Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 24STCP00706, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Moore v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, City of Los Angeles, et al.,

24STCP00706

Tentative decision on motion for reconsideration: denied

Petitioner Ivan Moore (“Moore”) moves for reconsideration of the court’s order granting Respondent City of Los Angeles (“City”) and its Department of Airports’ (collectively, “City”) motion for judgment.

The court has read and considered the moving papers and opposition (no reply was timely filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

Petitioner Moore commenced this action on March 8, 2024. The operative pleading is the First Amended Petition (“FAP”) filed on April 16, 2024. The FAP alleges in pertinent part as follows.

The City’s Los Angeles World Airports (“LAWA”) is a proprietary department of the City. FAP ¶2. LAWA and the City employed Moore at all relevant times. FAP ¶2.

On or about July 5, 2022 LAWA and the City notified Moore that he was being discharged, effective July 5, 2022. FAP ¶6.

Morre filed an appeal to the Commission pursuant to the Commission’s and City’s rules. FAP ¶7. Moore sought review whether the charges in the discharge notice were true and the penaltyof discharge was appropriate. FAP ¶9.

The matter was heard by a hearing examiner who issued a report, decision, and recommendation on June 20, 2023. FAP ¶10. The hearing examiner determined that Moore’s discharge should not be sustained. FAP ¶11. The hearing examiner’s report identified that the parties stipulated that Skelly’s requirements had been met, none of the charges or the penaly were sustained. The City’s only evidence was hearsay, which is not sufficient by itself to prove a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in a civil action. FAP ¶12.

The Commission thereafter considered the hearing examiner’s report. FAP ¶13. On December 14, 2023, the Commission adopted findings and conclusions opposite from its hearing examiner. FAP ¶14. On January 8, 2024, the Commission sustained LAWA’s decision to discharge. FAP ¶15, Ex. 1.

Moore seeks mandamus with respect to the Commission’s decision as not supported by the findings and the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. FAP ¶17. The Commission also failed to provide an analytical bridge from the evidence to its final conclusion. FAP ¶18. The Commission further did not proceed in the manner required by law. FAP ¶19.

Moore has exhausted all administrative remedies by filing and pursuing and appeal. FAP ¶22. Pursuant to the City’s Charter section 1017, Moore has filed a Demand for Reinstatement with the Commission (Ex. 2) and a Clam for Compensation with the City Clerk (Ex. 3). FAP ¶23.

Moore prays for a writ of mandate requiring the Commission to reverse the decision, and ordering full benefits and back pay from the date of discharge, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. FAP at Prayer 1.

On April 16, 2024, a proof of service on file shows that Moore served the FAP via personal service on the Commission’s authorized agent, Brenda Salgado, and via personal service on the authorized agent of the City and LAWA.

On June 11, 2024, the court overruled the City’s demurrer to the FAP, ordering that it would have 20 days to answer only. The City answered on June 27, 2024.

“Any board or officer having the power of appointment shall have the power to suspend or discharge any officer, member or employee of the office or department. No person in the classified civil service shall be discharged or suspended except for cause, which shall be stated in writing by the board or officer having the power to make such discharge or suspension.” City Charter §1016(a) (discharge or suspension for cause).

“The written statement of cause shall be filed with the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, with certification that a copy has been served upon the person so discharged or suspended, in accordance with Section 1018. Upon filing with the board, the discharge or suspension shall take effect.” City Charter §1016(b) (statement of cause).

“Within five days of service of the written statement upon any person so discharged or suspended, the person shall file a written application with the board in order to require the board to hold a hearing to investigate the grounds for the discharge or suspension. In the event that the person does not file an application, the board may, but is not required to, within 15 days after the filing of the written statement with the board, determine to hold a hearing to investigate the grounds for the discharge or suspension.” City Charter §1016(c) (application for hearing).

“If, after investigation and hearing as required by law is held, the board finds, in writing, that the grounds stated for the discharge or suspension were insufficient or were not sustained, the board shall order the person to be reinstated or restored to duty. With the consent of the appointing authority, the board may also reduce the length of the suspension, or may substitute suspension for discharge, if the board makes a written finding that such action is warranted. The order of the board with respect to the discharge or suspension shall be promptly certified to the appointing board or officer, and shall be final and conclusive.” City Charter §1016(d) (reinstatement; restoration).

