Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 24STCP00961, Date: 2024-08-13 Tentative Ruling

Mary Wright v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, 24STCP00961

Tentative decision on motion to amend complaint: granted

Petitioner Mary Wright (“Wright”) moves for leave to file a First Amended Petition (“FAP”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers (no opposition was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

Wright is a 60-year-old African-American woman. She relies solely on her fixed supplemental security income. She has been in good standing with HACLA, paying her rent on time and complying with the terms of her lease. She has lived in her current home for nine years. Pet., ¶15.

Wright suffers from schizophrenia, a mental disability that affects her thinking, emotions, and behavior. She often finds it difficult to plan and carry out daily activities like grocery shopping. Her energy levels are low, and she frequently has trouble processing information to make decisions. Pet., ¶16.

Wright’s daily life greatly depends on the vital help from her caretaker for essential tasks like grocery shopping, cooking, keeping her home clean, managing medications, handling laundry, checking the mail, and even ensuring the bath water doesn’t overflow. Pet., ¶17.

Throughout her tenancy, Wright has had various caretakers and she currently is being assisted by Donnie Jackson Sr., her long-time partner and the father of her son, Donnie Jackson Jr. Pet., ¶18.

Throughout her tenancy, Wright was approved by HACLA on several occasions to have a live-in caretaker, yet she has not used this opportunity. In February 2017, she requested to add her son, Donnie Jackson Jr., as her live-in caretaker. Despite the approval, he never moved in. Although a caretaker is crucial for her well-being, Wright does not require around-the-clock care. Pet., ¶19.

On or about September 1, 2022, HACLA sent Wright a “Notice of 20 Intended Action” stating that HACLA had discovered evidence that (a) she committed fraud in connection with a federal housing program by allowing an unauthorized tenant, Kim McZeal, to reside at the subsidized rental premises, (b) she and Donnie Jackson Jr. had vacated the subsidized rental premises without reporting the vacancy, and (c) she failed to disclose Donnie Jackson Jr.’s criminal conviction for petty theft. The notice further stated that, if Wright did not provide adequate evidence in response, HACLA would take action to terminate her Section 8 benefits. Pet., ¶20.

On or about September 19, 2022, HACLA sent Wright a “Notice of Intended Action and Right to Hearing” asserting that HACLA had determined that Wright’s Section 8 would be terminated based on the above-described allegations. The notice advised Wright of her right to request a hearing, which she did. Pet., ¶21.

HACLA scheduled the informal hearing for September 19, 2023 but rescheduled the hearing to November 14, 2023, to accommodate Wright’s attorneys. Pet., ¶22. On November 14, 2023, HACLA conducted the informal hearing. Pet., ¶23.

At the informal hearing, the hearing officer found the following: (a) The allegation that Ms. Wright had an unauthorized tenant, Kim McZeal, was sustained despite the fact that Wright testified that McZeal was her caretaker; (b) The allegation that Wright failed to promptly report changes in her household composition on the HAPP-27P Eligibility Questionnaire was sustained, despite the fact that Wright promptly reported that there were no changes to her household composition; (c) The allegation that Wright failed to provide true and correct information about her household composition on the HAPP-27P Eligibility Questionnaire was sustained, despite the fact that Wright provided true and correct information that there were no changes to her household composition; (d) The allegation that Wright had vacated the subsidized rental premises without reporting the vacancy was not sustained; and (e) The allegation that Wright failed to disclose Donnie Jackson Jr.’s criminal conviction for petty theft was not raised by the hearing officer. Pet., ¶24. The hearing officer upheld HACLA’s proposal to terminate Wright’s Section 8 benefits and set the termination date for March 31, 2024. Pet., ¶25.

On or about January 31, 2024, HACLA sent Ms. Wright a “Notice of Termination of Section 8” stating that she will lose her Section 8 benefits on March 31, 2024. Pet., ¶26.

On February 29, 2024, Ms. Wright requested that HACLA reconsider its decision to terminate her Section 8 and a reasonable accommodation to reinstate her Section 8 because her mental disability was not taken into consideration as mitigating circumstances during the informal hearing. To date, HACLA has failed to respond or otherwise engage in the interactive process. Pet., ¶27.

