination that there will be no significant impact from DPM
exposure during construction:
(1). Construction of the Project would
generate DPM emissions from the use of off-road diesel equipment required. The amount to which persons are exposed (a
function of concentration and duration of exposure) is the primary factor used
to determine health risk (i.e., exposure to toxic air contaminant
(“TAC”) emission levels that exceed applicable standards). Health-related risks
associated with DPM emissions are primarily linked to long-term exposure and
the associated risk of contracting cancer;
(2). The use of
diesel-powered construction equipment would be temporary and episodic. The
duration of exposure would be short and exhaust from construction equipment
would dissipate rapidly. Current models and methodologies for conducting health
risk assessments (“HRAs”) are associated with longer-term exposure periods of
nine, 30, and 70 years, which do not correlate well with the temporary and
highly variable nature of construction activities; and
(3) OEHHA has not identified any short-term health effects from
DPM. The Project construction is temporary and would be transient throughout the
Project site (i.e., move from location to location) and would not
generate emissions in a fixed location for extended periods of time. Construction activities would be subject to
and comply with California regulations limiting the idling of heavy-duty
construction equipment to no more than five minutes to further reduce nearby
sensitive persons’ exposure to temporary and variable DPM emissions. For these reasons, DPM generated by
construction activities would not expose sensitive persons to substantial
amounts of air toxins, and the Project would result in a less than significant
impact. AR
1846-47.
SAFER argues that
the MND’s conclusion that the Project’s DPM emissions will not pose any
significant health impacts to nearby persons is not supported by substantial
evidence. The MND admitted that
“[c]onstruction of the proposed Project would generate diesel particulate
matter (DPM) emissions from the use of off-road diesel equipment required.” AR 651.
However, the MND downplayed the cancer risks posed by DPM. AR 658.
The Project will be under construction for 25 months. AR 639.
The closest sensitive receptors are multi-family residences only 18 feet
south of the Project site, with other sensitive land uses surrounding the
Project site. AR 651. Despite acknowledging DPM emissions and
nearby sensitive uses, the MND’s only requires off-site trucks to comply with
state regulations which limit diesel powered equipment idling to no more than
five minutes at a location and minimize DPM emissions through inspections and
maintenance. AR 658. Pet. Op. Br. at 18.
Furthermore, the
MND did not identify the duration of short-term exposures to DPM but instead
made the unsubstantiated claim that DPM can “dissipate rapidly.” AR 658.
These subjective terms do not provide any means for the City or the
public to gauge the health impacts of Project-related DPM emissions. The MND gives the reader no indication
whether the exposure to DPM is great or small for the adjacent sensitive
receptors. Nor is there an explanation how an idling limit on heavy-duty
construction equipment would control DPM emissions from other equipment that
will be used to construct the Project, or from the additional exhaust emissions
of the approximately 1,442 vehicle trips anticipated for the Project. See AR 4048. Pet. Op. Br. at 18-19.
The City’s
responses say that it conducted no HRA because SCAQMD has not adopted guidance
requiring an HRA for short-term projects and therefore no additional analysis
is necessary. AR 4198. This is misleading. As Rosenfeld explained in SWAPE’s December
14, 2023 comments: “[A] quantitative HRA should be prepared for the Project
because, pursuant to agency guidance, the Project’s anticipated construction
and operation duration exceeds the 2-month and 6-month requirements provided
under agency guidance. These
recommendations reflect the most recent state health risk policies, and as
such, an EIR should be prepared to include an analysis of health risk impacts
posed to nearby sensitive receptors from Project-generated DPM emissions.” AR
4027; see AR 4049. The absence of
an HRA cannot substantiate the MND’s conclusion regarding the Project’s DPM
health risks. See Berkeley
Keep Jets Over the Bay Comm. v. Bd. of Port Comm'rs, (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
1344, 1370-71 (lack of a single precise methodology did not excuse the
preparation of HRA). Pet. Op. Br. at 19.
SAFER concludes
that the City bears the burden to investigate the Project’s potential health
impacts from its DPM emissions. See Gentry v. City of Murrieta, supra,
36 Cal.App.4th at 1378-79. The
City’s conclusory statements that the Project’s DPM emissions throughout 25
months of construction would not have any impact on neighboring residences are
not substantial evidence. See McCann
v. City of San Diego, (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51, 97 (city’s factual
conclusion unsupported by substantial evidence was abuse of discretion). Had the City chosen to prepare an HRA for the
Project’s DPM emissions, it could have avoided using vague, undefined terms to
convey its assertions that the Project’s DPM emissions would result in less
than ten cancers per million. Thus, the City’s conclusion that the Project’s DPM
health impacts will not be significant is not supported by substantial
evidence. Pet. Op. Br. at 19; Reply at 13.