“If the board orders reinstatement or restoration to duty of a person who has been discharged or suspended, the person shall be entitled to receive compensation from the City the same as if he or she had not been discharged or suspended by the appointing board or officer.” City Charter §1016(e) (compensation).

“Whenever it is claimed by any person that he or she has been unlawfully demoted, suspended, laid off or discharged, and that person has filed an application for a hearing as provided in Section 1016(c) and reinstatement or restoration to duty has been denied, the person may file a written claim for compensation and a demand for reinstatement. The claim and demand must be filed within 90 days from the date of the decision of the board following a hearing, or if no hearing is applied for, from the date on which it is claimed that the person was first illegally, wrongfully or invalidly demoted, laid off, suspended or discharged. The demand for reinstatement must be filed with the board and the claim for compensation must be filed with the City Clerk. Failure to file a demand for reinstatement with proof of filing with the board, within the time specified in this section, shall be a bar to any action to compel reinstatement. Proof of filing with the City Clerk of the claim for compensation within the time and in the manner specified shall be a condition precedent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due on account of demotion, layoff, suspension or discharge. Except as provided in this section, claims for compensation shall conform to the requirements of Section 350.” City Charter §1017 (emphasis added).

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a) (“section 1008(a)”) provides for reconsideration of court orders. Section 1008(a)’s motion to reconsider is broad in scope and allows any party affected by the order to seek reconsideration and modification, amendment, or vacation of prior orders. Relief under section 1008(a) is strictly limited. Motions to reconsider must be brought within ten days of service of written notice of the original order and the party making the application for reconsideration “shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” §1008(a).

A motion for reconsideration constitutes the exclusive means for a party seeking modification, amendment or revocation of an order. Morite of Calif. v. Superior Court, (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 490. To be entitled to reconsideration, a party must show (1) new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and (2) a satisfactory explanation for failing to produce such evidence earlier. Kalivas v. Barry Controls Corp., (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1160-61. The requirement of satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier can only be described as a strict requirement of diligence. Garcia v. Hejmadi, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690. A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted on the ground that the court misapplied the law in its initial ruling. Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.

Apart from the parties, the court has inherent power to reconsider its rulings in a particular case for any reason. Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, (1999) 75 Cal.App. 4^th 1148. The court may even entertain suggestions from the parties for such sua sponte reconsideration. However, the inherent power to reconsider, unlike the power under section 1008, is entirely up to the court. Other than a “suggestion,” the court need not, and will not, entertain argument from a party as to why it should exercise this inherent power.

Petitioner moves for reconsideration of the court’s order granting City’s motion for judgment. A motion to reconsider is a two-part analysis: (1) whether the court should reconsider and (2) if so, the merits of the reconsideration.

The court granted the City’s motion for judgment on August 8, 2024. The City’s counsel was directed to give notice of this ruling. No proof of notice is on file. Moore’s motion was filed on August 22, 2024, and therefore is deemed to be timely.

The party making the motion for reconsideration “shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” §1008(a). Petitioner Moore fails to present a declaration complying with this requirement and the motion is invalid. See Branner v. Regents of University of California, (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048-49.

Additionally, the City is correct that Moore has failed to present a motion based on “new or different facts, circumstances or law” as required by section 1008(a). Opp. at 5. Instead, Moore argues that a case cited in the City’s moving papers, Mota v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist., (“Mota”) (2021) 565 F. Supp. 3d 1207, actually supports his position, which he reiterates that he complied with City Charter section 1017. Mot. at 2.

At the hearing on the City’s motion, the court concluded that Moore’s demand for reinstatement amounts to a misdirected claim similar to the claim in Mota, which did not reach the body which would decide the demand. Erroneous or not, the court addressed Mota in its ruling on the City’s motion. Moore has presented no new facts, circumstances, or law to support reconsideration. Similarly, he has not shown due diligence for failing to present any new matter at the first hearing. See Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at 690.

As Moore’s motion fails to comply with section 1008(a), the court need not reach the second step of the process to consider the merits. The motion for reconsideration is denied.