HACLA’s termination of Petitioner’s Section 8 is invalid for the following reasons: (a) There is no evidence to support the finding that Wright has an unauthorized occupant; (b) There is no evidence to support the finding that Wright failed to promptly report changes in her household composition on the 26 HAPP-27P Eligibility Questionnaire; (c) There is no evidence to support the finding that Wright failed to provide true and correct information about her household composition on the HAPP-27P Eligibility Questionnaire; (d) The hearing officer committed an error of law when he found that Wright committed fraud, without a finding that Wright knowingly included false information to obtain a thing of value; (e) The hearing officer prejudicially abused discretion by failing to consider all relevant circumstances before terminating Wright’s voucher as required under 24 C.F.R. section 982.552(c)(2)(i). The hearing officer did not take into account mitigating circumstances related to Petitioner’s mental disability. Pet., ¶32.

Petitioner prays for a judgment of mandate ordering Respondents to set aside the hearing decision terminating her Section 8 and reinstate her to the Section 8 Voucher Program, enjoining Respondents from terminating Petitioners from Section 8 based on any of the allegations on which she was terminated, and attorney’s fees and such other further relief as the court may issue. Pet., Prayer.

On March 29, 2024, the court denied Wright’s ex parte application for a stay of HACLA’s decision.

On April 5, 2024, the court granted Wright’s renewed ex parte application for a stay of HACLA’s decision.

California courts employ a liberal approach to amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action. Nestle v. Santa Monica, (‘Nestle”) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Morgan v. Superior Court, (“Morgan”) (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530. Pursuant to this liberal policy, requests for leave to amend will normally be granted unless (a) the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the court, and (b) the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted. Hirsa v. Superior Court, (“Hirsa”) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490. Absent a showing of prejudice, a delay in seeking an amendment alone does not justify denial of leave to amend. Higgins v. Del Faro, (“Higgins”) (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-65. Moreover, where the plaintiff is the party seeking leave to amend, mere proximity to the trial date, absent any prejudice, does not constitute ground for denial if the plaintiff is amenable to a continuance of the trial date. Mesler v. Bragg Mgt. Co., (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 297.

The reason for a liberal policy is that if a plaintiff has a good cause of action, which by accident or mistake he has failed to set out in his complaint, the court should permit him to amend. Higgins, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at 564-65. Hence, where an amendment provides merely the addition of matters essential to make the original cause of action complete, effecting no change in the nature of the case and thus causing no surprise or prejudice to the adverse party, the amendment should be allowed by the court. Id., at 565.

A motion to amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading; (2) be serially numbered to differentiate the amendment from previous amendments; and (3) state the page, line number, and wording of any proposed interlineation or deletion of allegations or material. CRC 3.1324(a). The motion shall be accompanied by a separate declaration specifying the effect of the amendment, why it is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to it were discovered, and the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. CRC 3.1324(b).

In ruling on a motion for leave to amend, a trial court will not normally consider the viability of the proposed amendments. Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court, (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048. The court, however, has discretion to deny an amendment that fails to state a cause of action or defense. Foxborough v. Van Atta, (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 230. The court also has discretion to deny “sham” amendments -- i.e., those that omit or contradict harmful facts alleged in the original pleading, unless sufficient excuse exists. Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co., (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692; Berman v. Bromberg, (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945-946 (sham amendment rule does not apply to change of legal theories).

Wright argues that, since the Petition was filed on March 27, 2024, she has determined that an amendment is necessary. The proposed amendment seeks to add and refine legal theories based on facts already pleaded, clarify other facts, and provide additional detail pertinent to the case. Specifically, the proposed amendment adds a second cause of action seeking policy changes under CCP section 1085.

The proposed FAP will ensure that all relevant issues are properly before the court. The facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered through ongoing review and analysis of the case following the filing of the Petition on March 27, 2024. Villagomez Decl., ¶4. This review process revealed the need for an additional cause of action and factual clarifications. Id. The request for amendment was not made earlier because the necessity for these changes became apparent only after thorough review and consideration of the Petition in the context of the developing case. Villagomez Decl., ¶5.

On June 27, 2024, Wright’s counsel provided HACLA's counsel with a copy of the proposed FAP. Villagomez Decl., ¶6. On the same date, HACLA's counsel informed Wright's counsel that HACLA would not stipulate to filing the proposed FAP. Villagomez Decl., ¶7.

As Wright argues, no prejudice will result from granting the motion as no trial date has been set. While the amendment will expand the scope of litigation, this is not a basis for denial of a motion for leave to amend. Defendants will suffer no prejudice.

The motion for leave to file the FAP is granted and the proposed FAP is ordered filed. HACLA need not file a new answer unless it wishes to do so.