Respondents argue
that the facts cited by the MND are substantial evidence that the Project will
not cause a significant health impact from exposure to DPM during construction. Respondents further argue that SAFER has not
presented substantial evidence to support a fair argument to the contrary. There is no statutory requirement to prepare
a HRA for short-term construction activities.
See Nassiri, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
928. SCAQMD has not promulgated any
regulations requiring the preparation of HRAs for construction-related
activities, and there is no basis to claim the City’s analysis of potential DPM
construction impacts is legally inadequate.
Additionally, the Air Quality Technical Report prepared for the Project
analyzed the potential localized construction air quality impacts using
localized significance thresholds (“LSTs”) and methodology established by
SCAQMD, including potential exposure to particulate matter PM-10 and PM-2.5,
and it determined any impacts would be less than significant. AR 900-01, 1843-45. Respondents conclude that the analysis
contained in the Air Quality Technical Report and MND qualify as substantial
evidence that the Project’s construction activities would not cause significant
impacts related to DPM emissions. Opp.
at 19-20.
SAFER replies that
Rosenfeld submitted the only substantial evidence on the significance of the
health risk impact from DPM emissions.
Rosenfeld reviewed the Initial
Study and criticized the MND for failing to conduct a quantified
construction or HRA for nearby sensitive receptors to compare the Project’s
cancer risk to the SCAQMD’s numeric threshold of ten in one million. AR 820.
His opinion was based on his
expert knowledge about HRAs and their usefulness in quantifying the health risk
impacts of DPM emissions. AR
818-20. Rosenfeld’s opinion was based on
guidance from OEHHA, which is the organization responsible for providing
guidance on conducting HRAs in California.
AR 819. OEHHA’s guidance “describes the types of projects that warrant
the preparation of an HRA,” which includes the Project. AR 819-20.
That guidance states that HRAs should be prepared for all
short-term projects lasting at least two months and exposure from projects
which, like the Project, last more than six months should be evaluated for the
duration of the project. AR 819,
4049. Reply at 13-14.
Rosenfeld explained that the City’s LST
analysis does not support a finding of insignificance because “LST analyses are
only applicable to . . . criteria air pollutants.” AR 819.
Criteria air pollutants are NO, CO, and PM emissions. AR 819.
DPM is not a criteria air pollutant, but rather a toxic air contaminant
(TAC). AR 819. The City simply failed to examine the impacts
of DPM emissions because it did not conduct a HRA and did not calculate the
cancer risk posed by DPM.
Reply at 14.
SAFER argues that, despite Rosenfeld’s
assistance, the City maintained its unsubstantiated conclusion that the
Project’s health impacts from DPM emissions would be insignificant. The City cannot avoid analyzing short-term
impacts of DPM emissions merely because SCAQMD has yet to provide guidance on
how to assess them. See Berkeley
Keep Jets Over the Bay Committee v. Board of Port Com’rs, supra, 91
Cal.App.4th at 1370. The City’s
dismissal of SAFER’s expert evidence does not even reach the level of a disagreement
among qualified experts and rather is an attempt to evade its obligations. Reply at 14-15.
The court concludes
that SAFER is correct. The City’s
responses stated that health effects from TACs (such as DPM) for sensitive
residential receptors are described in terms of cancer risk based on a
long-term resident exposure duration (i.e., 30 years). AR 4198.
This statement is unsupported by identification of any expert, and it also
contradicts Rosenfeld and his reliance on OEHHA’s guidance. Without an HRA, the MND lacks substantial
evidence to support its conclusion that the Project will not cause a
significant health impact from exposure to DPM during construction. However, SAFER has not presented substantial
evidence to support a fair argument to the contrary.
F. Conclusion
The Petition is granted in part. The MND is not supported by substantial
evidence that (a) the Project will not have significant adverse impacts on
biological resources because it lacks an expert wildlife biologist’s opinion,
(b) MM BIO-1 will mitigate the Project’s significant adverse impacts on birds to
less than significant, and (c) the Project will not cause a significant
health impact from exposure to DPM during construction. However,
SAFER fails to present substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that an
EIR is required.
A judgment and writ shall issue directing the
City to set aside the certification of the MND and Project approvals and to exercise
its discretion in conducting such further environmental analysis as may be
required by CEQA consistent with this decision.
This further analysis may consist of a new or supplemental MND or EIR as
the City feels necessary.
Petitioner SAFER’s counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed
judgment and writ, serve them on Respondents’ counsel for approval as to form,
wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are
objections, and then submit the proposed judgment and writ along with a
declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved
objections. An OSC re: judgment is set
for May 1, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.
[1]
Although the Petition’s caption and Prayer indicate a cause of action for
declaratory relief, no CCP section 1060 cause of action is pled.
[2] The
court will use Noriko’s first name to distinguish her from Smallwood.
[3]As
an aid to carrying out CEQA, the State Resources Agency has issued regulations
called “Guidelines for the California Environmental Quality Act”
(“Guidelines”), contained in Code of Regulations, Title 14, Division 6, Chapter
3, beginning at section 15000. “[C]ourts should afford great weight to the
Guidelines except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under
CEQA.” Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of California,
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 391 n.2.
[4] The
City and Real Party (collectively referred to herein as “Respondents”) seek
judicial notice of the following: (1) a webpage of the Southern California
District Council of Laborers (“SCDCL”) containing its mission statement and the
fact that Jon P. Preciado is the Business Manager and Peter Santillan is the
Secretary/Treasurer (RJN Ex. 1); (2) IRS Form 990-PF filed by SAFER for tax
year 2019 reflecting that SAFER and SCDCL share the same office address,
employees, and telephone number (RJN Ex. 2); (3) IRS Form 990-PF filed by SAFER
for tax year 2020 (RJN Ex. 3); (4) IRS Form 990-PF filed by SAFER for tax year
2021 (RJN Ex. 4); (5) IRS Form 990-PF filed by SAFER for tax year 2022 (RJN Ex.
5); (6) IRS Form 990-PF filed by SAFER for tax year 2023 (RJN Ex. 6); (7) a face
page of IRS Form 990 filed by SCDCL for tax year 2019 (RJN Ex. 7); (8) a face
page of IRS Form 990 filed by SCDCL for tax year 2021 (RJN Ex. 8); (9) a face
page of IRS Form 990 filed by SCDCL for tax year 2023 (RJN Ex. 9); and an Initial
Registration Form for SAFER filed with the State of California on June 3, 2019
containing SAFER’s Bylaws (RJN Ex. 10).
SAFER objects to RJN Ex.1 on the ground that, while
the existence of a webpage can be judicially noticed, the truth of the content
of the webpage cannot. This objection is overruled. The existence of a company’s website may be
judicially noticed. Evid. Code §452(h); Gentry
v. eBay, Inc., (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 821 n.1 (taking judicial notice
of the manner in which a company described its operations on its web-site). However, a court may not necessarily accept a
website’s contents as true. See Ragland
v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 193 (“When judicial
notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper
interpretation of the document are disputable.”). In this case, Respondents offer SCDCL’s webpage
as a party admission and its contents therefore are judicially noticed. Evid. Code §1220.
SAFER objects to RJN Exs. 2-9 as tax forms that are
not authenticated. The court agrees and
the objections are sustained. SAFER does
not object to RJN Ex. 10, which is judicially noticed. Evid. Code §452(c).
[5]
Not all of these cited pages are in the Joint Appendix.
[6]
Not all of these cited pages are in the Joint Appendix.
[7]
Birds of Conservation Concern include migratory non-game birds that without
additional conservation are likely to become candidates for listing under the
Endangered Species Act. AR 770.
[8]
Not all of the cited pages are in the Joint Appendix.
[9]
SCDCL is an organization
comprised of 14 union locals representing laborers in collective bargaining in
Southern California. It is a “chartered district council of the Laborers’
International Union of North America. RJN Ex. 1.
[10] SAFER refers to RJN Ex. A, which purports to
be its articles of incorporation stating that “[t]he specific purpose of this
corporation shall be to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment . . . including but not limited to advocating for changes to
proposed projects and polices that, if adopted, would reduce air, soil and
water pollution, minimize harm to wildlife, conserve wild places,” among other
environmental benefits. Reply at 17. No RJN Ex. A was presented to the court for judicial
notice.
[11] There
is also the prospect of public interest standing. Where a plaintiff cannot satisfy the “over
and above” test for private interest standing, California cases have still
treated a plaintiff as beneficially interested for purposes of mandamus
standing if the plaintiff satisfies the criteria of public interest
standing. Asimow, et al., Administrative
Law (2018), Ch. 14, §14:5. Public
interest standing may be conferred “where the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty.” Save the Plastic Bag Coalition
v. City of Manhatten Beach, (“Save the Plastic Bag”) (2011) 52
Cal.4th 155, 166. This type of standing
“promotes the policy of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no
governmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of legislation establishing a
public right.” Green v. Obledo, (1981)
29 Cal.3d 126, 144. In determining
whether public interest standing applies, the court considers (1) whether “the
public duty is sharp and the public need weighty” (SJJC,
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at 1058), (2) whether the policy
supporting public interest standing is outweighed by competing considerations
of a more urgent nature (Reynolds v. City of Calistoga, (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 865, 873), and (3) whether the claim of public interest standing is
driven by personal objectives rather than broader public concerns (SJJC, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at 1057).
SAFER argues
that, if a plastic bag manufacturer has public interest standing to enforce
CEQA, then a labor organization with members living, working, and recreating in
the area, who will be directly affected by the Project, have the same right. See Rialto Citizens for Resp.
Growth v. City of Rialto, (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 914. Reply at 18.
SAFER provides no analysis of a sharp public duty or weighty need and
has not shown public interest standing to challenge the Project.
[12] SAFER
also argues that the MND failed to adequately analyze the Project’s impact on
wildlife movement because it was narrowly focused on impacts to native and migratory
wildlife. AR 660. CEQA requires the City to review how the
Project will impact the movement of wildlife species generally. Guidelines App. G, §(IV)(d). The City did not do so for this Project and Smallwood
identified several non-migratory special-status species on the Project
site. AR 4115. Pet. Op. Br. at 15-16.
Respondents
correctly point out that the Initial Study analyzed whether the Project would
have a substantial adverse effect on any riparian habitat or other sensitive
natural community identified in local or regional plans, policies, regulations,
or by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (“DFW”) or the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) and concluded no such habitat or
sensitive communities are present in the Project site or immediate
vicinity. AR 660. Opp. at 12.
This conclusion includes non-migratory wildlife movement.
[13]
Smallwood argued that special-status species include rare species, defined as a
species not presently threatened with extinction but is small in numbers that
it may become endangered if its environment worsens or is likely to become
endangered in the foreseeable future throughout a significant portion of its
range and may be considered threatened.
Guidelines §15380(b)(2). AR
4029-30. Smallwood contended that birds
of prey necessarily are rare because their position as top predator wherever
they live makes them so. Therefore, he
considers all birds of prey protected by Fish and Game Code section 3503.5 to
be rare. AR 4031. Pet. Op. Br. at 11.
This conclusion is unsupported by authority or
analysis. The fact that birds of prey
are protected from taking under Fish and Game Code section 3503.5 does not
legally make them rare within the definition of Guidelines section 15380. See Nassiri, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at 925.
[14]
Some of these criticisms may require an expert wildlife biologist’s opinion but
that does not undermine the court’s conclusion about the inadequacy of Smallwood’s
special species opinion.
[15] Smallwood’s
opinion also may be an example of
improper extrapolation, as reflected by the expansion from the initial Klem
estimate in 1990 to the ever-increasing estimates of Dunn, Loss, and
Machtans. AR 795-96. Smallwood fails to adequately explain why
this expansion occurred.
[16]
The City’s environmental consultant noted that the 2019 research paper on which
Offermann relied concludes that these CARB regulations have been effective in
reducing formaldehyde concentrations in homes and that “[c]omparisons of indoor
formaldehyde…levels with those from a prior study of new homes in California
(conducted in 2007-08) suggest that contaminant levels are lower in recently
built (after 2008) homes. California’s
regulation to limit formaldehyde emissions from composite wood products appears
to have substantially lowered its emission rate and concentration in new
homes.” AR 4200-01. The research paper also states that “[indoor
air quality] satisfaction was also similar in the newer homes as compared to
homes built in years prior. These results indicate the success of
standards.” AR 4201. Opp. at 18-19.